

WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR: A RECONSTRUCTION

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

HARA PRASAD PADHY



DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES
University of Hyderabad
HYDERABAD-500134
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TO

MY FATHER

K.S. PADHY

who walked with me throughout my life and shared
many of my pleasures and pains

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D E C L A R A T I O N

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled "WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR : A RECONSTRUCTION" submitted by me for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the School of Humanities has not been submitted to any other university for this or any other purpose.

10th February, 1992

Hara Prasad Padhy
(HARA PRASAD PADHY)

Dr. Ramesh Chandra Pradhan
Reader

Department of Philosophy,
School of Humanities
University of Hyderabad,
Hyderabad - 500 134.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Certify that the thesis entitled "WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR : A RECONSTRUCTION" submitted by Mr. KARA PRASAD PADHY for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, School of Humanities, University of Hyderabad, has been done under my supervision and embodies the result of bonafide research work.


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I recommend that the thesis be sent to the examiners for evaluation.

10 February 1992



RAMESH CHADNRA PRADHAN


Dean,
School of Humanities,
University of Hyderabad,
HYD - 500 134.


HEAD
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD
HYDERABAD.

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ABBREVIATIONS

NB	:	<u>Notebooks 1914-1916</u>
TLP	:	<u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u>
PR	:	<u>Philosophical Remarks</u>
PG	:	<u>Philosophical Grammar</u>
BBB	:	<u>The Blue and Brown Books</u>
RFM	:	<u>Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics</u>
PI	:	<u>Philosophical Investigations</u>
OC	:	<u>On Certainty</u>
Z	:	<u>Zettel</u>
RC	:	<u>Remarks on Colour</u>
NFL	:	"Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense data'".

INTRODUCTION

The present essay is a study of Wittgenstein's concept of *grammar*. It aims at bringing out if there is anything called Wittgenstein's philosophy of grammar. The concept of grammar seems to be one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's philosophical vocabulary. Though apparently the concept of grammar remains unexplained and without a sharp definition in Wittgenstein's writings, it is obvious that it plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations. There are two main questions which Wittgenstein raises concerning grammar, viz (i) How is grammar possible? (ii) What are the logical limits of grammar? The first question is answered by the fact that language is itself a rule-governed system of symbols. The possibility of language as a rule-governed activity shows that grammar, as a study of rules, is possible. The second question concerns directly, the question of the limits of language. The limits of grammar are the limits of language itself. According to Wittgenstein, grammar is the grammar of language. Therefore, the investigation into the structure of grammar is the investigation into the structure of language.

The grammar Wittgenstein talks about is nothing other than philosophical grammar which is to be distinguished from the linguistic (empirical) grammars. Philosophical grammar is exclusively the grammar of the logical possibilities of language.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is the custodian of grammar in the sense that philosophy gives it a status equal to its own. Philosophy and grammar do not have a subject matter of their own except that both are concerned with language. Philosophy and philosophical grammar have the same interest in language, i.e., to study the logical essence of language. So the gap between philosophy and philosophical grammar is ultimately abolished. They become one.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is a grammatical investigation. That is to say, philosophy can give us only a perspicuous representation of language and all that language is about, i.e., the world. Philosophy and grammar are both concerned with the world. Language which is the subject matter of their study is linked with the world. Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations are constantly aimed at the understanding of the world through the understanding of the structure of language.

The divide between language and the world is only a divide at the level of empirical study of language. But at the level of philosophical grammar the so called divide between the two is dissolved. Language and the world present themselves to the philosophical grammar in the same framework of logical possibilities. Therefore there is no ultimate distinction between the grammar of language and grammar of phenomena.

In Chapter I, I will argue that Wittgenstein entertains no

dichotomy between language and phenomena i.e., between language and experience. He reduces the phenomenology of experience into the grammar. The grammar tells us what constitute the logical possibilities of the experience of the world. In this connection, it is imperative to study the structure of philosophical grammar. In this Chapter I will examine the structure of grammar in the light of Wittgenstein's calculus and game model analysis of language.

In Chapter II my effort is to come back to the problem of reality. The structure of grammar can be explained only with reference to the representational function of language. As I have indicated earlier, language is basically a phenomenon in the world. Therefore, the philosophical understanding of grammar cannot but be concerned with how the world is projected by language. Grammar is concerned with the projection-relations. Wittgenstein has never ceased to be concerned with the projection relations between the language and world even in his later philosophy. Therefore, even though there is no picture theory in his later works, philosophical grammar is still concerned, with the problem of how the world can be tamed by language i.e., how it can be made intelligible in language.

In Chapter III, my problem is the structure of grammar. Therefore here I shall discuss up the nature of grammatical propositions and the grammatical rules. The grammatical propositions express what grammar is about. Since the grammar expresses the essences of language and the world, the grammatical

propositions **are** concerned with the logical essences of language and the world. In this connection I shall argue that Wittgenstein's grammatical propositions are identical with grammatical rules. I shall also show that Wittgenstein maintains the distinction between the grammatical propositions and the empirical propositions in order to establish that grammatical propositions have a unique status in our language. Grammatical propositions include the propositions of logic, mathematics and all those propositions which are concerning the logical form of language. In this connection I shall add that, for Wittgenstein, logic and grammar become identical since both are concerned with the essence of the language.

In Chapter IV my major-concern is with the concept of rule-following. The problem of rules and rule-following has exercised Wittgenstein's mind so deeply that it is impossible to talk about grammar without taking into account what is to apply and follow the grammatical rules. Wittgenstein believes that there is no gap between rules and their applications. Their relations are internal and necessary. So, Kripke's sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of rule-following needs to be re-examined in view of the corpus of Wittgenstein's writings on rule-following. My argument will be that there is no room for the Kripkean scepticism in the framework of language and grammar. The so called Wittgensteinian rule-paradox is only a reduction proof to show that language is based on rules and that our rule-following behaviour is sound and rational.

In Chapter V I will take up the question of autonomy of grammar and the grammatical rules. The autonomy question is implied by the fact that we consider our rule-following behaviour rational. The rationality in the rule-following would not have been possible if grammar had not been an autonomous system. The autonomy of grammar means its freedom from contingency of the actual world and the rule-application in this world. Grammar is autonomous to the extent it precedes the facts in the world. Grammar therefore has a legislative function with regard to the actual world. However, I shall argue that autonomy does not lead to a kind of Platonism and to a transcendent metaphysics of logical possibilities. The autonomy is realised in the peculiarity of grammar that it is arbitrary. The concept of arbitrariness has a deeper sense in Wittgenstein philosophy. My effort is to bring out the significance of this notion and to show that arbitrariness of grammar coincides with its necessity. The necessary truths which grammar expresses are bound to follow from the fact that our grammar would not have been otherwise than what it is.

In Chapter VI I will come back to the notion of philosophical grammar and attempt to relate it to other conceptions of grammar such as Chomsky's empirical grammar, Quine's and Strawson's logical grammar. In this connection I shall show that Husserl's notion of logical grammar can be compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar. This chapter is not exactly a comparative study between Wittgenstein

and other philosophers. It intends to show the similarity of structure between philosophical grammar and the logical grammar and the contrast between the philosophical grammar and empirical grammar. Wittgenstein's decisive assertion in this regard is that empirical grammar is not the philosophers' concern. It is interesting to note, therefore, to what extent the empirical grammarians can follow the lead of the philosophical grammarians.

To conclude, I would suggest that Wittgenstein's notion of grammar has deeper significance than generally realised by the Wittgenstein interpreters. This work is an humble effort towards making clear Wittgenstein's concept of grammar.

CHAPTER - I

WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein in his entire career devoted himself to methodological enquiries into the nature and structure of language and grammar. Interestingly enough, he had never attempted to build up a science of language or grammar. He attempted a reflective understanding of grammar. Thus he presented a philosophical grammar. The main structure of the philosophical grammar is the subject matter of this chapter. I shall explore the concept of grammar and its multifarious uses in Wittgenstein philosophical works in this chapter.

In Section 1, I shall discuss in general the concept of grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy. There are, two models of grammar found in Wittgenstein's works : One is the calculus model and the other is the game model. These models are examined in the above section.

