

A COMPUTATIONAL STUDY OF TRANSITIVITY

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FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES

TANMOY BHATTACHARYA

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DECLARATION

Tanmoy Bhattacharya
Centre for Applied Linguistics
and Translation Studies,
University of Hyderabad.

This is to certify that I, Tanmoy Bhattacharya, have carried out the research embodied in the present thesis for the full period prescribed under Ph.D. ordinances of the University.

I declare to the best of my knowledge that no part of this thesis was earlier submitted for the award of research degree to any university.



(Prof Probal Dasgupta)

Supervisor

Prof.
Centre for A.L.T.S.
University of Hyderabad
HYDERABAD-500 134



(Tanmoy Bhattacharya)



Dean of the School

DEAN

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES

University of Hyderabad,

Hyderabad-500 134.



Head

Centre for ALTS

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that Tanmoy Bhattacharya worked under my supervision for the Ph.D. degree in Applied Linguistics. His thesis entitled *A Computational Study of Transitivity* represents his own independent work at the University of Hyderabad. This work has not been submitted to any other institution for the award of any other degree.



Hyderabad

Probal Dasgupta
Professor & Head
Centre for A.L.T.S.
University of Hyderabad

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To see that this piece gets written one day, five years ago Udaya Narayana Singh insisted that I join CALTS – in fact, he did **more**

he brought me back to linguistics as he has brought **linguistics** to countless others by bringing up and nurturing this excellent centre of learning where the brightest of ideas takes shape in the most informal of gatherings. At this **moment** of being **dismembered**, I realize – more than ever before – what I have been a **part of**.

The Hardware

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION	1 - 79
1.0 Where Clause Meets Film Theory	
1.1 Tracking a Shifting Scene	
1.2 New Vs. Old Information	
1.3 Asymmetry	
1.3.1 Trajector/ Landmark	
1.3.2 Topic/ Focus	
1.3.2.1 Topicalization	
1.3.2.2 Topic/Focus and Pragmatics	
1.3.3.3 Doubl-Strike	
1.3.3 AgrS/AgrO	
1.3.3.1 Predication	
1.3.4 VP-asymmetry	
1.3.4.1 Subjects are External	
1.4 Time and Staging, Scening, Event	
1.4.1 Tense, Aspect, Aksionsart	
1.4.2 Staging	
1.4.3 Scening	
1.4.4 Event	
1.5 The Lenin Question	
1.6 Organization of the Thesis	
CHAPTER II: TRANSITIVITY	80 -146
2.0 Introduction	
2.1 Salience	
2.1.1 Accomodation	
2.1.2 Salience in Photographs	
2.1.3 Salience and Prespositions	
2.2 Novelty Condition	
2.3 DRT	
2.4 An Algorithm	
2.5 Accomodation Revisited	
2.6 The Camera Angle View	
2.7 Transitivity	
2.7.1 Semantic/Pragmatic Transitivity	
2.7.2 Reduction of Transitivity	
2.7.3 Transitivity as an Inherent Feature	
2.7.4 Psycholinguistic Basis of Transitivity	
2.8 Syntactic Transitivity	
2.9 Computation of Transitivity	
2.9.1 Model-Driven Computation of Salience	
2.9.2 Mixed Mode Parsing	

- 3.0 **Introduction**
- 3.1 Trajector and Landmark Revisited
- 3.2 **Unergatives**
- 3.3 Ergativity
 - 3.3.1 **Split-Ergativity** in Hindi
 - 3.3.2 Problems with **Mahajan's** Account
 - 3.3.3 **Singh's** Problematic Solution
 - 3.3.4 Split-VP Hypothesis
 - 3.3.4.1 Shortest Movement
 - 3.3.4.2 Split-VP
 - 3.3.5 SVP for Hindi
- 3.4 **Unaccusatives**
 - 3.4.1 Object Agreement in Hindi
 - 3.4.1.1 Evidence for **Movement** to Spec-AgrO
 - 3.4.1.2 Object Agreement in Singh (1993)
 - 3.4.2 Revised OCP
 - 3.4.2.1 **Laka's** (1993) Revision of OCP
 - 3.4.2.2 OCP for Hindi
 - 3.4.3 The Ergativity Parameter
- 3.5 Long Distance Agreement
 - 3.5.1 The Data
 - 3.5.2 borer's Anaphoric Agr
 - 3.5.3 **Mahajan's** Account of Long Distance Agreement
 - 3.5.4 Singh (1993)
 - 3.5.5 Oar Analysis
- 3.6 Computability of AGRs

- 4.1 **Definiteness and** the Given/New Distinction
- 4.2 Uniqueness of Definites
- 4.3 **Classifiers and** Definiteness
 - 4.3.1 Classifiers as a **Cognitive/Formal** Category
 - 4.3.2 Classifiers in Bangla
 - 4.3.3 Definiteness of Classifiers
- 4.4 Gender and Class
 - 4.4.1 Case and Classifier
- 4.5 Badge in Bangla/Hindi
- 4.6 The Bangla DP
- 4.7 Spec-DP
 - 4.7.1 Genitive Classifier Structure
 - 4.7.2 Gerunds
- 4.8 **The Strength of B**
- 4.9 **Definiteness and Head Movement**
- 4.10 **Principle-Based Parsing**
 - 4.10.1 **PBP and the Bangla Classifier**
 - 4.10.2 **Computing Scenes**
 - 4.10.2.1 **Frames**
 - 4.10.3 **WISE**

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Where Clause Meets Film Theory

Béla Balazs, the Hungarian-born film theorist, put forward in the early 1930s , a rather strong hypothesis regarding subjective identification - a notoriously difficult theme in film theory, and art theory in general:

In the cinema, the camera carries the spectator into the film picture itself. We are seeing everything from the inside as it were ...

Thus the spectating activity itself involves a process of identification with, among other things, the camera -- a process producing a coincidence of the gaze of the spectator with that of the camera.

Within the context of films, Balazs¹ theory actually runs into problems since it presupposes a consistent and uncontradicted use of the subjective camera. It suits our purpose, however, to use a film-theoretic concept such as Balazs' initially as

1. But it was published only in 1972

a metaphor, to take an exploratory look at the ways a clause unfolds itself as a microcosm of the totality of the linguistic experience of the speaker/spectator.

Very soon, however, we abandon the **mere metaphoric** use of the concept of the camera and we launch the **camera** angle view as a theoretical construct in Chapter II where we also explore the crucial concept of the field of view of a sentence as it figures within the context of discourse. The image of a field seems to lend itself better to the entirety of the **organizational** logic of the kind of theory we advance.

For certain realist film theorists (**Bazin** (1967), **Kracauer** (1979) et al), the screen was taken to be a window through which one could see **reality**. Later versions of their paradigm, more focused on form, took it as a frame which organizes the visual space and within which the spectator's attention is directed to certain areas of this two-dimensional surface.

What we gain from interfacing with this version of screen **identification** is our discovery and (later) use of the notion of **staging/dramatization** involved in such a framing. Suspending the implicit politics (crucial to film theory people) of staging associated with such **presentations**, we obtain a crucial hold on

the interplay between the structure of a clause and its pragmatic underpinnings by the introduction of a concept of staging in linguistic theorization.

Lacanian theorists use the mirror as a metaphor for the proper characterization of the screen and suggest that identification with the camera be called primary (in contrast with the secondary identification with person-figures). For most French theorists this camera identification was central and thus the spectator identifies less with what is represented than with what stages the spectacle, brings it to visibility (Baudry 1986). In spite of the demetaphorization of the camera that we attempt later, it is still a far cry from a Lacanian concept of spectating where the spectator is supposed to identify him/herself on the screen. The dose of film theory we import into our attempt to understand the interplay of syntax and pragmatics in the context of a clause stops at the formalist tradition. We, however, appropriate the French theorists' emphasis on the centrality of the primary identification to the extent that we use staging as a conceptual tool for clausal analysis.

1.1 Tracking a Shifting Scene

Our understanding of major themes like transitivity (Chapter II), agreement (Chapter III) and classification (Chapter IV) that we take up in this study, needs to remain in touch throughout

with the **specific** task of the clause — which 'stages' events and, as a special case thereof, actions. The **fundamental** problem of this thesis is, therefore, to track a shifting scene down the lanes of a discourse so that connections available in the tacit knowledge of language users can be made explicit.

As we shall outline in detail in Chapter II, **computational** work on transitivity in effect involves looking at the ups and downs of "saliency" in a clause. There are both soft and hard options of evaluating saliency and thereby laying bare the anatomy of transitivity. Saliency shapes our route to the heart of the problem of clause structure. The problem as we pose it bears on the **familiar** issue of anaphoric search/ referential tracking. Our issue therefore becomes a **subproblem** of an item on the **mainstream** agenda.

When focusing on the recalcitrant core of this problem of anaphora resolution we see that anaphors send us back to potential antecedents exhibiting weaker or stronger degrees of resolution (in a what is nearly a visual sense of the **term**). The only efficient way to study strongly resolved and thus exactly defined vs. weakly resolved and thus diffuse nominal entities is to begin with a study of various formal asymmetries that give grammatical shape to **saliency differentials**. These themes converge

finally on a crucial opposition of natural language, that is of the new versus old information — the single most important concept that drives the present work. The new/old distinction operates in various guises throughout the body of this dissertation, one of which is the Novelty Familiarity Condition of Heim (1982) — discussed in connection with anaphora resolution within the context of a version of File-change semantics in Chapter II. The Novelty Condition in its barest form (which applies specifically to indefinites) looks like the following:

(1) Novelty Condition

An indefinite NP must not have the same referential index as any NP to its left

(1) implies that an indefinite must always carry a **new** referential index. The condition applies regardless of the distance between the two NPs as long as they occur in the same text/ discourse session. The Novelty Condition, for example, rules out a coindexation of the definite with the indefinite in (2) but does not apply in (3).

(2) *He likes the cat_i, and she hates a cat_i

(3) He likes a cat_i, and she hates the cat_i

(Heim 1982)

This is because an anaphoric reading of the definite is acceptable. We discuss the generalities of the new/old opposition in

A quick glance through the following section will clarify our **preoccupation** with the investigation of a **series** of asymmetric dyads like Topic/Focus, **Subject/Object** etc. collectively under the rubric of a basic **Trajector/Landmark** distinction. Implicit in such a strategy is that it obtains for us, with growing efficiency, a program for tracking a shifting scene within the discursive context. These asymmetries, we hope to show, advance our understanding of the new/old distinction at each level in the **life-span** of a clause in a discourse. The new/old opposition, therefore, is for us a tool for tracking down the **modalities/behaviour** of a scene.

NP to NP connections, as an unrevised Novelty Condition **might** suggest, however, are not an efficient way to do the tracking. Many of the NPs such a procedure would need are not available in the text. Why should NP to NP tracking not be the game to pursue? We believe that the answer lies in the way **linkages** between sentences are established. A linking of, for example, **S1, S2, S3, ... Sn** is established by the clumping together of situations. For example, in (4) below *such gestures* is a clump expression which refers to **all** of the previous sentence and not

just a part of it.

- (4) John welcomed the cat back home, such gestures will make Felix happy

There is no way of telling by looking just at the NP *such gestures* that it encodes within its meaning the whole of the preceding sentence. In case of deictic pronouns also it is not just one NP that is hidden somewhere in the earlier text, rather, a general clumping takes place.

1.2 New versus Old Information

We mentioned in the previous section that a proper understanding of the new/old opposition through various asymmetries (reflexive of resolution differentials) is the major underlying objective of this study. In fact, the computational claims of this dissertation become valid in light of the present attempt to clearly state the status of new/old information within the overall structuring of scenes in a discourse.

Mainstream linguistics has for most part refused this topic a theoretical status save some salient exceptions like Vilem Mathesius and Jan Firbas . Researchers in the field of AI on the other hand have picked it up in a big way to explain a number of

1.Firbas (1966) and Mathesius (1967) as quoted in Chafe (1970)

important linguistic facts.

In any speaker/hearer exchange **there** are regularly some **items** of information which are new - **information** exchanged between the speaker/hearer pair for the first time. It is also the case that some of the **information** is typically old ; shared information -- either already uttered or of common knowledge about the world. Consider the following:

- (5)a. The blouse **is** red
- b. The blouse was red

(5a) **might** be used in a **context** of having encountered a blouse where the new information that the blouse is red is added. In (5b), primarily because of the tense, it is likely that the blouse was, **in** some past **time**, already an established object of which a new information that it was red is being communicated at the **time** of the utterance of (5b). In a **model like** that of Chafe's (1970) where sentences are a complex **configuration** of semantic units, we note that a repetition is hereby committed in stating that **red** is now in both a and b. A suitably **modified** Novelty Condition which includes generic indefinites in its range can give a **straightforward** analysis in terms of the new/old dyad

1. In connection with the Prague School theory of **markedness** it is often stated that no more than 17% new information should be encoded for **communication** to succeed.

in addition to the fact that definite **always** encodes old **information**.

As we mentioned earlier, **this** new/old distinction underlies most of the other dyads we investigate **like Topic/Comment**, Subject/Object, etc. For Chafe (1970) **new** is a **specification** added to a particular semantic unit within a verb or a noun, not to the whole verb or noun. This also provides a way of **distinguishing** certain **mechanisms** that have to do with new/old **information**. In English one often encounters an intonation where a reasonably flat contour generally carries the old information and items carrying any new information are **generally** spoken with higher pitch. A higher pitch and amplitude are tools used for highlighting. **We** make use of this phonological concept later in section 1.3.2.3 to **theoretically** construct the property of double-strike related to focus **constructions**. In (5), the new information is given the highest pitch. The correspondence, however, should be thought of only as approximate.

Our contention that asymmetries only serve to obtain for us a pattern of distribution of new/old information, becomes firmer when we see that in (6) below the asymmetry within VP that we point out in section 1.3.4 is exhibited in terms of the fact that in (at least) marked sentences only the verb contains new infor-

mat ion.

- (6)a. It is raining
- b. The glass broke
- c. The child cried

In **all** these sentences the verb marks the new information, the single noun, wherever present (b,c), carries old information.

With more than one noun per sentence, the situation, however, **changes**:

- (7)a. The blouse **is in** the closet
- b. Floyd broke the glass

In (7), new information is associated with the final noun which also carries the highest pitch. Chafe (1970) points out that to understand the **meanings** of these sentences fully would imply ascribing newness to the verbs as well although the latter are not given **high** pitch. From this, he constructs a hierarchy for **the** assignment of a feature **like** new, consisting of location, patient, beneficiary, and agent. There will be only one noun per sentence which is *not* new and this noun will be (looking at the hierarchy from the other side):

- **the** agent if there is one
- the beneficiary if there is one without an agent

- the **patient** if there is one **without** either an agent or a beneficiary
- the **patient** if there is also a location

Given the word order in English, Chafe derives a left/right asymmetry from this where it can be seen that new information is on the left whereas the old information is contained only within the one noun which is farthest to the right.

An alternate space where the new/old distinction is of equally crucial **importance** is in the realm of the pragmatic/semantic conditions that determine the choice between a definite and an indefinite NP. Christopherson (1939) identified **the** function of **definiteness** as the signaling of an NP with which the audience is already **familiar** at the current stage of the conversation. An indefinite NP **is** used to signal a unfamiliar or **novel** referent. Familiarity theories of definiteness staged revivals in various forms in linguistics and Artificial Intelligence research but the interest diminished when the thesis of reference as a basic function was questioned. Karttunen (1968) proposed **his** "discourse referents" (further details provided in Chapter II) to be the bearers of **novelty/familiarity** properties and thus succeeded in disengaging familiarity from reference. Heim (1982) introduced the construct of "file cards" which achieved a similar dissociation between familiarity and reference.

The Novelty Condition as stated in (1) **is** different from traditional familiarity theories of definiteness in the sense that **indefiniteness** is a sufficient condition for novelty, but is not a necessary one. A deictic use of a pronoun, for example, is a case of a novel definite. Heim (1982) revises (1) to make indefinites necessary as well when conversation is viewed as a file-keeping activity. In her file-change semantics, the Novelty Condition translates into the following:

- (8) For every indefinite, start a new card; for every definite, update a suitable old card

Let us see what (8) exactly means in Heim's theory and how it relates to novelty versus familiarity with respect to the logical form .

Heim defines truth of a file in terms of a recursive assignment of satisfaction conditions to formulas based on a Tarski notation. Satisfaction is a relation between an infinite sequence of individuals on the one hand and **formulas** on the other and is always relative to a model. A model for English is a pair

1. LF for Heim is a **disambiguated** extensional representation which resembles LF of REST as **well** as the analysis trees in Montague grammar.

$\langle A, \text{Ext} \rangle$ where A is a set of individuals and Ext is a function which assigns an extension to any predicate of **English** so that, if ϕ is an n -place predicate, then $\text{Ext}(\phi) \subseteq A_1 \times A_2 \dots \times A_n$.

We want the rules of semantic interpretation to assign satisfaction conditions to formulas of **LF**. For a given formula ϕ the rules should tell us which sequences satisfy ϕ with respect to a particular model. That is, rules of **interpretation** should define the relation $x \text{ sat}_{A, \text{Ext}} y$ to be read as "x satisfies y wrt $\langle A, \text{Ext} \rangle$."

Once files are defined in terms of satisfaction sets, it is rather difficult to know either the actuality or the quantity of the cards they contain. For this reason Heim defines the *domain* of a file. But first, to determine the truth of a file, we need to find a set of individuals that satisfies it. A sequence fits if the first member fits Card 1 and so on. For example for the **conversations** in (9), in file F there are two cards with the entries as in (10).

- (9)a. A woman was bitten by a dog
 b. She hit him with a paddle
 c. It broke in half
 d. The dog ran away

(10) Card 1 : "is a woman", "was bitten by 2"

Card 2 : "is a dog". "bit 1"

Now consider the sequence a_N with the following members:

- (11) a_1 : is a woman
 a_2 : is a dog
 a_2 bit a_1 ,

a_N as a set satisfies F. Any segment whose first member is not a woman or whose second member is not a dog or whose second member did not bite the first member, would fail to satisfy F. At least one segment has to be consistent for the file to be true.

Various stages of the conversation are as follows:

- (12) F_0 : before anything has been said
 F_1 : after (9a) is uttered

F_4 : after (9d) is uttered


Notice that $F_0 - F_4$ are different files. Satisfaction sets of segments for each of these files are as follows;

- (13) F_0 : A (set of all segments whatsoever)
 F_1 : { a_N : a_1 is a woman, a_2 is a dog, and a_2 bit a_1 }
 F_2 : { a_N : a_1 is a woman, a_2 is a dog, a_3 is a paddle,
 a_2 bit a_1 , and a_1 hit a_2 with a_3 }

Heim (1982) calls the sets (on the right) "satisfaction sets" and indicates them as $Sat(F_0)$, $Sat(F_1)$, $Sat(F_2)$, etc.

The LF corresponding to (9) is as follows:

(14)



(Heim 1982: 279)

S in (14) here is the LF of (9b); we can calculate the satisfaction condition as follows;

(15) $a_N \text{ Sat } S$ iff a_3 is a paddle and a_1 hit a_2 with

With this, the change from F_1 to F_2 is stated as:

1. In order to include intersentential anaphoric resolution, Heim considers expressions larger than sentences, namely, texts and a rule of Text Formulation says:

Attach a sequence of S^S under a T -node

2. A rule of existential closure adjoins a quantifier to the nuclear scope of every quantifier and indefinites are quantified expressions for Heim. The indices indicate binding possibilities.

$$(16) \text{ Sat } (F_2) = \text{ Sat } (F_1) \wedge \{a_N: a_N \text{ Sat } S^b\}$$

In general, a satisfaction condition relates to **file-changes** as **follows**:

$$(17) S(F') = \text{ Sat } (F) \wedge \{a_N: a_N \text{ Sat } 4\}$$

where \wedge is the LF of S and F/F' are files that obtain before and after a particular utterance.

Now, the inability to identify and determine the number of cards in a particular satisfaction set of a file prompts Heim to propose the notion of the *domain* of a file. The domain of F, $\text{Dom}(F)$, is the set that contains every number which is the number of some card in F. For example, in relation to (9), the following are the domains of files F_1 and F_2 .

$$(18) \text{ Dom } (F_1) = \{1,2\}$$

$$\text{Dom } (F_2) = \{1,2,3\}$$

Addition of a new card (as mentioned in (8)) can now be stated as **follows**:

(19) The change from F to F' involves the addition of a card number i iff $i \in \text{Dom } (F)$ and $i \in \text{Dom } (F')$.

Now **novelty/functionality** is defined as follows:

- (20) An NP is *novel* with respect to a file if its index $i \notin \text{Dom}(F)$ and is *familiar* with respect to F if $i \in \text{DOB}(F)$.

Let us now see how **deixis** interacts with familiarity. Neither a deictic use nor an anaphoric use is possible with indefinites. That is, both deictic and anaphoric references are familiar to the audience. In terms of the file this is taken care of by some already existing file card. But what about familiarity due to contextual salience? Heim assumes that even such NPs are represented by a file-card. This implies that a file must be able to add a new card without anything being altered. For us this means what is contextually salient must be somehow reflected computationally. The algorithm designed should be able to be sensitive to any changes in the context of a conversation.

Heim's example is that of a dog walking in the Diddle of a conversation. The state till then is F and suppose 7 is the index of the dog such that $7 \in \text{Dom}(F)$. Then F' , the new file, will be: $\text{Dom}(F') = \text{Dom}(F) \cup \{7\}$. Suppose now at F' one of the participants, say A , says *It is going to bite*. It here will then carry the referential index 7. F' will then become F'' where the satisfaction set is:

$$\text{Sat}(F'') = \{a_N: a_N \in \text{Sat}(F') \text{ and } a_7 \text{ is going to bite}\}$$

The reference of *it* therefore, is deictically determined and represents the contextually salient dog.

This prompts Heim to conclude that an NP can be novel with respect to the LF and yet be familiar with respect to the file. This leads her to propose the revised Novelty Condition as a Novelty-Familiarity-Condition:

- (21) Suppose something is uttered under the reading represented by *i*, and the file prior to the utterance is *F*. Then for every NP_i in \mathcal{D} , it must be the case that: $iEDom(F)$ if NP_i is definite, and $iEDom(F)$ if NP_i is indefinite. Otherwise, the utterance is not felicitous under this reading.

As we show in Chapter II, it is possible to integrate this aspect of contextual saliency in a Kamp/Heim model effectively by introducing the theoretical construct of a *field* (of vision) which is based on our film theoretic import into linguistics of a camera angle view. With such a move, we will note that it is possible then to record (in a photographic sense) the world of a sentence before its utterance based on the context of the conversation till then or in other words, the current states of the file.

1.3 Asymmetries

We mentioned in section 1.2 that the new/old opposition approximately derives a left/right asymmetry for the trajectory/

landmark dyads under scrutiny. For & distinction like Topic/Focus, we expect that salience (which **motivates** the study of transitivity) would play a role in terms of redefining or reinterpreting various interactions between the Topic/Focus opposition and salience since both are, to **some** extent, matters of pragmatic functioning . For an opposition like subject/object one would not expect such interactions to take place. That is, we would expect that **subject/object** should work **independently**. But this is not the case; subject/object reorient themselves in a fashion **similar** to the other dyads and participate in a right grammar versus left grammar opposition to the same extent. Externality of subject is a major force in such **participation**. More importantly, this alignment of the **subject/object** opposition with the Topic/Focus opposition unwinds the basic A/A' distinction that forms the basis of much **preminimalism** work. Whether this is desirable is not very clear at this stage but as we note in Chapter III, it is, **nevertheless**, possible to derive a typology of positions (in terms of actually-L-related positions) if we adopt a version of the checking theory which stands to gain from a **computational** approach to the study of gaps and **fillers**.

We mentioned earlier that if our goal is to track a shifting scene down the lanes of discourse, the nearest station for us is one at which a coarticulation of the various asymmetries that a clause display both within and outside the clause becomes possi-

ble. In short, asymmetries serve to create *fluorescent* zones for the tracking of a scene to proceed efficiently.

A crucial claim of this chapter is that the asymmetry displayed at the Topic/Focus opposition leaves its shadow all over the clause. In other words, the basic asymmetric pattern is maintained throughout the body of the clause. In fact, only through such repetitive patterns can an efficient tracking take place. We will see later how this asymmetry becomes important for staging to occur. Tracking also makes use of, as we stated earlier, a strong/weak distinction of resolution valency in terms of increasing/decreasing salience. This will result from a better understanding of the asymmetric system around the clause.

In this connection, let us consider the Larsonian asymmetry that works in terms of pervasive one-way c-command. Larson (1988) showed that the underlined NPs in the following double object constructions are in the domain of the first NP but not vice-versa:

(22) John sent Mary a letter

(23) I promised Felix a new set of golf clubs


(Larson 1988)

Barss and Lasnik (1986) (as cited in Larson 1988) point out the

problems with available structure for the double object construction. The Chomsky (1981) structure is as follows:



Between NP1 and NP2 in (24a). there is no formal asymmetry here; thus this structure goes against the spirit of double object construction phenomena. In (24b) below, on the other hand, although there exists an asymmetry between the two NPs whereby NP1 is in the domain of NP2 (and not vice-versa), the picture is still at cross-purposes with facts.



Larson suggests the following derivation for (23):

(25)a. John [_{VP} a letter [_{V'} sent to **Mary**]]

↑—————↓


b. John sent [_{VP} a letter [_{V'} t to Mary]]

In (25) the indirect object *Mary* becomes the derived VP "subject" and the direct object *a letter* receives an adjunct status within V. Larson's **position**, therefore, is that for a VP with V-NP-NP structure, the first NP c-commands the second NP but not vice-

versa. Larson (1988) would posit (26b) as the structure for the sentence in (26a).

(26)a. John gave a book to Mary

(26)b.



Although Larson's proposal makes VP-recursion possible as a result of asymmetric c-command, it nonetheless relaxes the condition for the externality of the subject.

This is the essence of asymmetric c-command. We can extend this notion to state that there are an infinite number of Vs with two NPs asymmetrically c-commanding each other. This also shows, for us, that the subject/object asymmetry pervades all others like Topic/Focus etc.

Conceptually asymmetry makes room **for** the appearance **of** recursive strings. Recursion **for our purposes**, as **we shall**

demonstrate later, is a matter of discovering of the embedding of scenes within scenes. Only verbs, we will see, can perform this stitching or at least, the crucial or important stitches. Recursion in Chomsky is through a rule schema like **XP** \longrightarrow **XP S** where **X=N,P,A** but not **V**. Dasgupta (p.c.) as part of the lexology enterprise¹ suggests that in fact, **VP** \longrightarrow **V S** is the prototypical device for **recursion**. Only **Vs**, in their typical function as predicate builders, in any case, can indefinitely extend a sentence structure and underwrite the infinity of sentences.

One motivation for the **asymmetries** that we discuss — all **asymmetries** — comes from Kayne's (1994) version of the arrow of time concept. Kayne shows that asymmetric c-command is similar to the dominance relation since both are locally linear. He attempts a closer parallel between the two by assuming an abstract root node **A** that **asymmetrically** c-commands every other node like a real root node which dominates all other nodes. Kayne shows that the terminal **a** associated with **A** is the abstract initial terminal and consequently a pair like $\langle x, y \rangle$ would mean '**x precedes y**'. Such a reading of $\langle x, y \rangle$ implies **specifier-head-complement** word ordering. The string of terminals in Kayne is are thought of as associated with a string of time slots. This,

1. For a very first introduction see Dasgupta (forthcoming) in *Linguistic Analysis*.

by **itself**, does not induce **asymmetry**. **Kayne**, therefore, claims that what is paired with each **time** slot is the substring produced till that time. That is, a **set** of terminals like **abcdz** is **mapped** to a set of substrings as follows:

$$(27) \text{ a, ab, abc, abcd, abcdz}$$

(27) above begins to show the roots of the **asymmetry**. Elaborating further, let us consider t_a , t_b , t_c , t_d , and t_z as the time slots associated with each of the terminals. The assumption in (27) would then result in the following:

$$(28) \text{ } t_a = a, t_b = ab, t_c = abc, t_d = abcd, t_z = abcdz$$

or

$$t_n = S(P_n)_n$$

where $S(P)$ is a set of terminals preceding n .

Note that in (28) from t_a to t_z , the set of strings expands and becomes more and more inclusive. In other words, $t_{n-1} < t_n$ or by (28), $S(P_{n-1})_{n-1} < S(P_n)_n$. A little reflection here would suggest that $S(P_n)_n$ is a bigger "space" than $S(P_{n-1})_{n-1}$. That is, the coverage increases as time progresses. With this, we think the well-known asymmetry between time and space can be approached. Given that both space and time are essential categories of our experience and cognition, an expression of space is optional but it is unavoidable in case of time. This asymmetry

takes a specific shape in Kayne's approach to time and word order. The word order of spec-head-comp is a fallout of the "x precedes y" reading of $\langle x, y \rangle$ which in turn is a result of the asymmetry in time.

Conceptually, the very nature of time (its property of progression) imposes the asymmetry - it is inherently asymmetrical. Approximating a simplification, this would mean for current time t_n there is no way to control or manipulate a chunk of time prior to t_n , namely, the set $t_1 \dots t_{n-1}$. The fundamental spirit of Kayne's LCA, we think, is that this sequence is equivalent to the set $S = s(P_1)1 + s(P_2)2 + \dots + s(P_{n-1})n-1$. That is, a sequence of temporality relates to a sequence of spatiality (word order). For our purpose, we conclude from this that the motivation of all asymmetries may well be time given that the latter (unlike nearly all other categories) is asymmetric by definition.

1.3.1 Trajector/ Landmark

We start our discussion with the trajector/landmark distinction since we make use of these functional terms as archi-concepts which underwrite all the major asymmetries to be found in a clause.

Langacker (1983) in his elaboration of space grammar makes

use of certain **dichotomies** like figure versus ground and trajector versus landmark to account for the cognitive **system** we arrive at as we try to understand natural language. Although it is **beyond** the scope of the present work to explicate the Motivation for his Cognitive Grammar **implementation** of such a programme, it is nonetheless useful for us to investigate how such notions in general, and a modified form of the **trajector/landmark** dichotomy in particular, may be bent to serve our ends in the context of a **juxtaposition** of the dichotomy between Topic and Focus on the one hand and that between Subject and Object on the other.

We begin, of course, by situating the terms in their Cognitive Grammar habitat. Langacker proposes that meaning and grammar involve elaborate hierarchies of **figure/ground relationships**. The **profile/base**, **subject/object**, and **head/modifier** distinctions are treated as **instantiating** a **figure/ground** distinction. The figure within a scene (scene being **Langacker's term** for a situation, in terms of images created to structure a conceived situation – the key to the meaning of an expression in **Langacker's** theory) is a substructure perceived as standing out from the rest, which is the ground, and is given special salience as the crucial entity around which the scene is organized and for which it provides a setting. The predicate for Langacker is the semantic pole of a morpheme and acts as the basic building block of cognitive functioning.

The grammatical category that **most** closely Batches Langacker's **semantic characteristic** of "**thing**" is the noun. "Relation" is a basic semantic property which describes the **grammatical** categories of verbs, adjectives, adverbs and **prepositions**. There are two sorts of basic relations — (i) processes (verbs), which potentially or actually trace the evolution of a process through time, and (ii) stative relations (adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions) which do not.

The **trajector/landmark** distinction is a fundamental organizing principle for relational predicates and underlies the subject/object distinction. The trajector is the figure within a relational profile . It suggests motion although it applies with equal appropriateness in the case of stative predicates as well. The landmark is the point of reference for locating the trajector the most salient entity other than the trajector itself. According to **Langacker**, and crucially for us, the location of a relationship reduces to the location of its **participants**. In our scheme of things, in relation to the discussion in Chapters I and

1. **Profile/Base** is another dichotomy crucially employed in **Cognitive Grammar** where the Base for a semantic predication is its necessary context and the profile is that substructure within the Base that the predication designates. The semantic value of an expression is a relation between the two.

II, this would translate into the location of transitivity (a relation) involving the location of the various participants in that relation – most crucially, subjects and objects. This locating activity is **morpho-syntactically** registered by the devices of agreement – the topic chapter III.

The participants in a relation are **all** profiled. Consider the following for this purpose:




In (29) e1 and e2 are two entities and e3 is the **interconnection** between them. For (29) to be seen as a relation, the participants get "**prof**i.ed" as follows:



Note: Profile is indicated by boldface in (30) and elsewhere

In case it is perceived as a "thing", e3 is not important which then approximates to zero and only e1 and e2 are profiled "collectively" to indicate the unitariness of a **nominal** predication. This is shown in (31). Notice that the **interconnection** in a nominal predicate diminishes both in terms of magnitude (it

approaches zero) and **prominence** or salience (its non-profiled status).



A relational predication focuses on interconnections and profiles the cognitive events in which the conceptualization of these interconnections resides. The prominence of these events requires giving prominence to the entities involved in the relation. A relational predicate therefore profiles two or more entities in addition to the operation connecting them.

For our purposes, we note that **trajector/landmark** is a special case of the **figure/ground** relation and **subject/object** is a special case of the **trajector/landmark** distinction. Trajector/landmark gives us a conceptually satisfactory tool to relate the subject/ object distinction to other dichotomies.

1.3.2 Topic/ Focus

We stated earlier that the specific task of a clause is to present actions and events. One place where this becomes grammatically significant is the position of the clausal topic. The Topic position **traditionally** is even more external than the

subject, in a sense that one cannot express in **terms** of notions operative in any serious theory *cf* grammar. This is because there is **discontinuity** between the **L-related** positions of (inner) object and (outer) subject and the **non-L-related** position of (very very outer) Topic. In other words, there is no **formulable** continuum of inner-outer on which Topics are outermost, objects innermost, and subjects in between. Rather, the foil to Topic is the notion of Focus, which too involves a non-L-related position. Their non-L-related nature is responsible for lack of a flow of energy between these two (unlike in case **subject/object**) and the lack of interaction with aspect.

In spite of these differences, there are connections between what we might tentatively — and without attaching significance to these descriptive labels — call subjectology and topicology. For it is clear, from earlier literature, that topics too like subjects have comments predicated of them. Elements in Topic positions like *wh* constituents in Bavarian display an agreement triggering capability. For such cases, Shlonsky (1991) suggested that CP be split between two functional positions: CP and AgrCP. The latter is an agreement projection belonging to the CP system. This splitting follows **from** Rizzi (1990) where certain

1. Consequently we discuss this in further detail in Chapter III

complementizers like *qui* are endowed with **agreement features**. Shlonsky's is a structural implementation of the same idea. Specifically the structure that he proposes is the following:



AgrC in (32) may contain **agreement** features or certain types of **complementizers** as in the case of Palestinian Arabic *illi* 'who' which captures the fact that *illi* occurs only in **RCs**:

- (33) I-bint illi Mona saafat-*(-a)
 the-girl that Mona saw-(her)
 'the girl that Mona saw'

Spec-CP in (32) is an A' position that operators move to whereas Spec-AgrCP may be an A (when AgrC has **agreement** features) or an A' position. From this we can conjecture that every XP has an overt/covert) AgrXP which in collusion with the former obtains all the agreement facts at XP. Our contention is that topics are similar to subjects in this connection.

Further evidence for the thematic connections between subjectology and topicology comes from the fact that only the lexical head exhibiting **transitivity**, namely V, can support the **paraphernalia enabling** topics and foci to appear. They cannot,

for **example**, occur on the periphery of a small clause built around an AP. Finite **INFL** allows a Topic sore easily than a nonfinite one. There is obviously then some connection between a strong **INFL** and the appearance of topic. Let us look at the process of topicalization to understand this better.

1.3.2.1 Topicalization

Chomsky (1977) points out a parallelism between a topicalization and a left dislocation construction:

- (34)a. John, I like t
 b. John, I like him

The topic in both a. and b. therefore, he proposes, is base-generated in Topic position under S' :



The difference between (34a) and (34b) is accounted for by showing that whereas (34a) involves movement of a VH-operator to **COMP** (later deleted), (34b) involves no such movement. **Chomsky** further suggests the rules in (37) based on embedded topicalization examples like (36).

(36) I think that the house, you should see t

Here the topic follows the COMP of the embedded clause and consequently we have (37a) revised in (37b) based on Chomsky (1986a).

(37)a. S'--> COMP S"

b. C'--> COMP TOPP

Combining (35) and (37), Chomsky suggests that what undergoes movement is an **empty** operator. The structure of (36) would therefore be:

(38) [_{IP} I think [_{CP} that [_{TOPP} this house [_{CP}^(VH) [_{IP} you
should see t]]]]]

However, Baltin (1982) (as cited in Lasnik and Saito (1992)) pointed out cases of embedded **topicalization** where embedded left dislocation is not possible:

(39)a. the **man** to whom liberty we could never grant

b.* the man to whom **liberty**, we could never grant it

Baltin proposes that (39b) involves a base-generated topic whereas **topicalization** as in (39a) involves adjunction to S. Lasnik and Saito (1992) show that embedded topicalization necessarily involves IP-adjunction and that matrix **topicalization** can involve either movement to Spec, CP (as in Chomsky) or **IP-adjunction**. We

note, however, that C carries **finiteness** features and therefore **topicalization** as a **movement** to **Spec,CP** can establish the **link** between **finiteness** and **topicalization** that we observed earlier. This, we believe, is true for at least the matrix topicalization cases.

Watanabe (1993), however, demonstrates that the **topicalization** in English is movement to **Spec,CP**, including embedded topicalization cases. He looks at the interaction of CP recursion with factive predicates and argues for a Larsonian analysis of CP recursion. He claims that CP recursion is created by substitution movement of C .

We **already** have a case of CP recursion in (38) as also in the following:

(40) John said [_{CP} that [_{CP} this book, [_{AgrSP} Mary should have read]]]

(Watanabe 1993:121)

An adjunction analysis, as is Baltin (1982) or Lasnik and Saito (1992), or even a modified one in Pesetsky (1989) (cited in Watanabe 1993), is problematic under a checking theory. The checking relation between AgrS and Topic is not clear since AgrS is already responsible for checking off Nominative Case features.

There is no such problem in the CP substitution analysis. Topicalization results if an additional CP, whose head has a feature to be matched with a Topic, is also present.

The CP substitution analysis is motivated in **Watanabe** (1993) by this notion of clause types:

(41) Clause Types

There are only two types of clauses to be selected by a V, namely, **wh-clauses** and **non-wh-clauses**. The former are characterized by the presence of a wh-phrase in Spec of the topmost CP. The latter are characterized by empty Spec of the topmost CP.

(Vatanabe 1993: 130)

By (41) factive complements like (42) will have a structure like (43).

(42) John regrets that he fired Mary

(43) John regrets [_{CP} that [_{CP} Op [_{Agr-sp} he fired Mary]]]

The **topmost Spec,CP** is empty since factives are non-wh clauses. Accordingly the inability of factive complements to undergo topicalization is explained.

To link (41) to the proposal in minimalism that a strong Operator feature in C prompts overt raising, we need only add that not only a **wh-clause** has a wh-phrase in its topmost **Spec,CP**, it must also have a strong Op feature in the C head.

We conclude from this section that topicalization therefore

is a case of movement to Spec, CP which is expected given the link between topicalization and **finiteness** that we pointed out earlier.

1.3.2.2 The **Pragmatics** of Topic/Focus

We stated earlier that **nonfinite** clauses do not undergo **topicalization**. Focus, however, can **appear** with nonfinites. The foil of Topic is Focus which appears only with verbs. For example, PPs do not carry focus. Focus has theta-properties and is related to the NP bearing the theme role of the clause. Theme/**patient** is somehow connected with action. The initiator/**agent** looks like an element slightly outside what one needs to know in trying to understand an action.

Although the position of Focus in a clause is not clearly understood, preverbal positioning of it seems to be able to explain a range of facts (like the stress on wh-words in most languages of India). Schaufele's (199C) preverbal focus sits at the (finite) Tense node. Schaufele challenges the Principles and Parameters approach of treating topicalization as a case of **movement** of an XP category. He shows that in Vedic Sanskrit lexical **topicalization** takes place prompting a bar-0 A' node called TOPIC to the **left** of S. The **structure** of (44) is as in (45).

(44) **manah_i** ha vai devaah I **VP** [**NP** **manuSyàasya e_i**]
 mind-A **Prtcl** gods-N man-gen


aa-jaananti

know-3p pres

'The gods knew the minds of **man**'

(Schaufele 1990)

(45)



He also suggests that TOPIC be treated as a **quasi-comp** node having its own spec position to allow for whole phrase **topicalization**.