Section 2, brings out the main features of philosophical grammar particularly with reference to the Philosophical investigations and the Blue and Brown Books. The different aspects of this concept are discussed.

In Section 3 I discuss the notion of depth grammar and in section 4 and 5 I raise the question of whether the Wittgensteinian grammar is phenomenological.

In Section 6 I conclude that Wittgenstein has a distinctive

notion of philosophical grammar that goes beyond the so-called phenomenological and empirical notions of it.

1. TWO MODELS OF GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein has worked out two models of grammar: the calculus model in the early period and the game model in the later period. Many believe that the two models are at cross purposes and sometimes contradictory to each other. In fact, there is an underlying unity of Wittgenstein's two models.

My effort in this section is to reconstruct the underlying unity of the two models. The reconstruction of the concept of a grammar will result in a number of significant issues which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

I. The Calculus Model:

The model of grammar presented in the Notebooks and Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be characterised as the calculus model as distinguished from the model presented in the Blue and Brown Books, Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics, Philosophical Investigations. The latter can be called as game model. However, it is not that both have not simultaneously existed in the Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical grammar.

The idea of calculus

According to Wittgenstein, every syntax can be conceived as a system of rules i.e., as calculus. Syntax is a formal

structure of rules. Syntax reveals that language is calculus-like. Wittgenstein calls language a calculus (PG, X, 140). He also says,

"when some one interprets, or understands, a sign in one sense or another what he is doing is taking a step in a calculus (like a calculation). What he does is roughly what he does if he gives expression to his interpretation" (PG, I, 140).

A calculus is a formal or logical system. This notion is found predominantly in Wittgenstein's early logico-linguistic investigations which consider language as a formally structured system or calculus. It can be represented as a logical or formal syntax with a set of defined rules. The rules are such that they can be surveyed completely without ambiguity and indeterminateness. Let us take TLP 3.325 for consideration:

In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax.

The proposed logical syntax² with a neat rule structure excludes all errors of ambiguous use of expressions. It is designed, besides, to generate all the propositions of a language from a set of elementary propositions. Logical syntax thus carries out two tasks: first, it disambiguates language and second, it constructs it out of a given set of primitive signs. Wittgenstein thus announces at TLP 4.51. "Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions; then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all

propositions, and that fixes their limits".

In this model, the elementary propositions are the basic syntactic units from which all the propositions of natural language can be derived. This is possible through a systematic rule application e.g. truth-operation.

TLP 5.0 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.

TLP 5.01 Elementary propositions are the truth-arguments of propositions.

The truth-operational method in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is the basic device through which all propositions including the general or quantified propositions can be generated. Thus, syntax can be called generative³ in view of the fact that it maps out all the possible structures in language. Wittgenstein's idea of logical grammar encompasses the creative aspect of every language logically conceivable. It presents the grammar of all languages perspicuously. Language is a system of propositions all unified in a calculus - like structure. The task of grammar is to make perspicuous the rules which systematically define all possible structures of language. Grammar represents the internal relations amongst propositions in a transparent notation.

Syntax and the Perspicuous Notation

Syntax takes care of the logic of the propositions. It is concerned with the network of their internal relations. It

displays their logical form. Thus Wittgenstein identifies syntax with the logic of language, that is, the logical structure which all meaningful propositions share. Wittgenstein tells us the broad framework of syntax in the following remark:

TLP 4.5 It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form : that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign language whatsoever in such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that meanings of the names are suitably chosen.

The basic structure of syntax is the logical form of propositions which is the primary desideratum of their sense. Sense is ingrained in the syntactic organization of a proposition. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, there is no independent theory of sense except the theory of syntax that specifies the general logical form. Logical grammar, in this sense, is the grammar of propositional-logical form. Syntax is the theory of possibility - the theory of form of all that could be said. The semantics of sense is an extended image of the syntax of form. The so called meanings (*bedeutung*) are the bed-rock of sense and so they are taken care of by the syntax. Wittgenstein writes at TLP 3.33:

In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign : only the description of the expression may be presupposed.

The main thesis of calculus model is to show the symmetry between the logical syntax and the language-world nexus. The

task of syntax is to bring out the identity of logical multiplicity of language and reality. Waismann in his book Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle has aptly expressed this point in the following passage;

Syntax hence becomes requisite where the nature of signs is not yet adjusted to the nature of things, where there are more combinations of signs than possible situations. This excessive multiplicity of language must be confined by artificial rules; and these rules are the syntax of language.

Wittgenstein continues,

The rules of syntax assign to combinations of signs the exact multiplicity they must possess in order to be pictures of reality.

You could say that a system of signs which is perfectly suited to its purpose renders syntax superfluous. And conversely - syntax renders such a system of signs superfluous. Each of them deputizes for the other.⁵

Syntax is ultimately superfluous because language can take care of itself. Nevertheless if we have logical syntax we have rules of calculus from which we can derive the propositions and their possible moves in language in so far as they are internally related amongst themselves.

Syntax contains the possibility of the world; it reflects the latter. The logical form of the world is the desideratum of syntax. Syntax provides the perspicuous notation for expressing logical form. "The rules of syntax assign to combinations of signs the exact multiplicity they must possess in order to be pictures of reality".⁶

THE GAME - MODEL OF GRAMMAR

For Wittgenstein, language resembles a game as both employ rules and thus are rule-governed (PG, I, Sect.26). Basically in the uses of words and expressions in the proper human contexts, that is, in the stream of life, rules come into being and become known. (PG, I, Sect 26). For example, we use colour words such as "red", "blue", "green" etc. and recognise samples in a colour-chart because they are based on a certain established conventions e.g. "standard sepia" or "standard metre" (PI, Sect.50-53). Rule-governed language thus gives rise to the grammar of rules. This is the crux of a game-model grammar.

The Concept of Rule

A language-game i.e. language use is bounded by rules which define what is a possible move within the language-game. A language-game is always constituted by rules. Language-game is so called because there are a set of rules underlying it. Without rules language-game is inconceivable, although the rules may not be codified into a recognizable grammar. A language without grammar is not a language without rules. This point is made explicit in the following passage in the Philosophical Grammar, I, Sect 32:

We are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of rules according to which we are inclined to use words.

The game-model features rules as formally rigid bodies. These rules are rules of use regulating all possible moves (PI. Sect. 82-85, The BBS, p.95).

The form of contingency that hovers around the notion of rules brings to mind that rules may be arbitrary. But the implication is wrong. The rules in language-game are completely bounded by the use of symbols. They are fashioned the same way as in a calculus. They are needed in the everyday use of language. The use is completely laid down. The only difference between a language-game and a calculus is that rules are more prominent in a calculus than in a language-game, or so it appears. That is, in a language game rules have loose ends. They can have a certain kind of flexibility about their formulations. But this does not mean that Wittgenstein abolishes rules and grammar (cf.PI. Sects. 108, 292) but only that he brings rules back into language-game. Rules are entrenched in the language-games without being on the surface. They fill the grammatical space without dramatization.⁷ As Wittgenstein views it, rules come into being as we go on in the use of grammar. Their "must" is a 'normative "must". (RFM, III, sect. 26,28,30) about the employment of language that accounts for the acceptability of linguistic transactions. What does then the absence of rules lead to? In the absence of rules which constitute the structure of language-games we feel not only being without a standard or norm but we feel helpless without any fixed guidance. Language is made possible, as it were by a

fortuitous Deity (Pl/ sect.234).

Wittgenstein also writes at Philosophical Investigations
Sect.240:

Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People do not come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework on which working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).

"Wittgenstein never gives the impression that language-games are normatively arbitrary or blind. They are based on the fact that language-use is an institution or practice. The practice is a form of life. Forms of life are determinately given as the common ground of universal agreement manifested in language (PI, sect.241).

III. UNITY OF THE MODELS

The following features of the game-model can be exhibited in the structure of the calculus.

- a. A language-game, is like a calculus, is constituted through rules, so that rules define what is possible or permitted in the language. This feature highlights the institutability of both language-games and the calculus.
- b. Language-game has internal moves within it in the way there are moves in the calculus. In both cases, the moves come into being along with the rules that permit them. Rules in

both cases pre-exist the linguistic moves. They are tracks making language-moves possible.

- c. The rules are laid down in the language use. Use is primary in both models. Rules are internal. Therefore, there is no external justification of the rules. This brings out the autonomy of rules insofar as the rules are not justified by any appeal to metarules or even to empirical experiences (The autonomy question will be discussed in detail in Chapter V).
- d. The rule following is a public activity, since it is learnable in a community and therefore, publicly checkable. Private rule-following is impossible. This feature brings out the social character of rule - following and the conditions of learnability. The social character of rule-following is the common feature of the game-model and calculus-model of analysis of language.

The game-model thus enlarges the scope of the calculus model and the rule structure assimilates the idea of calculus into that of a language-game. So the concept of rule is the continuing underlying unity between calculus model and game model.⁸ The calculus is itself a kind of language-game just as the language-game itself is a calculus. The rigid distinction between the two which is supposed to divide the two models is dissolved in the grammar of rules that underlies Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Rules define the activity of logic-shaping as much as the shaping of an ordinary language-use. The transition from

logic and syntax mirroring logical form to the network of language-games shaping and mirroring the form of all reality is the transition recorded in the change of the contours of grammar. Grammar, however, remains structurally identical.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of "grammar in various ways. In the Philosophical Investigations the usage has four aspects: The traditional, the non-empirical, the sentential and the non-linguistic.⁹ The discussion revolves round these four aspects incorporating the various meanings the concept has in its usage.

The Traditional Aspect

The usage of the expression "grammatical form" in the Philosophical Investigations sect.21 and Part II, sect. X, reveals the traditional grammatical form. The traditional "grammatical form" is in focus in these usages. The traditional grammar distinguishes between an "order" and a "command" and introduces many other distinctions amongst parts of speech. In a language-game these parts of speech get their functional role fixed eg. in the "builders' language game the report "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs". The difference between report and order lies in the "part which uttering these words plays in the language-game" (PI sect. 21} Wittgenstein continues:

(of course we might use the word "statements" and "commands" to stand for grammatical forms of sentences and intonations; we do in fact call "isn't the weather, glorious today?" a question although it is used as a statement) (PI, Sect. 21).

The traditional classification is not always based on use but is otherwise determined by the verbal form and intonation Wittgenstein disowns the traditional classification in view of the fact that the real test of a grammatical form is the use and not the verbal form.

The Non-empirical A Spect

In the Philosophical Investigations (PI, Sect, 251,295,458) there are remarks about the "grammatical propositions" which stand for a kind of propositions which are different from experiential or empirical propositions. The sense in which a proposition is called grammatical is not the same as that in which the word "grammar" used in the sense of "grammatical form". The later usage is based on the traditional grammar. But when Wittgenstein says a proposition is grammatical he assigns it a logical status. Grammatical proposition is a logical proposition of which the opposite cannot be conceived (PI, sect.251).

It has been demonstrated¹⁰ that "grammatical", for Wittgenstein, is synonymous with "non-empirical". In the sense of "grammatical" and not "grammatical forms", it is inconsistent to hold that a proposition is grammatical but is empirical. Wittgenstein's example, "Every rod has a length" demonstrates

that it is a grammatical predication to say that a rod has a length. Its opposite cannot be imagined (We will have detailed discussion on grammatical propositions in Chapter III).

The Sentential Aspect

There is a group of remarks especially at PI Sect. 90 which gives a broader usage to the word "grammatical", PI, Sect.90 characterises philosophical activity as "grammatical". "Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one." This usage has following implications.

- a. The sentences upon which the investigation is focussed are empirical.
- b. The negation of such grammatically investigated sentence is conceivable.
- c. The results of such investigations are themselves grammatical propositions.

The word 'grammar' used in PI Sect. 90 has dual characterization of the grammatical investigation: first, "we remind ourselves... of the kind of statement we make about phenomena" and secondly, it is "directed... towards the possibilities of phenomena". Both aspects take care of the statements we make about phenomena and the possibility of phenomena. For Wittgenstein, both language and phenomena which language is about are within the purview of grammar.

One may then ask in what sense grammatical investigations differ from other philosophical investigations. Grammar could be taken in the sense of philosophical statements that we make about phenomena i.e. their possibilities e.g. 'The world is all that is the case' (TLP, I). In that sense grammatical sentences would be demarcated from the statements that describe the phenomena e.g. 'This rose is red'. Wittgenstein offers a distinctive kind of space to grammar as a network of statements differing from statements of natural language. In that sense grammar becomes near synonymous with philosophy. Philosophy becomes philosophical grammar.¹²

The grammatical reflection on the kind of statements we make about the phenomena can be viewed as being "directed towards the" possibilities" of phenomena" in the following ways:

1. The connection between the "kind of statements" we make about "phenomena" can be seen when one looks at sentences from the point of view of their construction, the combinations of signs they contain, and also from the point of view of the function they perform in our lives. Thus sentences are marked intelligible when they make syntactically perfect combinations and also are assigned a role in use. Grammar describes the use of signs and their function in the total context of life.
2. If a sentence has a use, this will be correlated with the fact that what the sentence says is something that is

possible in our experience. For example "He was depressed the whole day" makes sense. The remark has a use for us in circumstance normal to our lives. It is correlated with the fact that depression is a phenomena whose persistence throughout a day is a possibility of our experience. The connection between the statement that has a use and the possibility of experience holds, whether or not the statement is true or false on any given occasion. What is possible in phenomena is not discovered by means of empirical enquiry, but by what Wittgenstein calls the grammatical investigation. The possibility question is thus central to the idea of philosophy being a kind of a priori grammar. It is debatable whether Wittgenstein's a priori grammar has any parallel with Kant's transcendental method of investigation of the possibilities of phenomena.

The non-linguistic aspect

In the Philosophical Investigations Sect 182 the concept of grammar is to be explicated as the relation of an expression in language to the circumstances in which it makes sense. In this context, the problem of grammar of 'to fit', 'to be able', 'to understand' is raised and discussed. The central issue is the nature of criteria that define when the expressions like "to fit" "to be able" etc are intelligibly used in language. The problem of criteria is a grammatical problem.

In the Philosophical Investigations. Sect.664, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of grammar: "surface grammar" and 'depth grammar'. He suggests that surface grammar be understood as the aspect of the use of a word in the construction of a sentence. Wittgenstein writes:

In the use of words one might distinguish, "surface grammar" from "depth grammar". What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use - one might say - that can be taken in by the ear. - And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way out. (PI, Sect 664).

The surface grammar relates to the external aspects¹⁵ of the use of an expression that can be taken in by the ear. Such features are contingent. Depth-grammar in contrast must show the necessary features that any use of an expression must have e.g. the rules. Surface grammatical features thus relate to those features which are for the most part perceptible in the expressions themselves. It could also be argued that surface grammatical structure of a sentence does not fully reveal the logical form of the sentence and the form of reality the sentence is about. Sentences are used in relation to the world. Depth grammar reveals this necessary relation between sentence and the world. Surface grammar may at best be a formal construction of a sentence without revealing its inner dynamics.

In PI Sect.182 Wittgenstein discusses the conditions in which the use of an expression is appropriate. There are

indications that the organic relations of the expressions, the linguistic discourse and the language-game are included in depth grammar.¹⁷ The notion of criteria (PI, Sect.354) and the notion verification of a sentence (PI, Sect.353)all belong to the depth grammar of a sentence. These do reveal the logical form of the sentence. Thus depth grammar seems to be more complicated and therefore more substantial than surface grammar. Depth grammar reveals the underlying reality of language.

3. DEPTH GRAMMAR : THE SYNOPTIC VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND PHENOMENA

Surface grammar deals with utterances "that can be taken in by ears!" Phonology, morphology and syntax are concerned with those features of utterances.¹⁸ Depth grammar is an appropriate method of "finding our way about" in philosophy. That is to say, depth grammar gives the overview or the perspicuous representation of language and realty. The surface grammar i.e. syntax by itself does not ensure this perspicuity. As Wittgenstein writes;

A main of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing connections" (PI, Sect., 122).