Schäufele's (1990) contributions to the understanding of the pragmatic aspects of topicalization is noteworthy. The pragmatic connotations of the process lead Schaunfele to consider **topicalization** as taking place at LF as well since that is where pragmatic **interpretations** might be thought of as taking place. In Vedic Sanskrit, topicalization **generally** performs the task of highlighting as in the following:

(46) RSibhyah ca eva enam etat devabhyah ca
 Rishi-Dual ?I Prtcl 3scl-A so gods-Dual and

 ni-vedayah
 introduce-3s pres
 'So he introduces him to the RSis and to the gods

Schaufele identifies the following **pragmatic** functions of topicalization:

- (1) **Stage-setting:** This is surprisingly similar to our proposal (to be elaborated later in section 1.4) of staging that we claim acts as the site where the pragmatic range (including deixis) of the clause is decided.
- (2) **Central concept:** Another function of **topicalization** is to restate a concept that has already been identified as central to the discussion. A subtype of this function, as Schaufele states, is the fronting of a word co-referential or otherwise related to the one in the immediately preceding clause that identifies the central concept.
- (3) **Focusing:** This is identified as the third **important** function of **topicalization**. It takes the form of highlighting of new information. This is important for our purpose since it relates to our concerns regarding new/old information. It also underpins a certain construal of the status of Focus in relation to the Topic in a clause. Schaufele drawing on his earlier work proposes the preverbal positioning of Focus.

All these functions listed above are useful handles for us to build our thesis of Staging/Scening/Event in section 1.4. Repetition/recall of the central concept as a function of topicalization coupled with Focus as new information leads naturally into our hypothesis of "double strike" that we develop in the

next section.

1.3.2.3 "Double Strike"

We elaborate the issue of **FOCUS** as it relates to our proposal of double strike. In our discussion of asymmetry in section 1.3 we claimed that the basic asymmetrical relation is preserved throughout the clausal structure which leads to the **identification** of new/old information. The Topic/Focus asymmetry is the biggest of the clause-structural asymmetries. However, the Topic/Focus asymmetry is a relatively free agent in the sense that there is no independent demarcation involving Case (as in the case of AgrS/AgrO) or theta roles (as in the case of the VP-internal asymmetry) imposing a specific shape on the asymmetry. Topic and Focus, we observe, count as the two ends of the functional foliage (as opposed to the VP trunk) of the **sentence** and thus encode the distribution of new/old information. **One** of the functions of topicalization is rephrasing, as we saw in the previous section, of information already known, while focusing is a matter of emphasizing **new** information. We shall sharpen these functions as follows. Topic, for us, is a point at which the clause weakly re-emphasizes old knowledge, while focus emphatically presents new material. Our theory of double strike is based on the role of emphasis and reemphasis in the making of Topic/Focus. We propose to **formalize** this role in terms of a

copy relation, in the spirit of other **elements** of the **minimalism package**.

Jayaseelan (**forthcoming**) situates the focus functional head **F** **below** AgroP and **above** VP; and thus an empirical argument in favour of this specific position for **FOCUS** is made available for the first time. He suggests that **F** assigns phonological prominence and other semantic (focal) **characteristics** to its specifier. Dasgupta (p.c., in consultation with Jayaseelan) builds upon this to further suggest that for Gricean reasons, we can limit the work of **F** to the assignment of just prominence to its specifier, leaving **it** to Gricean pragmatics to let the semantics follow from such phonology. Dasgupta adds (p.c.) a suggestion, which we adopt, that **F** does the syntactic job of the matching of its specifier **Spec,F** and some segment of the VP, and that its phonological job (assigning prominence, as Jayaseelan) can be seen as manifesting this. Specifically we claim that **Spec,F** contains a copy of the relevant segment of the VP, and the VP copy moves to and merges with the **Spec.F** copy, producing a merged, doubled, emphatic constituent the way the computer printer's double strike device produces boldface output. Following Dasgupta (p.c), we adopt this metaphor and speak of **Spec,F** as a

1. For example, normal volume assumptions lead loudness to be heard as encoding emphasis

site where such a double strike is **requires** by F — as the **formal** property **defining** its F-ness.

Spec, TOP as we understand it represents some context whether it is (in the **manner** of **Spec, F**) mimicking (and thus double striking) some segment or not is left open. In *JOHN I like* it assigns stress to *John* and thus, in this case, double strikes a segment of the VP. Therefore, in **this** instance, the topic site resembles **FOCUS** in its function.

In Gueron (1984) something similar is worked out. She proposes a **decomposition** analysis of **topicalized** constituents at LF to account for the **coreference** in structures containing topicalized elements like the following:

(47)a. Near him, John saw a snake

b.*Near John, he saw a snake

(Lakoff 1968 cited in Gueron 1988)

In her earlier works, Gueron had suggested a **reconstruction** at LF which brings back a moved constituent to its trace position. Preposed constituents were analyzed as in LF as either Focus or Topic of S. A Focus constituent is reconstructed in the position of its trace by rule (48)

- (48) **FOCUS** rule : In the structure X," [_S...e_i...], move X_i ' to the position of its trace at LF

If reconstruction does not take place, the fronted constituent is interpreted as a Topic of S.

- (49) **TOPIC** rule : In the configuration X" [_S N?....], X" is Topic of S.

But such a solution is problematic because it assumes that subcategorized constituents count as **FOCUS** when **preposed**, while non-subcategorized constituents count as **TOPIC**. This does not hold for (50), where the fronted constituent is subcategorized yet by the **TOPIC** rule (49) it is to be counted as **TOPIC**.

- (50) The article John just wrote, he thinks Mary likes.

Fourier (1980) (cited in Guéron 1984) suggested a decomposition of preposed wh-constituents into restrictive (wh; NP or PP complements of X) and non-restrictive (lexical elements, S' complements of X) and proposed that only the restrictive part of the preposed element be subjected to the c-command rule. This is also shown to be problematic for **some** cases.

Guéron's 1984 proposal retains the idea that the Focus of S is needed for coreference in general and in **topicalized** structures in particular. Preposed constituents are divided into two parts where one part is identified as a Focus of S and the re-

mainder is the Top c. She also assumes that the Focus constituent contains the head of the topicalized phrase. Therefore, the Focus constituent is the one which undergoes reconstruction at LF.

Following Chomsky (1976) Focus is defined to be a syntactic constituent which is interpreted as an iota operator at the level of LF; it picks out one element from a background set. This is shown in (51).

(51)a. John_i e_i I like e.

b. John = x x ∈ {M} I like x (where M is the set of humans)

(Guéron 1984:152)

The focus operator is marked by prominent stress. She suggests that in English, a topicalized constituent is construed both as a Topic and Focus of S. Then Topic fills a double semantic function. Since the rule of predication applies, Topic must denote an individual. The F operator selects one **individual/entity** from a background set of appropriate elements. There is no contradiction therefore if Focus selects the same individual for prominence as did in the Topic.

The double semantic function of the topmost constituent is explicated as follows. Following Chomsky (1977) Guéron assumes that the Top is coindexed with an empty element in COMP. **Guéron**

identifies this **empty element** as a Focus operator. The predication rule coindexes the Topic and the operator which infuses lexical content to the operator so that now it can be seen as an **argument**. The topicalization now nondistinct from the operator is **reconstructed** at LF. The steps in the derivation are illustrated below:

(52)a. John we like

b. S-structure:

John_i e_i we like e.

TOPIC FOCUS

c. Output of predication rule:

John_i e. we like e •

TOPIC FOCUS

d. Output of **reconstruction**:

John: e. we like John_i

This sense of similarity of Topic/Focus as in (52c) above is incorporated in our double strike hypothesis.

In Gueron (1984) something **like** this is worked out, ie, there **are** contexts where **TOPIC=FOCUS**. But in Gueron a **position** for FOCUS is not worked out **or**, to be precise, her account does not need a position.

The F project: on therefore reduces to hosting a copy of part o. the VP. In the case of the Topic, we might, for all practical purposes (modulo the detail that if C and TOP are separate then C is higher up and consequently Spec,TOP is not the leftmost), consider its Spec as the leftmost. And TOP, as we **said** represents part of the context — where context is a term broad enough to allow for the possibility of occasionally being a part of the VP also. In other words, TOP leaves us free to pick up an **item** from the previous context or a part of the VP. Importing the pragmatics of the FOCUS operation, we might then say that, in such instances, the Spec,TOP also undergoes double strike. Spec,F, as we noted earlier, is always a double strike position. From this we conclude that the property that Gueron talked is best formalized in our account as the property of double strike.

We see, then, that a formalism for double strike is worth developing; the notion that an emphasized item is present in two locations is **thematically** well-founded and deserves to be turned into an **operationally** explicit account. Now, Minimalism is **all** set for such a venture, being a framework that uses the exact duplicate mechanism for various (especially movement created A-bar) **dependencies**.

The contextuality of the copy story can be seen from **the**


formulation of the copying theory of reconstruction that animalism constructs, where syntax can be thought of as keeping n. track of what is happening in the body of the sentence through these copies.

With the assumption of copy theory of movement (Chomsky 1995), a two-element chain is a pair $\langle a, fi \rangle$ where $a = 6$. Consider the following derivation:

(53)a.



b.



If K, L are sets denoting objects in (a) and (b) respectively then $K = \{\beta, \{\beta, a\}\}$ and $L = \{\beta, \{a, K\}\}$. Let us consider two of the terms of L t_1 and t_2 where t_1 is the term of L such that $L = \{\beta, \{t_1, K\}\}$ and t_2 is the term of L such that $K = \{\beta, \{\beta, t_2\}\}$. Here, $r_1 = r_2 = a$. We obtain the pair $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle = \langle a, a \rangle$ which is the chain $CH = \langle a, \text{trace}(a) \rangle$. A copy theory of movement therefore determines a chain unambiguously. In short, the copy relation is significant.

To sum up, the Jayaseelan proposal as amplified by Dasgupta concludes that **Spec,F** always is and **Spec,TOP** may be a copy of the

VP.

There is one formal problem with this **mechanism**. In fact, this is one of the main problems that has precluded the **development** of a precise account of TOPIC/FOCUS grammar in earlier work. The theory presented so far warrants not only both of the following:

(54) John, I like (TOPIC **construction**)

(55) I like PIZZA (FOCUS **construction**)

but also, **overgenerously**,

(56)*To JOHN, I give the PIZZA¹

both positions in (56) being effectively available for FOCUS. But as we see, such double focal pointing is in fact not allowed. A **straightforward** reason could be pragmatic. If the TOPIC/FOCUS strategy is believed to result in a presentation of unique information, then two-site focusing is **pragmatically** incoherent. To see it more clearly, consider (57):

(57) JOHN, I **like**

The problem seems to be a clash of the **positional/functional**

1. Notice that we are not discussing here the notion of contrastive stress/Focus.

property. *John* is an old (topical) position but constitutes a new (focal) point of the message. For our purpose, we can describe the **double** strike property, wherever it **may** occur, as FOCUS and the position just-before VP as F(ocus).

1.3.3 AgrS/ AgrO Asymmetry

The basic asymmetry, as we have repeatedly pointed out, is preserved throughout. This is true of the subject/object asymmetry as well. It is this asymmetry which keeps the **flow/transfer** of syntactic energy from the **subject** to the object going. In the clause structure this is reflected to some extent in terms of the AgrS/AgrO asymmetry. **We can call** this AgrS/AgrO asymmetry an intermediate asymmetry which is visible in terms of Case marking activities that AgrS/AgrO partake in.

A lot of the empirical interest of the findings of the parametric tradition in the period of its classical successes lay in the discovery of the novel phenomenon of subject-object asymmetry. It was quickly shown that this asymmetry in general was best **handled** as a special case of a more general **complement-noncomplement** asymmetry. Such an inclusion implies that subjects count as elements that are arguments in the sense of receiving a **theta-role** from the verbal complex but are **noncomplements** in the sense that the verb does not, by Case marking or other means, **morphologically** license their appearing where they do at S-struct-

ture. In short, a **subject** is an external argument. We discuss the notion further in section 1.3.4.1 in detail. Most of the discussion here will also carry over to section 1.3.4 where we discuss an asymmetry deeper inside the clause.

Accounts that make too much of the NP-VP isomorphism push the burden of **responsibility** for these **differences** onto the shoulders of one of the following:

- (i) a process of predication occurring only in clauses **and** effectively making the clausal subject **obligatory**
- (ii) the specific nature of the functional head (call it AgrS) of the shell **housing** the subject of the **clause**, in contrast to a functional head of the D type
- (iii) specific nature of the lexical head V which, by virtue of its transitivity borne directly by V or indirectly by some functional head (call it, following Muraugi's **implementation** outlined in Chapter 2, Tr for **Transitivity**) that mediates, ends up associated with effects like **Predication**, AgrS, or whatever makes the clausal subject tick.

These ways of spelling out the agenda correspond to issues of transitivity and agreement. We take predication to be a part of agreement in as much as it underwrites the AgrS-AgrO (subject-object) asymmetry, to which we now turn.

1.3.3.1 **Predication**

The externality of the subject is a requirement **for** predication to take place. This is achieved by closing syntactic predi-

cates off by linking to an appropriate syntactic argument. This appropriate argument for Rothstein (1985) is the **formal subject**. The rule of predicate linking is a condition on the well-formedness of syntactic strings and, therefore, is a formal requirement of the externality hypothesis. Both the clausal (58a) and the nonclausal (58b) predicates in the following are linked to subjects.

(58)a. *Mary saw John*

b. *Mary ate the carrot raw*

(Rothstein 1985)

A sentence is, therefore, a clausal predication relation. A particular XP becomes a predicate only if it can be closed off by an external argument. So the subject of an XP must be external to that XP. An external **argument** is an argument not **c-commanded** by the head of the XP. **APs**, **VPs**, and **PPs** must always be predicated of an argument, whereas an **NP** may be predicated of an argument, but it must be closed internally. **NPs**, therefore, can act as both arguments as well as predicates in this system.

As in Frege, Rothstein's predication is also a function, but different since it is devoid of any semantic **import**. According to Frege, a grammatical predication is a function expression denoting a function and it has certain properties common to all such expressions. In Fregean terms, a function is open or unsat-

urated which requires the empty place to be filled by an argument to be saturated. For example, in $2x^3$ the variable marks the place where the name of a number will be inserted to complete the expression. In (58a) above the VP predicate *saw Mary* requires an argument *John* to complete it. This is the case for syntactic predicates which are always monadic functions. Frege's grammatical predicates can be polyadic. In generative syntax, the counterpart to this type of predicate is the lexical head. Consequently, the theta-role information for such heads is deciphered from their lexical entries such as the following:

(59) **put**_{prep}: agent patient location

The structure of a syntactic predicate is determined by the formal rules of syntax. The following are examples of different lexical categories as predicates:

- (60)a. John [gave Mary the **book**]_{vp}
- b. Bill eats carrots [**raw**]_{AP}]_{vp}
- c. He [drinks tea [with sugar]_{pp}]_{yp}
- d. She [thinks him [a **fool**]_{NP}]_{vp}

(Rothstein 1985)

In (b-d) each of the embedded categories is itself predicated of an NP also within the VP. In (b,c) although the embedded XPs must have a structural subject they do not form a constituent unlike (a,d). The latter are called for this reason secondary predicates

(or **small** clauses) and the relation between **then** and their subjects, according to Rothstein, **secondary predication**.

As far as the building of a syntactic tree is concerned, however, the Fregean notion of Predication has been standardly assumed to be the operative one. In our discussion of the interaction of **subjectology** and **topicology** below, we will assume that the Fregean notion of Predication to be relevant in constructing **predicational** pairs of staging/ event and event/ **focus**. For Chomsky (1977) a preposed X' phrase is base-generated in TOPIC position and linked to S' by a rule of predication. As we develop our concerns we will say that the TOPIC position is one of the sites for "Staging" to take place. Staging, therefore, will be **assumed** to involve an implicit **predicational** relation.

1.3.4 VP Asymmetry

The subject/ object asymmetry manifested at the AgrS/AgrO dyad is associated with a further asymmetry within the VP. This is the innermost asymmetry. Both the AgrS/AgrO asymmetry and the intra-VP asymmetry act out the transitivity of a clause. We conjecture here that the **SIH** (**Split-INFL Hypothesis**) is an encoding of the subject/ object asymmetry which gives rise to the AgrS/AgrO dyad. Similarly the **Split-VP-Hypothesis** of Koizumi (1993) that we report and use for our analysis in Chapter III is, we claim, a result of the recognition of the asymmetry within the

VP.

As we stated in the previous section the subject/object asymmetry as manifested in terms of the AgrS/AgrO asymmetry shows itself as patterns of Case marking. In the case of the intra-VP **asymmetry**, it is captured through a split in theta-roles. This is the externality of subject hypothesis; that we will shortly look at. We may note here that the AgrS/AgrO asymmetry and the one inside VP overlap to a large extent. An intra-VP asymmetry appears in all versions of the VP-internal subject hypothesis, where a VP must find niches for all the arguments of the verb. This we saw to some extent in discussing the Larsonian recursive shell in section 1.3. The AgrS/AgrO asymmetry is therefore a result of the way movements out of the inner VP that occur for case reasons preserve the intra-VP asymmetry. With the advent of a checking theory of Case, the status of the intermediate asymmetry (AgrS/AgrO) has become **important**. ~~What~~ we are trying to say here is that ~~most~~ of the discussion found in section 1.3.3 is also valid for the present discussion.

1.3.4.1 Subject as an External Argument

The notion of "external" argument deserves attention. The Extended Projection Principle of Chomsky (1981) requires an NP in the [SPEC, IP] position. But the proponents of the VP-internal

subject hypothesis like Kuroda (1986), Kitagawa (1986) and others shift the crucial position (where an NP is required for EPP) to [SPEC,VP]. Borer (1986) (further discussion can be found in Chapter III), on the other hand, proposes that there is no one subject position. According to her, an IP **must** contain an NP coindexed with INFL called the "I-subject". The distinction that these two hypotheses emphasize does not obtain in a sentence like the following:

(61) Rohan saw Runu

In (61) the structural subject and the "I-subject" are identical. This identity is extended to cases of expletive subjects which are assumed to be in the Spec-IP position receiving Nominative from the INFL and forming a chain with an NP (the postverbal NP) to which it ends up transmitting the Case. Such a reading treats (61) and (62) alike in terms of both EPP and the I-subject hypothesis.

(62) There is a rabbit in the box

However, the externality of the subject is not just a matter of occurring outside the VP *in sensu stricto* at S-structure if minimalism turns S-structure into an intermediate station without significance, and if even objects must move to [SPEC,AGRo] to get licensed at LF for what are taken to be Case-theoretic reasons. The standard picture says that, in the VP-internal subject hy-

pothesis, the object is generated inside, as the closest sister of the V, while the subject is in the outer layer, serving in some theories as a Spec of VP. This picture has the virtue of handling well the ways in which the VP is like the NP, which too displays subject-object asymmetry. It has the drawback of making the clause look too much like the nominal.

As shown in LGB, there are some important empirical differences between the optional subject of a nominal and the mysteriously obligatory subject of a clause. In deciding between the following two possibilities for an S-rule, Chomsky (1981) shows that it is (63ii) that needs to be specified as the correct S-expansion rule for English.

(63)i. S → NP Tense VP
(NP) to VP

ii. S → NP INFL VP

The obligatoriness of the subject position in a clause in English is evidenced by sentences of the following type:

(64) *there* is a good reason for his refusal

The expletive *there* in (64) cannot be missing. Chomsky (1981) points out that the theory of government prohibits the occurrence of a PRO in this position. For some reason these sentences require a phonologically overt structural subject. This require-

ment does not derive from theta theory since *there* in (64) does not bear any **theta-role**. The verbB in such **constructions** also cannot be said to subcategorize for subjects. The **obligatory** presence of the subject seems to be a purely structural necessity that certain **configurations** – infinitives and gerunds – must have a **subject**. This requirement, Chomsky points out, **falls** out naturally if we assume the S rule in (63ii) above.

In the case of subjects bearing a theta-role, the Projection Principle derives the requirement but it leaves it open **us** to whether non-theta positions also must be represented at each level. The **obligatoriness** of the subject is determined in English by the Projection Principle given that a particular subject position is a **theta-position** but some other principles determine whether or not any given subject does indeed occupy a **theta-position**. Therefore, the fact that clauses with certain VPs (like *persuade John to leave*) must contain a subject at LF is a **theta-theoretical** requirement.

The picture however changes for non-clausal **NPs like** the following:

(65)a. My belief that there will be a good reason for his **refusal**

b. The belief that there **will** be a good reason for his **refusal**

(Chomsky 1981)

Chomsky points out a fundamental difference between N' and VP. The former does not obligatorily **theta-mark** even when its head noun is lexically specified as one capable of indirectly **theta-marking** a subject, whereas the VP does **obligatorily theta-mark** if its head has this property. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to say that the Projection Principle entails the presence of subjects where the head of the construction indirectly **theta-marks** a subject. Obligatory positions in this system are those determined either by the subcategorization frames of lexical items or by rule (63ii) above. If the VP has appropriate **properties** in these cases then the subject will be obligatorily **theta-marked**.

In case of NPs the subject may or **may not** be present. If the N has the property of indirectly **theta-marking** the subject then if an argument is present in the subject position at D-structure, then that argument is **theta-marked** at every syntactic level. If no subject argument appears, then no **theta-marking** takes place. This convention, according to Chomsky (1981), gives the required distinction, while permitting NP movement to S-structure subject position of an NP, not a theta-position, without violation of the theta-criterion. Whereas if we adopt a structural rule where the subject NP is optional, the required distinction is lost.

The **importance** of studying the intra-VP **asymmetry** is that internal V correlates with external T just as the **intra-VP asymmetry** matches the AgrS/AgrO dyad. It is in this context that the fundamental **categorical** difference between verbs and nouns/adjectives becomes apparent. The latter categories nourish only one Agr whereas verb is unique in always supporting two Agrs. This defines the verb and assumes that only a verb can directly construct a scene.

1.4 Time and Staging, **Scening**, Event

In this section we hope to provide an overall picture of the notion of clause that we have in mind. This notion obtains as a result of the interaction between the asymmetric dyads which provide the bones and the concepts of Staging, **Scening** and event which lend thematic flesh to the clause. The asymmetries serve to provide, as we mentioned earlier, fluorescent highlights for staging etc. to take place.

This fleshing out of a clause in a process that runs parallel to the temporal drama that unfolds as we move deeper into the clause from Tense to Aspect to Aktionsart. This sequence then stretches from a deictic notion (Tns) to a specific property of the lexical item (Akt). That is, if the Tense is deictic then aspect can associate a specific picture with a (lexically) given

Akt ionsart.

1.4.1 Tense, Aspect, **Aktionsart**

Conventionally temporality is exhibited in three different ways (Klein 1994).

- (i) the time of some event, action, process etc. which is related to some other **time** interval (Temporal reference or Tense)
- (ii) the temporal course of an event, action, process etc. which is viewed/ presented in different ways (Aspect)
- (iii) verbs classified according to their inherent temporal features (Aktionsart)

Tense relates to some time span, especially to the time of utterance. Some event, for example, temporally precedes the time of utterance (past) or it follows the time of utterance (future), or it overlaps the time of utterance (present). Tns as well as adverbials may be used to express temporal reference. Tns is always deictic.

Aspect deals with different perspectives which a speaker can take with regard to the temporal course of some event, action, process etc. That is, the speaker may consider it as completed, on-going etc. This view is independent of the time on the time axis. Originally aspect was tied to a morphological difference

between perfective and **imperfective** forms in Slavonic languages (Klein 1994). The later, more **generalized** content of **aspectual** notions has lent itself to many uses. For our purposes, we note one point from aspect theory – the point that an action starts at the subject and ends at the object. This is where aspect theory intersects with the thematic or **pretheoretical** concepts that we begin to sharpen in this section.

To start with we note that there are various factors that interweave at aspect. We may consider a two point scale covering certain properties of aspect: compact and diffuse. Compact aspect will handle **telic** objects, especially a definite object, whereas diffuse aspect obtains when there is no object present or only an irresolute one. In the latter case the transitivity becomes low (detailed discussion can be found in Chapter II on the theme of calculating **transitivity**).

Compact and diffuse aspect so **distinguished**, we note, **interacts** with our construct of Scening. One may speculate that the proper embedding of compact versus diffuse aspect within a scene is a matter of economy. The relevant notion of economy may be expected to develop as the study of degrees of resolution of scene components progresses beyond its present programmatic **phase**.

Also note that a strong aspect supports an **unmarked** or typical overt object — as in the case of compact aspect — and provides the usual cornerstones for our prototypical transitive clause nucleus. The strength of aspect is determined by presumably many dimensions of aspect resolution one of which is the **telic/nontelic** distinction. Aspect strength is also a **pragmatic/discourse** criterion for calculating the transitivity of a clause along the Hopper and Thompson (1980) scale of pragmatic parameters. This is discussed in detail in Chapter II.


The temporal properties of the lexical contents of verbs differ in terms of **durativity**, **inchoativity**, **iterativity** and **stativity** etc. (Klein 1994). Verbs can, therefore, be grouped into classes whose members denote events, actions, processes, states etc. The membership of a verb in such classes is commonly called its **Aktionsart**.

1.4.2 Staging

From the discussion so **far**, it is clear that temporality can not be ignored and therefore we need an anchorage in time. We take it that Tense carries out such anchoring. As we stated earlier, Tense is deictic at the clausal level. To say that what the clause presents "has taken place before" is to indicate or refer to a previous time. Tense, we therefore claim, does the

job of referring to time.

We further claim that tense is present at two **places** in the clause: COMP and T(ense), the heads of the maximal projections CP and TP **respectively**. This gives us the following:



The T in Comp is illocutionary (and therefore T_{illo}) and the T in the head of TP is structural (so T_{stru}). T in Comp handles what we propose to call staging. The highest Comp of a sentence provides "absolute" deictic properties for the sentence as an illocution proper. Staging is a way of putting the clause in some picture — that is, to sponsor it vis-a-vis some audience for which it can perform, and this is done by setting up the deixis of the sentence through the T in Comp. Every non-root Comp provides "relative" deixis at its T, reaching the external world via **all** the upstairs Comps, which are so many pictures the clause must perform within. At the root T-in-Comp, "**all** the world's a stage". Our notion of "staging" is thus neutral between root and non-root Comps. We are also using "illocution" in a way that treats an embedded Comp as a relativized illocution site.

The illocutionary T in **Comp** which stages the clause, then, also communicates with the structural T located at the head of TP in order to construct properly the illocutionary stage for the clause. Staging proper is a matter of root illocution but it remains active throughout the body of the clause. Further down, at the location of the **AgrS\AgrO asymmetric** zone, transitivity shows up, we claim, as an effect of a weaker counterpart of staging that is active in the **AgrS/T/AgrO** area. This view supports our earlier contention that the asymmetries define the route through which staging etc. can initiate and travel down the clause. These illuminated islands manifesting a transmission of asymmetry provide a route down which the shadows of staging can be pursued. One function of the asymmetries, we mentioned earlier, is to facilitate staging. Transmitted asymmetry serves also as the observation arena where the increase/decrease in **salience** is determined which interacts with staging to yield the forces of **deixis** (and **transitivity**) active in the clause.

If topicalization is a movement to **Spec,CP** and if staging is at C, then topics cannot be independent of the act of staging. This is exactly what is borne out as one of the typical functions of a topicalized element. We claim that illocutionary T in **Comp** which drives the staging, controls the degree of resolution of the topic in **Spec,CP**. **Pretheoretically**, only a strong T in C

seems to support a topic at all. We shall take the position that a strong (finite indicative) T in C alone has the option of supporting an overt topic; otherwise we get Huang's covert topic or the ubiquitous trivial null topic. The topic-comment asymmetry is the **fundamental** stage prop; it reflects the work of staging as a matter of bringing the new (Comment) to bear on the given (previous text or context) via the mediation at the topic site. And a strong C can afford the occasional luxury of a high-resolution version of this asymmetry by opting for an overt, distinct topic.

1.4.3 Scening

Scening, we claim, is an entity different from staging both in terms of its function as well as location. We propose that NP slots are organized as roles in scenes nucleated at verbs • . Scening, therefore, continuing the work of staging, reaches down the illuminated highway of asymmetries to the verb where weakly and strongly resolved NPs are situated. Notice that this is another motivation for studying transitivity. If transitivity is

1. This is what we suggested earlier by saying that only verbs can construct a scene.


2. This also bears upon the Lexology project of Dasgupta (forthcoming), in the sense that this establishes the quintessential lexologic tenet: sentences are new, words are old. Verbs, note, are the crucial device in the business of building new sentences from old words.

defined in terms of staging, **scening** and event then a study of the phenomenon would lead to a better understanding of these fundamental concepts which seem to be the crucial forces behind a clause. Scenes, as we said, are constructed with NP roles and exhibit a particular distribution of high/low resolution. This is achieved by a hierarchy within the typology of possible scenings. Therefore, we claim that scening can be strong or weak. Strong scening results in an independent scene. **Weak** scening, we claim, results in dependent scenes. Through the latter one fills out the picture. It is as if that part of the clause (or discourse) where dependent scenes are born, is saying "embed me in another sentence (or scene)". Strong scening, however, is **pragmatically** responsible. In other words, it can stand all by itself as a separate speech act. A strong scening accepts full **responsibility** for answering queries on how the given/new deal is negotiated or implemented.

In order to now decide on the syntactic location of scening, we invoke the clause structure proposed by Polllock (1993). He claims, gathering evidence from historical facts, that the loss of overt main verb raising to the pre-Neg functional position in English is a consequence of the loss of **morphologically** manifested mood distinctions between the indicative and the subjunctive. Based on such historical facts he suggests a projection MoodP

above the TP projection for English and French as follows:

(67)



In the synchronic grammar of English we find evidence for this proposal from Laka (1990). We note with him, that Mood distinctions are also expressed in English through modal auxiliaries like *will*, *way*, *can*, etc. Keeping this in mind we represent Pollock's MoodP as ModP -- a move made in Roy (1995) for an analysis of Bangla negation. Laka points out the following paradigm for a variety of Southern American English:

- (68) Can you do that
'You can do that'

According to Laka, NPIs in this variety can be licensed at the subject position -- a possibility not realized in standard English -- only if negation cliticizes on the **modal**:

- (69) Can't anybody do that
'**Nobody** can do that'

For his purpose, **L** *ka* assumes a position higher than the **Comp** for **modals**. This variety of English, therefore is another evidence for a topmost projection of **ModP** in English.

The clause structure proposed by Pollock (1993) implies that the **modal** system is somewhere outside the prototypical clause structure, that is, outside the IP structure. This is borne out by the fact that when a language chooses to reduce its tense distinctions the system shrinks into the non-future subsystem, that is, the future is separate from the other tenses and moods in the tense system of a language. Let us say, the future does not fully participate in the tense system. Now consider the fact that imperative and subjunctive mood constructions resist topicalization. The situation is somewhat as follows:

(70)	<u>Mood</u>	<u>Overt Topic Possible</u>
	Indicative	YES
	Subjunctive Imperative	NO
	Infinitive	OF COURSE NOT

Also notice the fact that even in richly inflected languages imperatives (like the **pragmatically** parallel vocatives) resist inflection as well. We conjecture that imperative's very weak inflection or **subjunctive's** weak inflection needs to establish Mood-to-staging contact to get its bearings straight — a contact

that can not take place across a topic. This results in the above categorization (70). Infinitives are then just an extreme case of dependent scenehood.

We suggest from this that it is at M(ood/ode) where the actual decision regarding the strength/weakness of scening takes place. The topic/focus possibilities open up whenever the M (itself) is strong. In the case of both subjunctive/imperative and infinitives, any weakness in M results in the lack of Topic, hence the hierarchy in (70). This strong/weak distinction of M is reflected in strong/weak scening since the former decides the identification possibilities.

In short, what we have suggested so far, reduces to the following:

- (71) Staging decides the scene to scene constructions/connections through an illuminated highway of asymmetries and scening decides the modalities of each individual scene already structured at COMP through staging.

4.1.4 Event

Event is the last of the tools to drive down such a highway as the one depicted in (71) in order to understand the clause/

discourse-structure better through an inspection of **transitivity**. It is thanks to the parametric revolution of Pollock (19e9) and others leading to the **Split-INFL** hypothesis and then to **minimalism**, that we can make better sense of the **INFL** system both empirically (Pollock/ Chomsky/ **Mahajan**) and conceptually (Higginbotham on Infl/ Davidson on event linkage). Owing to earlier formal semantic work, we can deal with the event system, that is, with clauses more efficiently/ fruitfully than we can with the scenings associated at the Mood level.

Davidson (1967) suggests that in all action sentences — at least all the indicative ones -- there is a **quantification** over events. Consider (72) below:

(72) John kicked Sam

Kick in (72) is not a two-place predicate but a three place relation between *John*, **Sam** and an event. The semantic representation of (72) above is (73).

(73) [$\exists x$: x is an event) kicked (John, Sam, x)

In **Higginbotham** (1985) the thematic grid of a verb like *see* is shown **as**:

(74) see, +V -N, <1,2,E>

In (74) the position E corresponds to the "hidden" argument place for events. Higginbotham extends this essential Davidsonian

concept of **states** as well and **pragmatically**. E in **Higginbotham**, corresponds to a bundle of objects called "**situations**". He locates E at **Inf1**.

The proposal of relating verbs to events and states is not new in philosophy. It is found in Port-Royal Logic. It receded somewhat in the background after Frege and Russell who considered it secondary. In Parsons (1990), verbs are taken to be more like common nouns (kinds) than proper nouns. The theory he proposes combines Panini and Davidson. The basic assumption is that sentences like (75) say something like (76).

(75) Caesar died.

(76) For some event e
 e is a dying, and
 the object of e is Caesar, and
 e culminates before now

(Parsons 1990:6)

In symbolic logic this is translated as the following:

(77) (3e) [Dying(e) & Object(e, Caesar) & culminate (e, before now)]
 ' ' ' '
 DEFAULT VERB VERB TENSE

A traditional logic-book analysis of the above sentence would give a formula as: D(c) where D represents *died* and c represents *Caesar*. A more refined formula is:

(78) $(\exists e)$ [Dying (e) and object (e,x)]

This proposal is not very different from (77) except that **the** latter fills in some details.

Tenses representing time in Parsons (1990) are shown with operators like PAST, PRESENT or FUTURE as in the following:

(79) Brutus stabbed Caesar

stabs

will stab

PAST($\exists e$)[stabbing(e)& subj(e,Brutus)& Obj(e,Caesar)& Cul(e)]

PRES

FUT

This move of Parsons' (1990) combined with a present day translation of Higginbotham (1985) suggests that the event can be thought of as being located at *T*. At the level of interpretation, however this conflation is restricted. Thus, in the logical representation, event and tense are separately quantified. Notice that in Parsons, the event predicates all have *-ing* forms. This suggests that event, like staging and scening, is a process, different only in that it is probably more descriptive or nominal.

One final move that we may contribute is that if we believe Guasti's (1993) analysis of Romance Infinitives, then we may conclude (with Guasti) that event complements contain an **Agr**

projection. Although the notion of Event in Guasti differs from ours, we accept this conclusion and make the following moves. The presence of Agr in T (=Event), unlike Guasti, we say is a result of a linking established with an Agr projection. Now the M head, we conjecture, is in some way responsible for the Morphological appearance of the subject. If that is the case then we suggest that the M head has some way of linking on to the AgrS head as they, then jointly decide the subject properties. If we make this move then we are left with a possible link between the T head (where the Event resides) and the AgrO head. However, we can not, at this stage think of a concrete implementation of realizing the linking of M with AgrS and T with AgrO.

1.5 The Lenin Question

Pretheoretically, topicology is going to involve grammar and pragmatics, while subjectology seems to lend itself more consistently to grammatical treatment. Our approach is going to be computational. This is not to promise immediate (and thus shallow and unusable) results". Rather the role of the computational framework is to impose some order on our mix of grammar and pragmatics via the shape of an external requirement that needs to

1. The title of this subsection derives from the fact that Lenin had inherited from Chernyshevsky the crucial question "What is to be done ?".

be fulfilled. For the study of the clause in linguistics ~~first~~, if it ~~is~~ to be worth ~~anything~~, eventually converge with the study in psycholinguistics, in computational linguistics, and in philosophy, of the typical, sentential representation of an action or an event. Our purpose, then, is to pursue the linguistics of the clause, bearing in mind the need to ~~make~~ the account serve the broader purposes of a computational account -- relativizing linguistic theorizing to its non-linguistic use.

Transitivity, as we stated earlier, turns out to be a special case of topic-comment (subject-object and other trajector/landmark dyads) but studying it as a special case of the general dyad is beyond practical politics at present. The reason for this is that the nitty-gritt, of each study involves looking at specific grammatical landscapes. The landscape needed for the study of transitivity is inspectable but one needed for topic-comment is understudied and can emerge, if at ~~all~~, only after the present type of exercise on transitivity reaches a certain stage.

We propose to cross-breed this core work with thematic material on transitivity in Hopper-Thompson, Givón, Langacker and other functionalists whose thinking complements the structuralist achievements in the parametric tradition. Specifically, we cross-breed the grid given in the structuralists with the point mass specification provided by the functionalists who are worried

about degrees of definiteness/resolution/strength at what turns out to be each functional head (it is appropriate **that** it is the functionalists who turn out to be informative about what the structuralists call functional heads), at each Aspect, T, D, and we shall add in chapter IV, B.

This gets us to the point where we can at least figure out the prototypical simplex clauses with some confidence and map out an agenda for things to do on this basis. We have already outlined the main stories in this chapter, which have to do with the **trajectories/landmarks**, the ups and downs of givenness and newness interacting with constructs like **Staging, Scening** and **Event to play**" out the real world **manifestations** of a typical sentence.

The subplots are explicated in the following chapter. We first choose to explore the event. Hence the transitivity chapter. This lands us in a study of devices used in a language to show what is going on. Hence the agreement chapter. That takes us closer to the inner stories of D and B strength in **NPs**. Here we make new contributions based on the (to most readers) brand new mysteries of the Bangla classifier system, that is, the DP chapter where we hammer home the point about how functional head strength correlates with high resolution (here, nominal definiteness) and close the narrative of the thesis.

Such a study, we claim, is good for computational linguistics (even for NLP) and theoretical cognitive science where linguistics meets, Jackendoff style, the visual system and other forms of processing-organizing.

1.6 Organization of the Thesis

In this chapter, so far, we have elaborated the interconnections that obtain between various asymmetries and the given/new distinction. We further proposed the syntactic impact that such interconnections may have on concepts like Staging, Scening and Event which together define the consequences of a clause in the totality of a discourse. In this section, we outline the organization of the discussion presented in the rest of the dissertation.

In Chapter II we discuss the notion of transitivity to further demonstrate the connections between film-theoretic concepts and syntax proper by proposing to capture the transitivity of a clause through an evaluation of salience of the clause in terms of a modified version of the Discourse Representation Theory. This modification, in terms of a "Camera Angle View" and the notion of a *field*, we claim, will lead to a more efficient correspondence between the two major versions of DRT, that is, of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982). The crucial concept of *accommoda-*

tion is discussed in detail in this regard.

We present an algorithm in section 2.4 based on the Novelty Condition of Heim (section 2.2) and a modified DRT. This algorithm is shown to fall short in certain crucial respects and is, therefore, modified later in section 2.9.2. In this revised algorithm we attempt to integrate the two separate notions of transitivity — semantic/pragmatic transitivity and syntactic transitivity -- that we identify earlier (section 2.7), in terms of a mixed mode method of parsing. Thus, we show that, Hopper and Thompson's (1980) pragmatic parameters of transitivity and Murasugi's (1992) notion of syntactic transitivity can be effectively put to use to serve a common goal, that of computational efficiency.

In Chapter III we discuss the notion of agreement as much as it bears upon our agenda. Agreement for our purpose serves the goal of identifying the participants for evaluating syntactic transitivity and therefore, ultimately, salience — the major thrust of this project. We have earlier seen in this chapter that in our attempt to find an equivalence between the VP and the NP structure we need to take care of the network of agreement relations — in addition to other networks — of a clause to achieve the goal of equivalence. In short, agreement, therefore,

provides finer details in a **p**articular subrou:tine of an algorithm that we presented in the previous chapter.

The bulk of the chapter is devoted to the thesis that the object relation is more **i**mportant; we try to see this in the **l**ight of a more general term like *landmark*. The primacy of **t**he object was earlier (Chapter II section 2.7.4) shown to be prominent in child language and is also apparent when we try to expand our picture so that it includes unergatives and **u**naccusatives as well as dyadic verbs. In this chapter, unergative clauses are first shown (section 3.2) to consistently contain a deep object position. The following sections discuss ergatives, transitives **u**naccusatives to argue that all of them have an object at some level of derivation. This discussion also includes revisions of the **S**plit-VP Hypothesis and the **O**bligatory Case Parameter.