Grammar has to do with the way we put words together to form senteces.¹⁹ For example, as Wittgenstein puts it,

We do not say that the man who tells us he feels the visual image, two inches behind the bridge of his nose is telling a lie or talking nonsense. But we say that we do not understand the meaning of such a phrase. It combines well known words, but combines them in a way we do not yet understand. The grammar of this phrase has yet to be explained to us (BBB, p.10).

In this aspect Wittgenstein's conception of grammar as concerned with the combination of words is intelligible to the traditional grammarian. But he might not call it a syntactically deviant case, as Wittgenstein calls it, since the notion of the grammar of the traditional kind does not include what Wittgenstein calls depth-grammar. According to depth grammar, the sentence "one feels the visual image two inches behind the bridge of the nose" is as much deviant as "colourless green ideas sleep furiously".

Grammar is also concerned with the relationship between the word we use and other forms of human behaviour. The other forms of human behaviour²⁰ include (a) physical activity such as 'to sit on a chair' (BBB, p.24) (b) the mental activities called "expectation", "hoping", "knowing", etc (PI, Sect 572). (c) seeking evidence in support of statements (BBB, p.11) (d) setting up of conceptual structure for understanding the tenses (BBB, p.109). These activities constitute the various forms of life which are embedded in language. Grammar studies the internal relationships between the uses of words and the embedded forms of life.

Depth grammar is directly involved in the forms of life that

constitute the bulk of human activities i.e., language-games. As Wittgenstein puts it so clearly, a language-game involves both the use of words and the actions undertaken by such use (PI, Sect.7). Wittgenstein's depth grammar internalises the relation between language, life and world insofar as language reflects the essence of life and the world. Forms of life are the basic²¹ or ultimate bedrock of all significant structures of language and logic. But this is not to suggest that language is a derivative event in the cradle of forms of life. Language provides the outer limit of all human life and its activities. Language and life are one and the same.

4. GRAMMAR OF LANGUAGE AND GRAMMAR OF PHENOMENA

There is a distinct sense in which we can distinguish between (1) grammar of phenomena and (2) grammar of language . The question has been raised whether Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar is a grammar of language or grammar of phenomena. As Spiegelberg²³ points out, Wittgenstein's grammar is a grammar of language insofar as it stresses the question of rules for the use of words. It is more than what is traditionally called morphology and syntax. Wittgenstein calls grammar the "account book of language". (PG, Sect.44) in that sense grammar is concerned with language since the object of grammar is language itself (PG. Sect.109) Grammar is autonomous in that it is language - centric rather an incomplete socio-anthropological phenomenon. I shall discuss the concept of autonomy of grammar in Chapter V).

However, grammar is equally a grammar of phenomena, i.e. colours, natural histories and physical order of space and time. Thus grammar treats of the phenomena and their logical possibilities (PI, Sect.90). It has been suggested that grammar is phenomenological²⁴ since it deals with phenomena in the immediate experience Wittgenstein suggested the possibility of integrating phenomenology with grammar in the following passage in the Philosophical Remarks, Sect.1.

Physics differs from phenomenology in that it is concerned to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus, phenomenology would be the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories.

Thus it is correct to say that, for Wittgenstein, grammar includes the so called description of phenomena, even those presented in our experience.

Description of Essences

In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein was interested in exploring what is possible in the phenomena. In other words, he was interested in determining the essence of the phenomena. This is evidenced in the most significant remark: "The essence is expressed by grammar" (PI, Sect.371). The essences are not Platonic entities to be located in a mysterious realm of possibilities, but are to be deposited in language. As Hallorn puts it, "Essence is expressed by grammar because essence is not some mysterious entity lurking inside things, but rather

something given to things by the dynamic participation of linguistic statements in human life."²⁵ That is to say, "grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (PI, Sect. 373). Thus Wittgenstein conceives of grammar as a description of essences of human language. Philosophical grammar is a philosophical description of the essences of language.

However, Wittgenstein is no less interested in reality than in language. He is as much interested in the essence of the reality as that of language. In this sense, one could argue that his investigation into the essence of language and reality is phenomenological. This is reflected in Von Wright's following remark:

Perhaps it is of some interest to mention here that Wittgenstein in the last years of his life did much work on a problem-complex which had always greatly interested him, viz. colour-concepts. He was at the time reading Goethe's Farbenlehre, and we had discussions on it and on his own problem and views. He then often used to say that what he was doing was a kind some philosophers call "phenomenology". But he did not himself want to call it by that name - and I think I can partly see why. His attitude is connected, I believe, with the stress he wanted to lay on language in his philosophical enquiries. For this reason, incidentally, Wittgenstein's use of the term "grammar" (or "logical grammar") should be of great interest to phenomenologists.²⁶ (Italics mine).

The construction of language and the construction of phenomena run parallel in the sense that the forms of language reflect the forms of reality. The rules of language and their inherent network project the possibilities of phenomena. This tends to be a phenomenological description.²⁷ This is the same

as Wittgenstein's grammatical descriptions. The notion of a phenomenological language is of importance in this connection. It is in fact the language of phenomena. Grammar is concerned with this language insofar as it is concerned with every possible move in language. So it involves in the language the construction of phenomena. Phenomenological language is the bed-rock of all human experience. But that is within the limits of its grammatical description of rules and their interconnexions. The following passage from Wittgenstein gives a glimpse of his project of grammatical descriptions:

"Assume that there are in my visual field two red circles of equal size on a blue background. What is it that is present here in duplicate and what is present only once?.... One could say: we have here one colour but two locations. But it was said that recess and circularity are properties of two objects (GEGENSTANDE) which one could call patches and which have certain spatial relations to each other. The explanation ("there are here two objects - patches - which") sounds like a physical explanation. Like somebody's asking "what are the red circles that I see over there?" and my answering "there are two red lanterns, etc" such an explanation nevertheless not required here (To want to resolve our dissatisfaction by means of an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics). What worries us here is the unclarity of the grammar of the sentence, "I see two red circles on a blue background", especially its relation to the grammar of the sentence "There are two red balls on the table" and again "I see two colours in this picture. I can naturally say, instead of former sentence 'I see red patches with the properties Red and Circular in (this) spatial relation to each other' - and equally well 'I see the colour red on two circular locations next to each other' - If I stipulate that this sentence is to mean the same as the sentence above. Then the grammar of the words 'patch', location, 'colour', etc must adjust to the (grammar) of the words in the former sentence. The confusion arises here because we believe that we have to decide the presence or absence of an object (thing), viz. the patch, in the same way as one decides whether what I see is (in a physical sense) red paint or a reflection.²⁸

What the passage points to is the nature of phenomenological objects e.g. patches of colour presented in immediate experience. The phenomenological objects have a grammatical locus in that they are a part of the methods of description of the world. How one describes one's colour-experience depends upon one's colour-language, i.e., grammar of the colour-words. What is more important here is the grammar (i.e. logic) of the phenomenological sentences depicting the objects of experience. However, it must be noted that for Wittgenstein the domain of phenomenological objects is not independent of the language in which we describe them. Descriptions of the phenomenological objects is the task of language. Thus grammar is a kind of phenomenology of the objects given in one's experience which is filtered through one's language.

Logic, Grammar and Phenomenology

At TLP 5.552 Wittgenstein writes:

The experience that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is; that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so. It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What'?

This is a prolegomena to Wittgenstein's use of logic and grammar as being prior to all experience though they are essentially related to the latter. The only experience that is a presupposition of all logic and grammar is that there is a world. (It is not an experience in the ordinary sense). Logic in the

Tractatus presents a grammar of objects which constitute the domain of the possible phenomena. There is no domain called the domain of experience that is given to phenomenological description except the one presented in logic. Logic is a description of logical form of all experience i.e., the 'what' of all possible experience. Speigelberg's²⁹ idea that Tractarian logic is a kind of phenomenology is right only to the extent that experience is not taken in the ordinary sense. Wittgensteinian objects are not empirical and so not phenomenological in the usual sense of being given in experience. Wittgenstein does not admit a separate domain of experience independently of language. So, the so-called objects are presented in the network of language. Thus logic alone provides the description of those objects. Logic becomes at best a grammar but not phenomenology in the accepted sense.³⁰

But, for that matter, need grammar be phenomenological? The later philosophy of Wittgenstein was a step towards a rediscovery of the phenomenologicality of logic and grammar. His analysis of colour-experience, and also the experience of physical objects raised the question how far we can concede independence to experience. In Moore's notes³¹ in 1930-32, there is a record of grammar being constantly posed against experience. Moore notes that the arrangement of colour in the colour octahedron "is really part of grammar, not of psychology."³² This indicates Wittgenstein's general philosophical interest in grammar and not in experience as such as. However, it is the grammar (including

logic) that is not absolutely unconcerned with experience.