In section 3.5 we present our analysis of the phenomenon of long-distance agreement in Hindi, based on **W**atanabe's (1993) Three-Layered Case Theory and claim that the analysis has an advantage over existing analyses in terms of the data that it covers as also the **c**omputational edge that it packages. In our terms an (actually) **L-related** position can be detected if we **a**re able to track the different features like Fs (see section 3.5 and 3.6 for details) located/created during the derivation. This would then make our task of producing a list of the typology of

positions (in terms of the A/A' distinction, for example) easier. This, we claim, is the **computational** advantage of our theoretical **account**.

In Chapter IV the **phenomenon** of (Noun) **Classification** in Bangla (and Hindi, to some extent) is discussed in conjunction with our drive towards discovering newer asymmetries down the clause highway. The inner stories of strength resolution of B(adge) and D(eclension) are revealed in order to flesh out the relevant phrase picture as much as it contributes to the clause picture. **Definiteness**, in this connection, seems to correlate strongly with the new/given distinction (section 4.1). Thus, the classifier as a cognitive category and its definiteness import is presented in section 4.3.

Based on certain distinctions between Hindi and Bangla, we make a major claim regarding the typology of languages and propose that languages be classified as Gender languages and Class languages, Hindi and Bangla exhibiting the **characteristics** of each respectively. This distinction leads us to suggest certain differences between Hindi and Bangla DPs on the basis of the relative strengths of the B and the D head in each language.

In section 4.10 we discuss **Principle-Based Parsing (PBP)** in connection with the Bangla classifier system and show that a PBP approach along with a strong KB will give us the right results as far as the DPs in Bangla/Hindi are concerned. We propose (section 4.10.2.1) that **Frames** are phrase level computational variants of the thematic concept of **scening** which we claimed (section 1.4.3) determines the modality aspects of a clause and thus the parsing technique that we suggest enables a computation of scenes. Lastly (4.10.3), we propose a KB called **WISE** which solves certain residual problems of Bangla nominal syntax.

CHAPTER II

TRANSITIVITY

2.0 Introduction

If we buy Hopper and Thompson's (1980) Transitivity theory then transitivity is no longer a matter of mechanical **counting** of participant NPs but is rather a matter of a discourse-derived relationship which is stronger in proportion to the intensity of the event which the clause is reporting. This intensity, which Hopper and Thompson call "the degree of **Transitivity**" of the event is evaluated as an aggregate of a cluster of properties or parameters, each of which contribute in some fashion to the transitivity relationship.

These discourse parameters, which we will discuss in detail later, function in discourse to distinguish the "**more** salient, foregrounded, actions" (Hopper, 1983). Earlier, in 1977, **Fill**—**more** had proposed the notion of a "salience hierarchy" to pick out the true object, as opposed to the oblique, in connection with pairs like the following:

- (1) a. I hit Harry with the stick
- b. I hit the stick against Harry

Fillmore's **salience** hierarchy included properties like **humanness**, change of location or **state, definiteness**, and totality. In reworking such a hierarchy in Hopper and Thompson's **parameters**, it turns out that given two patient NPs in a clause, the one which is higher in "Individuation" or "Affectedness" will be selected as the object of the verb whereas the less individuated or affected one is relegated to the status of bearing oblique Case (Hopper and Thompson '980).

Our interest in this Transitivity theory lies in the fact that a **computational** measure of **transitivity**, following Hopper and Thompson, would not be a **simple** counting of participant NPs but a comparative *and* relative evaluation of these parameters. We can **imagine** designing a **system** whereby the transitivity of a clause can be determined on the basis of a scale where **these** parameters are arranged in their relative order of contributory potential. But this is getting into too much detail too soon.

2.1 Salience

Although Hopper and Thompson's set of **parameters** are **discourse-oriented**, the elaborations that they set forth (also Hopper, 1983) all involve clausal or sentential aspects. This is where, we think, the notion of salience cannot be totally abandoned. In inter-sentential discourse (and **semantics**) studies,

the notion of salience was **discussed**, at least as an elementary notion, in connection with the **problem** of reference of anaphoric **pronouns**. The **problem**, originally noticed by **Strawson** (1952) and **Geach** (1962), involves the two contradictory faces of anaphoric pronouns, like *it* in (2) below, picking up reference **from** their antecedents on the one hand, and Russell's (1919) contention that indefinites do not have reference, on the other.

(2) *A dog came in. It lay down under the table* (**Heim**, 1982)

It was **Kripke** (1977) who suggested a way out of this puzzle by proposing two types of reference: "speaker's reference" and "semantic reference". While Russell's indefinites can be subsumed under the latter, it is the former which decides the bound variable status of the anaphoric pronoun in (2) above. Speaker's reference depends on pragmatic rather than purely semantic factors. As **Heim** (1982) points out in her "file-change semantics" model, pronouns are capable of getting their reference by virtue of purely pragmatic factors such as an object's perceptual (or associative) *salience*. In fact, **Lewis** (1979) goes one step further in suggesting that a pronoun may refer to whatever object is **maximally** salient in the situation of the utterance whereby he **implies** that anaphoric pronouns are only a special case of this, as one method of raising the salience of an object is by producing a suitable utterance (**Heim**, 1982). This concept of salience

is more inclusive than Kripke's speaker's reference since it can account for the following utterances;

(3) a. A dog has been rummaging in the garbage can.

b. It has torn open **all** the plastic bags.

(Heim, 1982)

As Heim shows in her analysis, (3a) could have **been** uttered by someone who has not witnessed the event directly, but was **merely** inferring on the basis of an **after-effect**. Yet (3b) can be naturally uttered by the **same** speaker. In (3b) the pronoun *it* cannot be analyzed as picking up **speaker's** reference because there was **none**.

Heim argues that by Lewis' notion of salience however, the utterance of (3a) raises the salience of a particular dog – the dog that did the rummaging. Now in (3b), the anaphoric pronoun can easily refer to this most salient dog in the situation. However, **Lewis'** salience, Heim notes, **fails to correctly** interpret minimal pairs **like** the following:

(4) a. I dropped ten marbles and found all of them, except for one. It is probably under the sofa.

b. I dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them. It is probably under the sofa.

(Heim, 1982: 21)

By adopting **Heim's** notion of salience one can **imagine** that the first sentence of (4b) raises the salience of the tenth. Hissing marble. **Still**, the utterance does not **succeed** in raising the salience to such a degree that would **allow** the pronoun *it* in the subsequent utterance to refer to it. In contrast, the utterance of the first sentence in (4a) is capable of raising the salience of the object to a degree where the subsequent utterance of the pronoun is felicitous.

It can be concluded, therefore, that the **salience-shifting** potential of an utterance is a **matter** of how the utterance is encoded in terms of words. In answering the question: How exactly does wording influence the capacity of an utterance to raise an individual's salience, **Heim** (1982) proposes the following **generalization**:

A necessary condition of a sentence *S* to promote an object *X* to maximal salience is that *S* contain either an NP that **refers** to *X* or a singular indefinite NP whose predicate is true of *X*.

This revision can **now** distinguish between (4a) and (4b). In the former, the first sentence contains the indefinite *one* — to be read as "one of the **marbles**" which is true of the tenth Barbie, the referent of the subsequent pronoun. There is nothing in **the**

first sentence of (4b) which can, by the above **generalization**, raise the salience of the tenth marble.

2.1.1 **Accommodation**

In her discussion of novel **definites**, as in (5) and (6) below, **Heim** Bakes use of the notion of "**accommodation**" to render such **examples** felicitous which are otherwise unaccountable (that is become **infelicitous**) by her Extended Novelty Familiarity Condition [p369].

- (5) Watch out, the **dog**_i will **bite** you.
(**Immediate** situation use)

- (6) John read [a book about **Schubert**]_i and wrote to the author:.
(Associative anaphoric use)

(**Heim**, 1982: 371)

Accommodation, in terms of her kind of semantics, means **making** adjustments to a file by adding enough information to make a particular utterance felicitous. For instance, file change stops in case of (5) if no **accommodation** takes place. **Accommodation** would mean an addition of a new card i with an entry like: "is a **dog** somewhere close by". File change can now proceed.

When a new **file** card is introduced under **accommodation**, it **has** to be linked by **cross-references** to some already existing file cards. This is particularly relevant for (6), where a card

j is added with an entry **like**: "is author of i". That is, in pairing (book, author), the second **member** of the pair must have authored the first.

This concept of "cross-reference" (or "bridging" in psychological literature) in analyzing "**associative** anaphoric" uses as in (6) above, is carried over to other analogous **uses** (as in (5)) except that the role of "indirect antecedent" ("a book about Schubert" in (6)) is played by a contextually salient referent.

Accommodation, which is crucial for accounting for novel indefinites as well as certain **pronominal/non-pronominal** definites, therefore, to us looks like a matter of salience. For example, *the dog* in (5) **which** is visually or perceptually salient, already introduces a card i by the time the sentence is uttered. The utterance of (5) only "triggers" the **accommodation** whereupon a new card j is introduced that carries a cross-reference to i. On the basis of this we can introduce the following principle which takes care of such definites:

A: Accommodate whatever is salient in the context of the utterance.

Alternatively, by adopting **Stalnaker's** (1974) construct of speaker's **presupposition** as a set of possible worlds, we can replace

"context" above with **"possible** worlds". In fact we will extend Stalnaker's speaker's **presupposition** to include what we may call speaker's **pragmatic presupposition** or contextual **presupposition**. This is, in an extended sense, equivalent to **Heim's** "file" — the common ground for a context. The following passage from Stalnaker (1979) is relevant in this context:

If a goat walked into the **room**, it would **normally** be presupposed, from that point, that there was a goat in the **room**. And the fact that this was presupposed might be exploited in the **conversation**, as when someone asks, "how did *that* thing get in here?" assuming that others **will** know what he is talking about.

The discussion so far indicates that salience is an indispensable tool both in terms of:

- (i) sentential grammar where a concept like **Fillmore's** (1977) salience hierarchy **is** reworked within a broader framework of the discourse-parameters of transitivity of Hopper and Thompson (1980),

and,

- (ii) intersentential aspects of pronoun reference or **definite/indefinite** reference as in the frameworks presented by Lewis, **Kripke**, **Heim** and others.

It remains to be seen whether salience as a theoretical

construct can be **meaningfully** involved in a **computational** investigation of the sort we are **engaged** in. That this is indeed the case is our next topic of discussion.

2.1.2 **Salience** in Photographs

A group of computer scientists at the University of Massachusetts have **developed** an efficient technique for planning the generation of natural language texts that describe photographs of natural **scen@s** as processed by the **UMASS VISIONS** system. The texts follow the ordering that is imposed on the scene's objects by their visual salience. It is possible to find structural analogues to visual **salience** in other domains to build simple generation (or parsing) schemes based on **them**.

Avoiding the super-human fallacy, that is, requiring computers to operate **more** efficiently **than** humans themselves can do, McDonald & Conklin (1982) developed an expedient and computationally efficient, if "leaky", planning process which works by monitoring and attending to the user's questions.

The key to the planner's simplicity lies in its **making** use of the notion of "salience". Objects are introduced into the text according to their relative importance in the conceptual source of the text. The decision regarding which objects to

leave out is taken care of by **defining** a cut-off salience rating below which objects are ignored. The notion of salience needed for the task of production of short paragraphs describing photographs of houses is widely shared and people interpret what is important about a picture according to such a shared set of conventions involving the size and the centrality of objects shown as well as a knowledge of what is normal or expected in a given domain — a car parked in front of a rural house in India would be highly salient.

The salience ratings with which the objects in the visual **representation** of McDonald & Conklin's (1982) planner are annotated were derived **empirically** through extensive psychological testing of **human** objects, where subjects both rated the photographs on a zero to seven scale, and wrote short paragraphs describing the scenes. Given this data, the planning **algorithm** runs as **follows**:

- (1) The objects in the scene are placed in a list — Unused Salient Object List — in decreasing order of salience.
- (2) Objects are taken from the list in (1), packaged with selected properties and relations, and are sent to the **generator**.
- (3) This process is repeated until the list of objects is **exhausted**.

The generator uses **object-specific** rules to construct the text. Paragraphs thus generated on the basis of salience ratings were

shown to be effective in picking out which picture they correspond to from a different camera angle.

2.1.3 Salience and Prepositions

The McDonald & Conklin (1982) planners discussed above show how visual salience simplifies an otherwise complex operation of text generation. A related issue is that of how salience as a construct affects our use of prepositions in natural language. Herskovits (1986) considers salience as one of the fundamental properties (others being relevance, typicality, and tolerance) which influence the systematic behaviour of use of prepositions.

According to her, salience explains the direction of metonymic shifts. It may be obtained visually in connection with a given use of the objects or for some action performed within close association with the objects. This, to our mind, is a most standard description of transitivity. Traditionally, transitivity is understood as a global property of an entire clause such that an activity is carried over or transferred from an agent to a patient. One way, therefore, to measure salience is to look into transitivity in detail — a connection we have earlier pointed out and on which the argumentation in this chapter rests. But before we get into the issue of transitivity — which involves a much broader network of related concepts — let us first see what else Herskovits has to say about salience.

The first 'near **principle**' that she proposes, which activates certain synecdoches, is the **following**:

- (I) One can use a noun which basically denotes a whole to refer to the region occupied by a part of it that is typically salient.

Consider the following example:

- (7) A waiting line **at** the counter

In (7), a functionally salient part of the line, its head, should be **established** for the **line** itself. The phrase is **applicable** only if the head of the line, not any other part, is very close to the counter. Now consider (8).

- (8) The child in the back of the car

Here a **salient** interior is substituted for the whole reference object.

- (9) The cat is under the table

In (9), the cat is probably not under the legs of the table. *Table* here stands for the table top.

An object is "**typically**" salient because it abides by the social conventions in use. For example, (10) below is **unpragmatic** because typically the most **salient** important part of a cup is

containing part and (10) **uses** cap to refer to its **handle**.

(10) * He held the cup by putting two fingers through it

Herskovits has two corollaries for (I) above:

Corollary 1: One can use an NP which **basically** denotes **a** whole **object** to refer to the region occupied by a part of it that is typically visible.

Consider (11) and (12) in this connection.

(11) The rabbit is under the bush


(12) My house is on top of the **hill**

(11) does not mean that the rabbit is under the whole bush but under only part of it. Similarly, in (12), *house* refers to the visible part of the house alone.

Corollary 2: The geometric description applicable **may** be in the base of the object (that is. its area in contact with the ground plane).

(13) The house is above the apartment building


(13) depicts a situation like this:



Similarly, we have:

(14) The block is on the circle


(14) represents a diagram like the **following**:



Where *block* refers only to the base of the block, we do not even think of the metonymy involved in such expressions. Metonymy however does not apply in the following sentences because we are talking in terms of **two-dimensional** objects:

(15) • The rectangle is in the **line**

for a situation like the following:



Two other near principles that Herskovits (1986) proposes are the **following**:

1.) The **geometric** description applicable may be the projection of the **object** on the plane of infinity.

(16)a. The **morning** star is to the left of the church

(16a) will be true only of the appearance of the morning star and the church in the plane of view. This relates to **salience** since appearance is a salient aspect of one's experience of objects.

(III) The **geometric** description applicable may be in the projection of the object on the ground plane.

(16)b. The painting is to the right of the chair

(16b) may describe a situation like the following;



Although the painting is really higher than the chair, '**to the right**' is in fact true of the point **approximating** the chair and the projection of the painting on the ground. There is nothing unnatural about (16b) because horizontal coordinates stand out in our experience of objects.

Thus we see in **Herskovits' interdisciplinary** study of prepo-

sition in English (and this would appear to hold of other languages such as Hindi and Bangla as well) that salience refers to the kind of foregrounding of objects or object parts that arises in our interaction with and perception of our environment.

How does the account of salience presented so far relate to our principle A above where we viewed 'accommodation' necessarily in terms of incorporating salient objects from a contextually presupposed common ground/file? To answer the question we need to ascribe to "accommodation" a broader perspective than hitherto attempted.

2.2 Novelty Condition

In her File Change Semantics, Heim (1982) introduced the concept of file-keeping as a device, and later as a theoretical construct, to understand a dialogue or any piece of discourse. At any given point of conversation, a file contains all that has been conveyed so far. Files in her theory are introduced as an additional level of analysis to intervene between language and the world. Unlike other strictly grammar-internal levels of representation (e.g. logical form), files encode information from non-linguistic sources like perception, permanently stored knowledge, etc., along with information contributed by linguistic structures.

Suppose A is **uttering** the following text and B is trying to understand, that is B's task is to construct and update a file:

- (17) (a) A woman was bitten by a dog. (b) She hit him with a paddle. (c) It broke in half. (d) The dog ran away
(Heim, 1982: 275)

B's file, to start with, is empty (this concept is later qualified in the theory). After (17a), B takes two new **cards** and numbers them 1 and 2. On card 1, B writes "is a **woman**" and "was bitten by 2". On card 2, B writes, "is a dog" and "bit 1". Next, when A utters (17b), B takes another new card number 3 and writes "is a **paddle**" and "was used by 1 to hit 2". B **also**, at this point, updates card 1 by adding "hit 2 with 3". After utterance (17c), B updates card 3 by adding "broke in half". Then (17d) triggers a further addition on card 2: "ran away".

With this view of **conversation**, Heim points out that B is following the following principle:

- B: For every indefinite, start a new card; for every definite, update a suitable old card.

Heim's is not the first proposal to view **communication** as somehow analogous to **file-keeping**. Karttunen's (1976) "**discourse** **references**" also make use of a **file-keeping** concept. Around the same time as Heim, Kamp (1981) had proposed the concept of **Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs)** which together with Heim's files

came to be identified with Discourse **Representation** Theory (DRT)

2.3 Discourse **Representation** Theory

The motivation for DRT **comes** from the **following** goals:

- (18) a. giving a unified account of indefinite NPs
- b. giving a unified account of definite NPs
 (including pronouns in their different uses)
- c. accounting for the range of anaphora
 possibilities in discourse.

This, as we can see, matches our **computational** goals of giving an account of pronominal reference in discourse — a problem that has beset the construction of any satisfactory computational account in natural languages for **many** years now. It **will** not be out of place, therefore, to elaborate on DRT further.

The controversy regarding the status of indefinites as quantificational (Russellian view) and as referential that we **alluded** to **earlier**, becomes more acute and challenging in the realm of the donkey sentences. These are sentences containing an indefinite NP inside an **if-clause** or a relative clause and a pronoun outside that clause which refers back to the indefinite. Consider the following example:

- (19) Every man who bought a donkey was happy

In Russell's account, since the indefinite **descriptions** are existentially quantified phrases, the logical form of (19) may be represented as (in the predicate calculus notation):

(19') $(\forall x)((\text{man } x \wedge (\exists y)(\text{donkey } y \wedge x \text{ bought } y)) \rightarrow x \text{ was happy})$

Since $(\exists x)(x \supset U)$ and $(\forall x)(x \supset U)$ are logically equivalent this makes (19') logically equivalent to (19''):

(19'') $(\forall x)(\forall y)((\text{man } x \wedge \text{donkey } y \wedge x \text{ bought } y) \rightarrow x \text{ was happy})$?

Now consider the following which exhibits the problem associated with donkey sentences:

(20) Every man who meets a donkey beats it.

(20) is standardly assumed to be true only in case every man who meets at least one donkey beats every donkey that he meets. (20) therefore translates into (20').

(20') $(\forall x)(\forall y)((\text{man } x \wedge \text{donkey } y \wedge x \text{ meets } y) \Rightarrow x \text{ beats } y)$

1. The symbol " \wedge " here denotes the conjunction

The closest equivalent (in the sense of (19') and (19'')) above) to (20¹) is (20''):

(20'') $(\forall x)((\text{man } x \wedge (\exists y)(\text{donkey } y \wedge x \text{ meets } y)) \rightarrow x \text{ beats } y)$

In (20'') the final *y* **lies** outside the scope of the existential quantifier that is supposed to bind it. We cannot, therefore, represent (20) by **means** of a formula that treats a *donkey* **existentially**. Therefore, in Russellian terms, a uniform analysis is unavailable. Anaphora across a conditional gives rise to the same problem.

(21) If a *man* meets a *donkey*, he beats it

In both examples ((20-21)) a *donkey* cannot be referential. In order to get the right truth condition it cannot be quantificational either. It appears to function as a universal quantifier in these examples. Therefore the right translation of (21) is not (21a) but (21b) since, in the former, in *x beats y*, the variables are free.


(21)a. $\exists x \exists y (\text{man}(x) \wedge \text{donkey}(y) \wedge x \text{ meets } y) \Rightarrow x \text{ beats } y$

(21)b. $\forall x \forall y ((\text{man}(x) \wedge \text{donkey}(y) * x \text{ meets } y) \Rightarrow x \text{ beats } y)$

The problem with (21b) is the familiar one of (20) regarding the scope of the indefinite in addition to the **problem** of analyzing indefinites **sometimes** as existentials and **sometimes** as universals.

In the **Kamp/Heim** system definite and indefinite NPs are translated as variables which serve as discourse referents. In **Kamp's DRT** all the information collected in a discourse is represented **syntactically** by a DRS graphically depicted as a box. Statements asserted as facts by participants are entered into the matrix DRS which may contain smaller boxes representing denied or doubtful facts, temporary assumptions, etc. This is shown in (22) below where 1 and 2 in the matrix box are asserted facts, 3 is denied, 4 and 5 are possible, 8 is asserted on the assumption 6 and 7, etc.

(22)



As can be inferred, there is a hierarchical structure of subdiscourses within subdiscourses, which represents the logical **struc-**

ture of the discourse.


Kamp/Heim proposed that each indefinite **implies** an introduction of a new variable into the discourse **representation** (see B above). Let us **illustrate** this in **Kamp's DRT** (as we have already seen how it is done in **Heim's** file). In (23) below, the indefinite *a dog* is translated as a variable *x* with a descriptive content predicated of it as in: *dog (x)*.

(23) A dog came in

(23) is reduced to: *x* came in. The open formulas **dog(x)** and *x came in* do not have truth conditions of their own but influence the truth condition of a **DRS** when entered into it.

A discourse containing (23) alone **will** be represented as in (24) below.

(24)



The top **line** of the box represents the 'universe' of the DRS where the new variable *x* is entered. (24) is taken to be true if

x can be Batched with something in the world or in a model which is in fact a **dog** that came in. In this system, therefore, the definition of truth induces existential **quantification** over the whole discourse **representation**. DRS is a potential picture of the world or the model, and it is true if *there* is a part of the world/model which is correctly described by it. This is expressed by saying that a DRS is true if it can be '**embedded**' into the world/model, formally, a DRS is true iff there is an 'embedding **function**' which verifies it according to the conditions in the DRS.

The existential **quantification** which is induced over the matrix DRS is, as we can see, **unselective** — it **simultaneously** binds **all** variables that happen to be in the universe of the DRS. If we were to construct a **computational** system based on this **model**, note that such unselective binding would simplify the algorithm considerably.


In the **Kamp/Heim** system the indefinite is therefore neither referential nor **quantificational**. Its apparent quantificational force results due to some operator (in this case) in its environment .

Quantification in general in DRT is represented in a DRS by a condition which itself is composed of two **DRSs** — an antecedent

DBS which functions as the restrictive clause, **and** a consequent DBS which functions as **the nuclear scope**, in the **sense** of Heim (1982). The DBS of (25) is represented by (26) below.

(25) Every farmer has a donkey.

(26)



The verification part of this **DRS** would consist of induction of a combination of universal **quantification** (over the matrix DRS) and existential **quantification** (over the consequent sub-DRS). (26) is true if for every way of matching x with a farmer in the model, there is a way of finding a donkey that the farmer has.


The Lamp/ Heim system therefore **distinguishes** two kinds of **NPs**: (i) definite and indefinite NPs which are not quantificational, and which are translated as variables, (ii) quantificational NPs all of which induce unselective restricted quantification – in DRT they trigger the introduction of a conditional into the DRS.

Anaphoric definite NPs in the **Kamp/Heim** system, as we have

pointed out earlier, are translated as one of the variables which are already present in the **representation**. The DRS of (27) is (28).

(27) A dog cane in. It lay down.

(28)



The antecedent of the pronoun *it* is the DRS variable *x*. In DRT the antecedent of an anaphora **must** also be "accessible" to the pronoun.

Accessibility is a part of "nodal base" in the sense of Kratzer (1981) where a **modal** base defines an **accessibility** relation on the set of possible worlds. Heim (1982) denotes it as R_B for the **accessibility** relation defined by the modal base *B*; " $V R_B V$ " is to be read as: "*V* is accessible from *V*". In DRT of Kamp **accessibility** is **syntactically** defined as:

(29) The variables accessible **from** a position in DRS **K** are those which appear in the universe of


- (i) **K** itself
- (ii) all the DRSs that **graphically** contain **K**, and
- (iii) in case **K** is a consequent DRS of a conditional,

it is also the **antecedent DRS** of that **conditional**.

In (28), the dog variable x is accessible to the pronoun **from** the position of the pronoun because they are in the same box. According to the criteria in (29) above, the pronoun *it* in (30) cannot access the dog variable x , as shown in (3D).

(30) Every dog came in. It lay down.

(31)




Pronouns, **therefore**, function in the **Kamp/Heim system** like bound variables (x elements) by (i) picking up the variable of the indefinite, and (ii) getting bound by the same quantifier that binds the indefinite. The variables, or discourse referents, enable the speaker to keep track of the content of a conversation, without being tied down to any particular referent in the **model**.

Given this **model**, donkey sentences are no longer a **problem**. For instance (19), repeated here as (32), is treated like any

other **conditional**, with an implicit universal quantifier and is represented as (33).

(32) If a **man** meets a donkey, he beats it.

(33)



There are a few things to be noted in connection with (33):

- (i) indefinites, as usual, are variables
- (ii) their universal force is due to some quantifier that binds them
- (iii) the pronoun can refer back to variables X and Y because these are in the antecedent box and therefore **accessible**
- (iv) pronouns are in the scope of the same universal quantifier which binds the variable
- (v) there is no problem with the scope of the indefinite extending beyond the clause boundary because the indefinite is not a quantifier and does not bind the pronoun

As evident from (i) to (v) above, **DRT** then solves the donkey sentence **problem**.

2.4 An Algorithm

Our interest in DRT lies in the fact that all the essential steps for picking out the reference of a pronoun are already worked out in terms of the DRS construct. Designing an appropriate algorithm on the basis of such a model can now be trivially derived. At this stage we conjecture it as follows:

- (34)a. **construct** a 'universe' where the variables declared follow the Novelty Condition (B of section 2.4)
- b. **construct open formulas** for the indefinites by predicting them of the variables declared in a. and by replacing the indefinite with the appropriate variable
- c. **translate anaphoric definite NPs**, if any, in terms of variables already declared in a. (A sub-routine creates suitable pairs to decide which variables from the 'universe' to be used in such a translation)
- d. **check** if any anaphoric variable in c. is accessible or not according to the **accessibility** condition ((29) above)
- e. if yes, declare the discourse component as **felicitous**; **infelicitous** otherwise
- f. **any Q-adverb** (Lewis 1975), if **found**, triggers an introduction of a **condition** in the DRS and steps a to e are repeated

This is, of course, a very rough procedure awaiting a detailed working out of the finer **computational** points. Nevertheless, (34) indicates the extent to which DRT can be successfully **applied** to solve the **computational** problem of reference tracking

in a discourse.

2.5 Accommodation Revisited

Files are **common** grounds and therefore contain discourse **referents** which do not correspond to any NP **occurring** in the discourse, but are introduced on the basis of world knowledge. The objects to be included in a file are selected on the basis of their **saliency**. This is how a **saliency** rating of objects in the **surrounding** would feed into the process of discourse referent introduction in a file. Such a procedure will also necessarily subsume the concept of **accommodation**. In **accommodation**, as we **recall from** section 2.1, listeners adjust their **assumptions** by adding "just enough" information to **remedy** the Novelty Condition **violation**. For **example**, an expression like *my dog* can be assumed to be felicitous only in a situation where it is accepted that I have a dog. However, if I utter (35), even without such an assumption the listener immediately accommodates the **assumption** that I have one.

(35) My dog is at the door

This is analogous to the immediate situation case we presented earlier in (5), repeated here as (36), which is uttered, suppose, if I see a dog around someone.

(36) Watch out! The dog will bite you

The fact that **accommodation** is a **real** factor in natural languages cannot be challenged but as a **theoretical** tool it **seems** to be too powerful. It **might** conceivably allow too many cases of anaphora to an accommodated antecedent. An attempt, therefore, was Bade (in Heim, 1982) to constrain **accommodation**. We have already pointed this out in our discussion of Heim's notion of accommodation. The restriction proposed in Heim concerned the concept of **cross-referring**, as can be noticed in (6), repeated here as (37).

(37) John read [a book about Schubert]. and wrote to the
author;

As in a file, we will assume that accommodated material is also included in **DRSs** as and when they arise. We will further assume that such accommodated material is given an identity index, **distinguishing** it from material which directly refers to the text. This can be included (similar to the algorithm in (34)) as another step in an algorithm. Heim also talks about temporarily introduced **accommodation** or local **accommodation** as distinct from global or permanently accommodated material. She also suggests that the latter is preferable. According to her, local **accommodation** is needed while analyzing expressions with operators. In an analogous **computational** procedure, this can easily be achieved by tagging different types of accommodated

material differently.

Another way to constrain **accommodation** is by way of **making** it **minimal** – adding just enough information to avoid a felicity condition violation. It is most readily executed if it is very **minimal**. This criterion actually clashes with what we are going to propose next and needs to be modified in the context of our **proposal**.

2.6 The Camera Angle View

We propose that the best way to capture **all** the contextual **underpinnings** of an utterance **like (3f)** above (and others, as we shall point out below) is to imagine discourse being presented in terms of photographs. That is, imagine that at each stage of a **conversation**, the listener is being presented with photograph of the situation in question. In short, language **understanding** takes place through the camera lens. Throughout the **duration** of the **conversation**, a camera placed at the site records **all** the events as and when they occur. We emphasize that this is not just a metaphor. In fact, such a view of language understanding, especially in terms of a **computational** version of the **system**, is not impossible to imagine in the **light** of what we have presented earlier regarding the designing of a planner whose task is to generate texts based on photographs of houses on the basis of a

salience grading of **objects** in the photographs.

We suggest that the exact theoretical construct in a camera-angle view of discourse understanding be what we Bay call a field. We further suggest that a field has certain **advantages** over a **file** or a DRS in **Kamp/ Heim** in DRT. Introduction of a **file** card is achieved in this **model** through a new photograph each time a **new** object enters the field of vision. Imagine the camera to be sensitive to such new objects (or even substantial **modification** of new objects — a fact which neither **Kamp** or **Heim** considers) and takes a snap each time such a major change of state occurs. A field is never blank. Even before the utterance of (36) above, the field consists of, let us say, a flight of steps, you — the addressee — coming down the steps, and there is a dog lurking **behind**. By the time I utter (36), there is already a field consisting of a *dog*. By this we mean that a listener is not surprised by a definite **novel-NP** *the dog* precisely because s/he has popped up a field pertaining to the conversation under progress from a set of universal fields which are part of the human language processing faculty, where the utterance of a definite dog is not unexpected, given our language experience contained within this universal set.

In connection with **accommodation**, **fields** have an advantage over **files** in terms of the question: at what stage of a **dis-**

course-construction can one **accommodate** Material for the purpose of satisfying the felicity condition? In **Heim's** model, the felicity condition must be satisfied by a file *prior* to the processing of the definite. That is, whenever a **listener** encounters a novel definite **s/he** will have to first accommodate an antecedent; only then can the definite be added to the file. However, in **Kadmon's** (1987) theory of uniqueness, where she **makes** use of **DRSs** rather than files, **accommodation** follows the entry of the definite into the DRS. **Kadmon** also suggests that because of uniqueness, the **accommodated** antecedent is entered into a DRS permanently whereas **Heim** allows for temporary **accommodation** to take place, as we have seen **earlier**. This tension between the two theories regarding the level and the local/global nature of **accommodation** can be eased out with our concept of a field, which is a deeper (and more universal) level of **representation**, *in tandem with a file*.

What we are now suggesting is that, **theoretically** and **computationally**, it **makes** better sense to allow field and file to work together albeit at different levels of **representation**. **Accommodation** would now proceed as follows: **Accommodation** takes place in the field at some level prior to the processing of the utterance — in the speaker's intention, for example, — but it is available at the file-level only when the utterance is actual-

ly made. This weeds out the undesirable lag between the encountering of the utterance by the listener and its subsequent accommodation in the file in Heim's system. Secondly, an accommodated entry remains in the field memory (or, if you prefer, in the "album") once it is entered, but has a local character only in connection with its appearance at the file-level. Kadmon's DRS, therefore, is our file and Heim's file is somewhere between our field and the file-level. Although this theory is forced to propose an additional level of representation, it nevertheless attains conceptual simplicity.

In this model, accommodation is not minimal at the field-level but is minimal at the file-level, not according to Heim's (1982) criteria, but according to a salience grading of the objects in the file where a cut-off point determines the extent of minimality of accommodation. Translating a field into a file will proceed accordingly. Notice that the principle A that we proposed earlier can now be seen to be applying at the file level. Extending the metaphor of a camera's field of vision, salience could be seen as a device for focusing and zooming.

It remains to be seen how a field can be constructed. Given the universal character of fields in general, we suggest that a conceptual dependency network like Schank (1972) or a modified version of it (or even a modified conceptual semantics of Jack—

endoff (1992)) can be used to construct a model of a field. Scripts designed on the basis of actual language experience can be profitably used in this connection, as far as a computational model of a field is concerned. A simple functional semantics can do the job of then translating a field into a file in accordance with the "zoom potential" of various objects in the field.

2.7 Transitivity

One way in which this zoom potential or salience rating as we mentioned earlier can be worked out is through transitivity. This is crucial for our implementation to work because unless we evaluate the salience potential of different objects in a particular setting, we cannot construct the file — and, therefore, computation cannot proceed. This requirement, therefore, merits a detailed discussion of transitivity which we offer as a justification of the title of this dissertation.

Transitivity, as we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is some sort of transfer of energy from the agent to the patient. The big question that arises at this point is: is transitivity to be seen as a universal prime or is it to be merely viewed as a theoretical construct? We will produce evidence from (mainly) Hopper and Thompson (1980) and others to prove that it is the former. We will also say, however, that a

syntactic notion of **Transitivity** is essential for a **model-driven** computation of the kind we propose to proceed. Therefore, we will distinguish between a **semantic/pragmatic** notion of transitivity and a syntactic notion of transitivity in the course of our discussion.

2.7.1 Semantic/ Pragmatic Transitivity

Hopper and Thompson (henceforth HT) (1980) identified the following parameters according to which a transitivity rating of a particular clause can be measured.

(37)

PARAMETERS	TRANSITIVITY	
	HIGH	LOW
A. PARTICIPANTS i	2 or more participants, A and O	1 participant
B. KINESIS	action	non-action
C. ASPECT	telic	atelic
D. PUNCTUALITY	punctual	non-punctual
E. VOLITIONAILTY	volitional	un-volitional
F. AFFIRMATION	affirmative	negative
G. MODE	realis	irrealis
H. AGENCY	A high in potency	A low in potency
I. AFFECTEDNESS OF O	O totally affected	O not affected
J. INDIVIDUATION OF O	O highly individuated	O non-individuated

(A) PARTICIPANTS: No transfer at **all** can take place **unless** at least 2 participants are present.

(B) KINESIS: Actions can be transferred from one participant to another — crucial for the core definition of transitivity. States cannot be so transferred. Thus **something** happens in *I kicked the ball* but not in *I like football*.

(C) ASPECT: **Telic** action is an action viewed **from** its endpoint and is more effectively transferred to a patient in comparison to an atelic action. In (38a) the activity is viewed as completed but in the atelic (38b) transference is only partial.

(38)a. mEMne caawal kheayaa
I- EG rice ate
'I ate rice'

b. mEM caawal khaa rahaa huM
I rice eat PROG be-3PS
'I am eating **rice**'

HT also distinguish **aspect** in the sense of telicity from '**Aktion-sart**' or lexical aspect which involves those ways of looking at an action which are predictable from the lexical meaning of the verb.

HT show that if other things are equal an **interpretation** where the aspect is perfective **will** make the clause more transi-

tive than a **clause** where the action is interpreted as **imperfect**. For **example**, in the Finnish **example** (39a), the object which is **marked** by Accusative, is interpreted as perfective and is therefore considered to be more transitive than the object in (39b), which is **marked** with a partitive Case and is interpreted as **imperfective**.

- (3E)a. liikemies kirjoitti kirjeen valiokunnalle
 businessman wrote letter-ACC committee-to
 'The businessman *wrote* a letter to the **committee**'
- b. liikemies kirjoitti kirjetta valiokunnalle
 businessman wrote letter-PART committee-to
 'The **businessman** was *writing* a letter to the
committee'

The ergative construction in Hindi is limited to perfective environments, while a non-ergative is used in the imperfective:

- (40)a. mEMne ciTTThii likhi
 I-ERG letter wrote-I-sg-fem
 "I wrote a letter"
- b. mEM ciTTThii likhungaa
 I letter write-will-I-sg-masc
 "I will write a letter"

The ergative in Hindi therefore can be considered to be more transitive since it involves telicity. Hopper (1983) reaches a similar conclusion regarding the comparison of Ergative, Passive and Active in Malay and finds the ergative to be most transitive. As far as Bangla aspect is concerned, we will discuss this in greater detail when we talk about syntactic **transitivity**.

D. **PUNCTUALITY**: actions carried out with no obvious transitional phase between inception and completion have a greater effect on their patients than **actions** which are inherently on-going. For example, *hit* is punctual whereas *carry* is non-punctual. In **Samoan**, the contrast between the more punctual and the less punctual action is encoded in the ergative/antipassive contrast:

(41)a. saa **manatu le tama i le** tiene
 TNS think the boy OBL the girl
 'The boy thought about the girl!'

b. saa **manatu-a** le tiene e le tana
 TNS **think-TRANS** the girl ERG the boy
 'The boy remembered the girl'

(HT. 1980)

In a. *le tama* 'the boy' is in the **absolutive** with no **Case-marker**, while the object, *le tiene* 'the girl', is Barked OBL. The action is understood to be durative. In b. the position of the object is changed and is **marked** by the transitive suffix *-a*, the action being interpreted as punctual.

The **Samoan** example as well as the **Chukchee** example (42) below (**Comrie**, 1973 cited in HT) show an important point in support of the **hypothesis** that transitivity should indeed be considered as a fundamental property of natural languages. Both these languages, and many others, show a distinct **morphosyntactic** marker of transitivity and intransitivity (also marked in **some** languages such as **Eskimo**).

- (42)a. *tug-e* *na-ntawat-an kupre-n*
 friends-ERG set-TRANS net-APS
 'The friends set the net'
- b. *tug-at* *kopra-ntawat-Gzat*
 friends-NOM net-set-INTR
 'The friends set nets'

This point will be considered while **providing** a morphological validity of a syntactic notion of transitivity as proposed in Murasugi (1992) where TrP is a **mere** place holder for a "feature" of Transitivity which the NPs check against in a transitive **clause**.

E. VOLITIONALITY: When the agent acts **volitionally** the effect on the patient is more apparent than when it is not. For example, in Cupeño (Ell 1969, cited in HT) volitional **and non-volitional** verbs are distinctly marked with suffixes *-ine* and *-yaxe* respectively. **Morphosyntactic** realizations of **volitionality** are marked on the object in Estonian: Nominative on **O** when no overt agent is present; partitive in case of absence of voluntary **participation** as in (43).

- (43) *ta kuulis nende koMnet*
 he heard their talk (PART)
 'He heard their **talk**'

F. AFFIRMATION: In many languages the object of a negated clause appears in forms which show that the action of the verb is deflected or less direct. In French, indefinite Os in the partitive must drop the definite article normally present:

- (44)a. Nous **avons** du pain
 we **hav** **the-PART** bread
 'We have some **bread**'
- b. Nous n'avons plus de pain
 we **N.G-have** more PART bread
 'We have no more **bread**'

HT suggest that the object of a clause which is **imperfective**, negated, **inactive**, or irrealis is somehow less of an object and is marked as such in the **morphosyntax**.

This and the next parameter, Mode, are less convincing in the HT system and we contest these two **separately** in a later section in connection with syntactic **transitivity**. Also, the psycholinguistics literature that we present does not support at least the affirmative parameter.

G. MODE This parameter **distinguishes** between the **realis** and the irrealis encoding of events. An action which did not take place or is supposed to be occurring in a non-real world, is less effective than one whose occurrence is asserted in **the** real world. This is an opposition between the indicative and other non-assertive forms such as subjunctive, optative, hypothetical, imaginary, conditional, etc. In Yakulta, irrealis non-past clauses elicit antipassive rather than the **ergative** construction.

H. AGENCY: Participants high in agency can cause an action **more**

effectively than those without. The **interpretation** of (45a) would be that of a perceptible event with a perceptible consequence but b. is a Matter of internal state.

- (45)a. John startled **me**
b. The picture startled **me**

In **Cupeño** (Bill (1969) cited in HT) volitional and **non-volitional verbs** are **marked** with suffixes **-ine** and **-yaxe** **respectively**. Morphological realization of higher vs. lower Agency can be displayed in clauses with only **one** argument. Thus, depending on the degree of control exercised by this **argument** over the action, it is **marked morphologically** as either A or O. Lakota functions in this manner. **Therefore**, structures **traditionally** called 'intransitives' can be **either** more or less transitive depending on some **discourse parameter**.

I. **AFFECTEDNESS OF Q**: The degree to which an action is transferred to a patient is a function of how completely that patient is **affected**. For example, in (46a) it is **more** effective than in (46)b.

- (46)a. **■EM-ne kitaabeM paRhliiM**
I-ERG books **read-past-took-sg-fem**
'I read the books (up)'

b. **■EM-ne kuch kitaabeM paRhliiM**
I-ERG some books **read-sg-fem**
'I read some of the books'

In Indonesian two rival suffixes **-kan** and **-i** are used as follows:

(47)a. dia **memanas-i** air
 He heated water

b. dia **memanas-kan** air
 "He heated the water"

(HT: 261)

With **-i** in a. it is **implied** that the heating is gentler and **more** controlled. With **-kan** the act of heating is more drastic, for example, boiling water for cooking making (47b) **more** intense. The suffix **-kan** is also the suffix used to make **causatives** and to transitive dative verbs and is correlated with a sense of *total* effect on the object. In the Finnish example that we saw earlier ((39)), the Transitivity Hypothesis of HT predicts that the Accusative, which induces totally affected **Os**, gives the clause a perfective or **telic** value, while the partitive gives it an **imperfective** or **atelic** value.

J. INDIVIDUATION OF 0: Individuation refers both to the distinctness between 0 and A and to the distinctness from its own background. HT lists the properties of individuation as follows:

(48)

INDIVIDUATED

proper
 human, animate
 concrete
 singular
 count
 referential, definite

NON-INDIVIDUATED

common
 inanimate
 abstract
 plural
 mass
non-referential

An action which is sore individuated, that is, has **more** of the left-hand side **properties** can be Bore easily transferred to a patient than those with **more** of the right-hand sided properties. The definite in (49a) implies that probably *John* finished the available *beer* in contrast with (49b).

- (49)a. John drank the beer
 b. John drank some beer

In Hindi the **ko** marker on objects requires **them** to be animate *and* **human**, and also definite:

- (50)a. mEM-ne laRkaa dekhaa
 'I saw a **boy**'
 b. mEM-ne laRke-ko dekhaa
 I-ERG boy-OBJ-DAT **saw-sg-masc**
 'I saw the **boy**'

In other languages, the verb and object **tend** to **merge** in case of an indefinite object — they tend to form a single unit. In an extreme case an indefinite object is not really an object but is a sub-part of a **compound** of which the verb **stem** is the head, that is, the object is incorporated into the verb. This takes place even in Bangla to some extent.

- (51)a. ami kapoR dhulan
 I clothes washed
 b. **amar** kapoR-dhoVa SeS **holo**
I-GEN clothes-washing end became
 'I finished washing clothes'

In (51)b the object incorporates into the verb which creates an

intransitive clause.

Transitivity, **then**, in the HT **system**, is a matter of **carry-**ing over an action from one participant to another which can be broken down into component parts, each highlighting a different aspect in this transferring of action in different parts of the clause (agents, verbs, objects).

2.7.2 Reduction of Transitivity

Givón (1985) in his discussion of **ergativity** in Newari showed that ergative morphology, especially split **ergativity**, is sensitive to the transitivity properties of a clause **whereas** nominative typology is **sensitive** to the **discourse/pragmatic** role of NPs in the clause in terms of whether they are or not the **subject/topic**. He reduces the **transitivity** properties of a clause in terms of three core properties of Agent, Patient and the Verb and the rest can be predicted through **semantic/pragmatic** general principles. These three components are:

- (52)a. **Agent-related**: The prototypical transitive clause has a visible, salient, volitional, controlling agent-cause which imitates the event.
- b. **Patient-related**: The prototypical transitive clause has visible, salient, **non-volitional**, **non-controlling patient-effect** which registers the bulk of the change associated with the event.

- c. **Verb-related**: The prototypical transitive clause has a compact, perfective, **realis** verb or verbal **tense-aspect modality**.

As we can see, both A and O are salient in a prototypical transitive clause which further consolidates our motivation for studying one in terms of the other. The other crucial point to note at this juncture is that both a. and b. above are related to the predication properties of a clause, i.e. by **looking** at the clause type, something about the agent and the patient can be inferred. Whereas, as Hopper (1983) has shown, verb-initial ergatives in Malay are non-predicational events. By looking at the centrality of the verb in agreement patterns of a language, again, we can say something about the Agent and Patient in a transitive clause.

By reducing HT's discourse parameters to three core notions, as in Givón, we have in fact reduced transitivity to Predication and Agreement – central to the discussion in the next chapter. We motivate the last chapter (on **Classification**) on the basis of the discourse model that we have proposed in this chapter which picks out the reference of definites and indefinites in intersentential discourse according to a salience gradient.

The discussion of transitivity so far **might** give the false

impression that **HT's** transitivity parameters are calculable only for a simple clause. Givdn, in his discussion of **Newari**, shows that the interaction of **complenient** verbs and **ergative/non-ergative** subject **marking** in the **main** clause in case of sodality verbs (verbs requiring a **co-referential** subject in their **comple-**ments) like 'want', 'need', 'kill', 'break', '**work**', '**can**', etc. induce an upward filtering of **transitivity**. He shows that WANT/NEED are of low **transitivity**, KILL/BREAK are of high **transi-**tivity, WORK (like EAT) is **syntactically** high in transitivity but **semantically** low on the transitivity scale, and CAN is of low transitivity but at a higher position on the scale than WANT. This again shows that **transitivity** is a **fundamental** relation in natural languages.

2.7.3 Transitivity as an Inherent Feature

Amritavalli (1979) shows that in Hindi **sain** verbs as well as members of compound verbs carry the intrinsic feature of transitivity, independent of their context of occurrence. In the standard theory transitivity is a contextual feature **like** [+__NP], it is not a theoretical prime. We have been arguing against that and so does **Amritavalli**. She shows that the transitivity of a verb in Hindi **is** relevant for the operation of two rules in the language: the rule of ergative Case-marking and the rule of passive. Both rules apply if the verb is transitive and neither rule applies if the verb is intransitive. Transitive

verbs occur in the context of NP_____# and intransitive verbs in _____#. For Hindi, there is a third possibility, where the verb is a member of a compound verb. It is in the third context that the above two rules apply consistently *provided* transitivity is treated as an intrinsic feature of the verb.

In sentences with compound verbs, the transitivity of V2 which **determine** the ergative Case marking. Consider the following:

- (53)a. khargoS **gaajar** khaa-gayaa
 rabbit carrot **eat-go-perf-masc-sg**
 'The rabbit ate up the carrots'
- b. khargoS **gaajar** khaa-gayaa hEM
be-PRS-sg
 'The rabbit has eaten up the **carrots**'
- c. khargoS gaajar khaa-gayaa thaa
be-PST-M-Sg
 'The rabbit had eaten up the **carrots**'

The intransitive V2 *gayaa* here cannot induce ergative Case marking on the subject. Consider the **following** now:

- (54)a. khargoS ne gaajar **khaa-Daale**
 ERG **put-PRF-M-Pl**
 'The ate up carrots'
- b. khargoS ne gaajar khaa-Daale hEM
be-PRS-Pl
 'The rabbit has eaten up **carrots**'
- c. khargoS ne gaajar khaa-Daale the
be-PST-M-Pl
 'The rabbit had eaten up the carrots'

The transitive V2 ***Daale*** in (54) triggers ergative Case marking on

the subject.

Now let us see how **passivization** is affected by **different** types of compounds. For a VIV2 **compound** where V2 is **transitive**, passivization correctly applies as in (55) but not when V2 is intransitive as in (56).

(55)a. kisaan ne **mazduuroM** ke vetan de-diye
farmer **ERG** labourers to wage give-give-PRF
'The farmer gave wages to the labourers'

b. **mazduuroM** ko vetan de-diye gaye
go-PRF (pass **AUX**)
'The labourers were given wages'

(56)a. kisaan **mazduuroM** ko vetan de-gayaa
go-PRF

b. * **mazduuroM** ko vetan de-gaya gaye

Amritavalli (1979) points out that the ungrammaticality of (56b) is not due to any surface constraint of co-occurrence on the **two** identical forms of **jaanaa** since similar **ungrammatical** results obtain for the following:

(57)a. wo **muurkh** **kaam** kar-bETHaa
he foolish work do-sit-PRF
'He did something foolish'

b. * **muurkh** **kaam** kar-bETHaa gayaa
go-PASS

She concludes from this set **of data** that it is the transitivity **of V2** that is relevant for the application of the passive to take

place. Accordingly she justifies a system of designing the lexical entry of verbs in Hindi where the feature [\pm Transitive] is an integral part of the entry.

2.7.4 Psycholinguistic Basis of Transitivity

Having justified transitivity, so far, as a natural theoretical principle, we now present convincing evidence from the psycholinguistic material to further strengthen our proposal. Chomsky (1980) makes a distinction between computational and conceptual aspects of language and suggests that children at a very early stage may use a conceptual system to comprehend language when language-specific knowledge is not available. Researchers in learnability, like Wexler (1976), hypothesize that children construct meaning based on context. Wexler and Culicover (1980) show that syntax would be unlearnable unless children were able to make use of information from the underlying structure of sentences.

What the Semantic Bootstrapping Hypothesis (of Pinker, 1982, 1984) has in common with learnability theories is the idea that children's early grammar is characterized by a one-to-one form/meaning relationship between the events children witness and the linguistic input used to describe them. This is present only in the initial stages as the relationships do not apply in adult grammar. Syntactic categories are not reducible to meaning

despite the fact that early grammar makes use of this **correspondence**. These are two separate, interacting **systems** of representation.

Slobin (1981) showed how children begin the process of **grammaticalization**, that is, **how** they first crack the syntactic codes. Slobin shows that only certain conceptual relations are expressed and transitive events are likely to be among the basic ones. He hypothesizes that in the early stages only prototypical transitive events — the most salient events for the child — will be encoded in canonical form and later extended to other less typically transitive events. What is interesting for us is that Slobin bases his notion of prototypical transitive event on HT's discourse **parameters**.

Balcom (1990) extends this to mean that children are predisposed to attend to events that are of cardinal transitivity and therefore allow them to infer grammatical relations expressed therein. A distinction is made in the literature (Newport, et al. 1977; White 1980) between the language children are exposed to ("input") and the one they actually use in constructing their grammar ("intake"). Children are "tuned in" to cardinal transitive events — it provides a means for children to structure their experience.

Although HT's parameters are universal, individual languages select from those parameters rather than using them all. For example, Sheyne (1982) found that only four of HT's parameters were used in San Carlos Apache.

Bruner (1972) has found that from the first few weeks after birth, infants distinguish the category of **people** from the category of **things**. Other studies have similarly found that by twelve months participants (E's A) are **distinguished** by infants and are endowed with permanence. Particular attention is paid to the Agent and Balcom (1990) proposes that children can distinguish **agents** from other **participants**. However, most studies report experiments which suggest agents as initiators of **actions** — that is, they appear in a given context prior to other participants. This could be the reason why children pay more attention to agents. In fact Golinkoff (1981) reports that both agents and patients are salient for children. According to Bloom (1973), these notions come from the child's conceptual **relations**: persons perform actions and things are affected by actions. This for us means that transitivity is a **more** basic and primary concept than, let us say, agreement which is more like a syntactic surface phenomenon. This is, therefore, another **justification** for study-

ing both

At the Multi-word stage, Greenfield and Smith (1976) report that the object is more salient² and Lebeaux (1987) attributes the lack of subjects at this stage to the difficulty in Case assignment to an external argument.

Movement is a powerful visual stimulus which, according to some researchers, even neonates attend to. Movement makes objects more perceptible against their background. Bower (1982) has found that children detect motion as early as two weeks. All this research supports Nelson and Horowitz's (1987) hypothesis that the mammalian brain is "prewired" to attend to motion.

No clear distinction is made by children at an early stage between punctuality and aspect — their determination depends rather on the Aktionsart either inherent in the verb or conveyed by the interaction of the verb and its arguments (Tenny, 1987) and the situational context of the utterance. Bickerton (1989) suggests that the verb's situation determines its punctuality. Research in this field indicates that the distinction inherent in

1. One might also add that this is also the beginning of education for the human child regarding "power".

2. That is, an interest in the "victim".

the punctuality and **aspect parameters**, namely, the end results being more **salient** rather than the **transitional** phase and punctual events being more likely, is adhered to.

Volitionality in a child's language is defined **more** in terms of initiation of events rather than the adult concept of agency. Children first encode the notions of animate subjects or inanimate objects in terms of movement and intentionality. Bloom, et al. (1975) suggest that movement controls early word order.

As far as mode is concerned, **children's** language is based on the real world and real events in it. Sachs (1983) reports that before the age of three her subjects rarely made reference to objects or events based on fantasy or prior experience.

Crucial aspects of individuation, as we have seen, are **referentiality** and **definiteness**. The individuated entity is discrete, bounded, and separate from its environment. Bower (1982) found that young children (2-4 months) expressed surprise when an object did not appear after being covered by a screen. These studies show that infants perceive objects as being unitary and separate from their surroundings. Also, because their early speech is grounded in the here and now, words at this stage tend to be definite and have specific reference at all times.

Regarding **affectedness** of **object**, the change should be apparent and **visible**, causing the object to move or alter its state. Nelson (1973) found that the first fifty words children use consist Bore (and first) of words describing changeable states rather than words relating unchanging attributes. For example, '**allgone**', '**dirty**', '**hot**' vs. 'red', '**round**', '**pretty**', etc. The basic underlying fact (or universal) seems to be the one of kinesis.


For HT'a affirmation parameter no substantial evidence is found which points towards the use of one over the other. Typically, in the early stages children use 'no' in isolation to express rejection or refusal, while non-existence is expressed in a sentence and is generally considered to be learned later.

In **general**, Slobin's hypothesis **seems** to hold true in other studies as well (such as **Balcom** 1990), that is, children begin by attending to and encoding events of cardinal transitivity and subsequently apply the grammatical device thus acquired (for example, **SVO** word order in these studies) to events of low **transitivity**.


2.8 Syntactic Transitivity

Having established transitivity as an indispensable fundamental relation, let us look at a proposal of syntactic transitivity. Murasugi (1992) tries to account for the difference between Accusative and Ergative languages by proposing a difference of **movements** (of syntactic heads) in these languages and a difference of valency of TrP and TP among these two types of languages. The respective differences in movements are depicted in (58) and (59) below:

(58) ACCUSE tive language (Subj_{NOM} Obj_{ACC})



(59) Ergative language (Subj_{ERG} Obj_{ABS})



The strong head in each case is indicated by bold face – T in the case of Accusative languages and Tr in the case of Ergative languages. Notice that the series of movements result in crossing paths in the former and nested paths in the latter. In Accusative languages the Case features contained in T and Tr are respectively NOM and ACC whereas in Ergative languages they are respectively ABS and ERG. Movement, as standardly assumed in minimalism (Chomsky, 1993), is due to Case (and agreement) reasons.

Murasugi (1992) differs from Chomsky (1991, 1993) and Pol-

lock (1989) in not having any **AgrPs** in her **representation**. **Agreement** in her system is mediated through T and Tr -- by V to Tr to T **movement**. The other features carried by T and Tr are **[±TNS]** and **[+Trans]** respectively. In intransitive clauses the value of Tr is [-Trans] and the subject moves to SPEC TP for Case reasons in such clauses in both types of languages under discussion. So it is only the transitive paradigm that **distinguishes** the two **movements** shown in (58) and (59).

The feature system adopted is something like this:

T	Tr	NP	Vt	Vi
[+TNS]	[+Trans]	[0]	[0₁] [0₂]	[0₁]
[NOM]	[ACC/ERG]	[Case]	[+Trans]	[-Trans]
			[+TNS]	[±TNS]



In English the 0 features of the subject can be checked only at LF where the V raises to T. Features are not necessarily checked at the same level as their **movements**.

Now, **Murasugi's** notion of transitivity is purely syntactic and therefore transitivity in this system is **simply** a matter of counting the number of arguments in the VP (as also the subject of embedded clauses in ECM structures). She qualifies it later to say that transitivity is a matter of the number of arguments the Tr head governs. If it governs just one argument then the clause is [-Trans] and if it governs two arguments then it is **[+Trans]**. This is slightly unfortunate and **anachronistic** since

the notion of government is no longer a theoretical prise in the framework she has chosen to present her thesis.



Different types of clauses show the following type of **move-ments** in her system:

(60) Transitive Clause





(61) Intransitive Clause



Note: [-Trans) Tr has no Case feature so only SPEC TP is available for Case checking.



(62) Unergatives



(63) Unaccusatives



As we have indicated earlier, although in **Murasugi's** treatment of TrP is nothing but a place holder, there are reasons to **believe** that it carries more weight than that. Natural languages **like** Chukchee and Eskimo were shown to exhibit **morphological** features of transitivity and **intransitivity** which itself is a good reason to suppose that the projection proposed is **more** real than a **more** place holder. How it can be useful for our purpose will be depicted in the section after the next.

2.9 **Computation** of Transitivity

In this section we intend to show how the two notions of transitivity presented in this chapter - **Discourse/Semantic** transitivity (of HT) and syntactic transitivity (of **Murasugi**, 1992) - can be **accommodated** into a broader algorithm to serve our purpose.

First let us try to imagine what kind of computational processes transitivity represents. Or to rephrase the question in terms of what we have tried to establish so far, namely, to study salience is to study transitivity, what kind of computational processes are reflected by salience? What role does it play in the coordination of our processing certain information in our surroundings?

2.9.1 Model - Driven Computation of **Salience**

It is worth our pursuit to look at how Parma, Hanson and Riseman's (1980) UMASS VISIONS system works. The approach of the VISIONS system combines the bottom-up analysis of regions and edges in the raw visual image with top-down testing of frame-based hypotheses about the content of photographs of natural scenes. The VISIONS system is, therefore, **model-driven**, once it moves away from the low level problem of identifying regions. For example, if the system ascertains, from available edge and region data, that there is a house in the photograph, the **system** will use its generic knowledge to **disambiguate** regions. Even if the image is actually that of a boat in the water, it might still trigger the house hypothesis because of certain similarities in the features of the house and the boat. In such a case, the elements of the picture, inconsistent with a house-scene frame,

like the blue colour of the ground plane, would be vital in stopping the **instantiation** of that **frame** any further.

Generally speaking, an attempt is made to construct an inner model of the external world excerpt based on sensory data from that world and generic knowledge about it. Components of salience are therefore the following:

- (i) First, the system **relies** on a region of *size* and **centrality** of a region to approximate the most likely model for identifying the rest of the scene.
- (ii) Unexpected elements of a scene, that is, those which do not have a good fit with their slot in the hypothesized **frame**, are **important** for efficient allocation of resources (the **instantiation** of a particular frame) and will be tagged with some measure of goodness of fit.
- (iii) The intrinsic importance of certain elements in **the** scene is also useful for **further** allocation for **confirmation** of identification. For example, given the knowledge that people are **intrinsically** more important than objects, the system will make sure that this is indeed true when it identifies an image region as people.

The elements of **model** building for which the notion of salience is important, as we saw in the last paragraph, are the **following** three:

- (a) structural knowledge about the location in the external field of data where resources are to be focussed initially (e.g. size and centrality).
- (b) use of a measure of **"goodness of fit"** to guide the instantiation of generic features.

- (c) prior knowledge about intrinsic salience of objects in relation to a particular situation.

2.9.2 Mixed Mode Parsing

The parsing technique used here is a **mixed-mode method** which uses varying degrees of both top-down and bottom-up techniques to retain only the advantages of both approaches. Top-down **parsing** has the advantage that it will never consider word categories in positions where they cannot occur in a **legitimate** sentence. This is because the parser works from a syntactic category and checks the word that fits that category. For **example**, if we use the grammar (64) for a sentence *the can broke*, the parsing **will** start with rule 1 and will expect to find an NP to start with ART as in 4 and 5, to be **followed** by either a NOUN as in 4 and ADJ as in 5. But since *can* is a NOUN it finds it as expected and the AUX and VLRB senses of the word are never considered.

(64)

1. S \longrightarrow NP VP
2. S \longrightarrow NP AUX VP
3. S \longrightarrow NP VERB
4. NP \longrightarrow ART NOUN
5. NP \longrightarrow ART ADJ NOUN
6. NP \longrightarrow ADJ NOUN
7. VP \longrightarrow AUX VERB NP
8. VP \longrightarrow VERB NP

The problems of repetition and long processing are avoided in a bottom-up system. For example, a sentence like *the man jumps* **will** require a top-down parser to backtrack twice (after **failing**

to parse with 1 and 2), in a **bottom-up** approach *the man* will be constructed only once and rule 3 **could match** to give an S. **Among** mixed-mode approaches there is one where a top-down approach adds each constituent as it is constructed to a chart. **As** the parse continues, before rewriting a symbol to find a **new** constituent, it can first be checked whether it is already there in the **chart** or **not**.

However, the model-driven mixed-mode parsing that was used for **VISIONS** could have been made more efficient, we think, if there **had** been some way to pick up the salient features instantaneously instead of first trying to construct a **model**. This, we believe, can be achieved by using the concept of syntactic transitivity of the kind we have looked at. For the purpose of execution a Principle-Based parsing technique could give us the right measure of **sophistication** we need to build in a network like the one we are considering. For details regarding Principle-Based parsing, see chapter 5 where we take up the issue of **Noun-classification** in this context. The added advantage of using Principle-Based parsing techniques for a syntactic framework like **minimalism** is that due to a reduction in the number of principles in the current framework, parsing would become simpler **computationally**. We emphasize that at this point of derivation or analysis the transitivity parameters are not taken into ac-

count. After we have **worked** out the **agreement system** in the following chapter, it will become a trivial operation to pick up the object of an input clause. Depending on how exactly this is done by the **agreement** algorithm, we will be in a position to assign a feature to the Tr and T heads. Case/Agreement checking can then take place according to the set of operations depicted in (60) - (63). Apart from the transitivity feature, agreement will also decide the [\pm TNS] features on T which has a crucial effect on Case/Agreement checking.

Once we have a broad idea of what the clause looks like, by performing the set of operations proposed so far, that is, a **principle-based** parsing through syntactic transitivity, we can **now** think of finding further details in connection with the participants in the clause. This can be **achieved**, we propose, by properly working out **HT's** parameters to suit our purpose. That is, all the lower level **computations** to achieve the **correct** status of various participants is done through HT parameters. Parsing here **will** proceed in a bottom-up fashion **working** out how different parameters and the input words interact to give us all possible senses of the input words. In cases where we have to resolve the reference of anaphors, we **will** construct a computational version of our field-view of discourse and use essentially the techniques elaborated in this section for the purpose.

We have tried to show in this section how both syntactic and **semantic/pragmatic** studies of transitivity are justified to serve but one goal — that is, to be efficiently used in a **mixed-mode** parsing strategy — in short, a **computational** goal.

3.0 Introduction

Unlike the discussion in the previous chapter, in this **chapter** we shall engage in a more or less purely syntactic analysis of the specific languages that we are concerned with, namely, Hindi and Bangla. Hindi will drive most of the discussion simply because a lot has been said by others and there is more to say about Hindi agreement than Bangla. **Agreement** in Bangla, as is well known, is restricted to person agreement the description and analysis of which is fairly **straightforward**. Hindi, however, needs careful attention.

Before we proceed, we would like to remind ourselves of the fact that **agreement** for our purpose serves the goal of identifying the participants for evaluating syntactic transitivity and therefore, ultimately, salience — the major thrust of this project. As we have observed in the **Introduction**, in our attempt to find an equivalence between the VP and the NP structure, notwithstanding the untenability of such an equivalence according to some (Chomsky 1981), we need to take care of the network of agreement relations — in addition to other networks — of a clause to achieve the goal of equivalence. In short, agreement,

therefore, provides finer details in a particular subroutine of an **algorithm** that we presented in the **previous** chapter.

3.1 Trajector and **Landmark Revisited**

There are certain chunks of expressions which the **trajector/landmark** distinction, that we introduced in Chapter I, is better equipped to deal with, as Langacker (1983) points out. Unlike subjects, trajectors can be **stative** as **well** as processual relations. Thus in the expression *talk loudly*, *talk* is the trajector of the stative relational predicate (adjective in this case), but it can never be designated as the subject. In (1) *to the house* is the landmark of the verb *ran* but can never be the **object**.

(1) John ran to the house

Again in (2) *Mary **came*** is the trajector while *I left* is the landmark of *before*.

(2) Mary came before I left

In space grammar, any relational predication has a trajector and a landmark as part of its internal structure. *Red*, for example, has both a trajector and a landmark regardless of whether the former is manifested overtly by a nominal expression and despite the fact that the latter never can be. The notions subject and object are elements of clausal structure whereas the

trajector/landmark asymmetry holds of every relational predication regardless of its size or grammatical status.

Trajector/landmark is a matter of perspective rather than something expressed in **propositional terms**. Perspective and similar concepts like *salience* are considered to be crucial aspects of the semantic structure of an expression. The **schematic** definition of trajector that Langacker advances is the most appropriate to capture the class of objects variously termed as subject, agent, controller etc. in traditional discussions. The figure/ ground asymmetry is a pervasive **phenomenon** in human cognition and trajector/ landmark is seen to be a natural place to look for its operation in the language system. The trajector normally corresponds to the entity that is designated as the figure on ~~visual~~ perceptual grounds. As a **moving** object is always conceived of as the figure in the scene, **linguistically** the mover is most normally selected as the subject of a motion verb. In specifying the **figure/ground** asymmetry for verbs of motion and activity, the lexical exceptions to this principle **for** the selection of the trajector (subject) are relatively few; verbs of perception and **mental/emotional** attitude present a less regular picture.

To show the correspondence between the unmarked trajector

and the natural figure, **Langacker** claims that *before*, *in front of*, and *over* are the unmarked members of the pairs *before* vs. *after*, *in front of* vs. *in back of*, *over* vs. *under* etc. The unmarked members are more likely to be used when introducing new **entities** in a discourse. The trajectors of these unmarked members are the entities that are most readily perceived in a canonical viewing situation — they are visually **more** accessible and salient. Note that the Novelty Condition of **Heim** (Chapter II) ties in quite neatly with the notion of trajector and **landmark**. The notion of trajector (and therefore, subject) is basically semantic and all the syntactic properties of a subject are symptoms of the special salience that trajectors have by being figures in a relation.

Clausal subjects are supposed to exhibit greater topicality than other complements. Indefinites and non-specific subjects are barely tolerated and new information is likely to be **furnished** through an object. This leads to the equivalence of the **figure/ground** relation to the **subject/non-subject** relation. The externality of the subject in relation to the verb that we talked about in Chapter I lends itself to the interpretation that being the figure in a relational profile is what makes it special. Even in free word order languages like Hindi or Bangla, adverbs can be fairly easily inserted between the subject and the residue in comparison to insertion between the object and the verb.

- (3) **mEM-ne** zor-se gas **laa** gaayaa (Hindi)
 I ERG **loud-with** song sang
 'I sang **loudly**'
- (4) ami **taRataRi** baRi **gelam** (Bangla)
 I quickly house went
 'I went home quickly'
- (5)a. mEM-ne gaanaa zor-se gaayaa
 'I sang SONGS **loudly**'
 'I sang songs LOUDLY'
- b. ami baRi taRataRi **gelam**
 'I went HOME **early**'
 'I went **home** EARLY'

(3) and (4) show the most standard word order and a shifting of the adverb does alter the semantic import of the sentences to some extent **(5a,b)**. This suggests that the externality of the subject has observable effects in these languages as well. Figure/ground as abstract concepts to deal with such phenomena begin to help make sense of them.

However, we take this to mean that the object is **more** often there than the subject. In Chapter II, we have mentioned at least two studies showing the primacy of the patient role in child language (Greenfield and Smith (1976) and Lebeaux (1987)). In terms of **trajector/landmark** we note that a predication relation will always need a landmark to be covertly or overtly specified, primarily because a trajector is the most salient entity. We also view the function of the notion of trajector/

landmark is to recast a clause in terms of locating a pivot — a pointer; the rest of the clause then follows as being either the trajector or the **landmark**. If a clause can be viewed as a paper then such pointing establishes the axis along which the paper can be folded to provide two separate areas.

We differ from Langacker's proposal of the importance of the trajector or the clausal **subject**. Within the theory of Cognitive Grammar, this is a result of searching for the **prominent** topic of an expression. To continue the position that we are taking, we emphasize the chain link that may be established when the landmark of an expression E becomes the trajector of the expression E+1, thereby **demonstrating** again the **importance** of the notion of **landmark**.

3.2 Unergatives


The importance of the object relation, which we are trying to see in the light of a more general term like **landmark** that also covers the parallel notion of focus, is also apparent when we try to expand our picture so that it includes unergatives and **unaccusatives** as well as dyadic verbs. In this on unergatives section we will attempt to show that unergative clauses consistently have a deep object position. We will discuss ergatives, transitives and accusatives in the following sections to argue

that all of them have an **object** at some level of derivation. **We** begin with the most unlikely candidate.

Unergatives are a subtype of **intransitives** containing a subject perceived as actively **initiating** or actively responsible for the action of the verb, like *run, talk, resign*, etc. Subjects of these verbs are assigned an external **theta-role** (of agent) by the verb. In **many** languages these are **distinguished morphologically**. In Italian and Danish, unergatives **form** their perfective with *to have* (and **unaccusatives** use *to be*).

As we mentioned in Chapter II, both unaccusatives and unergatives are **distinguished** by the presence of only one argument in the (deep) VP (assuming that subjects also are **generated** VP-internally). Unergatives are marked by the apparent absence of an object and accordingly the structure that we presented in Chapter II (62) is repeated here as (6).

(6)



The Movement of the subject NP to **[SPEC,TP]** is overt in Accusative languages and takes place at LF in ergative languages. By the end of the next few sections, it will be clear why we do not prefer a structure like (6) without any **AGR** projections. For now, we adopt the Chomsky (1993) version of the ergativity parameter (see next section) or the Obligatory Case Principle (OCP) of Bobaljik (1993). They claim that ergative and nominative case systems are due to a parameter in Case Theory. We will come back to it in greater detail in section 3.4 but for now it is enough to know that if AgrS is active the resulting Case system is nominative and if AgrO is active then it is ergative. In this system, unlike Murasugi (1992), nominative corresponds to ergative and absolutive to accusative, the former pair being checked at **[SPEC, AGRs]** and the latter at **[SPEC, AGRo]**.

However, Laka (1993) shows that this is not always the case. In Basque, the following obtains:

- (7)a. emakumea-0 erori da
woman-ACC fallen is
 'The woman has fallen'
- b. emakumea-k barre egin du
woman-the-ERG laugh done has
 'The woman has laughed'

Both (7a,b) are instances of intransitive predicates, the former being an unaccusative and latter an **unergative** predicate. As can

be seen **from** (7), there is no single Case that gets checked **for all intransitives**. While the unaccusative predicate (7a) assigns a (**morphologically** My null) accusative to the **subject**, the unergative assigns an ergative (Barked by -if). (7a) would lead one to think that AgrO is active in intransitives but (7b) shows that the external argument is assigned (or checks for) Case at [SPEC, AGRs].

This is also found in Hindi to **some** extent. Mahajan (1990) and Saleemi (1994) report the following:

(8)a. kutte bhoMke
 dog-Pi barked-Pl
 'the dogs barked'

b. kuttoM ne bhoMkaa
 dog-Pi ERG barked-MSg
 'the dogs barked'

(9)a. laRkii khaaMsii
 girl coughed-Fsg
 'the girl coughed'


b. laRkii ne khaaMsaa
 girl ERG coughed-MSg
 'the girl coughed'

(8) and (9) above show that ergative Barking is optionally allowed in certain **unergatives**.


To approach an adequate analysis of (7 - 9) let us look at the structure of unergative predicates. Hale and Keyser (1991) point out that unergatives are transitive at the lexical **rela-**

tional stage — a **pre-D-structure** stage of derivation. This is shown in (10a) **below**.

(10)a.



b.




At **D-structure**, the N head of the unergative incorporates into the V. This is shown in (10b). The Basque data in (7) is explained on the basis of (10a), that is, the predicates never undergo **incorporation** and they involve a **light** verb and an action **nominal**:

(11)a. nik **lan** egin dut
 I-ERG work done have-me
 'I worked'

b. nik eztu! egin dut
 I-ERG cough done have-me
 'I have coughed'

Laka (1993) assumes that the lack of **incorporation** explains the syntactic transitivity of unergatives in Basque. The structure he proposes is the following:

(12)




Unergatives that assign ergatives in Hindi are also assumed

to be **syntactically** transitive (Mahajan, 1990). Notice that the aspect of the verb in (8-9) is perfective which, in Mahajan (1990), is a **non-Case-assigner**. The subjects in these clauses are, therefore, assigned ergative inherently and subsequently raised to [SPEC, AGro] to satisfy the licensing criterion.

Laka (1993) initially proposes the following structure for (7b):

(13)




¹.AgrsP and AgroP are respectively Agr1 and Agr2 in Laka's system.

receive Case2. (13) implies that **the** internal structure of **unergatives** is the same as that of the transitives. Laka (1993), **however**, gives it up in favour of a non-movement (of the internal argument) analysis based on the fact that only internal arguments of unergatives fail to carry determiners or quantifiers to **license** them whereas all other nominal arguments in Basque must carry a **Det/Q** head regardless of their specificity or definiteness. He generalizes that arguments of unergatives are **NPs** whereas other NPs are really DPs and only DPs can occupy [SPEC, **AGRs**].

Mahajan (1992) argues that only subjects which are [**+Specific**] move to [SPEC, **AGRo**] to receive Case from AgrO. NPs marked [**-Specific**] receive Case directly from V (inherent Case). Consider the Hindi data in (8) and (9) again. Native speakers other than Mahajan himself have consistently failed to find (8a) and (9a) more specific than (8b) and (9b). Notice that in **Mahajan's** account the a. sentences will have to move to [SPEC, **AGRo**] to achieve **SPEC-HEAD** configuration for the purpose of agreement. Assuming with most speakers that there is no specificity difference between the a and b sets of sentences, the account fails to derive the right surface structure.

However, if we adopt **Bhattacharya's** (1994) account of **long-distance** agreement with certain **modifications**, we get a better

idea of what is happening inside an unergative clause. The specific details of the proposal will be presented in section 3.5 (**Long-Distance** agreement). For our present purpose it will suffice to note that in Bhattacharya (1994) whenever a surface subject carries a visible morphological feature – either Case or agreement – a **dummy m-Case** feature **P1** is introduced in the embedded subject position in case of long-distance agreement cases which takes place in non-finite embedded clauses. We extended this dummy feature introduction (**DFI**) to cases of unergatives that we are looking at with the following **modifications**. As far as the DFI is concerned we propose that it depends not on visible m-Case on the subject but rather on the aspect of the verb in finite clauses like (8) or (9). We will assume with Mahajan (1994) that a nonCase assigning verb (**perfect** participle in this case) always triggers the introduction of, in our system, a dummy m-Case feature. We also adopt the structure proposed in Dasgupta and Bhattacharya (1994), Bhattacharya and Dasgupta (**forthcoming**), Bhattacharya (1995) for NPs in Hindi and Bangla. **This** is shown in (14).



It is proposed that the syntactic environment of an NP is conditioned by two forces. Its external **grammar** shows up at the D (declension) head of DP and registers Case, **definiteness** and other relational properties. Its internal grammar is a matter of B (badge) which comprises gender and number in Gender languages and is formally instantiated in the features of the N. we explore this structure and other related issues (**definiteness**) in detail in Chapter IV. For now it is enough to know that B in Hindi contains only PF-visible empty features and therefore must be erased before SPELL-OUT (Chomsky, 1993).

We claim in our analysis that the valency of the **dummy** feature introduced by a modified DFI interacts with the **valency** of the B node in Hindi to decide the agreement facts in **unergative** clauses. In Bhattacharya (1994) if a **dummy** feature Pn is weak or [-strong] then it triggers movement of the NP out of the VF. If on the other hand Pn is [+strong] the NP does not move ~~out~~ of the VP and default agreement takes place. We also claim that the **Dummy Feature Principle (DFP)** operates (see section 3.5 for motivations and **justifications**) as in (15):

(15) DFP: P2 only if **P1**

By (15) we assume that a second dummy feature CDF) is introduced and attached to the object, when **P1** is introduced. Notice that (15) entails a unified transitive clause structure for all types

of predicates -- an assumption with which this chapter began, i.e. clauses always have a deep object available at **some** level of derivation.

The strength of P2 mirrors (and depends on) the strength of P1. Therefore, the movement of an internal argument also depends on the valency of the DFs. We further assume that **DFI** now, after adopting (14), need not introduce a separate node but can achieve the same results by simply strengthening or weakening the sister node to the NP which is B in our system.


With this gadget let us see what happens in case of (8) and (9) repeated here as (16), (17) respectively:

- (16)a. kutte **bhoMke**
 dog-Pi **barked-P1**
 'the dogs **barked**'
- b. kuttoM ne bhoMkaa
 ERG barked-MSg
 'the dogs **barked**'
- (17)a. laRkii **khaaMsii**
 girl cough-FSg
 'the girl coughed'
- b. laRkii ne khaaMsaa
 ERG **coughed-MSg**
 'the girl coughed'

We propose that for the b. sentences, since there is an overt **n-**Case present, the valency of the DF introduced is "strong" whereas for a. sentences, absence of **n-Case** results in choosing a

"weak" DF. We **suggest** that only a weak or **{-strong}** P1 (and **P2**, as introduced by the DFP) results in **movement** of the **arguments** out of VP. The intuition behind this set of **movements** lies in the bare agreement facts of the language. In Hindi, overt **Case markers** or **postpositions** block **agreement**; it is, therefore, expected that their absence **will** result in **movement** out of the VP to an appropriate head since agreement takes place through the mediation of **AGR** heads to which T and V adjoin for checking off **subject** and object features **respectively**. The following is the structure for (17a):


(18)a.



In (18a) above, since the DF introduced (which in our **modified DFI means** altering the content of B) is **[+strong]**, the subject NP stays back in the VP and is assigned the inherent **ergative** Case. An alternative to inherent Case assignment could be a checking theory account for inherent Cases as well. Ergative Case on the subject could now be the result of **N → B → D** raising. Since **N → B** raising is overt in Hindi (Dasgupta & Bhattacharya, 1994), it is quite plausible to imagine that the ergative Case feature checking takes place at **[SPEC,D]** once the N-B complex raises to D. This is possible since D is taken to be the site where **communication** between the internal (BP) and the external (V) world takes place. However, such an alternative would amount to making inherent Case also an instance of structural Case. Although such an attempt at unification will lead to **overall** simplicity for the grammar, it is still too early in the present state of our analysis to assume such a move. Notice that the **DP1** in (18a) will have to **move** to **[SPEC,AGRs]** ultimately for **licensing** reasons while the V **finally** moves through other intermediate heads (to check its own **Tense-feature** and object **agreement** features if it has an agreeing object) to AgrS where it checks off **1.As** is done for licensing of PRO as a case of Null Case checking in Chomsky & Lasnik (1992), Chomsky (1993) and elaborately for Hindi in Shah (1995).

its (the V's) own default agreement phi-features (**3Msg**)

(18b)



In (18b) we presume that the content of B is weak or B is [-strong]. In our system, therefore, the overt NPs in such a situation move out of the VP. Notice that the weakness of the B node in (18b) is correlated with the absence of an overt Case marker or postposition on the external argument. A [-strong] B of DP1 causes it to raise out of VP to [**SPEC, AgrS**] to check for nominative Case against the raised T and phi-features against the V which ultimately raises, as in the case of (18a), to AgrS. **This** is how the verb in (17b) comes to agree with the subject NP.