Wittgenstein carried the Fregean legacy of anti-psychologistic view of logic and language to its logical conclusion. Frege founded the philosophy of language and logic on the Platonist theme that logical forms are real along with logical truths.³³ Hence there is no psychologist need to open up this domain of truths and forms to our consciousness for it is far removed from our thinking and experience. This transcendent domain of logic must be based on its own autonomous reality. Wittgenstein tried to bring Frege's autonomous domain of logical reality into the heart of grammar. This needed a revision of the Fregean logic and grammar. Wittgenstein brought into view the inner bond of logic and grammar by demonstrating that the logical forms are only grammatically describable, that is to say, are only revealed in grammar. Grammar is not merely a tool as in Frege for revealing the logical essences but is itself autonomous as logic. This led Wittgenstein to view both logic and grammar as the autonomous domain of transcendental³⁴ (not transcendent logical forms).

Grammar describes the logical form which consists in the logical form of simple objects. The very fact that logical forms of objects open all the possibilities of arrangement of objects, i.e. the possibilities of phenomena, shows that the grammar of language of physics is the grammar of all possible objects. Physics therefore is as much grammatically structured as geometry insofar as logic provides the logical form of all that is real.

For Wittgenstein, both physics, geometry and logic (in the narrower sense) are all parts of grammar (conceived in the wider sense). Even if we take grammar as phenomenological, we must make a distinction between empirical phenomenalism³⁵ (especially the Machian variety) and the grammatical phenomenology of objects in the Tractatus. Russell's³⁶ simple objects had a Machian root in their being conceived as the logical atoms of the empirical world. For Russell, logic is based on generalizations like physics' except that the logical truths are more abstract and independently valid. Wittgenstein rejects this notion of logic as a domain of truth and takes it as a rigorous domain of non-empirical forms which explain the possibility of the empirical world. In that sense, "in logic nothing is accidental" (Tractatus, 2. 012). Besides, logic is transcendental (Tractatus 6.13) in that it brings out the a priori possibilities of all empirical objects. Thus the logical forms of all empirical objects are presented in a perspicuous representation of the language. Logic is committed to the reality of logical forms but not their independence from grammar. Grammar thus is the indispensable home of all logical forms and their logical articulation.

6. PHILOSOPHY AS CUSTODIAN OF GRAMMAR

The argument whether Wittgenstein's grammar is grammar of language or grammar of phenomena is misplaced. Actually, for Wittgenstein, the entire philosophical investigation is a grammatical investigation. Philosophy is study of grammar of

reality. Wittgenstein writes:

'For what belongs to the essence of the world simply cannot be said. And philosophy, if it were to say anything, would have to describe the essence of the world. But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the propositions of language, but in the rules for this language which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs (PR, Sect.54).

Thus philosophy can provide a grammar of the essences of the world. In that sense it is a custodian of grammar. It holds grammar as its own mirror. It can grasp the world only in so far as it is mirrored in language and grammar.

Grammatical analysis is a kind of conceptual analysis. As I have argued earlier, grammatical analysis can assimilate all phenomenological analyses qua conceptual analyses (RC, II, Sect.16). Phenomenological analysis implies analysis of the phenomena of the world. All grammatical insights are therefore deep insights into the conceptual connexion of phenomena e.g. colour. The essences which are the grammatical philosophy's exclusive concern are the logical essences or the grammatical essences deposited in our language. As Wittgenstein put it, essences are ultimately deep conventions of language (RFM, I, Sect.74). Grammatical analysis therefore need not look beyond the rules of language to understand the essences of reality.

According to Wittgenstein, in philosophy there are no theories, no explanations, no definitions. It is purely

descriptive. (BBS, p.18, PI, Sect.123). It describes the essences of phenomena. Its fact it describes only the essences of the use of language itself. The essences of language are the essences of the world. Thus the construction of language runs parallel to the construction of phenomena. It is not true that a construction of language implies construction of phenomenological language. Rather the construction of language and construction of phenomena collapse into each other. Grammar includes everything i.e. language and the phenomena. It studies both. Once we make this point clear there is no distinction between 'language' and 'experience'. Let us take some of the remarks of the Big Typescript :

Why do we sense the investigation of grammar as being fundamental?

—The investigation of grammar is fundamental - in the sense in which we may call language fundamental - say its foundation.³⁷

Our grammatical investigations differ from those of the philologists and empirical grammarians. What interests us, for instance, is the logical rules that fundamentally matter to language. Philosopher's concern is the use of language and its constitutive rules. The philologist is an empirical grammarian who cannot look beyond what happens in languages. He cannot see the essentials of grammar. . His business is with the accidentals of language. Wittgenstein says,

But that is only an external differentiation//
an external *difference*// I believe there is no other.

Rather we could say that we are calling something else grammar than he is. Even as we differentiate kinds of words where for him there is difference (present).

The importance of grammar is the importance of language.³⁸

This is an attempt to see that Wittgenstein's multifaceted use of the concept of grammar has an underlying unitary theme that grammar is concerned with essences whether it is a study of language or of phenomena. Grammar is the guide to both language and reality.

NOTES

1. See S. Stephen Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1987), Chapters 3 and 4.
2. The term logical syntax has a Fregean origin. Frege attempted to construct a logical syntax or begriffsschrift in his Begriffsschrift (1879). The concept-script constructed therein presents a new model language based on the principles of logic and mathematics. Wittgenstein acknowledges his indebtedness to this Fregean idea (also found in Russell) in Tractatus 3.325.

(The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though, it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes).
3. The notion of generative grammar is due to Noam Chomsky according to whom syntactic structures are generated from a base-structure with transformational rules. See Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1965).
4. F. Waismann, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, ed. Brian McGuinness; trans. J. Schulte and B. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.240.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka have claimed that the rules give way to the linguistic activity in the language-games. That is, rules lie submerged in the cluster of linguistic

activity. But the activity of rule-following presupposes rules per se. Rules are organically related to the rule-following activity. See Merril B. Bintikka and Jaakkao Bintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986).

8. See R.C. Pradhan, "A Note on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Grammar", The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy, Vol.XXVIII, (1989), 32-42.
9. For a classification of the aspects of grammar see Diane F. Gottlieb, "Aspects of Grammar in the "Philosophical Investigations" in Morscher, E. and Stranzinger, R. (Eds.) Ethics - Foundations, Problems, and Applications (1981), 501-504.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. See W.E. Kennick, "Philosophy as Grammar and the Reality of Universals," Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophy and Language, (1972), pp.140-85.
13. See S. Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy", Philosophical Review (1962), pp.67-93. Also see a different view from Cavell's R. Bailer, "Was Wittgenstein a neo-Kantian." in Question of Wittgenstein (University of Nabrasaka Press, Lincoln, 1988), pp.45-56.
14. The problem of grammar is the problem of use, the criteria and rules thereof. See EBB pp.23-24 for an understanding of the grammar of the word "know". The words like 'thinking,

- 'believing' etc. can have their grammar. i.e. the criteria of use (See PI, Sects.360, 410, 574, 613, BBS, pp.47,63).
15. For detailed discussion on this distinction, See J.F.M. Hunter, "Depth Grammar" in Understanding Wittgenstein. (Edinburgh University Press, 1985).
 16. Cf. G. Benjamin Oliveri, 'Depth Grammar' as a Methodological concept in Philosophy, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vo.12, No.I (1972), 111-30.
 17. Wittgenstein writes, 'The criteria which we accept for "fitting", "being able to", "Understanding" are more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic discourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved, the role of these words in our language other than, we are tempted to think (PI, Sect.182), (Italics mine).
 18. See Oliveri "Depth Grammar" as a Methodological Concept in Philosophy" for a comparison of Wittgenstein's surface grammar with Chomsky's surface structure of grammar. It is argued that Wittgenstein's depth grammar has no similarity with Chomsky's depth structure of grammar.
 19. See Hallorn, M. "Wittgensteinian Grammar," Personalist. Vol.51, No.2, (1970), 212-21.
 20. Ibid.
 21. Ibid., p.215. Wittgenstein writes, "What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life, (PI, p.226).