In 3.5. we will **make** use of a modified version of **Watanabe's** (1993) **Three-layered** Case Theory to account for the **long-distance** agreement phenomenon in Hindi. We will see **how** certain types of features are created as a result of feature checking which, we will claim, gets cancelled against similar features elsewhere. (18a,b) in such a system will produce, after feature checking, the right number of features to be cancelled out against each other, accounting for the agreement facts we notice in (16) and (17).

Notice that in (18), the structure for unergatives contains an object position in the form of **DP2**. This is a long known fact about unergatives. Unergatives in Dutch and German regularly passivize, from which Postal (1986) and others concluded that unergatives must have a "dummy" object. Further evidence of such a dummy object is shown (Jayaseelan 1989) cases like the **following** where unergatives mark accusative Case:

(19)a. John laughed him out of the court

b. John laughed himself silly

Unergatives in **Bangla** also passivize (unlike the **unaccusatives** — see section 3.4):

(20) e rOkom parTi-te heMSe phEla jaY
 this type party-LOC laugh-CP fall-INF goes
 'It is possible to laugh in such parties'

In (20) the **dummy** object of the **unergative** becomes a **dummy** subject.

This discussion so far demonstrates that **unergatives** are best seen as underlyingly transitive, derived from a structure involving nominal arguments of the V (see (10) above). In some languages the process of **incorporation** (Hale and **Keyser** 1991) is overt and in others it is not. Basque and Hindi belong to the latter group. This unincorporated **dummy** object, therefore, counts as the second argument and the clause, for feature checking purposes, behaves like a transitive one whereby the external argument moves to [SPEC, AGRs] for Case reasons.

In fact, the attribution of an underlyingly transitive character to unergatives is the motivation behind Bobaljik's (1993) OCP which, in effect, claims an equivalence between **NOMERG** and ACC/ABS. If there is only one argument in the clause (that is, if incorporation of the type (10b) takes place), Case is realized at [SPEC,AGR2] and if there are two arguments (as in Hindi and Basque) the derivation parallels that of a transitive clause where the **dummy** object because of its very nature cannot support any Case checked at [SPEC,AGRo] and **AGR2**, therefore, is not realized.

Further evidence for the existence of a non-overt **dummy**

object in unergatives **comes** from the existence of 'cognate' objects of unergatives in **many** languages, including Hindi. In **English**, typical examples of cognate objects are expressions like *fight a tight*, *dance a dance*, etc. In Hindi, these cognate object constructions are possible only with unergatives that take an ergative subject.

(21)a. rukun-ne ek madhur haMsii haMsii
 Rukun-ERG one pleasant smile-F smiled-FSg
 'Rukun smiled a pleasant smile'

b. • rukun madhur haMsii haMsaa
 smiled-MSg

21) shows the cognate object *haMsii* 'smile/laughter' appears only in cases where the unergative verb assigns ergative to the subject.

Notice however that (21), according to our theory, generates a **[+strong]** DF or rather makes B of **DP1** (and therefore **DP2**) **[+strong]**. Recall that a **[+strong]** B restricts movement out of the VP. This is clearly problematic because in (21) the V agrees with (and assigns, according to Mahajan (1990), a "partitive" Case to) the cognate object which implies the presence of the object at **[SPEC,AGRo]** at some point of derivation. We suggest that **Laka's** (1993) distinction between **nominals** of unergatives and other **nominals** in terms of the former being NP (and therefore



remaining inside the VP) and the latter being DPs (and therefore moving out) applies here for the Hindi data as far as the distinction between "dummy" objects of **unergatives** (16b, 17b) and "cognate" objects (21) is concerned.

Specifically, we claim that if the object of the unergative is a non-trivial DP (by which we mean a DP with its [SPEC,B] and/or [SPEC,D] filled), it moves out of the VP irrespective of the valency of the Badge node. Therefore, the presence of a non-trivial DP is a stronger requirement for the movement of arguments. This makes intuitive sense since it is imaginable that arguments with more content have a better chance of surviving on their own.

The non-triviality of the DP in (21) is quite transparent. In fact, the sentence without the Det is less acceptable and further elimination (of the adjective) deteriorates its unacceptability to the extreme. This is shown in the following:

- (22)a. ? rukun-ne madhu- haMsii haMsii
 Rukun-ERG pleasant smile-F smiled-FSg
- b. * rukun-ne haMsii haMsii

The respective structures of the DP2s for these two sentences are as follows:



The syntactic requirement proposed in Laka (1993) that only categories headed by a D can occupy [SPEC, AGR] holds and we obtain the results of (21, 22).

Notice that movement of any argument in spite of a [+strong] Case feature associated with it is not a phenomenon to be viewed in isolation. In Gujarati, verbal agreement in transitive clauses takes place with the object even when the latter is marked with a **postpositional** Case feature. This analysis would predict similar movements in Gujarati transitive clauses to account for the agreement facts.

We conclude this section by observing that unergatives behave like underlying transitive predicates with a dummy/cognate

object. The Case properties of the clause fall out as a result of the application of the OCP. Transitivity of **unergatives**, we assume, **implies** the presence of an AgrO and as we proceed, we **will** adduce further evidence of this presence, in other words, of the pervasiveness of the **object**.

3.3 Ergativity

As we pointed out in the previous chapter, ergative Case marking typology is sensitive to the transitivity property of a clause (Givón 1985). A tense/aspect split in terms of ergativity **marking** is typical of verbs on the higher side of the transitivity scale. As the transitivity of the verb decreases, the range of **environments** where the subject is **marked** NOM rather than ERG expands. In fact, ergative **constructions** in general, as Hopper (1983) points out for Malay, are highest in transitivity compared to passives (which are next) and actives. It becomes, therefore, pertinent to study the phenomenon since one of the languages under study, anyway, shows the (split) ergativity pattern. Ergativity, therefore, is important from the point of view of its position vis-a-vis transitivity and its **participation** in agreement. We discuss this **participation** in detail in this section.

3.3.1 Split **Ergativity** in Hindi

The split **ergativity phenomenon** of Hindi is exhibited in a transitive clause in a perfective aspect in the following:

- (24) rukun-ne kitaab xariidii thii
 M **ERG** book-FSg-ACC bought-PRF-FSg be-PST-FSg
 'Rukun had **bought** a book'

No other aspect tolerates **ERG marking** of the external argument:

- (25) rukun-(*ne) kiitaab xariide-gaa
 book-FSg buy-FUT-MSg

(24) also shares the agreement pattern associated with ergative clauses — the inertness of external argument marked ergative, in terms of its participation in agreement **morphology**. The verb, therefore shows gender and number agreement with the object. If the object is overtly Case-marked (unlike in (24)), then the verb shows default **agreement**.

Mahajan (1989; 1990) accounts for ergative Case marking in Hindi by means of the following assumptions:


- i. the perfective participle **form** of the verb does not assign Case, and
- ii. ergative is an instance of inherent Case

1. Other accounts like that of Gair and **Wali** (1989) operate from a unified **INFL** structure and the notion of maximal c-command by a 'direct'-Case marked NP. However, our account has a different focus as it deals with a split-INFL hypothesis.

In Mahajan's system the assignment of structural Case is tied to the Agr system. Before we go on to present the structure for (24) and the derivation thereof, it might be instructive to look at Mahajan's (1990) system of agreement and related concepts.

Mahajan proposes the movement of Argument Shift (A-shift) to analyze agreement (and other) facts of Hindi syntax. A-shift is movement to an L-related position. X is L-related to Y if Y is lexical (V, A, N, P, Agr, T) and X is related to (included in) a projection of Y. So in the following tree everything from TP upwards (including TP) is non-L-related and everything else is L-related.

(26)




Especially the Spec of T, AgrS, Aux (if there is any) and V are the positions to which A-shift takes place. Out of these, Spec-T and Spec-Agr are potential Case positions, that is, where Case can be assigned. We will return to the distinction between L- and **non-L-related** positions in a later section (3.6) in connection with the **computational** tracking strategy we have in mind.

Related with this is the concept of L-chain. Every L-chain should have Case. For example, the L-chain (A, t, **t'**, t'') has structural Case assigned to its head and the tail consists of which t, **t'**, t'' are all **theta-positions** but structural Case is not assigned to these. It is like an A-chain. A in the above chain can receive structural as well as inherent Case. Inherent Case is **theta-related** and therefore not visible for the Case filter. The distinction between **L-positions** and **non-L-positions** and the concept of L-chains resolve the **conflict** between Case marking to A or A' positions across the two theories.

1. Raina (1991) states that making a distinction between IO and DO in Hindi does not make sense and assignment of both inherent and structural Case would result in Case conflict. In Chomsky (1981) A-positions are argument positions (VP-internal) and the Spec of IP. But now Subjects are generated VP-internally and therefore Spec of IP is not a theta-position anymore. The present framework implies that it is an A' position to which subjects, after receiving **theta-role** and Case (by Infl) VP-internally, move.

Agreement is mediated through A-shift which **moves arguments** to **L-related** positions which are governed by Agr. This provides a **configuration** where agreement can take place. An Agr - governed argument position is also a **configuration** for structural Case assignment. An object in the VP-internal position which does not get Case in-situ moves out to the Spec of AgrO to get structural Case assigned by AgrO. Consider the **following**:

(27)




Object agreement therefore takes place in those cases where it is not possible for the verb to assign Case, for example, a perfect participle or psych verb or a passive participle.

There are two visibility conditions at work in this system. The LF visibility condition requires that **all** NPs (or chains) bear structural Case. **S-structure** visibility requires all NPs (or chains) to have Case (inherent (lexical) or structural). In

this theory **arguments** (objects) that are structurally Case-marked by the verb can never undergo **argument** shift. **Scrambling** possibilities are related to this (in)ability.


From the agreement facts of Hindi we get V-AgrO-Tense-AgrS. That is, we need two Agr positions as shown. In a typical VP structure an argument within that VP which gets the structural Case cannot move out for Case reasons but it can move out to a non-L-related position. Arguments not receiving structural Case VP-internally move to Spec of Agr position and show **agreement** by copying the agreement features from the Agr. Consider the following ((12) in Mahajan) :



Here the V is supposed to assign structural Case to the object *roTii*. The subject moves first to Spec-T and then to Spec-Agr_S and gets structural Case assigned to that position through that Agr. It has to move to Spec-T for getting the tense features of the verb. In spirit, it does not differ much from with account in Minimalism where the T moves to AgrS and the V to AgrO for the purpose of assigning structural Case to the subject at Spec-AgrS and the object at Spec-AgrO respectively. The Case features of T and V and the phi-features of Agr combine to give Case and Tense and agreement to the subject as well as the object NP.

Returning now to (24), the structure in this system will be (29).

(29)



the participial fora in Mahajan's system **necessarily** pushes these forms into the **lexicon** proper. This is not preferable since all verbs can have similar **morphological** markers which can be derived or predicted on the basis of the Morphological system of the language. Mahajan's **assumption** (a above) is also empirically inadequate since **Davison** (1988) presents cases where a perfect participle form assigns Case. Consider the following:

(31)a. mEM-ne unheM dekhaa
 I-ERG they-ACC **see-PRF-MSg**
 'I saw him'

b. * mEM-ne ve dekhaa
 they

The nominative NP *ve* in b. is not allowed, showing that the **PRF** is a **Case-assigner**. Other examples of this movement are the ones with perfect auxiliaries like **cukaa** and **gayaa**. **Saleemi** (1994) points out that such non-ergative perfective patterns are quite common and productive.

(32)a. **ajmal** voh kitaab paRh **cukaa** thaa
Ajmal that book-F read done-PRF-M **be-PST-3MSg**
 'Ajmal' had read that **book**'

b. **ajmal** voh kitaab choR gayaa thaa
 left go-PRF-Msg
 'Ajmal had left that **book**'

Singh (1993) also points out that according to **Burzio's** (1986) **generalization** (Unaccusative Hypothesis), if the perfect Participle is a **non-Case-assigner** then it should absorb the

external **theta-role**. But the **following** shows that this **is** not the case and therefore the perfect participle not **being** a **Case-**assigner is suspect.

- (33) * unheM **dekhaa**
 they-ACC see-PRF-MSg
 ('they were **seen**') (Singh 1993: 112)

In connection with (29), note that the inherently Case-marked subject NP moves through the **[SPEC,AGR_O]** to the **[SPEC,AGR_S]** position. This gives rise to two problems:

(i) At D-structure by Spec-Head Agreement, agreement is established between the verb and the subject and then later the subject moves to Spec-Agr to get structural Case. Under this view the subject can agree with both the **main** and auxiliary verb but receives structural Case from AgrS. This does not work in **Minimalism** because there is no Agr in the **VP-internal** position for **agreement** to take place.

(ii) The subject first moves to the Spec of Agr_O and then to the Spec of Agr_S. The **t_{left}** at the Spec of Agr_O should not be **Case-marked** because the head of the chain (**Subj_i, t_i, t_i'**) should be structurally Case-marked by Agr_S.

How is this achieved? There are again 2 ways:

- a. Structural Case assignment is optional and therefore the Agr_O need not in this case Case-mark the t.
- b. Deletion of the t takes place at the Spec Agr_O position.

There is some evidence for the latter view from Marathi. In imperfect tense in Marathi (**34a,b**) are possible. The Marathi verb

in perfect tense shows **agreement** both with the subject and the **object**, that is, there is a **slot** for object **agreement** in **Marathi** (see (35a,b))

(34)a. tu pothi vaac-t-o-s
 you book-F read-IMP-M-2Sg
 'you(M) are reading the **book**'

b. tu pothi vaac-t-e-s
 you book-F IMP-F-2Sg
 'you(F) are reading the **book**'

-s in (34) shows agreement with the subject in person and number and the object slot shows subject agreement (in gender). This piece of data, therefore, speaks in favour of a deletion analysis. But the following does not. The object slot registers object gender in (35):

(35)a. tu kavita vaac-l-i-s
 you-ERG poem-Fsg read-PRF-FSg-2Sg
 'you read the book'

b. tu nibandh vaac-l-o-s
 you-ERG essay-MSg read-PRF-MSg-2Sg
 'you read the **essay**'

If we buy the erasure story then chain formation for the subject to [SPEC,AGRs] movement is problematic due to the absence of any intermediate trace.


A further problem posed by the account is its glossing over certain details regarding auxiliary agreement. In (24) above,

even the tense auxiliary agrees with the object NP. The position of T in (33) is, however, higher than that of **AGRo**. Singh (1993) notes that it is not very clear how the object NP at [**SPEC,AGRo**] can trigger agreement on to the tense **auxiliary** (at least not the **SPEC-HEAD configuration**). Neither can AgrO love up to T, nor can T lower to **AGRo** since the latter is already occupied by the raised V.

3.3.3. Singh's **Problematic** Solution

Singh (1993) proposes a more elaborate phrase structure for Hindi clauses in which separate heads for the nodal and the aspect are provided. The structure he proposes is as follows:

(36)



This structure acts for sentences of the following type:

- (37) laRke kitaab paRhthe the
boy-MPl-NOM **book-FSg-ACC** **read-IMP-MPl** **be-PST-MPl**
 'The boys used to read the book'

With this structure aspect need no longer be generated in the lexicon but can be derived **syntactically**. This **solves** the **economy problem** in **Mahajan's** (1990) account. Singh's (1993) system crucially assumes a government account of Case assignment. He proposes that the imperfect ASP head ("containing" *-t* above) governs the **[SPEC,V]** position and assigns **NOM** to it.

For ergative Case assignment, as in (38) below, he assumes that the perfect ASP now assigns ergative Case to the **[SPEC,V]** position. The difference between the two ASP heads is that if it is imperfect, it assigns **NOM** and if it is perfect the **same** head assigns ergative.

- (38) laRkoM-ne kitaab paRhii thii
 boy-MP1-OBL-ERG book-FSg-ACC read-PRF-FSg be-PST-FSg
 'the boys had read the book'

The barrierhood of VP is waived by adopting Fukui & Speas (1986) where lexical projections are never barriers. Singh (1993), therefore, replaces VP with V for (37). Objective Case is assigned within the V by the verb.

This account is difficult to digest not only because it completely disregards the Checking Theory of Case efficiently using the canonical relation of **SPEC-HEAD** which is a logical outcome of the **Split-INFL** hypothesis (which Singh adopts), but

also because it cannot account for the **full** range of data. Consider an example of an unergative predicate discussed in the previous section, again:

- (39) laRkii haMsii
 girl-FSg laugh-PRF-FSg
 'the girl laughed'

In (39) although the aspect is perfective, ergative Case is not marked on the subject, which in fact bears the nominative. Also, as we shall see in the next section (3.4), surface subjects of **unaccusatives** do not carry ergative even when the aspect is perfective. The following is a relevant example:

- (40) laRkaa aayaa
 boy-MSg come-PRF-MSg
 'the boy came'

Even Singh's own account, the (following) data that he uses to show that (perfective) Aspect is the Case **assigner** for the external **argument** in **fact**, proves that Tns is the Case assigner.

- (41)a. laRkoM ne caay pii thii
 boy-MPI-OBL ERG tea-F drink-PRF-F be-PST-FSg
 'the boys had drunk tea'
- b. laRkoM ne caay pii
 boy-MPI-OBL ERG tea-F drink-PRF-F
 'the boys drunk tea'

(42)a. **laŕke** caay piite the
 boy-MPI-NOM tea-F **drink-INF-MPI** **be-PST-FPI**
 'the boys used to drink **tea**'

b. ***laRke** caay piite
 boy-MPI-NOM tea-F drink-INF-MPI

(41,42) above show that the tense can be deleted for perfect aspect (as in (41)) but not in case of the **imperfective** (as in (42b)). From this, Singh (1993) concludes that ergative Case is assigned by the ASP head and not T. But this is just one part of the story. (42b) in fact, as Singh finally points out **himself**, shows convincingly that nominative Case is assigned by the T, in the absence of which (the T), **ungrammaticality** results.

To carry on his contention that T cannot be the Case **assigner**, he points out the following data:

(43) laRke caay **nahiiM** piite
 boy-MPI-NOM tea-F not **drink-INF-MPI**
 'the boys don't drink **tea**'

In (43) although a T is absent, the sentence is **grammatical** which proves to Singh's satisfaction that T is not required for the purpose of nominative Case assignment. However Singh has no account of how the **nominative** Case on the external argument in does get licensed in (43).

A checking theory of Case in line with Chomsky (1993) where

T in collusion with AgrS checks for **nominative** Case at **its** Spec can provide a neater account for the above data. Ergative Case in (41) can be taken care of either by:

- (i) inherent Case assignment within the VP in the same fashion as the unergatives which assign ergative (section 3.2)
- (ii) a unified account of Case checking at some Agr head, hinted at in section 3.2, within the DP where D is standardly assumed to contain an Agr element (Abney 1987).

Nominative in (42) can be checked at [**SPEC,AGRs**] **after** the T head containing the subject Case feature raises to AgrS in the spirit of the checking theory of Case in Chomsky (1992, 1993). The **ungrammaticality** of (42b) is then easily explained as a failure of the external argument to check its Case feature against the Case feature of **the** T head since it lacks a T head.

If we assume T to be responsible for nominative Case (since **nominative** is a **function** of finiteness) checking, (43) is no longer a problem. Notice that in **many** languages negative morphology carries the syntactic tense **information** as well (see Hariprasad (1988) for evidence of negation carrying the tense feature). This is true to some extent in Bangla **perfectives**. Bhattacharya (1995) proposes a highly articulated structure for Bangla which Roy (1995) adopts in working out the negative facts of Bangla in detail. For a predicate like (44), a series of

movements la proposed which works out the derivation in detail which is partly represented in (45) **schematically**.

- (44)a. **poR-e-chi-l-am**
read-PRF-AUX-T-1
 '(I) have **read**'
- b. **poR-0-0-0-i-ni**
 read **1-NEG**
 '**(I)** have not **read**'

(45) V+ASP+NEG+AUX+T+AGR ==> V+AGR+NEG
 ! _____ !

In (45) NEG represents a fused form. Whether this is the correct order or not can be inferred from the following simple data:

- (46)a. **poR-i-ni**
read-1-NEG
 '(I) did not read '
- b. **poR-o-ni**
 read-2-NEG
 '**(you)** did/ have not **read**'
- c. **poR-e-ni**
read-3-NEG
 '(s/he) did not **read**'

The intuitive idea behind the analysis is that the presence of a Neg head blocks verb movement to T and instead the Neg moves up to the T. This **is** how a fusion of ASP, **AUX**, **T**, and NEG takes place **syntactically**. The correct word order is achieved by the fused Neg head's need to check off its **modality** feature at a

higher head. This provides independent evidence that the Neg
•ay carry tense information.

The problem with Singh's (1993) analysis lies in making Aspect and not Tense the Case assigner. The dependence on the government relation for Case assignment also leads him to propose an entirely arbitrary apparatus to account for the agreement phenomena. Subject agreement is achieved through traces left behind by the movement of the subject to [SPEC,T] (to satisfy EPP), which triggers agreement on the ASP while agreement on T is achieved by coindexation of the subject with T. Object agreement, as we shall see in the next section, is achieved through the process of CHAIN formation mediated by an expletive element located in the subject position.

As we see it, this account relying on the notion of government and the separation of Case and agreement, does not achieve the desirable consequence of an overall economy of grammar.

3.3.4 Split VP Hypothesis

As pointed out in section 3.3.1, Mahajan's (1990) account of subject-verb agreement gives rise to certain problems because he

1.This in Roy (1995) is assumed to be MOD.

assumes Movement of the subject NP to [SPEC,AGRo] . Although in Minimalism, such a move is illegal (the subject NP having no feature to check against the AgrO head) and a violation of the OCP as well, his needs for suggesting such a move were for binding and word order reasons.

The movement of the external argument from [SPEC,V] to [SPEC,AGRs] was not a problem in the present framework. It does not violate the Shortest Movement Principle. This principle, as Chomsky (1993) observes, subsumes ECP which subsumes the HMC (Travis, 1984). This is also consonant with Epstein's (1984) analysis of LF verb raising in English. LF raising of V over a deleted trace of T is a violation of HMC, but is not a violation of Shortest Movement since a deleted head does not count as a blocking category.

3.3.4.1 Shortest Movement

The checking theory of Case as outlined in MPLT results in crossing paths instead of the familiar nested paths. A problem unattended to in Chomsky (1991) was what prevented the NPs from raising to the Specs of the wrong Agr heads. That is, there was no account of why the object could not raise to [SPEC,AGRs] and the subject to [SPEC,AGRo]. Notice that Mahajan, written in 1990, in fact, takes the latter to be the case for subject movement in non-perfective clauses, which resulted in the problem we

have already noticed.

Chomsky (1993) **formulates** Shortest **Movement**, an **Economy** principle (Chomsky, 1991), to resolve this problem as follows:


(47) Shortest Movement Principle

The target of movement must be no farther than the first appropriate landing site, where **appropriate** includes the following:

- (i) A Head position for head Movement (EMC of Travis, 1984)
- (ii) Spec of **AgrP**, TP, VP, etc. for A movement
- (iii) Spec-CP and adjoined positions for A¹ movement

To see how (47) operates, consider (48) below which shows overt subject raising (as in English) while the object remains in-situ until LF.


(48)



By hypothesis specifiers are freely generated which means Specs **are** present in a structure only if they are filled or targeted (as in 48) for **movement**. This is a consequence of the operation of Generalized **Transformation** (Chomsky, 1993). The absence of other Specs while the subject **movement takes** place can be inferred from (48) where Spec-AgrsP is the first appropriate landing site. The subject could not afford to raise to a [SPEC, **AGRo**] since the object then cannot check its features at that position.

The problem arises when an object has to raise to (SPEC, **AGRo**) after the subject movement has taken place. In English the object raises to [SPEC, **AGRo**] at LF for feature checking. The object movement must cross the trace of the subject in SPEC-VP which constitutes a violation of (47). Chomsky (1993) proposes that distance, for the purpose of (47), should be defined over chains. V raising to AgrO makes the SPEC of VP and that of AgrO now eauidistant from the complement of V position. Raising of the object can now skip one SPEC ([SPEC, V]) and is not a violation of (47). This is shown in (49).

(49)




Economy conditions therefore can rule out an inappropriate movement of the subject to SPEC AgrsP position if we raise the [V+AgrO] complex to T. This implies the Strict Cycle Condition where object raising to [SPEC, AGRo] precedes subject raising. This will immediately exclude Mahajan's set of subject movements where the subject moves to [SPEC, AGRs] through [SPEC, AGRo].

Suppose that in languages with overt object raising, the Strict Cycle Condition does not apply and further suppose that the subject trace at [SPEC, AGRo] is needed for semantic interpretations; then Epstein's (1984) account and even Mahajan's (1990) proposal of trace deletion can see us through this derivation. But then it constitutes an ECP violation since the subject trace at the [SPEC, VP] position cannot be deleted for theta reasons. And if the trace is not deleted it results in violation of the theta criterion since two chains (subject and object movement) will have a link in the [SPEC, AGRo] position.

3.3.4.2 Split-VP

We **claim** here that the **problem** of the subject trace in [SPEC, AGroP] can be solved if we **assume** a **split-VP** structure (Koizumi 1993) of the following type (50) where the subject resides in the SPEC of the higher VP.

(50)



Evidence for ISH (Kuroda 1986, Kitagawa 1986, Fukui and Speas 1986 and others) cited suggests that subject is associated with a position lower than SPEC-IP. Thus the floating quantifier *all* in (51) is associated with the trace of the subject:


(51) The **men_i** will [[**all t_i**] cut oranges]

(from Sportiche (1988), cited in Koizumi (1993))

Koizumi points out that this does not merely prove that the subject is **VP-internal** but rather that the subject originates at a place lower than its surface position. **Nakayama** and Koizumi (1991) (cited in Koizumi, 1993) prove that the base position of the subject is in fact outside the VP as in (52).

(52) [**IP** [**XP** Subject X [**VP**]]]

The interaction of **SIH** with such a view raises the question of choice behind the following.



Koizumi argues in favour of the (53)b. structure and **claims** that:

- (i) Objects in English raise to [**SPEC,AGRO**] in overt syntax for Case (Case and agreement) reasons, and
- (ii) Contrary to **ISH** the **base-position** of the subject is higher than **AgroP**.

As a consequence of (i) above the **main** verb in English also moves in the syntax to X. Koizumi shows that the Adjacency Condition (for Case assignment) is not well **motivated** and therefore overt main verb and object movement is **theoretically** possible in English. The motivation of overt object movement in English is because the NP feature of verbs – the accusative Case feature – is "strong" in English. This implies that the object moves to [**SPEC, AGRO**] (and V to AgrO) before SPELL-OUT. The overt main-verb movement is also similarly motivated by the

presence of a "**strong**" **V-feature** of X. He further shows that the V-features of T and **AGR** are weak in English while they are strong in French. Also, **while** the NP-features of V and **AGR** are strong in English, they are weak in French. Therefore, in French NP objects stay in the VP as in the following:

- (54)a. Pierre a [_{XP} *vu*_i [_{AgroP} [_{VP} *t*_i Marie]]]
 Pierre has seen Marie
- b. John has [_{XP} *seen*_i [_{agrop} *Mary*_j [_{VP}

He proposes (55) to account for the nature of X in (53).

- (55) External Phrase Hypothesis
 [_{EP} Subj [_E ...]]

The exact category of E could be a parameter among languages. In English he assumes E to be V. The null hypothesis is (56):

- (56) Split VP Hypothesis

EP is VP in all natural languages

(56) is a version of (55). A transitive verb such as *cut* in (51) will consist of, according to this hypothesis, two V's — V1 and V2 which are spelled out as a single word *cut*. The upper V (V1) is like an unergative verb (not in our terms though) whereas the lower V (V2) is like an **unaccusative**.

3.3.5 SVP for Hindi


If we adopt the split VP hypothesis for Hindi it immediately solves the **problem** of the trace left by the argument moving

through [SPEC, AGRo] to [SPEC, AGRs] in Mahajan (1990).

Now that the external **argument** is no longer sitting inside a projection under AgroP, the question of its trace at Spec-AgroP does not arise. A sentence like (24) repeated here as (57) will, therefore, have a structure like (58) instead of (29).

- (57) Rukun-ne kitaab xariidii thii
 Rukun-ERG book-FSg-ACC bought-PRF-FSg be-PST-FSg
 'Rukun had bought a book'

(58)



Although the various details are not worked out in Koizumi, we propose that in (58) above the subject originates at Spec-VP1 and moves to Spec-AgrsP to satisfy the licensing condition. The object NP checks for accusative Case feature overtly against the raised V at the AgrO Bead. The verb, for economy reasons (*mini-*

size chain links — Chomsky's (1993) version of Relativized Minimality) head-to-head **moves** to check off its **V-features** (Tense) and agreement features.

French participle agreement is also assumed to involve the subject touching Spec-AgroP before moving on to Spec-AgrsP (Kayne, 1985). A French participle agrees with its derived subject such as the surface subject of a passive construction or an unaccusative. The following examples depict this fact:

- (59)a. les livres de Jules Verne ont tous ete imprimes
 *imprime
- b. ils sont deja partis/ *partir

(59) implies that the NP from a VP-internal position moves step by step. A participle does not agree with external arguments such as the subject of a transitive clause and an unergative predicate as shown in Kayne (1985):

- (60)a. Jean a repeint/ *repeinte la table
b. ils ont rit/ *rits

(CO) shows that the participle does not originate in a place lower than AgroP — if it did, then participles in (60) should bear overt agreement features, which they do not.

According to (56) the subject of a transitive or an unergative originates external to the VP and therefore it cannot stop

by a [SPEC,AGRo], **simultaneously** the required word order of **tous** after the auxiliary is also achieved.

Notice however that our reworking of the SVP structure leaves the ergative Case assignment/ checking unsatisfactory. Koizumi's proposal does not work out these details. We imagine that the following are the **possibilities**:

- (i) **Spec-VP1** is assigned a structural ergative Case once the V2 moves up to **V1**, or
- (ii) **V1** in collusion with V2 assigns inherent ergative Case to the **subject** at Spec-VP1.

Both these **possibilities** are problematic. (i) above is unacceptable because structural Case checking taking place here although it involves a **SPEC-HEAD configuration** does not involve Case checking against a "proper" head — a basic **tenet/assumption** of **MPLT** — where proper means an **AGR** head. (ii) suffers from the same problem and additionally a syntactic **implementation** of "in collusion with" would be different from the spirit of Minimalism since it would have to present a Case theory utilizing either the notion of government or chain formation.

We, therefore, propose the following modification in a structure **like** (58). We preserve the basic insight of Koizumi's SVP by generating the subject external to the lower VP containing the object and the V, but propose the structure (61) where a type of **AgrP-split** is noticed.

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{AgrPv} \\
 / \quad \backslash \\
 \text{Subj} \quad / \quad \backslash \\
 \text{AgroP} \quad \text{Agrv} \\
 / \quad \backslash \quad | \\
 \text{Obj}_i \quad \text{VP} \quad \text{V} \\
 / \quad \backslash \quad | \\
 t_i \quad t_v \quad t_v
 \end{array}$$

(62) anguti-up arnaq taku-ja-a
man-REL woman (ABS) see-TR PPL-3Sg/3Sg
'The man sees the woman'

AgrPv
 / \
 NP \
 | / \
 arnaq AgrPn AGRv (Ø-patient)
 / \
 NP \
 | / \
 anguti-up NP AGRn (Ø-agent + NUM)
 | |
 taku-ja a

(63) is a **result** of projection of two functional heads, **AGR_v** and **AGR_n**. **AGR_n** is found in **transitives**, and a possessive clause take a verbal noun as its **complement** and assigns ergative Case to the NP at its specifier which is the agent of the clause. **AGR_n** contains the phi-features of the agent and the number feature of its complement. **AGR_v** is found in both transitive and intransitive clauses. **AGR_v** contains the phi-features of the patient and assigns **absolutive** to its specifier. Johns (1993) proposes that the lexical head of a transitive clause, the verbal noun, undergoes head **movement** first to **AGR_n** and then to **AGR_v**. Along with this movement of the verbal noun to the main predicate position, the agent moves up to adjoin to **AGRP_v**.

The structure we have proposed (61) can, therefore, take care of a larger set of empirical facts. We propose that ergative is still structurally assigned in such a split structure, but now, consonant with the spirit of **Minimalism**, it takes place in **SPEC-HEAD configuration** with an appropriate **AGR** head (**AGR_v** in this case). The object moves up to [**SPEC**, **AGR_o**] as in (58) and checks for its phi-features as well as Case feature (**ACC**) against the V's phi and Case features. Such an account, we claim, will also unify the Case checking procedure for both **perfective** and **imperfective** clauses.

3.4 Unaccusatives

Continuing with the broad **theme** of this chapter, that is of **investigating** the primacy/ pervasiveness of the object/ patient/ internal **argument** (see section 3.1), we now discuss **unaccusatives** which are more transparent than unergatives (see section 3.2) as far as the possession of a deep object is concerned.


Unaccusative predicates, unlike unergatives, have a surface subject which takes no active part in the action of the verb. That is, the subject is **nonvolitional**. Many languages, as we pointed out in 3.2, distinguish between unaccusatives and unergatives **morphologically**: in Danish and Italian, **unergatives** form their perfectives with *to have* while unaccusatives use *to be*. Thus in Italian, unaccusative verbs like *arrivere* 'arrive', *sembrare* 'seem', and *affondare* 'sink' take *essere* 'be'.

In Chapter II (section 2.8) we pointed out that **unaccusatives** have a VP with an object but no **subject**, although they share the property, with unergatives, of possessing only one **argument** in the clause. More **specifically**, the structure pro

1. In Burzio (1981) unaccusatives are called 'ergatives': we **will**, however, stick to the original **terminology**.

posed by Murasugi (1992) ((63) of section 2.8) repeated here as (64) is as follows:


(64)



In (64) the object moves to the [SPEC,T] position in overt syntax.

In the older terminology, that is before SIH arrived, we have a structure like (65) where the accusative V *arrived* fails to assign accusative Case to the object. The object therefore moves up to Spec-IP position and receives nominative Case from the I head.

(65)



The failure of the unaccusative verb to assign accusative Case to its object **is** explained by **Burzio's generalization** which predicts that verbs which fail to assign an external **theta-role** also fail to assign Case. Since unaccusative predicates do not consist of a '**deep**' subject, they consequently fail to assign accusative Case to their '**deep**' objects. This brings into **ques'tion** their transitive status, but because they have deep objects we will assume that they are instances of transitive verbs. The following examples illustrate their inability to assign accusative Case:

- (66)a. • John **fell** him out of court
b. * John existed himself easy

This leads to the natural conclusion that **unaccusatives** do not passivize, **unlike** unergatives which do passivize in some

languages. In Relational Grammar this follows from the **IAEX** principle which says that no more than one **argument** can be advanced to subject position in the course of a derivation. This is true in Bangla where the lack of a volitional agent results in **ungrammaticality** when **unaccusatives** are passivized a fact first noted by **Klaiman** (1981):

- (67) * e rokom janla diye poRe jaWa jaY na
 this type window **from-LOC** **fall-CP** **go-INF** goes not
 'It is not possible to fall **from** such **windows**'

Compare this with (20) repeated here as (68) where **passivization** does not result in **ungrammaticality**.

- (68) e rokom parTi-te heMse phEla jaY
 this type party-LOC **laugh-CP** **fall-INF** go
 'It is possible to laugh in such parties'

The agreement facts of unaccusatives are **straightforward** in that the verb agrees with the subject. Consider the following:

- (69) laRkaa aayaa
 boy-MSg **come-PRF-MSg**
 'the boy **came**'
- (70) darvaazaa khulaa
 door-MSg **open-PRF-MSg**
 'the door **opened**'
- (71) guldaan TuuTaa
 vase-MSg **break-PRF-MSg**
 'the vase **broke**'

Notice however that although the verbs in the above sentences are in the perfective, the subjects cannot be **marked** ergative. There-

for we get the following:

(72) * **laRke-ne** aayaa

(73) • darvaaze-ne **khulaa**

(74) • **guldaan-ne** TuuTaa

Saleemi (1994) attributes thiE to the agentive character of the ergative *-ne*. Since the volitionality of the surface subjects in (69-71) is weak, they cannot, therefore, cooccur with an ergative marker. To understand how we can derive this syntactically, we need to look at the process of object **agreement** in detail.


3.4.1. Object **Agreement** in Hindi

Object agreement in Hindi takes place when the subject is overtly (**morphologically**) Case-marked, as seen in (24) in section 3.3. Mahajan (1990) accounts for object agreement in the **following** manner. Consider (75):

(75) **raam** ne roTii khaa-y-ii
 Ram-ERG bread-F eat-PRF-F
 'Ram ate the bread'

the structure for which is as follows:

(76)



In (76) *khaay* 'ate' is a perfective fora and is a **non-Case** assigner like passives and participles. In (76) *raam* gets inherent Case in its **VP-internal** position and therefore can stay in-situ in the S-structure and thus results in the order as in (77).

(77) roTii **raam** ne khaayii

The verb moves to AgrO in this system. The object *roTii* 'bread' in this case does not receive structural Case from the verb and therefore has to move to the Spec-AgroP position where it is supposed to get structural Case **from** AgrO. The problem for (75) is that the **object** agrees with the verb and since agreement is a matter of Agr and since there is no Agr in the VP, there cannot be any **agreement**.


3.4.1.1. Evidence for **movement** to **Spec-Agr_o**

Mahajan (1990) cites adverbial **interpretation** as part of the evidence for the **movement** to the Spec-Agr P position. **Assuming** the work of Travis on this, it **is** argued **that** we need an **adjunction** to a projection of V for a process reading of **an** adverbial sentence whereas the event reading involves adjunction to a projection of I. Consider (78) and (79).


- (78) **raam ne kaam jaldii se kiyaa**
 Ram HRG work quickly LOC do-PRF-MSg
 'Ram did his work **quickly**'

- (79) **raam ne jaldii se kaam kiyaa**
 Ram HRG quickly LOC work do-PRF-MSg
 'Ram **quickly** did his **work**'

In both the cases the object *kaam* 'work' agrees with the verb.
 The respective structures are as follows:




(81)



In (81) the adverb has scope over the whole predicate which is why it gives an event reading, whereas after the object Moves in (80) the adverb can have scope only over part of the predicate and therefore we get the process reading. If (81) were not the **S-structure** of (79) then we would have the tree as in (82).

(82)



In (82) the adverb could be adjoined to either I or V and therefore should give an ambiguous reading but (79), as we saw, has an event reading only, showing that the object must have Moved to the **Spec-Agr_OP** position at S-structure.

3.4.1.2. Object **Agreement** in Singh (1993)


Singh (1993) proposes a KP structure for the **NPs** which do not trigger agreement since they have an overt **postposition**. The structure for the **KPs** like *laRke* 'boys' and *laRkoM ne* 'boys-erg' are as follows:



A filled K in (83b) marks it as an opaque domain for agreement purposes. The agreement on the aspect (his ASP head) and tense is taken care of through the process of **CHAIN formation**. He also assumes that **CHAIN** formation is Mediated by an expletive element located in the subject position. This is shown in (84b).

- (84)a. laRkoM ne kitaab xariidii thii
 boys ERG book-F bought-PRF-F be-F
 'the boys had bought books'

(84)b.



Singh's motivation for a *pro* in the subject projection is EPP and the existence of sentences like the following:

(85) lagtaa hE ki **baariS** hogii
 seems is that rain **be-will**
 'it seems that it will rain'

(86) aaj bahut khelaa gayaa
 today very played went
 '**there** was a lot of playing **today**'

(85) and (86) show weather and **impersonal constructions** respectively. If EPP holds then a *pro* subject can be assumed for these sentences. Whereas this is certainly true of (85-86), there is no reason to assume that (84a) above also contains a *pro* in the subject position since an overt subject already occupies this

position. On the basis of this ~~and other objections~~ raised in connection with his account of **subject** agreement (section 3.3) — **essentially** the **incompatibility** of such accounts with the spirit of **MPLT** — we state that Singh (1993) is not an improvement on earlier accounts.

Notice that in (69-71) the verb **agrees** in phi-features with the **unCase-marked** surface subject. It follows, then, that the deep **object**, at **some** point of derivation, should reach the Spec position of an **Agr** head which the V head **moves** to. In other words, an **Agr** projection is needed to account for the **agreement** facts noticed in these sentences.