22. Cf. H. Spiegelberg, "The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Phanomenologie (1929-?)," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.5. No.4 (1968), pp.224-256. 23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. See also Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein.
25. Hallorn, p.216.
26. Quoted in Spiegelberg, "The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Phanomenologie" in Ludwig Wittgenstein :_ Critical Assessment Vol.1, ed. S. Shanker, (Groom Helm, London, (1986), pp.233-34.
27. See Wittgenstein's Big Typescript (No.213) in Von Wright's catalogue) entitled "Phanomenologie 1st Grammatik".
28. The Big Typescript, pp.437-8 translated and incorporated in Merrill B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.143.
29. See Spiegelberg, Op.cit.
30. Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka have argued that the Tractatus presents a phenomenological account of objects, See their Investigating Wittgenstein Ch.6. However, there is a difficulty in accepting that the Tractarian objects are given in experience. Rather they limit all experience and are therefore prior to all experience (Cf. TLP, 5.5561, "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects").
31. G.E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33" in Classics of Analytical Philosophy ed. Robert R. Ammerman (Tata McGraw Hill, Bombay-New Delhi, 1965), pp.250-51.

32. Ibid.
33. See Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Hans Hermes et al. Trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979) pp.125-51.
34. Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Hutchinson Univ. Library, London, 1951, Fourth edn. 1971), p.166. 35. See Gair: Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (SUNY Press, Albany, N.Y. 1981), pp.93-94.
36. See' B. Russell Logical Atonism. ed. D.F. Pears (Fontana/Collins, 1972).
37. Wittgenstein, "Philosophy' (Sect.86-93 of the so-called "Big Type script' (Catalogue No.213"), ed. H. Nyman trans (G. Lukhardt and M.A.E. Auve, Synthesese, 87 (1991).
38. Ibid, p.9.

C H A P T E R I I
GRAMMAR AND REALITY

The problem of this chapter is : what is the nature of reality as represented in language? The internal relationship between grammar and reality is the central focus of Wittgenstein philosophy of grammar. I shall explore this relationship and its various logical features in course of this chapter. I shall show that Wittgenstein is committed to the thesis that reality is ultimately grammatical in its essential structure.

I. Grammar, Reality and Logical Form

Wittgenstein defines reality within the framework of grammar. Wittgenstein's investigation into the structure of reality, therefore, is a grammatical investigation. Its focus is "the essence of reality, not reality as it is contingently structured. Essence is expressed by grammar (PI, Sect.371). Grammar is said to determine what is meaningful or what is meaningless in our uses of language. Language is constituted by grammatical rules. In the structure of rules of grammar, the concepts that we use regarding reality, e.g. "object", "fact" etc. and their relations are reflected. For example, to talk about a physical object like chair is to station the concept in our grammar and give it determinable use. Thus grammar is in constant harmony with reality.

For Wittgenstein, any kind of investigation into the nature of grammar leads to the knowledge of reality. But grammar not

only takes account of rules of languages but also shows that reality is amenable to rules i.e. rules apply in the world. Grammar provides a way of looking at things. As Hacker points out; "grammar is the network of concepts and conceptual connections formed by the rules determining the use of language as well as those rules themselves".¹ A grammatical form stands for a conceptual connection and so grammar provides the conceptual structure that represents reality. Wittgenstein writes:

You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing.... what you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song (PI, Sect.401).

So, grammar provides a logical form or a form of representation to apprehend reality. Wittgenstein gives considerable scope to logical form as the essence of language and reality. Logical form of language is the same as the form of reality (TLP 4.12). Logical form is the foundation of logic and language insofar as it constitutes the essence of all that logic and language do. Logical truths and relations are the ramifications of the logical form of propositions in the language. Thus logic and the logical forms are the most essential aspects of language. Wittgenstein accords the primacy of place to logical form in the understanding of the grammar of language. Language reveals the logical form (TLP 4.121), since the home of logical form is language itself.

The logical structure of language is its logical form. Every symbol system, i.e. language has a network of structural rules and relations. These can be called the essences of symbolism and representation. Philosophy has only to show what those forms are and how they work . Hence, philosophy becomes a description of logical forms. Wittgenstein writes,

Since language stands in internal relation to the world, it and these relations determine the logical possibility of facts. If we have a -significant sign it must stand in a particular relation to a structure. Sign and relation determine unambiguously the logical form of the thing signified (NB, pp.42-43).

Thus the internal relations of the signs mark the internal relations of the things. That is, the logical form of signs is the logical form of reality. This is not only true of the logically defined symbols but also of all natural symbol-systems. Logical form is therefore the global feature of the symbol systems. Grammar in this sense is the doctrine of logical form* Grammar is a "theory of logical types' (PR, Sect.7).

Of course, neither logical forms nor grammatical rules can be constituted by extra-logical devices. In the other words, there is no extra-logical device to constitute the logical forms of the language and its rules. Because logical form of language is a basic non-derivable fact. That is shown by logical syntax through internal connexions of the grammatical rules.

Wittgenstein appeals to the ultimacy of logical form. This appeal must not be taken as Frege's logical method which appeals

to Platonic realism. Frege's logical method is a method of discovery as he assumes that logical form is independent of language and mind. For Wittgenstein philosophy and logical grammar are declared not to be sciences which can discover the logical forms (TLP, 4.111, 4.112). Both are only explications of logical form. Logical form is not fact of any kind because it comes along with language itself. The rules of grammar which define logical forms are *a priori* rules and they determine what language can express, i.e., what can be said and what cannot be said. These logical forms and rules of grammar are a priori and transcendental.²

2. Reality and Pictures

We know reality as we think it in language. We can picture it in language. Grammar, for Wittgenstein, provides the logical representation of facts. Facts are the existence and non-existence of states-of-affairs (TLP, 2). Facts constitute the world (TLP 1.1). Wittgenstein thus provides a logical map of the world in the network of grammatical relations of sentences which are constituted as representations of facts. The Tractarian metaphysics of the world is a grammatical representation.³ "Picturing" is a method of our linguistic representations of the world. For Wittgenstein, language is a logical picture, i.e., a logical model of reality (TLP, 4.01) by which he means that language represents the logical structure of the world. It is language that represents reality. Grammar only provides the conditions for the possibility of the picture.

The fundamental thesis of picture theory is that the language and the world have a common logical form (TLP. 4.12). Language displays the logical form of reality in its own form (TLP. 4.121). The picture theory does not demonstrate the actual identity of language and the world. But it lays down the conditions of representation of the world in language. In other words, it transcendently unfolds the conditions of logical reconstructibility of the world in language. These conditions belong to the grammar (logic) of language. Wittgenstein suggests that we picture facts to ourselves (TLP, 3.001) only by being able to think and reconstruct the facts in language. So, ultimately, Wittgenstein's picture theory lays down the forms of our thought of the world and the logical conditions which make the thought possible. The conditions which make the thought possible are linguistic since there is no thought without being expressed in language. Thought and language have the identical logical structure. All the forms of thought, according to Wittgenstein, are forms of language⁴ (TLP 3.03).

The internal relationship between language and reality shows that pictorial relationship is not an external relationship. As we know, language is logical picture of reality because language and reality share the common logical form. So, we can say that logical form of language is collateral with the form of reality but it cannot be justified by the later. In simple words, one can say, if a proposition agrees with a fact in its logical form, it does not necessarily follow that it is justified by the fact.

The fact is constituted through its linguistic representations. There are, therefore, no non-linguistic facts. In the logical scheme of the calculus model the notion of correspondence ill fits. The question of correspondence does not rise at all. The sense of propositions consists in their being logical pictures of possible states-of-affairs. It is internal to the propositions and can be demonstrated within the calculus of language itself. The possible situations which constitute reality are themselves possible moves in the calculus since they have the same logical multiplicity (TLP. 4.04) as that of the propositions. In that sense, the limits of language are limits of the world (TLP 5.6). Grammar determines what is possible and what is not possible (PG, Sect. 82). Wittgenstein writes.

The connections between "language and reality is made by definitions. These definitions belong to grammar. So, language remains self-contained and autonomous. (PG, Sect.55)

The picture theory contains the basis of the autonomy of language in that language and reality have logical agreement and that language is the picture of reality. Language internally imposes its structure on reality. In that sense, language contains the image of the world.

Wittgenstein's model of explaining the relations between language and reality is not causal or empiricistic, because he never felt it necessary to justify language externally through appeal to experience. What we call experience is itself constituted by the rules of grammar. The causal conditioning of

the rules of grammar is ruled out since there is no need for deriving them from our experience of the world. Wittgenstein, however, is not a Humean in proposing that there is no justification for our representation of the world. For logical forms and rules of grammar do not need any justification at all. They are not matters based on Humean conventions.

3. Logical or Grammatical Essence

Grammar does not create reality. Reality as such is pre-linguistic. Its ontological significance, however, is inferred by grammar. We cannot describe and even think of reality if the latter does not fulfill the basic grammatical conditions of being meaningfully represented. In the other words, grammar constitutes the logical essences of the world Wittgenstein's writes: "Essence is expressed by -grammar"(PI, Sect.371). The logical essences are the logical possibilities or forms that are the constitutive conditions of the empirical world. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein called these essences the "objects" that underlie every possible state of affairs. Objects constitute the substance of the world (TLP 2.021). Substance is "the form and content" (TLP. 2.025) of the world. From the logical or grammatical point of view the objects are the formal concepts (TLP. 4.1272) and are the marks of conventions in language. The "objects", therefore, can be called a grammatical category. It derives its significance from grammar itself.

In this context, Wittgenstein observes: "Grammar tells what

kind of object anything is (theology as grammar)" (PI, Sect.373). The grammaticality of object is the hallmark of the later Wittgensteinian concept of object and the world. The grammaticization of every ontological category deepens the Tractarian view of world and objects rather than rejects it.⁵

4. Objects, Facts and Complexes

Wittgenstein's early theory of the world is that the world is a totality of facts and these facts in the ultimate analysis are concatenations of objects. These objects are simple. They make up the substance of the world. They are combined with each other in different ways so as to form facts. The totality of facts is limited by the totality of objects that can serve as ingredients of facts. An object is represented in the language by a name. With the combination of names we can form propositions. Thus the totality of propositions representing the totality of facts makes up our language. Language as a whole mirrors the world.

Wittgenstein includes properties, relations and functions in his notion of objects. He writes, "Relations and properties, etc., are objects too" (NB, p.61). In his middle period Wittgenstein demonstrates in his Philosophical Grammar that properties and relations are included among objects and that objects are the all-embracing logical ingredients of facts and complexes. He writes:

A complex is a compound of its parts, the things of a kind which go to make it up. (This is of course a grammatical proposition concerning the words 'complex', 'part' and 'compose'.) (PG, Appendix p.200).

In the Tractatus also there are enough of evidences to show that objects have replaced the so called properties, relations and functions.⁶ There is only one category of reality and that is the 'objects'. Objects account for all the possible states of affairs (TLP. 3.1432, 3.2, .- 221). Objects .make up the substance of the world. Substance is what subsists in the world independently of what happens in the world. There must be objects, if the world is to have alternative descriptions. Objects are the ingredients for the unalterable form of the world. (TLP, 2.0271). Objects constitute the unalterable form. They are subsistent. Their configuration produces states of affairs which are changing and therefore are contingent. Wittgenstein's search for the objects was the search for the necessary and logical conditions of our language and the world. Objects thus being the basis of our meaningful representation of the world in language have the characteristics of being simple, such that (1) they do not have a structure like the physical objects, and (2) cannot be further analysed and so are the end points⁷ of the process of analysis. Accordingly, we can say objects constitute the limit of the empirical world and the empirical discourse. Objects are proxied in the discourse by the logically simple and semantically primitive simple symbols or names (TLP. 3.22). Objects are, therefore, necessarily named and

thus are discourse-dependent for their formal or grammatical nature.

5. Phenomenological Vs Grammatical

As I have indicated in Chapter I, the objects of the Tractatus have been supposed to be phenomenological⁸ - the items given to our immediate experience. The following remark is adduced as an evidence.

As examples of simple I always think of parts of visual space. (NB, p.45).

It seems to me perfectly possible that patches in our visual field are simple objects the visual appearances of stars even seen certainly to be so. (NB. p.64).

The following remark from the Tractatus may be taken as supporting the above claim:

2.0131 A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place). A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour; it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the sense of touch some degree of hardness and so on.

It is compatible with the character of simple objects that Wittgenstein should countenance complex physical objects. Complex physical objects can be taken as the configuration of simple objects. As Wittgenstein remarks at TLP 6.3431 "the laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak however indirectly about the objects of the world". The language of physics is descriptive of the so called phenomenological world and a purely fictitious world. Wittgenstein remarks:

Let us not forget that the language of physics too, again describes only the primary [i.e. phenomenological] world and not a hypothetical world. The only hypothesis (of physics) is an assumption concerning the practical method of description.⁹

However, phenomenological description of the physical world does not fit the description of the Tractarian objects. As argued in chapter I, the objects which constitute the essences of the world are logical (formal) and so grammatical in character. They are not given in immediate experience as objects of consciousness. In fact, they constitute the limits of all empirical reality and so cannot themselves be empirical. "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects" (TLP, 5.5561). Objects are the non-empirical and therefore the grammatical essences of the world. It is therefore a grammatical statement that any possible world must have the same objects (the logical form). {TLP 2.022 -2.0231}.

6. The Objects in the Later Philosophy

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein is explicit that grammar determines the essences or the objects of the world. Grammar tells us "what kind of object anything is" (PI. Sect.373) and to which category of descriptive language it belongs. So one can say object is constituted in grammar. E.K. Specht, expressing such a view writes,

—Language is not abstracted from objects; but drawing up language-game creates a new articulation and organisation of phenomena, simultaneously with the introduction of the new linguistic sign. In this way a new group of objects is "constituted" ¹⁰ in a language game simultaneously with new linguistic sign

According to Wittgenstein objects are articulated and signified in language. A language-game as a grammatical move articulates the object into a new form. The constitution of the objects is only grammatical or conceptual. This does not imply that objects are created in language. Wittgenstein was never concerned with the origin or creation of the world. His problem was concerning the logical possibility of the world or the way it can be made intelligible. To put it in his words, "... our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the possibilities' of phenomena" (PI, Sect. 90). As I have argued, this is the most important motivation of the grammatical investigation that Wittgenstein undertakes in his later philosophy. All conceptual remarks on the nature of objects and the world are descriptions of the paradigms in our language. Wittgenstein explains:

What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but none the less an observation concerning our language-game-our method of representation (PI, Sect.50).

The paradigm - setting in the object-description is grammatical in the sense that whenever we talk about objects and their being 'simple' or 'complex' we make grammatical remarks about certain

language-games. The object is simple or complex relative to a language-game (PI, Sects.47). Wittgenstein writes,

The question "Is what you see composite?" makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity - that is, which particular use of the word - is in question (PI, Sect.47) (italics mine).

The attribution of the property of existence (being) or non-existence (non-being) to objects (elements) is a matter of grammar, since within language alone is it considered what a particular object is or is not. "The standard metre in Paris" is Wittgenstein's notable example wherein the grammar of the word "metre"¹ is laid down. Wittgenstein says,

There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. - But this is, of course not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but, only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule. (PI', Sect.50). (Italics mine).

What, according to Wittgenstein, is important now is the language-game and its grammatical structure. That alone decides what objects we are referring to or describing. The objects have their grammatical proxies in the paradigms of language-games. They become part of the method of representation.¹¹ (PI, Sects.50-57).

7. Ontology of essences

Wittgenstein addresses himself to the question: Are the essences objectively real? That is, are the so called grammatical essences objectively true of the factual world? This

is a fundamental question regarding the ontological reality of grammar itself.