3.4.2. Revised OCP

In section 3.2 we mentioned **Bobaljik's** (1993) and **Chomsky's** (1993) contention that ergative and nominative Case **systems** are the results of a parameter in Case Theory. Given that there are two positions available for the **assignment** of structural Case in a clause, then, if the predicate contains only one argument, only one of the **Agr** positions is active. An active **Agr1** results in a nominative Case **system** and if **Agr2** is active, the resulting Case system is ergative. This is shown in (87):

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| (87) Nom. system | ⇒ | Agr1 active (Case 1) |
| Erg. system | ⇒ | Agr2 active (Case 2) |

This parameter can yield either of the following :

- | | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|------|--------------------|
| (88) | Active Agr1 | (89) | Active Agr2 |
| a. Transitive V | C1, C2 | | C1, C2 |
| b. Intransitive V | C1 | | C2 |

By (88-89), a true predicate is not **parametrized** and is universally assigned two Cases — Case 1 to the external argument and Case 2 to the internal **argument**.

Bobaljik (1993) shows the operation of (88) in **English** as follows:

- (90) a. she C1 saw her C2
 b. she C1 fell
 c. she C1 laughed

(89) operates as follows for an ergative language (**Inuit**):

- (91)a. jaani-up C1 natsig C2 kapi-jaNa
 Jaani-ERG seat stab-Tr
 'Jaani stabbed a seat'
 b. inuk C2 tikit-tuq
 person arrived
 'the person arrived'
 c. ilinniagtitsiji C2 uqaq-tuq
 teacher spoke
 'the teacher spoke'

Notice (91b) is with an unaccusative predicate and Case with an **unergative**. Bobaljik stated that languages which diverge from

this pattern should be accounted for **independently of Case** Theory. As we pointed out in 3.2, **Basque** does not follow the pattern shown in (88-89). **Mahajan (1990)** and **Laka (1993)** point out that **Hindi** also does not **follow** that pattern. Let **us** look at the relevant data which is repeated here for comparison of tags **like C1 and C2**.

Basque (92)a. **emakumeak C1 emakumea C2** ikusi du
 woman-the-ERG woman-the-ACC Been has
 'the woman saw the woman'
 (Transitive)

b. **emakumea C2** erori du
 woman-the-ACC fallen is
 'the woman has fallen'
 (Unaccusative)

c. **emukameak C1** barre egin du
 woman-the-ERG laugh done has
 'the woman has laughed'
 (Unergative)

Hindi (93)a. **rukun-ne C1 kitaab C2 xariidii**
 Rukun-ERG booi:-FSg-ACC bought-PRF-FSg
 'Rukun bought a/the book'
 (Transitive)

b. **laRkaa C1 (*ne)** aayaa
 boy-(MSg)-NOM came-PST-MSg
 'the boy came'
 (Unaccusative)

c.(i) **laRkii-ne C1 haMsaa**
 girl-(FSg)-ERG laugh-PRF-3MSg

(ii) **laRkii C1 haMsii**
 girl-(FSg)-NOM laugh-PRF-FSg
 'the girl laughed'
 (Unergative)

The **intransitives** (b and c examples) of **Hindi** show that they indeed follow the **Case parameter** as stated in (87-89) as far as

activating only one Agr per clause type ie concerned. Whereas there is an asymmetry in **(92b,c)** – Agr2 being active in one (b) and Agr1 in the other (c) – **this** is not true f c r **Hindi (93)**. Notice that in accordance with the pattern in (88), in Hindi, there is no asymmetry in Case pattern for intransitives, both of which receive **C1**. **That**, precisely, IE the problem with Hindi. On the basis of (87) we would predict C2 being the Case **assigned** in intransitives in Hindi.

There are three **possibilities** here:

- (i) Hindi shows split ergativity reading Case Parameter as (89/90)
- (ii) In Hindi C1 in intransitives is assigned by Agr2
- (iii) OCP revision is in order.

(ii) will be in direct violation of the Checking Theory of Case presented in Chomsky (1993) where Agr2 (AgrO) is responsible for objective (ACC/ABS) Case checking and Agr1 (AgrS) is responsible for the Case of the subject (**NOM/ERG**). We think (i) is basically correct but OCP as stated does not mention this possibility. By (i) we mean that split ergativity can switch off the Case Parameter. In other words, (iii) is the option we would like to adopt.

3.4.2.1. Laka's (1993) revision of OCP


Chomsky (1991) propose 1 that both structural Cases (Case 1 and Case 2) involve the mediation of Agr. The difference between the two is that the former (NOM/ERG) involves Tense adjoined to Agr1 while the latter (ACC/ABS) involves V adjoined to Agr2. Structural Case therefore uniformly involves a [SPEC, X] relation. The motive of government does not come into play, unlike Mahajan (1992). According to Chomsky (1993) the Case features belong to Tns and V respectively. There are therefore two types of Case features – Tns Case features and V Case features. Laka (1993) proposes that the Case Parameter must invoke these two features rather than the Agr elements that they pair with. He, therefore, suggests the following revision (94) of the Case Parameter (92):

- (94)a. Activate Cv : Ergative Case system
- b. Activate Ct : Nominative Case system

The elements in (94) which have the capacity to be active or inert are no longer Agr1 and Agr2 but the Case features of the two Case assigners V and T respectively. This modification, according to Laka (1993), accounts for the Basque data. The ungrammaticality of (95) is accounted for by the modification since once the internal argument has received a Case feature assigned by V, there is no Case feature left to be assigned in

Agr. The external **argument** occupying ISPEC,Agr2) will remain **Caseless**.

(95)*



Laka **suggests** that **Belletti's** (1988) inherent partitive Case is a result of Case **assignment** by Cv directly in the VP without a mediating Agr. It is not subject to Burzio's **generalization**. Structural Case assignment (which necessarily involves an Agr **element**) by Cv results in ACC/ABS and the inherent Case **assignment** by Cv yields partitive Case of **Belletti** (1988).

Given (94), Burzio's **generalization** necessarily follows. Languages where Ct is active (nominative languages) Must **make** Cv inert whenever there is only one argument to license. It **follows** from this that clauses with only one argument **will** be unable to assign accusative, since accusative involves Cv. Laka proposed the following principles to account for the data:

(96) 1. Economy: 1 **Argument** \longrightarrow 1 Case

2. Case **Parameter**: a. **Activate** Ct
t. **Activate** Cv

a. (1,2a) ~ if 1 NP then only Ct
Burzio's generalization follows
Passives exist

b. (1,2b) = if 1 NP then only Cv
Burzio's generalization does not follow
Lack of passives

Antipassives

According to (96) in an ergative Case **system** a clause with one argument **will** receive Cv Case feature, in other words, accusative. Activation of Ct in such **cases** **will** violate **economy**. This explains the Basque data in (92). In 3.2 we have showed that unergatives are underlyingly transitives and by (88-89) there is no **parametrization** in case of transitive predicates. This explains the unergatives in Basque. For all practical purposes, therefore, only unaccusatives are predicates taking a single argument to which, thus, (96) applies. Laka concludes **from** this that Burzio's **generalization** does not hold for ergative languages. Passive is a particular instance of **Burzio's generalization**. In a dyadic predicate, if one **argument** is denoted, the other argument then will be assigned Ct Case feature or nominative in a nominative **system**. In an ergative system object Case is assigned (Cv + **Agr**) to the internal argument where the external argument has been demoted.

5.4.2.2. OCP for HINDI

This does not work for Hindi data in (83) above. The one **argument** that is activated does not bear Case **feature** \bar{C}_v or accusative Case. From this we might conclude the following:

(97) Split ergativity patterns like the **nominative system**.


Accordingly, the one argument Case activates C_T (as in (96a)) and the external **argument** receives **Nominative** or Ergative (as in (93c(i))). This position (of (97)) forces us to consider ergative as a case of structural Case, an option we toy with in 3.2 and 3.3. We further claim that the ergative Case feature is a property of **Tns**. This makes sense since **Tns** accommodates **agentive** Case features like the **nom** in nominative languages.

Notice however that with this assumption, our analysis of ergativity in 3.3 needs **modification**. In (61) we said nothing about the possible location of **ERG** Case feature. The analysis there **implies** that it is either a feature of the verb or the **Agr**. The latter possibility is not standardly assumed since **AgrS** do not have lexical content of their own. With the assumption that **Erg** Case feature is a property of the **Tns** head, we are in need of revision of the analysis presented there since the external argument in (61) cannot check for structural ergative Case at **[SPEC, Agrv]**.

Instead we propose that further raising to [SPEC,AGRS]¹ takes place for the subj NP which can check for the ERG Case feature against the AgrS head after T raises to AgrS. The Hindi data in (95), we propose, maintains the spirit of OCP in Bhat-jik (1993) by activating only one Case feature (or Agr), which is C1 for Hindi, for predicates with one argument. OCP, in our view, does not, therefore, need substantial revision. We claim that the general economy principle connected with the Case parameter, something along the lines of (96), holds in conjunction with (97) above.

Let us now see how (69-71) are accounted for in our system. We present the following as the structure for these unaccusative clauses:

(98)



1. Which is anyway the final position of the external argument at LF in (98).

The set of **movements** is as depicted. We claim 'hat **Ag-Pv** (as in (61)) is not generated here since there is a deep object for **unaccusative** predicates. The object instead is **promoted** to the surface subject position to **[SPEC,AGRs]**. Due to the absence of a deep subject, unaccusative verbs in their lexicon do not carry any **phi-features**. Ct here, as we have suggested above, contain the ergative Case feature, **ERG**. The V moves as shown to check off its phi-features and tense features. The object moves through Spec-AgroP (for agreement feature checking) to Spec-AgrsP (for Case feature checking).

3.4.3 The **Ergativity** Parameter

The reason for discussing this here in this section rather than in 3.3 is that it investigates a problem that results due to the **Ergativity** Parameter proposed in Mahajan (1994). He argues that the difference between the two major types of languages, **Nominative/Accusative** and **Ergative/Absolutive**, can be accounted for without recourse to any particular parameter. These two different systems of Case marking patterns can be shown to **follow** from other basic properties of the languages under **consideration**. The basic word order of a language may be one of the factors that contribute to this difference.

Mahajan (1994) takes the following typological **generaliza-**

tions to be significant in determining the difference between these Case marking patterns:

- (99) (i) SVO languages are never ergative. Ergativity is found only in verb-final languages
- (ii) Ergative languages are quite often **split-ergative**
- (iii) Ergative languages usually lack a verb corresponding to Romance/ Germanic have. The **auxilliary** in ergative **constructions** is be
- (iv) Ergative languages usually have a **proliferation** of oblique (**non-nominative**) subject **constructions** in addition to the ergative construction itself


All these properties are shown to follow from the basic word order that languages possess.

To see the underlying similarity between these two language types, consider the following (Mahajan 1994:2):

- (100)a. **raam-ne** vah kitaabeM **paRhii** thii
 Ram-ERG those book-Pi **read-PRF-FP1** **be-PST-FP1**
 'Ram had read those **books**'
- b. Paul **les** a repeintes
 Paul them has repainted
 '**Paul** has repainted **them**'

In both examples object agreement takes place. Object agreement in (100b) is an instance of SPEC-HEAD agreement, the clitic triggering object agreement when it passes through a [**SPEC,AGRo**] position. The agreement in (100a) is also, as we have seen in detail in 3.4.1, a case of SPEC-HEAD **configuration** involving

AgrO. However, in French only the participial agrees with the object while the **auxiliary** agrees with the **subject**. The other difference is that the auxiliary in French is *have*, while it is *be* in Hindi. In addition, the subject **markings** of the two languages differ. Mahajan (1994) proposes that these differences follow **from** the basic word order difference between the two languages. The underlying structures for (100a,b) are as follows:



These two structures differ only in **directionality** which leads Mahajan to state that the differences between (100e,b) are due to different derivational processes.

Kayne (1993) suggested that *have=be* + an empty preposition. Therefore, *have* is a form which is derived from *be*. Mahajan crucially assumes that the empty P that incorporates into *be* to yield *nave* is generated as a sister of the subject (the subject is **VP-internal**).

Have is, therefore, **an** oblique form of *be*. The empty P — which is the reason for this obliqueness — is incorporated into **AUX** *be* to yield *have*. The obliqueness is present in Hindi as a postpositional marker and in **French** as a **prepositional** marker. **P incorporation** can take place in French but not in Hindi. This results in leaving the surface **form** of the AUX in Hindi as *be*. The postposition surfaces as a subject **postposition**. This is assumed to be the source of the ergative marker in Hindi. This, in short, is the crux of Mahajan's account of Hindi ergativity.

The reason for **P-incorporation** taking place in French and its absence in Hindi is attributed to the following. This fact follows from the underlying structures of the two language types presented as in (101). The subject in French can both be governed by **AUX** and be adjacent to it. This, Mahajan **suggests**, satisfies the **incorporation** criterion. The P introduced with the subject incorporates to produce *have* in (101b) and the subject surfaces without the P. **Whereas** in Hindi the **AUX** can govern the subject but cannot be adjacent to it. Given that adjacency is crucial for **incorporation**, P to **AUX** incorporation will, therefore, fail for Hindi. Ergativity in Hindi is thus a matter of Hindi being SOV. The absence of *have* in SOV languages also follows from this.

Realization of P is limited to the context of the verb being of a **non-Case-assigner** type. Apart from the perfect participle, in Hindi, dative subject construction and **possessive** constructions also include a **non-Case-assigning** predicate:

- (102)a. **raam-ko** Bar dard hE
 Ram-DAT head ache-F be-F-PRS
 'Ram has a headache'
- b. **siitaa-kii** do bEheM hEM
 Sita-GEN two sisters be-FPl-PRS
 'Sita has two sisters'

(Mahajan, 1994:7)

From this Mahajan claims that the Case realization of the subject will depend on the type of the predicate chosen. If the predicate is a perfect participle, the Case is **ergative**, if it is a psychological verb, the Case is dative, when it is a noun the Case becomes **genitive/locative**. In all these types of constructions, the predicate is a non-Case-assigner.

Notice that this account has certain aspects in common with our analysis of unergatives in section 3.2, especially, the proposed **DFI**, first introduced in Bhattacharya (1994), and related tools presented therein. We further claim that our principle, **DFP**, has an advantage over Mahajan's system since it accounts for object Case marking, for **example**, in a sentence like (100a). **DFP**


as proposed in section 3.2 (further **discu** sion **will** be presented in section 3.5) **also** accounts for the overt **dative** on objects in Hindi, **whereas** Mahajan's account is silent on the **issue** of such overt **morphological** markers.

The condition for the realization of P that Mahajan proposes is as **follows**:

- (103) In $\{_{XP} SPEC(X \dots X \dots)\}$, P appears as a sister of NP in $[SPEC, X]$ if X is a non-Case-assigning category.

With this in **mind** let us see how Mahajan's system would derive the Case and agreement properties of an unaccusative like the following:

- (104 1a. laRkaa aayaa
 boy-(MSg) came-PRF-MSg
 'the boy came'



By condition (103), P cannot be **realized** here because $[SPEC, VP]$ is empty in unaccusative constructions although the internal

argument is **not assigned** any structural Case **since** the predicate is of a nonCase **assigning** type. The agreement between the V and the object, which appears as a surface **subject**, we guess, **will** take place at **some** appropriate SPEC-HEAD **configuration**. Notice however that the system does not imply anything about the Case on the surface subject, it cannot, for example, prevent the V from assigning accusative to the subject. In other words, it does not make any predictions based on the Case **Parameter**. More specifically, **Mahajan's** account implies the following:

be **will** appear only when the verb can check for accusative at the Spec of some Agr head

This is contrary to the standard analysis of **unaccusatives** where **unaccusatives** cannot assign any Case. The above would imply that **unaccusatives** will always have *have*. It also fails for Hindi unaccusatives which regularly have nominative on the sole argument, although *be* is present.

3.5 Long Distance Agreement

In this section we will see how the phenomenon of long distance agreement **finds** a natural explanation within a modified version of **Watanabe's** Three Layered Case Theory (**Watanabe** 1993) and our analysis of unergatives that we presented in section 3.2. Our attention, so far, has been restricted to agreement within a simplex clause. The phenomenon of long distance **agreement** is a

natural ground for exploring the nature of **agreement** in connection with the network of **relations** between a matrix and an embedded clause.

3.5.1 The Data

Participial **complement** clauses do not show agreement within the **embedded** clause. Thus in (105), although the condition for it is met, that is, the object is without a **postpositional** marker, object agreement does not take place.

- (105) rukun-ne [**maalaa-ko caawal** roTii **khaate**] dekhaa
 Rukun-ERG Mala DAT rice-M bread-F eat-PPL **saw-PRF-MSg**
 'Rukun saw Mala eating **bread**'

From this, however, we cannot generalize that non-finite forms of verbs in Hindi do not show agreement. As a case in point, consider the following:

- (106) is **laRke-ko_i [pro_i saaikal calaanii)** aatii hE
 this boy-DAT **cycle-F ride-INF-F** come-3MSg
 'this boy knows how to ride a **cycle**'

The Hindi infinitive ending **-naa** shows agreement with the object in (106). This is, however, not true of all verbs. Consider the following where the matrix verb does not trigger object agreement within the embedded clause:

1. The data in (98-99) is taken from Davison (1994).

- (107) ye laRke_i [pro_i saaikal calaa-naa] caahte hEM
 these boys-MPI cycle-F ride-INF want-3PL be-3PL
 'these boys want to ride a cycle'

This conclusion is obviously not tenable since, as we shall see later in detail, the same verb can trigger **agreement** within the embedded clause. For now, let us just look at ~~one example~~:

- (108) laRkoM ne [caaY piinii] caahii
 boys-PI ERG tea-F drink-INF want-PRF-F
 'The boys wanted to drink tea'

However, our interest lies in the **communication** between the embedded and the matrix clause and is not restricted to agreement possibilities within the embedded structure alone. Notice in this connection that we are already in the realm of the phenomenon of long distance **agreement**: the matrix clause in both (106) and (107) agree with the object of the **embedded clause**. Consider the following additional examples in this connection:

- (109)a. naadyaa-ko [gaar_i calaanii] aatii hE
 Nadya-F-DAT car-F-NOM drive-INF-F come-IMP-F he-PRS
 'Nadya knows how to drive a car'
- b. naadyaa-ko [TaaMgaa calaanaa] aataa hE
 tonga-M-NOM drive-INF-MSg come-IMP-MSg
 'Nadya knows how to drive a tonga'

(Butt, 1993)

Agreement within the clause shown in (106,107) is sometimes called local optional agreement and is shown in **non-finite complements** and small clauses (110).

- (110)a. runu ne [us kitaab ko burii] samjhaa
 Runu ERG that book-F-DAT bad-F consider-PRF-3MSg
 'Runu considered that book bad'

- b. runu ne [us kitaab ko buraa] samjhaa
 Runu-ERG that book-F-DAT bad-M consider-PRF-3MSg

Long distance agreement is shown in nonfinite subjects:

- (111)a. [ciTThi likhnaa] rukun ke liye
 letter-F write-INF-3MSg Rukun-M for
 buraa hogaa
 bad-M be-FUT-3MSg
 'It will be bad for Rukun to write a letter'
- b. ? [ciTThi likhnii] rukun ke liye
 letter-F write-INF-F Rukun-M for
 buriihogii
 bad-F be-FUT-F
- c. • (ciTThi likhnii) rukun ke liye
 letter-F write-INF-F Rukun-M for
 buraa hogaa
 bad-M be-FUT-3MSg

In complements:

- (112)a. rukun-ne [roTii khaanaa] caahaa
 Rukun-ERG bread-F eat-INF-3MSg want-PRF-3MSg
 'Rukun wanted to eat bread'
- b. rukun-ne [roTii khaanii] caahii
 Rukun-ERG bread-F eat-INF-F want-PRF-F
- c. * rukun-ne [roTii khaanii] caahaa
 Rukun-ERG bread-F eat-INF-F want-PRF-3MSg

In small clause complements:

- (113)a. rukun-ne [won kitaab burii] samjhii
 Rukun-ERG that book-F bad-F consider-PRF-F
 'Rukun considered that book bad'
- b. * rukun-ne [woh kitaab burii] samjhaa
 Rukun-ERG that book-F bad-F consider-PRF-3MSg

And in raising constructions:

- (114)a. *aisaa lag'taa* *thaa* *kɪ* *rukun-ne*
 such **seem-3MSg** **be-PST-3MSg** that **Rukun-ERG**
- kursii* *toR* *dii* *hE*
 chair-F break give-PRF-F be-PRS
 'It seems that Rukun had broken the **chair**'
- b. * *aisaa lagtaa* *thaa* *ki* *rukun-ne*
 such **seem-3MSg** **be-PST-3MSg** that **Rukun-ERG**
- kursii* *toR* *diyaa* *hE*
 chair-F break give-PRF-3MSg be-PRS
- c. *rukun-ne* [*kursii* *toR* *dii*] **lagtii** *hE*
 Rukun-ERG chair-F break give-PRF-F **seem-F** *be-PRS*
- d. * *rukun-ne* [*kursii* *toR* *dii*] *lagtaa* *hE*
 Rukun-ERG chair-F break give-PRF-F **seem-M** *be-PRS*

(114a,b) show that the verb agrees with the direct object *kursii* 'chair'; (114c,d) show that it triggers long distance agreement on the matrix verb. Notice that there is no **optionality** (113,114)¹. The constructions in (106-109) and again (111,112)

2

are instances of **infinitivals** with a null subject . These are all instances where the matrix subject is overtly marked for Case. If it is not, then agreement cannot percolate up into the matrix clause. This is shown by (115) below.

1.Examples (102-105) are based on Saleemi (1994).

2. For a discussion of whether the null subject is a pro or a PRO, see Borer (1986) and Davison (1994).

(115)a. **laRke** [caay piinaa] caahte the
 boy-Pi tea-F **drink-INF-M** want-Pi **be-PST-MPI**
 'The boys **wanted** to drink **tea**'

b. • **laRke** [caay piinaa] **caahtii thii**
 boy-Pi tea-F drink-INF-M want-FSg be-PST-FSg
 'The boys wanted to drink **tea**'

To some speakers, however, (116) is **marginally** acceptable:

(116) ? **laRke** [caay piinii] caahte the
 boy-Pi tea-F drink-INF-FSg **want-IMP-MPI** be-PST-MPI
 'The boys wanted to drink tea'

Psych-verb constructions:

(117)a. **vaid-ne** [use ThanD **lagii**]
 doctor-MSg-OBL-ERG he-DAT cold-FSg-ACC catch-PRF-FSg

paayii
find-Prf-FSg
 'the doctor found him having a **cold**'

b. ***vaid-ne** [use ThanD **lagaa**]
 doctor-MSg-OBL-ERG he-DAT cold-FSg-ACC catch-PRF-MSg

 paayaa
find-Prf-MSg

(117b) shows the lack of optionality in local agreement possibility.

EM construction:

(118)a. **laRke-ne** [usko baiThii huii] paayaa
 boy-OBL-ERG she-ACC **sit-PRF-FSg** be-PRF-FSg find-PRF-
 MSg
 'the boy found her sitting'

b. ***laRke-ne** [usko baiThii huii] **paayii**
 boy-OBL-ERG **she-ACC** sit-PRF-FSg be-PRF-FSg **find-PRF-**
 FSg

(118b) shows that agreement is not triggered in the **matrix** clause. In our **terminology** it is then not a case of long distance **agreement**. But the analysis that we present later is capable of giving an account of **ECM** structures as well. Notice that in (118a) an overtly Case marked NP – the ECM Case Barked NP – triggers **agreement** within the embedded clause.

Having presented the data so **far**, let us see if any available analysis can account for the seemingly variable data **economically**.

3.5.2. Borer's Anaphoric **AGR**

Compare the following pair ((108) repeated here as (119a)):


(119)a. laRkoM ne [pro caay piiniil caak.i
 boy-Pi ERg tea-F drink-F want-PRF-F
 'the boys wanted to drink tea'

b. laRkoM ne [caay piinaa] caahaa
 drink-M want-PRF-3MSg

Borer's (1986) **theory** of **null** subjects gives us the right results for (119b) but not (119a). For Borer both the ECs in the finite as well as the non-finite version are pro and the differences that exist between the subjects of tensed and non-tensed clauses are the results of other principles independent of the properties of the pro. The reference of this pro is obligatorily dependent on an argument of the matrix clause. On the basis of this it is assumed to be anaphoric due to this obligatory referential depend-

ence. Borer however **claims** it to be pronominal. This **apparent** contradiction **is** sorted out by **making** AGR, which is part of I, anaphoric in **infinitives**. The AGR is an **N-type** element that is subject to Principle A. The structure of infinitive **clauses** in Borer, after I to C raising has taken place, is (120).

(120)



I in (120) is the derived head of the CP. Borer assumes that the **features** of the raised I percolate to its **maximal** projection, making it I_cP rather than CP. It **is** now easy to see that the head I and the I_cP of the projection which it heads share the same binding domain. If the I_cP contains a coindexed c-commanding antecedent in the appropriate **domain**, the head of I_cP is bound by this antecedent and the inflectional features of that antecedent percolate to this head, I, containing AGR.

Let us consider the **folloition** to Spec-AgroP in the matrix clause. The desired agreement facts are obtained as a result of the interaction of the traces and the positioning of the Spec-AgroP of the matrix clause. In cases where there is no long dis-

tance **agreement**, the infinitival **form** of the verb can (optionally) assign Case to its object. Therefore, the object in **such** a case does not move **from** its **d-structure** position. This would explain (119b).

For a sentence like (116) where the object triggers **agreement** on its embedded verb but not on the matrix verb, Mahajan suggests that the government of the lower **AGR₀** by the matrix imperfect participle makes structural Case possible in the lower **[SPEC,AGR₀]**. The embedded object, therefore, in this case moves up to the lower **[SPEC,AGR₀]** position to get Case. **Agreement**, therefore, is restricted to the embedded clause.

3.5.4 Singh (1993)

Singh, as we noted earlier, discusses three types of constructions where long distance **agreement** is possible, namely, ECM structures, psych-verb constructions, and infinitival constructions.

Regarding ECM structures, Singh notes that agreement does not percolate upwards, that is, agreement is a clause internal phenomenon. However, it is puzzling to observe a **morphologically** marked NP triggering agreement (see (118a,b) for details).

For the psych-verb (or experiencer verb) constructions the embedded object obligatorily triggers agreement within and outside the embedded clause. In (117a) both the embedded and the

matrix verb agree with the embedded object *Thand* 'cold'.

Agreement is optional for the third type of construction showing long distance agreement, by far the most common construction — **infinitivals**. This we have seen in some detail; we have fleshed out an available type of analysis (Borer, 1986) to account for the data. Both clauses in the infinitival show identical **agreement** (sentence (119)). As we saw in (115), if the matrix subject **is** not overtly **marked**, agreement with the embedded structure cannot percolate up to the matrix clause. This is true for all the three types of constructions that Singh identifies.

Singh attempts an integrated view of long distance **agreement** by posing the following important question; Why does **agreement** percolate upwards for **infinitivals** and experiencer-subject constructions *only*? The answer, according to him, lies in the **fact** that in both these constructions the **complement** subject position is empty. The complement subject position in (119) is **PRO** for Singh. For Davison (1994), and by Borer's theory it is **pro**. We side with Singh on this count in our analysis; details and justification have been provided in Shah (1995).

(124) below illustrates the derivation of (119a) where the **pro** is the expletive element responsible for **CHAIN** formation with the subject in Singh's theory (see also section 3.4 for details).

(124)

```

      VP
    /  \
  SPEC /  \
laRkoM ne TP2 V
      /  \ caahii
    pro TP1
      /  \
    SPEC /  \
      ASPP T
      /  \
    SPEC /  \
      / ASP
    VP   |
    /  \ piinii
  SPEC  \
    | /  \
  PRO NP V
    |   |
    caay t

```

In experiencer subject **constructions** the experiencer subject originates as the indirect object. The subject position of the **embedded** clause is **empty** at d-structure. (125) below **illustrates** the derivation of (117a):

(125)

```

      VP
    /  \
  SPEC /  \
  vaid ne TP2 V
      /  \ paayii
    pro TP1
      /  \
    SPEC /  \
      ASPP T
      /  \
    SPEC /  \
      / ASP
    VP   |
    /  \ lagii
  SPEC  \
    | /  \
  use NP V
    |   |
    ThanD t

```

In (124, 125) above, the *pro* is free to participate in the agreement CHAIN which extends up to *pro* in the main clause. This is responsible for Barking agreement on relevant heads in the clause. In (125) the experiencer subject is assigned inherent dative and therefore does not need to move up in the tree.

For the ECM constructions the facts are different. The embedded subject moves to the subject position, which is an adjoined position (Spec-TP2) for Case reasons. (126) below illustrates this:



In (126), *usko* 'her' is at the embedded subject position where it is assigned exceptional accusative by the ASP head. The non-percolation of agreement upwards in Singh's model is attributed now to the adjoined status of the *pro* which is, **therefore**, unable to participate in CHAIN formation. Agreement within the clause

is triggered by traces of the **moved** NP. (119b) is **explained** through the **ambivalent** nature of the infinitival/ **gerundive** possessing **nominal** or truly clausal properties.


3.5.5 Our Analysis

Both the analyses reviewed are unsatisfactory on similar grounds: empirical inadequacy and conceptual **incompatibility** with a checking theory of Case and agreement as **well** as being empirically inadequate. The objections raised against these analyses with regards to **agreement** in general (as in 3.3 and 3.4) apply in the case of long distance agreement as well. In short, both the systems depend heavily on an elaborate theory of traces to account for the range of data chosen. We will argue in this subsection that an articulated theory of features can provide an account for long distance agreement in a fashion which, apart from being within the general confines of the **framework** of Minimalism, leads to a more viable system (**computationally** speaking).

For our analysis we adopt Watanabe's (1993) Three Layered Case theory and modify it accordingly (see Shah (1995) for some of the **modifications** suggested). We will discuss Watanabe's theory in detail in section **3.6**. For now let us present as much as we need for our purpose. In his theory, during the process of Case checking, a new feature is created on the highest Agr and this Agr has to, then, undergo further movements to a higher (appropriate - see section 3.6 for details) functional head to

check **this** extra feature off. Thus a **configuration** like (127) is needed where X is a Case feature **element** and Y an **appropriate** checker of the extra feature. In **this extra feature** is not discharged, the **Agr** node cannot disappear at LF since **it will** contain an unacceptable entity, unchecked.

(127)




This, in short, is Watanabe's **AGR-Based** Case theory.

The **modifications** that we have in mind were first suggested in Bhattacharya (1994) and Shah (1995). Ura (1993) suggests that the feature F, created as a consequence of Case checking, should be thought of as a part of C. This is a natural extension of Watanabe's theory in light of the Checking Theory of Case where a feature is checked off against identical features contain in a functional head. Shah (1995) **claims** that certain non-finite **constructions** in Hindi are best analyzed as **DPs**, **from** which solutions to certain long-standing problems of visibility follow. She claims that the D head of such a DP contains the feature **F_A**.

D being shown to possess **COMP-like** properties. We adopt the the DP structure based on Valois (1990) that she proposes. (128) below is the structure.

(128)



F_c being a Case feature can only check off another **Case** feature. It is proposed, contra **Watanabe**, that agreement checking can also create F features like F_{agr} , especially, in case of long distance agreement. This happens only when **agreement features** are **morphologically marked**. In section 3.2 we introduced two principles **DFI** and **DFP** which deal with the operation of **dummy** features. The motivation of dummy features **comes** from Hindi where prototypical NP arguments **always** carry morphological markers. Evidence for **P1** comes from the fact that embedded subjects always carry some **in-**case as in the following:

- (129) rukun ne [(uskaa/uski i) caay pi inaa/pi ini i] caahaa/caahi i
Rukun **ERG** his/her tea **drink-INF-M/F** want-PRF-M/F
 'Rukun wanted his/her (self) to drink **tea**'

The following is a piece of evidence for **P2**:


- (130) rukun-ne [PRO sev-(ko) khaanaa] caahaa
Rukun-ERG apple-(DAT) **eat-INF-M** want-PRF-3MS
 'Rukun wanted to eat the **apple**'

We suggest that the motivation for DFP comes from the following:

- (131) *rukun-ne [runu pha!-ko khaanaa] caahaa
 Rukun-ERG Runu fruit-DAT eat-INF-M want-PRF-3MS

The intuition of this analysis comes from the fact that the various arguments in the sentence participate in agreement through various Case markers. This is captured by the device of creation of dummy features on arguments inside the DP which ultimately decide movement out of a particular argument. This movement is responsible for creation of floating features which establish contact with the world outside the clause.

With this simple apparatus let us look at (119a), the structure of which is as follows:



Checking off of features is indicated by a cross as shown in the

structure above. What **happens** is as follows. **P1** (and then **P2**) is created because **we** have *ne* on the **matrix** subject. **PRO** is sanctioned at Spec-Ca thereby creating an **F** feature **which** checks off against the **Fc** feature of **D**. Now, because of **P2** the object *caay* has to **move** to check agreement. So it loves to Spec-AgrP and checks off agreement features against the head to which the verb has raised to check off its own **features**. Although **P2** is **dummy** it is counted as an **m-case** feature and therefore in this case agreement feature checking at Spec-AgrP results in an **Fagr** feature. This happens only when **agreement** is **morphologically** visible, in this case it is rendered so by the dummy feature **P2**. We will call this **Fagr** feature a floating Agr feature because it cannot check off within the DP and therefore it floats. This floating feature can check off only outside the domain of the DP and is in fact checked off at the Spec-AgrP against the object agreement features of the matrix verb when the DP **moves** up.

We make a distinction between the valency of **P1** and **P2** in case of (119a) and (119b). We claim that **P1** and **P2** are **[-strong]** in (119a) and **[+strong]** in (119b). The motivation for positing this distinction lies in the fact that object agreement is observed only when there is no **P2**-like element after the verb in Hindi. The object moving up when **P2** is **[-strong]**, therefore, makes a lot of sense. This accounts for the difference between (119a) and (119b). In case of the latter, since **P2** is **[+strong]**, the object cannot move up for agreement reasons. The result is

default **agreement**. Therefore, no floating **Fagr** feature is available in this case and so no **agreement** with the matrix verb is possible. (119b) obtains for those speakers for whom P2 is for some reason [+strong].

We observe that the object raises for feature checking only when there is a [-strong] P2 available. Notice that Pn cannot be created or introduced if the matrix subject does not overtly carry a marker. This accounts for the following:

(133)a. rukun [caay piinaa] caahataa thaa
 Rukun tea-F drink-INF-3MSg want-IMP-M be-PST-MSg
 'Rukun wanted to drink tea'

b. * rukun [caay piinii] caahatii thii
 drink-INF-F want-IMP-F be-PST-FSg

Since there is no Pn introduced, the embedded verb should show default **agreement** (133a), and (133b) is out because it violates this principle of default **agreement** by showing object agreement, that is, it allows the object to move when it cannot.

Consider now the following:


(134) * rukun [caay piinii] caahataa thaa
 Rukun tea-F drink-INF-FSg want-IMP-M be-PST-MSg

(134) is acceptable in Punjabi but is not acceptable in Hindi for the **same** reason as (133b). What happens here, we suggest, is as follows. Although the matrix verb does not carry any object agreement features there is still a superweak **P1** created. That such a possibility obtains is indicated by the variety of Punja-

bi-Bindi spoken in Delhi, where the **ergative marker** *ne* is used even in **non-perfective tense**:

- (135) *tum ne jaanaa hE*
you-ERG go-INF-M be-PRS
 'You have to go'

Misplacing the **P1**, however weak, is a possibility in Punjabi. This creates a superweak P2 which thereby induces **movement** of the object out of the VP. We suggest that the *Fagr* feature that results from the checking of agreement features by this superweak P2-bearing object does not have the floating energy. That is, it cannot float and therefore need not be checked off and "dies" out before visibility. This, we assume, is the reason for the lack of **agreement** with the matrix verb. This is depicted in (136).



Superweak **elements** are denoted by asterisks.

Consider now (137).

(137) ? **laRke** [**caay** piinii) caahate the
 boy-MPI **want-IMP-MPI** **be-PST-MPI**
 'The **boys** wanted to drink **tea**'

In case of (137) P1 that is generated contains a Nu feature, since the matrix subject carries visible number marking. This P1 with a Nu value creates a weak P2 adjoined to the object. This induces movement of the object out of VP. Note that the subject is first licensed at Spec-Ca and then it has to **move** up to Spec-NuP. The subject is doing two things and **thus** we end up with two Fs. One is checked off against the Fc on the D, as usual, the other being an Fagr feature which gets checked off **against** the Fagr feature created out of the object agreement feature checking. In other words, there **is** no floating feature left unchecked, and therefore the matrix verb does not **show** any agreement. The relevant derivation **is** the following:

```

      DP
     / \
    /   \
   /       \
  NuP        D
 /  \         [Fc]
/    \
CaP   Nu ==> Fagr
/  \
Agr   Ca ==> Fc
/  \   [NC]
/    \
VP    Agr ==> Fagr
/  \
/    \ _____
/  \   |
PRO P1 | V
      |   |
      Ø   | pii
          |
        caay P2
              Ø

```

Consider now the psych-verb constructions as in (117). The relevant structure is the following:


DP
/ \
/ \
NuP D
/ \ [Fc]
/ \
CaP Nu
/ \
/ \
Agr Ca ==> Fc
/ \ [NC]
/ \
VP Agr ==> Fagr
/ \
/ \
PRO P1 : \ V
Ø : \ lagii
: P2
ThanD Ø

In (139) **p1** and P2 are created thereby forcing **movement** and

subsequent creation of **Fagr** which floats. ((17b) is bad because, since we have **P2**, default agreement cannot take place. Also note that PRO does not need to check for Nu because there is no number overtly visible on the subject and **also** in view of the fact that the following is out:


(140) *unheM ThanD **lage**
 they-P1-ACC cold-F feel-Pi

Now, finally, we can look at the ECM cases in (118). The structure is represented in (141a) below:



We claim that the **movement** of this **V-complex** to Nu to check off agreement feataures with the subject in its Spec should create two Fagr features. This makes sense since both the components of

the verb show agreement with the subject, it is not a case of a serial verb construction where only one of the verbs takes on the agreement markers. A more elaborate VP structure could be as in (142) below. Notice that the ECM Case feature is checked off at Spec-CaP but realized at Spec-DP.



3.6. Computability of AGRs

We have shown in the last four sections that the agreement facts of the languages under consideration lead overwhelmingly towards establishing the pervasiveness of Agr heads. Recall that we set out to syntactically capture the abstract notions of trajector and landmark. In the process, the evolving theme of the primacy of the object became the major finding of the preceding sections. Unergatives, unaccusatives, and, of course, transitives, all show a distinct head - AgrO - as engaging in intensive syntactic labour. We claim that this outcome is a natural consequence of the current formulations in syntax explor-

ing, in genral, the **pervasiveness** of functional heads in a syntactic structure.

Kayne (1994) presents a radical theory of **grammar** where the vertical structure always determines **linear** order and if two phrases differ in linear order, they must also differ in hierarchical structure. In short, he proposes that **asymetric** c-command invariably maps into **linear** precedence. He derives a restrictive word order of **specifier-head-complement** as the universal basic word **order**.

Although we are not concerned with the specific proposals of **Kayne** (1994) we nevertheless find the following proposal regarding a restriction on the number of adjunctions to be supportive of our claim of pervasiveness of **Agr**. **Kayne** derives the well-known facts about the verb-second effect found in Germanic languages other than English. The relevant **example** is the following:

(143)* Gestern Peter tanzte
yesterday Peter **danced**

Given that the subject is in the Spec of IP, adjunction of *gestern* to IP is prohibited because in this theory multiple **adjunction** to a single head is disallowed. Specifiers are considered to be formally cases of adjunction. For the parallel grammatical English sentence, **Kayne** proposes that a covert functional head over IP is available to which *yesterday* can adjoin.

(144) Yesterday Peter danced

Kayne's proposal regarding (144) should be understood in the broader context of the need for functional heads. The existence of contentful functional heads such as Tense is not **problematic**. Tense is present in overt syntax and at LF, and there is evidence to show that it is an independent head. The general statue of **agreement** is not so clear. There are languages which do not show any **morphological** agreement but even such languages provide syntactic arguments for positing abstract Agr heads. There are many references in the syntactic literature to the **ubiquitous** presence of Agr heads and a **SPECHHEAD** relation as a basic canonical relation. Kayne's proposal tries to find a deep non-morphological reason for the **proliferation** of Agr heads. Given that phrases have to often move out of their base position, only functional heads make enough landing sites available **especially** in something as radical as Kayne's current theory. Kayne shows that **SPECHHEAD** is the **only** **configuration** available for licensing. Kayne suggests that an Agr can be thought of as a label for head positions imposed upon phrase **markers** by the scarcity of landing sites.

The fact that Agr heads are not restricted to canonical subject and object positions is revealed by the well-known fact of **complementizer** agreement in certain Germanic languages . In

these **languages**, which also show the V2 **phenomenon**, the **complementizer** agrees with the subject in person/ number. In the following, the a. sentences show **complementizer** agreement and the b. sentences are control **cases** (examples are all taken from Zwart, 1993):

Munich Bavarian

- (145)a. **damid-ds** **komm-ds**
 so that-2Pl come-2Pl
- b. **damid** ich **komm**
 so that I **come-1Sg**

South Hollandic

- (146)a. **dat-(t)e** ze kom-(m)e
 that-Pl they **come-Pl**
- b. dat ze **kom-t**
 that they **come-3Sg**

Groningen

- (147)a. of-s toe kom-s
 whether-2Sg you come-2Sg
- b. of ik **kom**
 whether I come-1Sg

Complementizer agreement in these cases indicates that some Agr element interacts with the COMP in some fashion. The COMP never gets into SPEC-HEAD agreement with the **subject**. This is evidenced by the **following**:

- (148)a. * ze datte **komme** (South Hollandic)
 b. • toe ofs **koms** (Groningen)
 etc.

This shows that **complementizer** agreement is different from other

agreement phenomena which **always** involve the SPEC-HEAD relation. It is natural to think (as Zwart 1993 does) that **complementizer** agreement is a morphological reflex of the **movement** of Agr to C. That this must be the case, is shown by the fact that both the **complementizer** and the verb show agreement with the subject in the same clause. Since the Spec of the Agr (which later moves to C) is occupied by the subject.

- (i) the COMP cannot **move** into it, and
- (ii) the verb agrees with the subject.

The motivation of the movement is to satisfy **morphological licensing** conditions. AgrS in these languages is considered to contain a strong N-feature and the Agr—>C movement is a way of lexicalizing AgrS by adjoining to a position which has a lexical head (**complementizer**).

Watanabe's (1993) Three Layered Case Theory is formulated on the basis of substantial evidence where the shape of the COMP is determined by or related to the subject position inside the (embedded) clause. In this theory, the AgrS head has to move up to C to get the extra feature **F**, created out of the process of Case checking (see section 3.5 for other details and **modifications** suggested) against Spec-AgrSP, and I has to be checked off against an appropriate C. An appropriate C for **Watanabe** is a C which is lexically filled. Notice that this subsumes exactly what happens in the German dialects showing **complementizer** agree-

ment.

In this connection, let us consider the case of Greek subjunctives, which, like Balkan subjunctives in general, allow PRO as well as lexical subjects. Terzi (1992) (cited in Watanabe, 1993) claims that the appearance of lexical subjects is dependent on the clause structure:

- (149)a. ...V [_{CP}Prt+V I [_{IP}pro/lexical NP t_i...]]
b. ...V [_{CP}Comp [_{IP}pro/lexical NP V...]]
c. ...V [_{CP}∅ [_{IP}PRO V...]]

The verb in place of C (in the a. case) marks the fact that overt subjects appear only in postverbal positions. All the above three are found in Albanian and Romanian. One important thing to notice is that there is a definite relation between the shape of C and Case possibilities of the embedded subject; a Nominative subject is possible only if there is some overt material in Comp.

The foregoing discussion has one significant consequence for the purpose at hand, which we may pose as a question: How is having an AGR in a clause structure computationally relevant?

In order to answer this question, we observe that the discussion so far, especially the facts (and analysis) of complementizer agreement in German dialects, has, by locating an AGR even in the COMP, narrowed down the gap between L and non-L-related positions (section 3.4). Consider the following:

(i) Zwart's (1993) proposal of **Agr-->C** movement;

(ii) **AgrS-->C** to check off F feature generated on AgrS;

(iii) our proposal in section 3.5 of movement of the Fc feature to the D head of a DP.

These all point to the movement of an L head to a non-L position.

While, as we pointed out, this weakens the distinction between L and **non-L-related** positions¹, we claim that **computationally** it makes our task easier — that is, the distinction is now sharper. The presence of features **like** Fc (either in D or created out of Case feature checking) and Fagr (created out of agreement checking) — as proposed in section 3.5 — can, if somehow tagged, make our **computational** task easier. This is a favourable consequence of the theory we have proposed and shown to produce satisfactory results **theoretically** in the last few sections.

The distinction between L and non-L-related positions based on the A/A' distinction becomes a controversial issue in the realm of the distinction between narrowly **L-related** and broadly **L-related** positions. Chomsky (1993) suggests including an adjunct position to the maximal projection of the L-related head in the checking domain of L-features, calling such a relation to a

1. Mahajan's (1990) account of **agreement** in Hindi which crucially depends on this distinction is also undermined .

head with L features broadly **L-related**. He does not, however, directly associate the question of these **positions** with either A or A' positions. Ura (1993) indicates that a broadly **L-related** position may in some cases be counted as an A **position**. He formulates the following in this connection:

- (150) A *narrowly* L-related position is always an **A-position**. A *broadly* L-related position counts as an **A-position** only if it is *actually* L-related to an **L-head**; otherwise it is an A' position.
- (151) A given position is *actually L-related* if **feature** checking actually takes place between that position and some L-head.

In our terms an actually L-related position can be detected if we are able to track the different Fs located/created during the derivation. This would then make our task of producing a list of the typology of positions (in terms of the A/A' distinction, for example) easier. This we claim is the **computational** advantage of our theoretical account.

Our analysis of the long distance **agreement phenomenon** (section 3.5), it is to be noted, differs in its **approach** from a purely syntactic analysis. The specific algorithm of **our** analysis starts with a sentence and proceeds, through the **application** of principles like DFP, to build a structure along with an explanation of various operations within the structure. **Notice** that the starting point is not a lexical entity like a **verb**, for

example. This is because, crucially, our approach serves to link syntactic analysis to computational parsing strategies, where the triggering structure is a given sentence. A speaker/ listener however does not wait for the a particular sentence to be uttered completely before starting to process the incoming information, whereas a machine does. The natural question then is why go into a syntactic explanation, if the goal is purely computational. To answer this, we reemphasize the fact that by computational we mean an initially theoretical approach where the exact implementation of the "program" is not necessarily worked out every time one makes a computational point, but is seen as a separate phase of the endeavour. And importantly, this approach is also bidirectional in the sense that a "computational" approach can give us valuable insights into the formal possibilities of a syntactic theory. It could, by that logic, lead us to certain unexplored areas of natural language which can easily not be perceivable in traditional theorization. Whether this is possible or not is not our present concern and we leave the issue open for future research.

A computational theory based on a suitably modified version of the A/A' distinction, we claim, will be able to resolve the old computational problem of detecting a gap (non-argument Wh elements) and a filler (argument positions) by identifying A/A' positions through a sophisticated theory of syntax.

CHAPTER IV

CLASSIFICATION

Earlier, in chapter I, we mentioned the need to extend our concern regarding the distribution of the new/given **informational** packaging **manifested** throughout the clause structure, to the NP-**internal** substructure. This will also lead us to expect the location of a high resolution - functional head **parallelism** within this substructure. **Computationally**, again, we suggest that such a location can profitably advance parsing efficiency. We further **claim** that a clear understanding of the processing of **nominals** helps to bring down parsing time in the case of ill-formed expressions. If the **system** fails to return a parse for a nominal sub-tree, further processing becomes redundant. To see that this is so, consider Smith and **Genesereth's** (1985) work on search tree rearrangement showing that the ordering of conjuncts makes a difference to parsing efficiency.

This advantage carries over to a mainstream version of the Principle-Based Parsing (**PBP**) technique based on the assumption that principles apply locally to parse substructures. In a later section we take up the PBP approach to parsing to illustrate how a computational framework based on pure linguistic research in linguistics operates in the context of NPs in Bangla.

It has been the **theme** of our account BO far that high resolution centered around a particular functional head of the clause structure. In this chapter we **claim** that within the **NP** structure, this function is fulfilled by the functional head **B**. We noted earlier in Chapter III, that the Badge head in our **formulations** exhibits a merger of Gender and Number **information**. We further claim that the property of high resolution, necessary for efficiently tracking a shifting scene (Chapter I), is realized in terms of nominal definiteness of the phrase. It remains to be seen how exactly definiteness of a nominal phrase encodes the new/given information.

4.1 Definiteness and the Given/New Distinction

The role of a particular entity in the discourse determines the form, function, and the position in the sentence of the phrase representing that entity. It is customary in discourse analysis to identify this role as relating to information status and specificity.

Givdn (1989) proposes the metaphor of a Discourse File in discussing the information status aspect of NP types. Discourse file refers to the mental file containing various entities, actions, concepts etc. at different levels of activation that a speaker/hearer possesses. Activation status of a particular entity depends on the topicality of the entity. This implies

that the hearer's consciousness contributes **equally** to the determination of the information status of a **conversation**. We will have more to say regarding this shift to the receiver's side of the **scene-building** activity when we discuss uniqueness of definites within a **Heimian** model of discourse representation. An entity not in use for long in the conversation is put into an inactive discourse file; whereas a direct mention of an entity marks it as an active member of a discourse file. Given/new, therefore, in this model, refer to different levels of activation. Entities mentioned in the **immediately** preceding discourse are most highly active and are, therefore, given. Entities **mentioned** for the first time are least active and are, therefore, new. In English this difference is clearly manifested in the use of pronouns and in the use of **indefinite/definite** nouns. We have discussed this in detail in Chapter II.

Specificity, on the other hand, can be regarded as a continuum where a reference to an entity is specific when the communicative goals of the message may be altered if the reference is substituted to another entity. For example, in (1a) the subject NP is more specific than the instrumental NP whereas in case of (1b) it is not so.

(Da. John was **killed** by an explosion

b. A man was **killed** by an explosion

a man in (1b) is less specific than *John* in (1a).

Definiteness, as it relates to **NPs**, however, is a broader concept. Chafe's (1970) discussion of noun inflection (seeing it as parallel to verbal inflection) has some bearing on definiteness. Barking of nouns. This concept (of noun inflection), we believe, reappeared in a different format in Abney's (1987) DP hypothesis where the D head of a DP contains **Agr**. We will present our departure from Abney in detail in a later section. Chafe's idea of noun inflection broadly covers the range expressed by the following paradigm:

(2)a. Boys score better in programming

b. A boy ate up **my** lunch

c. The boy ate up **my** lunch

(2a) above is used when one wishes to refer to a general class of boys; (2b,c), on the contrary, are used to refer to a particular **member** of that class. Within the latter, it is again possible to refer to a particular **member** with which the hearer is already **familiar** with (2c) or a particular member newly introduced in the **conversation**. This, in our scheme of things, correlates with the given/new distinction. The interaction exhibited by the choice of (2a,b,c) is the basis of noun inflection. **Definiteness**, for Chafe, is a Bark of inflection. The subject NP in (2c), therefore, is *inflected* for **definiteness**. Uniqueness is another manifestation of noun inflection in Chafe's system. Some nominal

expressions are restricted to the extreme of being constituting a class of one member. Because of the unique membership of the class, the hearer can uniquely determine the referent. A unique noun, therefore, is definite. Chafe expresses this by the following rule:

(3) N \longrightarrow definite

unique

(3) says that a unique noun must be inflected as definite. The other inflectional rules that Chafe (1970) proposes are disjunctively related to a rule like (3) since a unique noun receives only a definite inflection. We discuss the uniqueness interpretation of definites in greater detail in the following section within the Kamp/Heim model of DRT (see Chapter II for a detailed explication of the DRT model).

4.2 Uniqueness of Definites

We referred briefly in Chapter II to Russell's (1905) analysis of definite description as carrying uniqueness implications. For example, both (4a) and (4b) imply that there is a cat, but only (4b) implies that there is only one cat.

(4)a. A cat came to the room

b. The cat came to the room

To include plurals like (5), definites can be thought of as referring to a unique set.

(5) The cats cane to the **room**

This is identified as **maximality** in **Kadmon** (1987). In Evans (1980), pronouns used anaphorically in a discourse exhibit a similar **maximality** effect. The discourse anaphora in (6) are called E-type pronouns which refer to a maximal collection determined by the antecedent NP.

(6)a. John owns *some sheep*. Harry vaccinates *them*.

b. There is a *doctor* in London and *he* is Welsh.

The pronoun *them* in (6a) refers to a maximal collection of sheep owned by John; (6b) implies that there is only one doctor in London. He extends this analysis of E-type pronouns to definite descriptions used anaphorically.

In the **Kamp/Heim** system the novelty condition (Chapter I) associates a definite with a discourse referent (or file card) already present in the DRS. **Heim** accepts that definites are **typically** unique in some sense but derives it from her theory of definites. If there is more than one candidate for the discourse referent to act as the **antecedent**, the hearer confronts an **ambiguous** context in violation of the Gricean **maxim** of **manner**. This is the reason that leads **Heim** to propose that definites have a unique antecedent in some sense. Such an account predicts the

following:

(7) The cat is at the door

(8) John has a cat and a dog. The cat's/ ?Its/ ? The **pet**'
name **is Felix**.

(Hein 1982)

The discourse referent for *the cat* in (7) is fixed. In (8), the discourse referents for both the indefinites could serve as the antecedent. Only *the cat* is felicitous because it fits the description of one of the antecedents. Contextual **saliency** or the uniqueness of the discourse referent in this **system** brings it closer to the **Russellian treatment** of definites. The uniqueness effect predicted by **Heim**, however, differs from what a theory like Evans' would predict. **Heim's** theory, as **Kadmon** (1987) points out, will not make any distinction between (8) above and (9) below.

(9) John has a cat whose name is Felix, and a dog

Evans (1980) would imply that John has only one cat in (8) and not in (9). According to Heim, therefore, definites have some uniqueness effects, but not as strong as those proposed by Russell or Evans. **Kadmon** (1987) holds that the uniqueness effect is the fundamental **distinguishing** factor between a definite and an indefinite NP. However, **Kamp/Heim** framework provides a natural **platform** for the representation of uniqueness.

In connection with the Speaker/Hearer asymmetry, **Kadmon** states that the uniquely identifying information is not **available** to the hearer and thus she takes a position different **from** a shared-knowledge view of Vendler (1967) (cited in **Kadmon** 1987). The hearer's perspective is, however, paid attention to by proposing that even the hearer has a DRS which must satisfy the uniqueness requirement. The uniqueness property in the hearer's DRS is a derivative of the speaker's uniqueness.

The Uniqueness Condition that **Kadmon** (1987) proposes translates roughly as follows:

(10) If a discourse contains a definite NP x , then **all** the functions that verify this discourse must assign x the same set or individual as value

(10) states that there must be at most one set or individual in the model that x can refer to. (10) when applied to a sentence like (11) will result in the DRS depicted as in (12).

(11) I have to show this document to exactly three
colleagues

(12)

X	
I have to show this document to exactly three colleagues	
colleagues (X)	
I have to show this document to X	
X = 3	

Y	
colleagues (Y)	=> Y ⊆ X
I have to show this document to Y	
-----	-----

(Kadmon 1987:164)

The conditional (see Chapter II for details) in (12) says that any set Y of colleagues is a subset of X, which means that the X is the set of all colleagues. (12) is true iff X can be Batched with a set in the model which satisfies all these conditions, that is, iff there are exactly three colleagues. X in (12) is, therefore, a variable of exactly three colleagues. Now if the following addition is made in the discourse, the pronoun *they* is linked to the same variable as its antecedent. This is shown in (14).

(13) They are in the meeting

(14)

X		
I have to show this document to exactly three colleagues		
colleagues (X)		
I have to show this document to X		
$ X = 3$		
<hr/>		
Y	:	:
colleagues (Y)	\Rightarrow	$Y \subseteq X$
I have to show this document to Y	:	:
<hr/>		
They are in the meeting		
X are in a meeting		

(Kadmon 1987:165)

(14) above satisfies the uniqueness condition as stated in (10) since the pronoun is assigned the variable X which stands for all the colleagues, the latter being a unique set.

It is assumed that the language user develops discourse representations during the course of the conversation into which is introduced any new material and/or salient entity as and when such entities crop up. In some versions of the DRT a new variable becomes available whenever a definite is used and then a condition identifying the new variable with an existing (old) one is entered into the DRS. This is an operation performed before a definite is assigned any other value. In the **Kamp/Heim** model, therefore, a direct association of the definite with an old variable is preferred.

Given this analysis of definites as unique entities, we assume that at least for the anaphoric uses of definite!, it **makes** sense to ascribe a uniqueness reading to such definites since we believe that Gricean constraints govern the effectiveness of **communication**. Notice that in the **Kamp/Heim** system definite **NPs** are identified as anaphoric since they must be associated with an already existing file card/ discourse referent. Our concern for Gricean principles was reflected in the notion of double strike that we presented earlier (Chapter I) where we contended that if focusing (always) and topicalization (optionally) are to be seen as repetition of some part of the VP then the two strategies cannot both be used in a single **sentence** for uniqueness reasons. Uniqueness, therefore, we consider as **some** sort of an extended Gricean principle that governs effective **communication**. This extension, could, we presume, take the form of a device meant for resolution of ambiguity in the context. Avoiding repetition is, therefore, a part of this general principle of uniqueness. Since a definite anaphor is old **information**, it makes sense to imagine that such definites obey this general Gricean (in our reading) principle of uniqueness. If anchoring on to a particular referent is the basic idea behind using an anaphor, then uniqueness, we claim, is the route to such a connection.

This anchoring through **uniqueness** is, however, much more apparent in cases of a class of expressions in **Bangla** that we take up in detail in the following sections. Classifier expressions in Bangla exhibit a **definiteness** effect that we consider as a testing ground for studying one aspect of **Computational Linguistics**, namely, machine translation. We devote a section to this aspect in connection with a **Principle-Based** strategy of parsing as formulated in Berwick et al (1991). But first we present a detailed discussion of the classifier system as it relates to **definiteness**.

4.3 Classifiers and **Definiteness**

A theory of prototypes as the basis of **categorization** in linguistics challenges the traditional Aristotelian concept of meaning. Categories are now characterized as having fuzzy edges and graded membership. Consequently the main research question in the present agenda is about the degree and the nature of categoriality. This shift is more in line with a **non-categorial Wittgensteinian** non-categorial family resemblance approach. In linguistics, the concept of a prototype has been extended from being a **lexico-semantic** term to being a grammatical construct (Lakoff 1973). We may note here that our discussion of parameters of transitivity — the **functional/pragmatic** parameters — is based on a prototypical approach to **classification**.

4.3.1 Classifiers as a **Cognitive-Formal** Category

Our study so far has evoked a **formal-cognitive** approach towards the analysis of transitivity (Chapter II) which is **accomplished** through a proper understanding of the notion of **saliency**. **Silverstein** (1986) notes that classifiers as a category-type in languages can be defined only by a **formal-functional** definition. Let us, therefore, see how classifiers relate to a prototypical approach to **classification**. If we think of classifiers as markers of categories — or categorizers — then it is important for us to study classifiers to understand the human **categorization** system.

The linguistic **categorization** through overt **classification** results in lexical forms known as the **lexico-syntactic** phenomenon of noun **classification**, including numeral classifiers. This phenomenon of linguistic **classification** may take a number of forms displaying a contrast between the noun class gender system of some languages and the sets of classifiers in some other languages. On the basis of this, we make a major claim about the types of languages in section 4.4.

From a cognitive, semantic, and cultural point of view, the function of classifiers is to categorize objects in "classes" with respect to the way we interact with them (Craig 1986). Nouns, on the other **hand**, establish reference to things in the world. A study of classifiers, thus, will result in a better

understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of the human categorization **phenomenon**.

The prototype theory is in view in the Domain of Experience Principle that Lakoff (1986) proposes:

- (15) If there is a basic **domain** of experience with A, then it is natural for entities in that **domain** to be in the same category as A

(15) was proposed to provide a general principle to account for the Dyirbal classifier system more economically than Dixon (1982). The prototype theory advances the concept of a general cognitive apparatus that is used by the mind to categorize the way humans do. This is **conceptually** not very distant from the theory of salience that we elaborated in Chapter II which forms the basis of our understanding of the **computational** architecture of **transitivity**.

Classical theories do not permit any member of a set to more or less salient since in a classical theory a category has **well-**defined boundaries and membership in the category is governed by necessary and sufficient conditions common for all the members. A cognitive theory necessarily, therefore, gives rise to nonclassical effects. Lakoff (1986) points out that cognitive theories make sense of a humanly restricted and humanly conceived portion of human experience. It disturbs the classical view that concepts are abstract and are separate from human experiences. It supports the view that our conceptual system is linked to our

physical and cultural experiences¹.

We mentioned earlier that classifier systems come into being as a result of various types of human interactions carried out with the objects in the world as opposed to a view where objects are thought to be classified according to how they are in the world rather than how humans interact with them. These interactions may be social, physical or functional. In the following subsection we look at some of such interactions in connection with classifiers in Bangla. The formal aspect of classifiers as a category is discussed in detail in our analysis presented from section 4.4 onwards.

4.3.2 Classifiers in Bangla

Classifiers in Bangla include the default classifier *Ta*, the collective classifier *gulo*, the human classifier *Jon*, the inanimate count classifier *khani*, the numeral absorbing human collective classifier *ra* etc. (see Dasgupta 1983, 1985, 1987 for details).

Traditional Bangla grammar as well as Sen (1979) uses the term affix (*prottoy*) for classifiers. Sarkar (1992) uses different categories of classifiers as follows:

1. The lexology project of Dasgupta (forthcoming) reclaims this more general domain for linguistic study.

(16) Class I: Ta Te To Ti
 khana khani
 gacha gachi
 gulo gula gull

Class II: Tu Tuku

Class III: ra era

Ta for Sarkar is like Bloomfield's bound morpheme. Since affixation changes the category, Ta cannot for him be an affix. Tagore (1892) used a term that translates as 'Definitive marker' whereas Chatterji (1926) used a more grammatical term such as enclitic definitives for these but this was rejected later in favour of 'class-dependent definitive' since clitics are usually full words elsewhere in the language. 7a, however, cannot be shown to be related to any other word.

Some of the earlier authors claimed Ta to have an onomatopoeic origin. The explanation is as follows. To show something we usually point a finger and if that leaves any doubt we touch or knock with our finger. The sound of such a knock is Tok or Ta. Using Ta while pointing has the same effect as the striking of a finger. This looks like a cognitive explanation for the existence of classifiers. But other, more neogrammarian explanations may carry the day.

If classifiers are considered to be some kind of inflection (Chafean "inflection") markers, it is a marker of definite Case. Demonstrative pronouns in the language, however, perform a simi-

lar function. Sarkar (1992), **therefore**, points out that *oy lot* "that **man**" cannot be replaced by *lok-Ta 'man-cla'* "the **man**" where the definitizing effect is somehow reduced. The use of **Ta**, **accordingly** denotes a reference to the person/topic mutually agreed upon by the speaker and the hearer. Therefore the **Ta**, for Sarkar (1992), is referential. With this use of **Ta** the speaker wants to convey to the hearer the message that he is talking about the same person/thing that the hearer has in **mind**. A **demonstrative** pronoun involves pointing whereas the classifier does restate that in the given context the topic is identified as identical by the speaker-hearer. This terminology that Sarkar uses, is borrowed from Dasgupta (1983) who uses **them** to distinguish between the following:

(17)a. *oy kham-duTo*
 those **envelope-two-cla**
 '**those two envelopes**'

 b. *oy duTo kham*
 those **two-cla envelope**
 '**those two envelopes**'

Sarkar's account misses the crucial aspect of the interaction of the two strategies in such cases. In (17) above it can be shown that **Ta** does have the definitizing property also and demonstratives by nature involve pointing. (17a) for **example**, involves, what we call, topic **identification** in spite of the presence of a **demonstrative** pronoun. In (17b), on the other hand, only the strategy of pointing is made use of. This reminds us of the

uniqueness **possibilities** that we pointed out in connection with the concept of double strike (Chapter I) and anaphoric **definites**. We presume that the crucial difference between (17a) and (17b) above obtains if we entertain the possibility of highlighting of a unique strategy in any particular discourse. In a **more** recent analysis, Ghosh (1995) fails to account for the difference in definiteness (or in degree of topic identification) between these two word orders.

Within the uses of *Ta* it is sometimes assumed that entities which are bigger in size receive the classifier. Tagore (1892) shares a similar opinion and identifies *Ti* as a variant to be used for smaller objects and for **affectionately** considered things/people. *Ta* is used not only for bigger things but also for things which are forgettable and unadorable. Objects which imply no special emotion, and are neutral, also take *Ta*. In the following, (18a) expresses a sense of caring on the part of the speaker whereas in (18b) there is no such special sense being expressed.

- (18)a. *chata-Ti* *kothaY?*
 umbrella-cla where
 'where is the umbrella (that little one)?'
- b. *chata-Ta* *kothaY?*
 umbrella-cla where
 'where is the **umbrella?**'

The classifiers like ***gula, gulo, guli*** denote plurality,

This plurality, however, is definite. Plurality in Bangla could be **marked** or **unmarked**. In the following sentence, **nach** is an example of a unmarked plural form while (20) is case of marked but indefinite use.

(19) nodi-te Bach thake
 river-LOC fish be-PST **HAB**
 'river has fish'

(20) **meYera Ekdum** taS **khEle** na
girls at **all** card play not
 'Girls never play cards'

In cases of marked plurality wherever **guli** is used it acts as a direct plural form of **Ta/ Ti**. Therefore these morphemes also carry some referential and some social meaning. But not **all** the differences in **interpretation** between *Ta* and *Ti* are found between *gulo* (a **form** of **gula**) and **guli**. **gulo** is more common and that is why it has a connotation of disregard, whereas *guli* is slightly more neutral but not respectful like *Ti*. Both are used with inanimate nouns and they are most appropriate if they are used with non-human nouns. The following demonstrates the deviation from natural uses (Sarkar 1992):

- (21) **boy-gulo** : natural : spoken
book-cla
'books'
- boy-guli** : natural : standard **calit**
- lok-gulo** : natural : spoken
man-cla (disregard)
'men'
- lok-guli** : natural : standard **calit**
(disrespectful)
- lok-era** : natural : standard **calit**
(neutral
indefinite)


ra/era are used with human nouns only. *guli/gulo* are more definite in comparison to *ra/era*. In cases where *Ta* is natural *gulo* is also natural. Similarly wherever *Ta* is unnatural *gulo* is also unnatural. When *gulo* is used with human nouns the disrespectful connotation is clear but when it is used in nonhuman or inanimate nouns such a connotation is not inferred.

4.3.3 Definiteness of Classifiers

In this section we discuss more of the formal properties of classifiers with a special attention to the ways in which definiteness is encoded in such structures. The Bangla classifiers are often called definite articles. However, as Dasgupta (1983) clearly pointed out, classifiers themselves are not articles. Following Dasgupta and Bhattacharya (1994), we will show in section 4.4, that any analysis equating classifiers with determiners (as in Ramchand 1992) will violate the directionality

parameter. Hawkins (1978) has shown that the use of determiners is discourse motivated. Masica (1986) observed that numeral expressions are inherently indefinite. Therefore, **numerals**, in order to produce a definite reading, would require an overt **marking**. This **marking** could be in the **form** of **demonstratives**, word order, relative clauses etc. Bangla uses classifiers for this purpose. Masica (1986) proposes a feature hierarchy which is used by **Kwiatek** (1986) to situate the definiteness of classifiers in Eastern **Indo-Aryan** languages like **Ahomiya**, Bangla and Oriya. This feature hierarchy is shown in (22) below.

(22)



Kwiatek (1986) identifies classifiers as **[+/-Identified]**. Notice that such a **categorization** would imply that classifiers are also specific and referential. The feature **[+/-identified]** in the above hierarchy, for our purpose, translates to given and new information respectively. Such a **classification** has the merit of bringing together the notion that classifiers are specific (Sarkar 1992) and the given/new reading of definites which, we

claim, are obligatorily Barked with classifiers.

Definiteness is a discourse-related **phenomenon** in Hawkins' (1978) terms, an NP bearing definiteness marking 'locates' the NP in a **pragmatically** defined discourse set of **common** knowledge, experience or discourse which is shared by the speaker and the hearer. He uses the concept of '**inclusiveness**' to explain the definite use of an NP. We note that this is completely taken care of by Heim's (1982) Novelty Condition (Chapter I and II) and Kadmon's (1987) Uniqueness Condition. By **inclusiveness**, Hawkins means that the NP is included in a set which unambiguously refers to the NP.

We will show later what the different strategies these two languages employ are to mark **definiteness**. Languages differ in terms of strategies they choose for definiteness **marking**. Hindi and Bangla differ in this respect. Both languages engage certain determiners for the task. Besides, both languages relate strong or **phonologically** overt Case marking (Hindi *ko* 'to', Bangla *ke* 'to') to **definiteness**. That is where the resemblance stops. They diverge in that Bangla, but not Hindi, has a system of Classifiers and employs the **postnominal** placement of a classifier (with or without a numeral prefix) as a device which signals nominal **definiteness**. The location and other details of the morphological **manifestations** of definiteness are worked out in detail in sections 4.5.

4.4 Gender and Class

In this section we propose a typological bifurcation of South Asian languages into two Major groups: Gender languages, **like** Hindi, and Class languages, like **Bangla**. We suggest a particular **formalization**, in terms of a Badge node exhibiting either Class or Gender, of the correspondence between gender in gender languages and the classifier in classifier languages. We accept as our point of departure some of the key assumptions of the minimalist version (Chomsky 1993) of the principles and parameters approach to syntax. In particular, we take it that fully inflected lexemes are inserted at lexical sites, raised to positions where they trigger '**checking**' **mechanisms** ensuring that **all** nodes get licensed, and finally — after finishing **all** syntactic work — '**spelled out**' as a specific phonological shape. This analysis is a modified version of earlier accounts of Dasgupta and Bhattacharya (1994) and Bhattacharya and Dasgupta (**forthcoming**).

4.4.1 Case and Classifiers

The existence of approximately two major schools, as many as the number of slots available for Case **identification**, is **generally** recognized. Fairbanks (1960) and **Kelkar** (1959) belong to

1. We restrict our discussion here to the phenomena **surrounding** the classifier *Ta*

the school which believes that Hindi has only three true Cases: Direct, Oblique, and Vocative. For example, the following show these three Cases:

- (23) *laRkiyaaM* "girl-fem-pl" - Direct
 laRkiyoM "girl-fem-pl" - Oblique
 laRkiyo "girl-fem-pl" - Vocative

These authors treat Case as inflectional in a strong structuralist sense of the term and thus as more easily identifiable with the first slot (that is, the *yoM* slot) in a construction like *laRkiyoMko* "girl-fem-pl Acc" 'to the girls', segmented for our purposes as *laRki+yoM+ko*. The crucial point is that Case here is like a bound morpheme and acts more like an integral part of the word. We also notice that *yoM* merges Gender and Number information.

The other school, exemplified by generative syntacticians (see Mahajan 1990 for the latest exposition) take *ko*, in the above example, as the surface realization of Case. It is less inflectional and behaves more like a **postposition**. These Barkers, as is evident, occupy the second slot.

In Bangla, however, there is no nominal (as distinct from pronominal) evidence that Cases like Oblique or Vocative exist. Case, therefore, is less inflectional in Bangla and is more like the second slot of the Hindi Case system. But Bangla has a system of Classifiers which interact more closely with subtypes of Noun than these Cases do. For **example**:

(24)a. **amaY** **ph0l-Ta** **daV**
 to **me** **fruit-cla** give
 'give **me** the fruit'

b. **mee-gulo** **dekhte** **Sundor**
girl-cla to see beautiful
 'the girls are beautiful to look **at**'

So far, the differences between the two languages that we notice are as follows:

- (i) Hindi has a Gender system but does not have a **system** of Classifiers.
- (ii) Hindi has two apparent Case slots.

What emerges from this discussion is that Hindi has more space to operate than Bangla which is evident from the fact that Hindi has two apparent Case positions which one might, straddling the fence between the two theories, call inner and outer Case. Our proposed notion of Badge is an **attempt** to try and reduce this difference. We deal with the intricacies of the proposal in section 4.5 in detail. Here we initiate the discussion.

We are interested in the site where the postnominal Classifier in Bangla and the first Case slot in Hindi appears. The first or inner Case position in Hindi **morphologically** interacts with the gender and the declension of the noun. As an **example** of the latter consider **laRkaa**, the Direct plural of which is **laRke**; but the Direct singular and plural forms of **raaJaa** 'king' are identical. In both Hindi and Bangla, this site interacts with the noun's intrinsic features. Bangla Classifiers and Hindi inner

Case are also similar in the way ~~that~~—unlike inflectional elements in highly **fusional** languages—~~they~~ never invade the body of the stem proper, altering its final consonant, for example.

There is substantive evidence to show that Gender and Class can be unified. The prefix-type classifiers of the Bantu **family** show agreement with the noun-class they are attached to. This agreeing behaviour of certain classifiers is evidence that class is a gender-like category. Although in South Asian languages the Classifiers do not **morphologically** trigger or participate in patterns of agreement, there are overall typological grounds for saying that Classifiers and Gender are two different shapes of the same thing. We further conjecture (following Singh, **p.c.** via P. Dasgupta) that the loss of ergativity in Eastern **IA** languages was accompanied by a loss of the system of gender **classification** in these languages. Bangla and other Magadhan languages are presumed to have developed the system of classifiers subsequent to this attrition of the agreement system .

4.5 Badge in **Bangla/Hindi**

With this sort of a background we suggest a neutral **term like** Badge for this site since we are talking about the noun's

1. More work is needed on Oriya, which preserves **Number** agreement, to sort out the genetic and typological picture.

identity indications. In Class languages it houses the classifier. In Gender languages it holds the Gender and Number information. The importance of Badge is also reflected in its ability to respond to the process of Case marking. It is a site where the Case information spills over. There is evidence that noun subtype properties interact with theta/ Case properties in an obvious way. Larson (1985) has demonstrated this for bare NP adverbs. He argued that adjunct NPs get their theta-roles and Case through the N since nouns have intrinsic semantic properties; that is, certain lexical items get their theta properties from being what they are and where they are. The idea that noun subtype information can feed Case and theta features becomes easy to implement if we postulate a Badge site housing noun subtype properties.

We mentioned in section 4.3 that Bangla, but not Hindi, has a system of Classifiers and employs the postnominal placement of a classifier (with or without a numeral prefix) as a device which signals nominal definiteness. The account of these and related phenomena which we develop elsewhere (Dasgupta and Bhattacharya 1994) proposes that the syntactic environment of a noun phrase is conditioned by two forces. Its external grammar shows up at the Declension (or D) head of the DP and registers Case, definiteness and other relational properties. Its internal grammar resides in what we have called the Badge (or B) enclosure of the noun complex. The D slot mediates the instructions of the external world. The Badge decides how the internal world, that is, the N is to be

organized. To this we now turn.


Badge **comprises** Gender and Number in Gender languages and is formally instantiated in the feature composition of the Noun. In Class languages of the Classifier subtype, we suggest, Badge may be a site, between the Noun word proper and the Declension, where a Classifier (with or without a numeral prefix) may appear. On such an analysis, both Hindi and Bangla manifest **definiteness** by strengthening Det (the Spec of B') or D in both languages, or B in Bangla where it may be weak (zero B) or super-strong (overt). Options for B in Hindi are limited; gender is **lexically** fixed and number depends upon speaker's choice. Thus Hindi cannot strengthen B to mark **definiteness**. We propose that in both types of language the content of B interacts with that of D to determine the often fused shapes of the relevant inflectional morphology.

Before we work out the specific details relating to the interaction of Badge and Declension within the minimalist framework, in the next section, we show how DPs in Bangla differ from DPs in European languages.

4.6 The Bangla DP

We maintain the position of Dasgupta and Bhattacharya (1994) (henceforth **D&B**), the first work to propose a DP analysis of Bangla **NPs**, that Bangla NPs are best analyzed as DPs.

Abney (1987) shows that in **Hungarian** (and Turkish) possessor **constructions**, the possessed N agrees with the possessor. The possessor carries Nominative Case **marking** which is standardly assumed to and be assigned under government by the element Agr in **Infl**. In a sentence Agr occupies an Inflectional position outside the VP; Agr in a noun phrase, Abney conjectures, occupies a similar position:



In (25b) X is a "nominal **inflectional**" category. Modals are the only lexical class representing **Infl** and Abney proposes that the category Determiner is the NP equivalent to modals in English while looking for a suitable label for X. A typical canonical **configuration** of a DP in English will have the form:



In English, French and German D is identified as the Det where

agreement morphology occurs.

The account presented here for Bangla and Hindi closely resembles, but at the same time brings into focus certain differences with, the familiar European language type as described in the standard literature of parametric syntax. The D head of the DP in these languages is a Det and precedes the NP, conforming to the general pattern of head-first functional projections in that language type. The South Asian D head of the DP follows the NP and is not Det. The South Asian Det which carries deictic features precedes the N' but must be analyzed as a Spec (of what we shall call B'), not as the head of DP. The real D in South Asian languages is a DP-final element and is in line with the generalization that South Asian functional projections exhibit the head-last pattern throughout the language type.

Trying to extend to Bangla the general form of the current parametric accounts of syntax, D&B faces the question of a suitable candidate for the D head of the Bangla DP. Det is identified as the D head in English, German and French where it is the site for Agr morphology, but this leaves open the identity of D in other languages like Bangla. They note that in Bangla an identification of Det as D would lead to certain architectural problems since every other head in Bangla, lexical or functional, is final in its projection. Det is initial in the nominal construction from which they conclude that it cannot be the head. They further present the following minimal pair to strengthen their claim:

- (27) e lok**Ta**_i jane je er_i/**tar**_i bhay aSbe
 this Ban knows that **his-Prox** brother will-cose
 his-Seq
 'This nan knows that his brother **will** cone'
- (28) e_i jane je er_i/***tar**_i bhay aSbe
 he-Prox knows that his-Prox' brother will-come
 his-Seq
 'He knows that his brother **will come**'

The embedded coreferential pronoun may either be a Proximal or a Sequent in (27), where the antecedent DP contains the noun meaning 'man'; but it is obligatorily Proximal in (28), where the antecedent DP is a bare Det e 'he' whose Proximal feature must be responded to. If the Det was the D head of DP, it would have equally unoverridable **Proximality** in (27), precluding the coreferential Sequent *tar* 'his-Seq' which in fact occurs. The fact that the determiner carries the Proximal feature which has to be visible from (and copied at) other relevant sites in the sentence might lead one to believe that the determiner might be the head of this **construction**. But that possibility is ruled out since *tar* 'his-Seq' is in fact allowed in (27).

D as the classifier element *Ta* acting as a site for definiteness, as we mentioned earlier, is also ruled out. **Ramchand's** (1992) analysis is not preferable for the following reason. One motivation behind positing DP as a functional projection was that it functions as a site for dependential morphology **like** Case and agreement. Abney's D has the inflectional Agr element which is the Case **assigner**. One piece of evidence for the presence of Case

would be **morphological** variation, which is not observed in the case of **Ta** or other classifiers. **D&B** infer **from** the absence of variation that D in Bangla does not contain Case features. In Hindi it does, as is evident from direct **laRkaa** 'boy' and **laRko** 'boys' versus oblique **laRke kaa** 'boys's' and **laRkoM kaa** 'boys', of (the) **boys**' showing obvious variation. Obliqueness at the gender/number site in Hindi is a piece of evidence for Case. **German** shows overt Case at D as in *der Mann* 'the-Nom **man**', *den Mann* 'the-Acc man', etc. **Abney** does provide evidence for dependential morphology at D in the languages he considers, in particular, agreement morphology.

Bangla Classifiers neither bear Case nor trigger adjectival/**determiner**ial agreement:

- (29)a. e chele**Ta**
 this **boy-cla**
 '**this** boy'
- b. oy **meYe-Ta**
 that **girl-cla**
 '**that** girl'

D&B (1994) take D to be a site for Declension which encodes Case, **definiteness** and other relational properties.

4.7 Spec-DP

The preceding section has given us an empirically explicit idea of the nature of the head of the DP in Bangla nominal constructions. In this section, we look at the other "periphery"

where syntactic energy is concentrated in the present **framework**. In doing that we discuss the GCS and the Gerund constructions in **Bangla** as evidences for a Spec-DP position. This would give us a **justification** of the both ends of a DP structure like the following:



4.7.1 Genitive Classifier Structure

Considering that the present **framework** emphasizes a morphological assessment of strings on the basis of the degree of **lexicalization**, it is worthwhile to pursue an analysis of a construction which behave like a single morphological unit. GCS is such a domain where we initiate our inquiry. In any parametric account of Badges as well as **Ds**, GCS is among the facts it should be able to handle. (31) below exemplifies a GCS construction.

(31) toma-r-Ta
your-Gen-Cla
 'the **yours**'

One of the properties of a GCS is that it is non-recursive, that is, (32) is ruled out.

(32)* toma-r-Ta-r-Ta

But it is equally interesting to note that (33) is **possible** in an appropriate context.

(33) **du-jon-er-Ta**
two-Cla-Gen-Cla


'the one belonging to **both**'

(33) shows that there **is** no particular restriction on the **Cla-Gen-Cla** order **from** occurring. Nor is it the case that a **Ta-r-Ta** order is not allowed since (34) is possible (again, in an appropriate context).


(34) **paMc-Ta-r-Ta**
five-cla-gen-cla
'the one pertaining to five o'clock' (from **paMcTa** '5 o'clock')

Bhattacharya (1995) provides no formal account of (31-34) or rather stipulates that whenever **Ta** marks an NP as definite, strong features of the classifier prohibit any more definiteness marking. We now have a better account of this phenomenon as it **falls** within the general restriction imposed upon felicitous **constructions** by the Uniqueness Condition that we studied in detail in section 4.2. Once the definiteness information is decoded by encountering a definiteness marking classifier **morph**, appearance of another such **morph** leads to **unparsability**. Bhattacharya (1995) further notes the fact that a **num-cla-gen-cla** is more tolerable if a context can be provided. This could be as in (34) above because a numeral generally takes a classifier after it and has lexically frozen readings **like** 'five o'clock'. The

construction **Num+Cla**, therefore, does not really count as exhibiting a definitive use of the classifier. **Sarkar's (1992)** contention that *Ta/Ti* **limits** or definitizes the preceding numeral, therefore, is not true. As a result another classifier will **be** needed if any definitive leaning is to imposed. A simplified structure will be **like** (35) below.



Definiteness in Bangla is established, as we have seen, through strengthening of different sites **like** the Det and the D (*ko* and *ke*, for example in Hindi and Bangla **respectively**) in both the languages and a **superstrong** B in Bangla. We suggest that definiteness is established by a Spec-head relationship and if the definiteness feature is detected in such a relationship the maximal projection licensed by that head gets the **definiteness** effect. This can be built in the parsing scheme that we propose in section 4.10. This is true of DP-B and BP-D relations both of which are Spec-head relations. A Spec-head checking is done **via** the checking domain (Chomsky 1993); DP and BP are the checking domains for B and D respectively. The **following**, however, is **out**:



A GCS like (32), we noted earlier, is also not possible. We believe that *paMcTa* acts more like a unit than *lokTa*. For one thing, nothing can be inserted between the classifier and the noun in the former while possible to have (37) as a version of the latter.

- (37) lok du-To
 man two-cla
 'the two men'

The reason behind this, we presume, is because such an incorporation is exhibited only by a numeral and since *paMc* 'five' is itself a numeral there should be no need for a further numerical modification of it. To rule out such structures one could propose a constraint on the **accessibility** of checking domains. However, such a constraint will not serve our purpose since *lok-Ta-r* 'of the man' in *lok-Ta-r-Ta* 'man-cla-gen-cla' and *paMc-Ta-r* 'five-cla-gen' in *paMc-Ta-r-Ta* 'five-cla-gen-cla' should be **equally** inaccessible for the bigger B head; **still** only one structure is ruled in. Note that, such a constraint will not prevent the generation of **toma-r-Ta-r-Ta* 'you-gen-cla-gen-cla' (32). It

is quite possible that the deeper B in case of *paic-Ta-r-Ta* and *du-jon-er-Ta* 'two-cla-gen-cla' does not have anything in its checking domain to establish a Spec-head relationship and consequently the deeper DPs do not carry any definiteness effect. We have to show that *lok* 'man' and *toma-r* 'your' are in the checking domain, that is, they are in the Spec positions of the head **Ta**. But *lok* like *paMc* is a sister of the deeper B and as such **cannot** be a part of the Spec of the head.

It is possible to conceive of the **following** set as an expanded form of these expressions:

- (38)a. **toma-r-Ta-r-0-Ta**
you-gen-c la-gen-0-cla
- b. **lok-Ta-r-0-Ta**
man-cla-gen-0-cla
- c. **paMc-Ta-r-0-Ta**
five-cla-gen-0-cla
- d. **du-jon-er-0-Ta**
two-cla-gen-0-cla

0 in (38) above denotes the missing NP object. Notice that in (38a,b) 0 is a property which "belongs" to the pronoun and the noun **respectively**, whereas in the latter two cases it is not so and the numerical expressions are **just** a property of 0, they do not possess it. In (38), therefore, 0 is an inalienable noun (by extension) and **inalienability** is a **semantically** dependent notion. By this token we can consider *tumi* and *lok* as the possessor arguments and 0 as the inalienable argument. A type of binding

relation through predication holds between these **arguments** which imposes a Mutual **n-command** relation (Vergnaud and Zubizarreta 1992). This will rule out the first two expressions if a copy of 0 is present which, therefore, fails to follow the mutual **n-command** condition. In case of (38c,d) this is not the case. Here 0 is not an inalienable noun. As such a **n-commanding** relation may not hold between these two arguments. However, if 0 was overt in (38a,b) the condition of mutual n-command could not have been set. Vergnaud and Zubizarreta's (1992) criterion, therefore, may not be duplicated at the word level. More concretely these two do not lexically specify an **inalienable** argument in their lexical entries. This makes omission easier because there is no binding relation in these cases. Whereas for the first two expressions, omission of the inalienable argument leads to unacceptability. This makes sense because in case of (38a,b), the noun or the possessor pronoun is picked out for reference for definitizing by adding *Ta*, any further inalienable argument of that possessed part will retain that definiteness information rendering the occurrence of another *Ta* **ungrammatical**. This is not true of the numerical expressions which modify intended nominal arguments; since the implied nouns are novel entities, emphasizing them with a definitive force does not clash with the existing *Ta* morpheme. The crucial point that emerges is that the implied (deleted) object noun **is** a new entity in case of a **numer-**

ical expression*.

The non-recursive property of the GCS coupled with its being & **postnominal** classifier, closes the phrase. This is in line with the DP hypothesis in general. Fukui and **Speas** (1986) claimed that functional categories possess certain features by which they can license a unique specifier which 'closes off' the category's projection ²[FN: This is done in their **system** by discharging **Kase** features which are a unification set of the usual Case features (Objective Case assigned by V, for example) and F(unctional)-features (Nominative Case assigned by Agr/Tns, Genitive by 's, +WH by Wh-Comp, for example in Fukui, 1986) 1 .

4.7.2 Gerunds

Another piece of evidence for the existence of a Spec-DP position, as we mentioned earlier, is gerunds in **Bangla**. In order to account for the structure of such **constructions and** related to this, the assignment of Case in such structures, let

1. However, there is a problem that we have to address: assuming that Fukui and Speas (1986) right the expression *lok-ta-r-Ø-Ta* containing a Genitive following the first instance of the classifier should be possible because such a Genitive will **make** addition of further material possible and therefore should be able to project a phrase which would include Ø. Given the present framework, this does not **seem** possible.

2. This **is** done in their system by discharging Kase features which are a unification set of the usual Case features (Objective Case assigned by V, for example) and F (unctional) features (Nominative Case assigned by Agr/Tns. Genitive by 's, +WH by **Wh-Comp**, for example in Fukui, 1986.

us begin with the following **examples**:


- (39)a. ey **jO1** **jOma-Ta** bhiSon biroktikOr
this water **logging-cla** very bothersome
'**this** fact of water logging is quite **bothersome**
- b. **rame1** ey **OSomoYe** aSa-Ta
Ram-gen this **neg-time-loc** **coming-cla**
'this Ram's coming at odd times'
- c.* ey **OSomoYe** ram aSa-Ta
- d. ey **OSomoYe** **ciThi** aSa-Ta
this Neg-time-Loc letter **coming-cla**
'this coming of the letter at odd **times**'

Genitive in Bangla is notorious for its numerous uses. One of these uses is that of representing the agentive role. In (39c) we see that *ram* plays an agentive role and somehow that is expressed by a Genitive marker which is bearable only in the position shown in (39b) above. This is indirect evidence for the fact that the Genitive is assigned at the Spec of DP position. Notice, however, that scrambling of *ciThi* out to the initial position is ruled out. This is because gerunds tend to be more rigid as far as their internal structure is concerned. Gerunds thus resist scrambling. Since *ciThi* is the Theme in this sentence it needs to stay with **aSaTa**.

The typical gerund structure in Bangla is as follows (the decision to have a Det daughter of NP is a provisional mechanism, as is the hybrid notation of **G,G',NP**; see 4.9 for the exact

position proposed for Det):

(40)



G in (40) denotes a noun type element and *ey OSomoYe* occupies an adjunct position which itself can get Genitive Case for Fukui's (1986) account makes it possible for anything (including an adjunct) to move to the Spec-DP position for Case reasons. For an expression like (39b), we will claim that *ram* is generated at the lower Spec-DP position and receives **configurational Genitive Case**.

Coming now to (39c,d), we see that they have two different structures. For (39d), since there is no Spec generated, there is no VP too and the V is the equivalent structure. Furthermore, DP *ciThi*, being a sister of the lexical V, receives a direct theta role (and Case); whereas for (39c), the verb can give only an indirect theta role to *ram* which in an alternative account is allowed to move to the Spec-DP position from the Spec-

VP position.

In Abney's (1987) account the node D has Agr features which "assign" Genitive Case in possessor constructions but since Bangla does not manifest agreement, we claim that such an analysis is not needed. As noted earlier, in Bangla, therefore, the DP "gets" Case in the Spec-DP position which could either be base-generated or licensed by movement of the DP to this position. This is similar to Chomsky's (1981) story of Genitive Case assignment. Gerunds, therefore, provide crucial evidence for the existence of a Spec-DP position.

4.8 The strength of B

In Chomsky's (1993) exposition of the *Minimalism* programme, the notions of government, D-structure and S-structure are all discarded. Morphological properties of lexical items come to the fore. Inflectional features of any lexical item are inserted along with it whenever the item is drawn from the lexicon. These features are then subject to a feature checking mechanism whereby the item reaches the specifier position adjacent to each functional head (F) and gets its features checked against the set of features contained in these Fs. If the features match then the relevant feature marking (an abstract formal object) at F disappears and the lexical item enters the PF component under SPELL-OUT; if it does not, then F remains and the derivation "crashes"


at PF. For an expression to converge (not crash) at PF and to be interpreted by a **performance system** it should be **made** entirely of **legitimate** PF objects and unchecked abstract features at F are not legitimate PF/LF objects. Agr as a functional **element** in a typical sentence has two kinds of features: V-features to check the features of the verb adjoined to it and NP-features to check the features of NPs (or DPs) that raise to the Specifier position of Agr (Chomsky 1993). In this analysis we are interested in the NP-features of the functional head B.

We **assume** that nouns are drawn from the lexicon along with **all** their morphological features including phi-features. The B site in Hindi consists only of PF-visible ("strong") but **segmentally** unspecified ("empty") inflectional features, which **must** be erased by checking, in the system of Chomsky (1993), so that the representation converges at PF. The notion of PF-visibility is crucial in a checking theory - there are **segments**, PF-visible by definition, and there two kinds of abstract (**non-segmental**) features, which Chomsky calls weak and strong (invisible and visible, respectively, at PF). For a derivation to converge at PF, it must erase all strong abstract features by PF.

In Chomsky's reworking of Pollock, **Agr_s** and **Agr_o** are used as 'mnemonics' to distinguish between the two functional roles of Agr, namely, subject and object agreement. According to Chomsky (1993) Agr is a collection of phi-features like Gender, Number and Person. In our parallel nominal system there should be **avail-**

able an Agr position. One crucial difference between this Agr **element** and the more **familiar** Agr in D pertainB to the mediating role it plays: **Abney-Agr** which resides in D is typically a matter of two **NPs**. For example, consider the **following** Turkish example and its structure:

- (41) sen-in el-in
 you-Gen hand-2Sg
 'your **hand**'




Agr in D here links DP_i to NP_i , that is, two NPs. The phi-features of B proposed here have to do with just one NP, the one that the B serves. Presumably Bangla B, if null, has Chomsky-**weak**' (PF-invisible) **phi-features**, while Hindi B always has Chomsky-strong phi-features.

Consequently a Hindi N must raise to B in the overt syntax to go through feature checking and to make the derivation converge as otherwise these Chomsky-strong phi-features of the Hindi B **will** survive till PF. These naked features are not legitimate PF objects and so the derivation **will** crash. Bangla raises N to B at LF because the Bangla B is, if overt, a classifier morpheme

with a distinct phonological shape of its own and posing no **PF**-licensing problems. If null, it has no **PF-visible** material at all, again posing no problems and requiring no N-raising in the overt syntax.

Ghosh (1995) departs **from** DAB (1994) in identifying Abney's (1987) D with Determiners in Bangla. He further uses Lobel's (1989) **QP** and Tang's (1990) **KP** for building up the structure of the Bangla DP as in (44) for a phrase **like** (43). Ghosh proposes that Case features are located at **K**.

- (43) **amar** oy boy du-To
 my those book **two-cla**
 'those two books of nine'



The rest of his argument follows this structure which, however, we note, violates the head parameter in a fashion similar to **Ramchand** (1992) which we pointed out in section 4.6. An adoption of **Kayne's** (1994) LCA is not explicitly stated, neither is any empirical, **Bangla-internal justification** for the specifics of

Ghosh's apparent adoption of **Kayne** presented.

There are other problems with Ghosh's (1995) invocation of **Minimalist** Principles to account for the set of **movements** that his possibly premature (and certainly not **independently** Motivated) conversion to the ICA forces him to posit. In general, the needs for feature checking which would drive his Last Resort movements are presented in an unconstrained package of "agreement" features that never seem to show up in the overt morphology of any classifier language of Asia. In particular and even more **damagingly**, a **[+definite] Det**, in his system, whether lexical or non-lexical, **optionally** makes the feature of **K** strong which induces a NP to **Spec-KP** movement. Firstly, **optionality** of strength in this system seems ad hoc. Secondly, by this logic of D strength driving NP **preposing**, one would expect a lexical D (a demonstrative Det, in his system) being a case of a strong D to attract all NPs to its own Spec. The need for a **[+strong]** head to fill its Spec along with the need for a null **[+definite]** D to fill its Spec in Ghosh's system pull in opposite directions and cannot both be used to explain the **definiteness** effect in Bangla **DPs**. Ghosh (1995) is silent about the prominent connection between Genitive Case checking and the Spec-DP position (Miyagawa 1993 and Bhattacharya 1994). The failure of a coherent account of the mechanism of Genitive Case assignment in this system leads to the absence of any morphological statements reflecting the need to establish a connection between various

heads like D, Q and K.

Our present account (similar to DAB (1994)) **makes clear claims** regarding the relative strengths of heads responsible for displaying the definiteness effect. In this **system**, the account of N-raising taking place in syntax (Hindi) or LF (Bangla) results in simple stateaents about the contrastive definiteness effect observed across these two language types (see below).

The feature-only content of nominal B in Hindi is similar to the French verbal Agr as opposed to the English facts (see Pollock 1989 and Chomsky 1993). Pollock's (1989) idea of **I-to-V** lowering in English type languages is redone in terms of verb raising in both types of languages in Chomsky (1993). French Agr in **Chomsky** has strong V-features (features of the verb that the functional elements hold up for checking, Chomsky 1993) and since strong features are visible at PF, V in French Bust raise to delete the strong V-features in the Agr for the relevant derivations to converge.

Analogously, in our account, the strong feature content of the nominal B triggers overt syntactic N-raising in Hindi. Consider (44) below in this connection.

- (44) ye **meraa** giit
 this my song
 'this song of **mine**'

In (44) **meraa** 'my' gets its genitive Case checked vis-a-vis the

B complex, which **exceptionally governs** it. after the N *giit* 'song' raises to B. We assume that this is because B, unlike D, has no stable, **independently** specifiable phonological content and thus has no lexical identity (not even the attenuated kind that D has) until N raises to it. **N-raising** ensures feature checking for Hindi in the overt syntax. Once checked, **B's** features disappear in the sense of becoming **phonologically invisible** (cf. Chomsky 1993 on Agr in French), and the head complex N-B functions as a single inflected lexeme.

Can D Case-mark **meraa** directly? Or does N-B raising to D empower it to Case-mark? Our account compels us to say that D assigns (or equivalently licenses) Case on its own. Since we allow Bangla to procrastinate N-to-B raising to LF, the Bangla s-structure D is separated from its N by a **lexemeless** B. Such a D must be able to assign Case on its own in the Bangla version of (45) – a variant of (44) – which is **grammatical**.

(45) meraa ye giit
 my this song
 'this song of mine'

By parity of reasoning, D must do so in Hindi as well. The question is whether this is a desirable feature of our analysis. On conceptual grounds, we would argue that it is. D has independent phonological **segmental** content in both Bangla and Hindi. It merits recognition as a distinct site of indexation and **grammatical-**

cal processes. Languages that have D (Japanese may turn out not to have it) instantiate Case on the D site (consider *ko* 'to' in Hindi and *ke* 'to' in Bangla) and can reasonably permit one Case-bearing D to assign Case to another D. Another consideration, apart from the Case facts, is that Ds show agreement and thus deserve, like verbal Agr, to be recognized as potential Case assigners.

Notice that an expression like (44) in Bangla is excluded as a nominal projection (though the string is okay as a verbless clause meaning 'This is my song'):

(46)* *ey amar gan*
 this my song
 'this song of mine'

The Bangla B is weak (like English Agr as compared to French), and thus does not require N-raising to take place in the overt syntax. A Bangla B is either null (devoid of strong or PF-visible features) or a classifier morpheme (a low content lexeme). It does not contain inflectional features which, being PF-visible but devoid of phonological content that can be spelled out, might require N-raising in the overt syntax to check and erase the feature content of an empty B in order to forestall the outcome where the derivation, without N-raising in the overt syntax, crashes at PF because of unerased B-features. Bangla therefore procrastinates N-raising to LF. Thus (46) is excluded because,

assuming that N as a lexical **head** cannot assign Case, and assuming that the non-N-raising Bangla B (like a Hindi B in a derivation without N-raising) also cannot, there is no way for **amar** 'my' to get Case. So the only variant available, (47), shows the word order of (45) in Hindi:

- (47) **amar** ey **gan**
 my this song
 'this song of **mine**'

At **this** point we may ask why Bangla needs to raise *gan* 'song' to B at all. Presumably the reason, if there is one, is perfectly general. We speculate that no lexical head can be interpreted in situ at **LF**. The principle of **FI** (**F**ull **I**nterpretation) requires them to have a formally identified function. So N must attach to the functional head B at **LF**. The functional heads work as mediators for the purpose of **FI**. The constitutive features of a functional head F are checked in a sister relation (**Murasugi** 1992). This mechanism underwrites **FI**. See Chomsky (1993) for some relevant discussion.

4.9 **Definiteness** and Head **Movement**

Definiteness in Bangla, as shown elsewhere (Dasgupta, 1983) is not directly expressed by a classifier morpheme like *Ta* per

se. It is associated in **some** cases with N NUB **Cla** word order:

- (48)a. duTo **kham**
 two-cla envelopes
 'two envelopes'
- b. **kham** duTo
 envelopes **two-cla**
 'the two envelopes'


But the construction (48b) exists only for Numerals of sufficiently low **cardinality**——prototypically two or three. A small **Num** may structure-preservingly (in a nonstandard sense) [FN:The idea of **structure-preservation** here is a semantic one. **Postnominal** classifier elements can carry a limited amount of cardinality information: *laThi-gacha* 'the (*singular*) walking stick', *juto-joRa* 'the *pair* of shoes', *Dim-gulo* 'the (*plural*) eggs'. We suggest that this is why Numerals with an inconspicuous amount of cardinality information can slip into the Badge without occasioning semantic incongruity. For whatever reason, **kham-satTa* 'the seven envelopes', **Dim-aTTa* 'the eight eggs' and other examples with postnominal large numerals are excluded] head-move to Badge (see (49a-c)), yielding **Num-prefixed** Badge which way, structure-preservingly (in the standard sense), head-move to the B head of the matrix BP. This will give (48b). The movement of a small **Num** to the B head of the lower BP first (see (49b)) is necessitated by the Head Movement Constraint.

(51) ey Sobuj **SaRi-du'to**
 this green **sari-two-cla**
 'these two green saris'


(52)* ey Sobuj duTo **SaRi**
 this green two-cla sari

This **may** be due to the fact that numerated Badges **may** play left adjunct within BP but, maybe for **FI-related** reasons (of the kind outlined earlier – see the discussion after (47)), not within NP proper. It is quite possible that there is a general constraint prohibiting functional projections from interrupting a lexical projection. **This** ensures that there is no way to generate (52). Consider the following trees for further elaboration:

(53)a.



b.



These are the **representations** for (50) and (51) respectively where *duTo* 'two-cla' head-moves to the B head of the matrix BP (as elaborated in (49)) to derive (51). Presumably a "definite" B has some features of the sort discussed by **Murasugi** (1992) that require checking in a sister relation and thus **trig-**

ger **B-raising** in the overt syntax in **examples** like (53b). We **conjecture** that definiteness in Bangla and **Hind.** involves "strengthening" one or more of the sensitive sites D, B, and Det, which we have so far taken to be an acceptable Spec of BP, a point **reexamined** below. All three are choice points in Bangla and thus may serve, if strengthened, to express **definiteness**. Hindi B is always "strong" (that is, in Chomsky's (1993) system, **PF-visible**) - **medium-strong** rather than super-strong in the context of our notion of strengthening - and thus, not being a choice point, is inert as far as definiteness is concerned.

Notice that the NP *Sobuj SaRi* 'green saris' here is a lexical projection, a fact which protects it from interruption by a functional projection like BP *duTo* 'two-cla'. This reasoning, if correct, provides independent motivation for the existence of a functional projection like BP.

We consider the possibility that, in continuing to place the Det *ey* in a [Spec, BP] position, we are cleaving to an untenably pre-Abneyan perspective in one crucial detail. Our decision obviously does amount to an exception to the otherwise general pattern of only maximal projections being allowed as specifiers. But we wish to submit that any account is bound to do something **stipulative** about Det in South Asian languages. Functional heads like T, Agr, B, and our D (outer case) appear in (at least **su-**

perfcially) **projection-final** positions; Det does not, which ~~makes~~ it at best an untypical functional head if one wishes to treat it as a functional head at all. Readers who prefer an account that says **Num/Q** and Det are heads that do, **untypically** for South Asia, occupy the **superficially** initial position in their projections are welcome to mutatis the mutandis in our analysis, and to begin to construct a response to our worry that theirs is an equally **question-begging** account. Such a superficial **modifica-**tion **will** not jeopardize the moves that make our overall analysis tick. And if a deeper and satisfying revision becomes available **generalizing**, say, from the properties that Det and **Q/Num** share with A, and conceivably working with a head **movement** mechanism that maps Agr [**MaxP** F] into F-Agr [**MaxP** t], where F is a functional Head, MaxP is a maximal projection, and Agr a new type of agreement node that handles these little apparent modifiers of **nominals** — then we will of course hail such a revision as contributing to our project of formalizing the nuts and bolts of **saliency** and **identification**.

4.10 Principle-Based Parsing

The latest convergence of interests between Natural Language Processing (NLP) and pure linguistic research in syntax has led to the development of a principle-based approach as an alternative to one based on rules. Such an approach to NLP may be viewed as a **computational** application of the syntactic research

perspective **variously** known as **the** Principles and **Parameters** approach or the GB approach. A principle-based (or **parametric**) approach to parsing does not rely on a **complicated**, language-specific and **construction-specific** set of context-free rules but involves the **interaction** of some principles (housed in different modules) with other principles and with the setting of parameters, in the sense of Chomsky, 1981. In Principle-Based Parsing (PBP) as applied to Machine Translation (**MT**), therefore, writing a grammar would **basically** mean stating parametric differences between languages. This **characteristically** linguistic activity thus turns out to be potentially a direct contributor to the enterprise of understanding what it takes to work out a serious and sustainable theory and practice of translation. Thus, our account **links** the parametric approach both to translation and to **parsing**.

The **following** list **may** serve as a quick reference guide for evaluating the relative advantages of **PBP** over a rule based **approach**.

1. In the parametric approach, principles interact *deductively* to produce the same result as would a large number of CF rules (see Berwick, 1991 in this connection).

(54) Disadvantages of a Rule Based Approach

1. Involves a **complicated** set of rules. The ATN based parsers of Bates (1978) and Wood (1970), for example, handle passives as a series of if-then rules and use register assignments and an ordering of rules (see Berwick 1991).
2. This approach does not work in the context of translation, because we will need **language-specific** rules.
3. As a result of 1 and 2, the grammar size becomes **formidable** for a MT system. METAL (Sloum et al 1984), where each parser operates **multilingually**, GETA (Vauquois 1975), SUSY (Maas 1984) etc. are some of the examples.
4. As a consequence, an Earley's (1970) algorithm for CF languages can quadruple its running time if the grammar size is just doubled (Barton 1984).
5. It fails to preserve a modular organization of the grammar.
6. As Dorr (1991) notes, trying to capture the **multiplicative** effects of linguistic constraints in the form of rules results in a **failure** to separate movement from **agreement**, for example, and the grammar size becomes explosive.

(55) Advantages of a Principle-Based Approach

1. Syntactic structures are derivable by means of **formal** procedures, or deductively, from principles.
2. Does not require **language-specific** and construction-specific context-free rules.

1. For subject-verb agreement we can have rules like: $S \rightarrow NP$
 NP_{sg} and $S \rightarrow NP_{pl} VP_{pl}$ but then we need rules for passive and
 agreement also: $S \rightarrow NP_{sg} VP_{sg}$ and $S \rightarrow NP_{pl} VP_{pl}$ + en

3. Modularity involves building simpler independent components, language descriptions are reduced in size, allowing general conditions to be factored out.
4. Modularity makes inclusion of new languages in the system easier, that is, the system is more readily extensible.
5. The grammar writer by setting up parametric values has unlimited access to the operating principles of the system.
6. Properties common to various languages, that is, cross-linguistic generalizations, are now captured in terms of modularized principles.
7. Multiplicative effects of constraints are spelled out in the form of rules. We can now have an underspecified grammar and independent modules that handle movement and agreement, for example.
8. The task of the grammar writer is to determine various parameter settings and thus we do not need a separate grammar for each language. So, adding a language would mean merely adding fresh parametric settings, easing the burden of the programmer.
9. No extensive ordering of the rules is required and, because the principles are abstract, a declarative framework can be used.

4.10.1 PBP and the Bangla Classifier

In this section we will look at a particular translation problem in Bangla and see how a principle-based approach can handle it. A restricted version of a bidirectionally operating MT system between Bangla and Hindi will have to carry a parameter setting regarding the use of Classifiers in Bangla and their absence in Hindi nominal expressions. An exercise involving such a restricted operation might seem regressive in a period shaped

by NLP goals based on discourse models. Some scholars might argue that **the only** fruitful NLP task is the analysis of sentences as they **configure** in real speech situations. However, our reading of the current state of affairs suggests that it may not be such a waste to break down our goal of building the ultimate NLP system into **smaller** subgoals. We believe that such a manoeuvre will yield far more encouraging short-term results. Let us now take a look at the expression of definiteness in the examples of **most** immediate interest. The important contrast **is** between the **definite/indefinite example** of (48) similar to (56) below.

- (56)a. **boy**-[**duTo/tinTe**]
 book-[**two-cla/three-cla**]
 '**the** two/three books'
- b. [**duTo/tinTe**] boy
 [**two-cla/three-cla**] book
 '**the** two/three books'

In (56a), where the noun complex contains a Badge following the noun lexeme proper, we get a definite reading. In (56b), where the Badge material occurs as an independent word consisting of [Nun Badge] and precedes the noun lexeme (which in (56b) is the sole member of the noun complex), we obtain an indefinite reading¹. The semantics of such **definitizing** seems to involve a

1. Note that *boyTa*, where the Badge in the noun complex has no numeral prefix, behaves identically with respect to definiteness: it means 'the book' -- and may be considered to imply an understood numeral 'one'. The corresponding indefinite expression is *EkTa* boy (with the numeral *Ek* 'one'), not **Ta* boy.

novel versus familiar entity distinction. If we use a direct method, for MTing these fragments into Eindi using finite state transducer machines, it will give us word for word Hindi **equiva-**lents as in (57).

(57)a. kitaabeM do
book-pl two

b. do kitaabeM
 two book-pl
 'two books'

At some stage of such a direct translation, (57a) will be rewritten as (58) because the (57a) surface word order is unacceptable in Hindi:

(58) do kitaabeM

(58) as we can see, is the same as (57b), which means that in Hindi we are unable to capture the difference in definiteness exhibited by (56). In fact (58) will be marked unacceptable as a translation of (56a). Hindi, as we know, employs a different set of strategies to express **definiteness**——it cannot strengthen the B site as it has only *B-features*, no B site.

If we assume with **Lieber** (1980), that affixes have separate lexical entries, which is a part of their morphological information. Bs in Bangla are, therefore, part of the lexicon and have distinct lexical conceptual structures (LCS). Various subcategorization **possibilities** of B suggest that its LCS should include a

statement that it **s-selects** a canonical structural realization (Chomsky, 1986a), **canonically** an N (or a **DP/A/Q** etc.) as its **complement**. Full **Interpretation** (Chomsky, 1986a) extends the projection principle to the morphological component and by the same token an affix would carry a theta-grid which percolates to the **dominating** node.

4.10.2 **Computing** Scenes

The discussion so far has provided us with a fairly broad base on which we intend to tackle the problem. There are two sets of issues we will have to address concerning the directionality of translation. The general architecture of the system, which we elaborate further in the next section, will constitute a **language-independent** interlingual (**IL**) **representation** to be acted upon **simultaneously** by two subcomponents before proceeding towards a TL **representation**. One component, which we **call** the Generate Tree Procedure (**GENTREE**), will provide us with bare syntactic structures (very much **like** the ones we saw in the last two sections) with the help of the **X'-theory** and some other parameters. The other component, which we call the Principle and Parameters Component (**PARACON2**), will host all the principles, the rest of the parameters, and the constraints. These two subcomponents forming a larger component which deals with the syntactic procedures of the system **will act interactively** to

produce substitution-ready **IL** representations¹.

We will recommend a bottom-up approach, since a top-down parser (and a parser with a dominant grammar component, more often than not, tends to become one) is not robust **enough** to deal with deviant expressions.

As we mentioned **earlier**, Badges like 7a and *duTo* are like clitics when **postnominal**. We extend the analysis to suggest that an *index transference* mechanism takes place in such cases and the host acquires the index of the clitic. A 7a in the Bangla B crucially contains, apart from other features, a referential feature of its own. Bangla, therefore, has a parameter (that regards B as a clitic), as a part of **PARACON2**, which is absent in Hindi. A feature fusion (and a theta-grid fusion) takes place at the node **dominating** the clitic. This is **made** possible by percolation (of features and theta-grids) triggered by a phonologically real clitic/ affix like 7a (Roeper 1987). We suggest that whenever such a fusion takes place, that is, the referential index of a cliticized B appears at a **completed** XP phrase, an empty position (which attains a thematic shape once it is out of the **IL**) is licensed **prenominally** (determined by the constituent order parameter of the **TL**) in the **IL** representation. This is in

1. This is similar to the model proposed by Dorr to some extent but we will demonstrate shortly how it differs from it, especially in terms of possible control structure and knowledge based positions (see Bhattacharya 1993 for a similar discussion).

line with the criterion that every element that appears in a well-formed structure must be licensed (Chomsky 1986a:p93). This licensing fails whenever theta-grid/feature fusion fails to take place, that is, whenever B is thematically empty. The distribution of empty positions also, then, is parametric between these two languages. The constituent structures of a category is decided by a constraint which is a part of the X'-subsystem. Such a constraint will decide that B can have a Noun/Quantifier/Gerund/DP/A/P as its complement to the left; if it does not find one it does not complete the phrase. (59) below lists some of the parameters of Bangla and Hindi and (60) gives a view of how GENTREE and PARACON2 interact.

(59)a. **Parameter** setting for principles of **X'** Module

BANGLA		HINDI
1. subj-comp-head	Order of constituents	1. subj-comp-head
2a. Det-N-B		2. Det-(Num)-N
b. Det-Num-N		
3. DP/G/A-(N)-B		3. _____
4. spec(D):DP	Specifiers	4. spec(D):DP
5. spec(N):Det-Num-e		5. spec(N):Det-Num-Ø
6. YES	Clitic Adjunction	6. NO
7. YES	Index Transference	7. NO

(59b) Parameter setting for the distribution of empty categories

BANGLA	HINDI
e_b	e_{det} e_{num}
Types of empty categories	

(60)

Step	GENTREE	PARACON2
I	Tree building; Cliticization; Complete Phrase Procedure	Constraints on agreement and Case; Index Transference
II	substitution	Agreement features check

This MT **system** would involve two **steps**. During I GENTREE applies and projects each lexical item to its maximal projection

(given certain constraints of the complete-phrase stage), attaches phrases (relative to the Head), and predicts empty elements (like traces in the **prenominal** position for Hindi and **postnominal** for Bangla). This procedure then generates trees which are underspecified as to the value of various features. **PARACON2** then checks on each subtree locally for **well-formedness** and either returns modified structures or rules out certain structures based on principles and constraints.

For step II we then have **substitution-ready** language-independent IL **representations** as inputs which, referring to the TL lexicon, gets substituted appropriately to derive the TL forms. Note that the IL forms can be translated into any TL form which means that you would need exactly one parser and one generator for translating any language couple. Its **extensibility** to other languages is a major advantage of an Interlingual approach.

4.10.2.1 Frames


Frames, we propose, are phrase level **computational** variants of the thematic concept of scening which we claimed (section 1.4.3) determines the modality aspects of a clause. We will now give a simplified picture of how this system, if implemented, might operate. We make use of frames (similar to the "**snapshots**" of Dorr 1991) to show the projection of lexical items and how steps I and II of (60) operate to produce parses and well-formed

TL forms. Parsing, as is evident, is **bottom-up** and **LR**. Let us **look at** (61a).

(61)a. **chele** Ta
 boy **cla**
 'the boy'

First *chele* is projected up to N to give **(F1)**

(F1)




PARACON2 applies to instantiate features N, G, P and is unspecified as to the value of DEF. The **same** procedure applies on *Ta* and we get **(F2)**.

(F2)




In **(F2)** the **feature-value** of P is default 3 and G is unspecified for *Ta*. Now by the cliticization parameter associated with the **X'-subsystem**, the **postnominal B** gets cliticized to N and fused features get focused at N through **Index Transference**. This is something which is ignored in the **GENTREE** but realized only at the **PARACON2**. N gets projected to its maximal bar level at this stage and we get something **like** **(F3)**.

(F3)




The NP now has the feature set [3MS+]; such an NP, that is, one with a positive referential value will license an empty Det node according to the Hindi parameter and constituent ordering restrictions. This gives us the following frame (acceptable in an implementation that does not hug its linguistic basis excessively closely):

(F4)



The fact that the Det is to the left is realized from the X-theory module. The next frame is of the pure IL form which has been substituted with appropriate lexical items of Hindi, satisfying the feature agreement and thematic similarity requirements, to give the following:

(F5)



For other **fragments** that we have talked about, a **similar** kind of approach would derive the right surface order of the TL. However, we need to Mention here that if the feature-set **collect-**ed at NP has a numerical feature-value then another **pronominal** empty position **will** be created. This **pronominal** position is motivated on independent grounds in both Bangla and Hindi.

In the other direction, that is, translating from Hindi to Bangla, it will suffice to point out that if the SL expression feature-percolates a positive value for the **Definiteness** feature then, by the same token as the pronominal empty position, a **postnominal** empty position will be created which gets substituted during the generation step by a B in Bangla. For example (61b) in Hindi will generate (61c) in Bangla.

- (61)b. *ve laRke*
 those boy-PL
 'those boys'
- c. *oy chele-gulo*
 those boy-cla
 'those boys'

In (61a,b) both the lexical items in Hindi have the value PL for Number and *ve* has the value + for referential expression. These, then, **collectively** decide to create a cliticized B node containing these **features**. *gulo* in Bangla, as we know, is the classifier marking for plurality which, **thus**, instantiates that node. But, as we shall see in the next section, this is not **all**.

4.10.3 WISE

The **system** as it has been described to be **operating is** not, however, the **complete** story. Consider the following **Bangla expressions**:

- (62)a. boy-duTo
book-two-cla
'the two books'
- b. oy duTo boy
those two-cla book
'those two books'

Notice that (62a) is our earlier example (56a). These two are distinct in their **interpretation**. There is no better way to capture this subtle semantic/ pragmatic difference than to give a fragment of a discourse:

- (63) A: ki cay
what want-Aux
'what do you want?'

B: boy-duTo

C: oy duTo boy

The former reply (by B) to the query, we **suggest**, involves 'reminder of familiar information' and the latter, '**pointing**'. This difference, unfortunately, is not captured in the Hindi equivalents which return the **same** fora for both these expressions as (64).


(64) ve do kitaabeM
those two book-PL
'those two books'

Next, we suggest a Modification of the earlier solution and also explicate our position vis-a-vis the overall architecture of the system.

We would like to suggest¹ that MT be firmly situated in AI and we claim that the parametric approach is the most effective way of doing it. Implicit in such a programme is the proposal that semantics not merely be a subroutine of syntax, but be more flexible regarding possible control structure positions; in other words, semantics be a coroutine of syntax. To achieve such a goal, we propose that an Interlingual (ID) approach be adopted and a KB component be introduced in its immediate surrounding in such a way that it feeds directly into the IL representations. (65) below represents the general architectural design of the system.

1. These are worked out in further detail in Bhattacharya (1993)

(65)



As a **modification**, we suggest that this KB component acts as a third subcomponent apart from the GENTREE and **PARACON2** that we have already talked about. This component, which we call WISE (Word Intensions and Semantic Equivalents), joins the coroutine of GENTREE and **PARACON2**, so that now we have a three-way coroutining. Such an approach avoids the pitfalls of a model like Dorr's (1991) which is not adequate to handle **thematically** divergent structures resulting in a mismatch. WISE will thus interact with the other two subcomponents to identify this **seman-**

1. Dorr's model also **involves** as we mentioned earlier, three steps, but our modified model **acheives** the task in two steps by predicting the empty positions in the first step itself bypassing, thereby, the need to have a third step **involving** movement for generating TL surface word order.

tic difference through **AI** techniques like Inferencing. The answer to such puzzles as the ones brought out by (62-64) and (66-67) will, then, **lie** in the KB component (which hosts the principles and **parameters**); and enriching this **component** could, **in** the relatively distant future, possibly lead us somewhere.

WISE is an interactive computer-based KB where the user **is** the domain expert in a position to directly encode knowledge to the KB. It contains at least the following two **components**:

- (i) knowledge acquisition/ updating tool/ **component** and
- (ii) **application** component

During (i), knowledge is acquired and added by interacting with the domain expert. Once the KB grows, it **will** contain information about possible **configurations**, in **IL** for a, and about **problem** features like **B** in Bangla and its absence in Hindi. During (ii), any gaps or faults in reasoning are identified and the new knowledge thus gained is incorporated updating the KB. For example, that the content of **B** in Bangla is different from the Hindi **B** is detected and stored as new knowledge early in the system.

Semantic/ pragmatic knowledge is encoded in WISE through high-level knowledge structures. For an efficient use of knowledge, tools are put to use to acquire domain knowledge in relation to specific problems. In this case an enquiry system "**stationery** shop" script can act as a valid **subdomain**. With such **scriptal** knowledge WISE will infer that in Bangla (63C) involves

'pointing' and can be captured in Hindi through an adequate paraphrased translation.

The need for a KB component is more clearly visible in case of the following:

(66)a. tin-Te mach
three-cla fish

b. tin-khana Bach
three-cla fish

The former can be ambiguous but not the latter which can only have an inanimate interpretation. A carefully designed KB can provide clues for solutions to such problems. For example, a key word in the context of the utterance (66a) might trigger a script which will disambiguate the expression with respect to the feature of animacy. The expression will accordingly be either translated into the only available Hindi counterpart (67) or be paraphrased.

(67) tiin machliYaam
three fish-PL

Thus, the introduction of a KB component is an indispensable tool for an efficient MT system.

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