There are essences in the objective domain of language according to Wittgenstein. We know them through an eidetic-intuition,¹² i.e., the intuition given to us in language-use. These essential structural properties are mirrored in the structure of language. Wittgenstein claims in the Tractatus that the structure of the world is reflected in the structure of language (TLP. 4.124). He also claims that the formal properties are objectively located in the world. The world shares with language the formal properties or essences. So the formal properties are a feature of world itself (TLP 4.1221-4.123). Wittgenstein has no other world than the world of language to locate the formal elements of reality. The formal or grammatical essences are the essential conditions of reality.

The word "mirror" perhaps brings us a feeling that there is a gap between language and reality. Pictureing of reality by language is a kind of bridging this gap. For Wittgenstein, language and world are structurally identical in the sense they have same logical form. Structure of the world cannot be conceived without domain of language.

If we accept the view that Wittgenstein takes the notion of the form of the world to have an ontological significance, in the way the Platonic forms have, then it is difficult to accommodate the transcendental framework¹³ of the Tractatus. which claims to

lay bare only the apriori conditions of the possibility of language and the world. We can show that these formal properties or essences attributable to reality are contained in logic. So, they have been derived from logic and not from reality itself. They are true of the world, since the latter conforms to the forms of logic. This shows the co-existence of realism and the transcendental framework in the Tractatus without undermining the logic-dependence of essences. The later works can be deemed to be following the Tractarian reconciliation of realism of essences with the transcendental¹⁴ standpoint of grammar. Since grammar expresses the essences, it is quite right to say that they are real in language without being derived from the world itself. They provide the conceptual moulds in which the world itself could be made intelligible.

8. Grammatical Illusions

According to Wittgenstein any pointer to reality beyond grammar is completely deceptive. That grammar represents a pre-linguistic reality is only a grammatical illusion. Wittgenstein writes,

'You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing new object. You interpret a grammatical movement by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing (PI, Sect.401).

It is an illusion to say that grammatical forms stand indecently of grammar. What is illusory is not the reality of

the world itself, but the logical form of the world standing independently of the grammatical form. It does not amount to a denial of those forms themselves but their independence of grammar. The logical form of the world has its source in grammar and in language-use. The structure of the world has no ontological foundations. It is decided ultimately by grammar. Limits of grammar are also co-terminus with the limits of the world.

P.M.S. Hacker writes,

"In the investigations the structure of language is still the subject of investigation. Moreover, it is still isomorphic with the "structure of reality", not because language must mirror the logical form of the universe, but because apparent 'structure of reality' is merely the shadow of grammar.¹⁵

What does Hacker mean by the "shadow of grammar"? Perhaps he means that the structure of reality has no ontological basis in the world but is ultimately based on grammar. This is a plausible construction of the above statement. Shadow of grammar is merely a shadow, it is not an illusion. The structure of reality is as real as that of language. Reality as such is formless. Its forms are derived from grammar. So, the structure of reality is also real. But it is a grammatical reality. Thus ontology collapses into grammar. The universe as a vast panoramic existence derives its essential structure from the inner necessities of grammar.

9. Language-games

The notion of language-game seems to provide answers to the following questions in Wittgenstein's later philosophy:

1. How are the pictures, which our sentences are supposed to be, compared with reality?
2. How do we establish whether they are true or false?

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the relation between language and reality is established not through "picturing" but through language-games.¹⁶ But the transitions from 'picture' to language-game is found in remarks like the following:

My leading idea is that a proposition is compared with the reality (MS. 107, p.155).

I must after all be able to compare reality with a proposition.(MS 107, p.153)

In the Tractatus, language-world relations through the picture model are simple and straight-forward. Language establishes projective relations with the world with the intermediary of names and objects. The Tractarian projective relations are logically neat and syntactico - semantically transparent. Language-reality relations are, however, not so simple in the model of language-games. The relations are diverse and they can be effected only by means of rule-governed activities on the part of the language-users.¹⁷ The rule-structure of language use contains the diversity of the relation; they reveal that language keeps contact with reality not simply

as a description. Sometimes language contains predictions suppositions, hypotheses and sometimes, orders, commands, or simple guidelines for future descriptions. In any form, language is always compared with reality if not as a measure or map, but at least as a system of rules, conventions and repeated practices.

Wittgenstein continues to hold the idea that it is the use of *-picttfre* that mediates between the picture (a sentence, a thought, a blueprint, or an order) and the reality it represents. In the later works the term 'language-game' can be taken to constitute the basic semantic relations between language and the world. When this fact is noted, the picture idea is vindicated. The semantic projections in an appropriate language-game remains pictorial even though in a minimal sense. As Wittgenstein puts it:

So I am imagining that the difference between proposition and reality is ironed out by the lines of projection belonging to the picture, the thought, and that no further room is left for a method of application, but only for agreement and disagreement.

Thus what may look like ensuring the rejection of the picture theory is in fact an underlying continuity of the semantics of pictures and its grammatical reincarnation in the theory or language-games.¹⁷

This interpretation is confirmed by Wittgenstein's own statements such as follows:

Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language. (PG, Sect.112).

In other words, Wittgenstein is not denying the agreement between language and reality, but asserting the relation in the forms of language-game. The agreement is grammatical, since what is demanded is the agreement in form, not in content. Language is in the last analysis related to the world, not by name-object correlations, but by language-games. These language-games contain the symbols of our language under the control of the network of rules and also determine the application or use of these symbols in the world. It is only the language-game that first determines what the symbol is and then how it is used to represent an object or phenomenon in different situations.²⁰

10. Language-game As a Method of Representation

Forms of representation, according to Wittgenstein, evolve out of our actual ways of using language for describing the world. The forms of representation are the language-games with which we represent the world. At PI Sect 50 Wittgenstein says:

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascription of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented but is a means of representation. - And just this goes for an element in language-game;.. .when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is now a means of representation. And to say "If it did not exist, it could have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game.

The language-games as the forms of representation are the ways we describe the world or talk about it in various ways. Describing is not mapping but bringing the world into our

cognitive network. Our fundamental relations with the world are accentuated in our linguistic network, i.e., in our grammar. Our experience is dependent on our grammatical modes, that is on our methods of representation.

We have a world-picture which is present in our language. The world-picture is grammatical. It lays down the conditions of all linguistic description. Wittgenstein says,

I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing. (OC, Sect.162)

The world-picture is not something which we acquire as a matter of pragmatic choice but it is basic to our thinking. It is the substratum of our ways of thinking and acting. It is neither true nor false, reasonable nor unreasonable- "It is there - like our life" (OC, Sect.559).

Now the question is : can we call our forms of representation *apriori*? Of course, they are not *apriori* - in the sense that Wittgenstein's early logical system is : nevertheless, they can be called *apriori* in the sense that they are prior, to any form of experience. They are not based on the experience of the world. Their source is language, rather than experience. Ultimately they lie in our forms of life.

What do these forms of language represent? Do they represent facts or possibilities of facts? Wittgenstein answers

these question in a novel way. They no doubt represent the world, but the world is already given to us in language. The world is grammatically located in our linguistic network. So the world that we seem to represent is a fact of language. These are ultimately linguistic facts. No other facts are recorded.

There is a wide-spread view that Wittgenstein has given up picture theory of language that he had put forward in the Tractatus. Name-object relation is the main thesis underlying the picture theory. Later this idea of 'picturing' is missing in his writings. There are important changes found in the attitude of Wittgenstein towards picture idea in the middle period and the later period of his life. What are those changes? Let us briefly discuss the following points in order to support the view that Wittgenstein continues to believe that picture theory was basically alright.

1. The primary evidence is that pictorial relation between language and reality lost its primacy in his later theory of language apparently because picture theory was very much idealized and was far removed from ordinary language. The relation between sentences and facts was based on idealized name-object relationship. In his later period, Wittgenstein says nothing about naming relations except that they are there, and can be taken care of in our ordinary language-use. In the Notebooks Wittgenstein declares: "Logic takes care of itself!". What he is concerned about there is the primacy of logic. However, the change in the order of

conceptual priorities greatly reduced the importance of the picture-view. Logic in the transcendental sense gave way to logic as the description of language-games.

2. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein proposes that the basic language-world relations are not one-to-one relations. One and the same language-game can, as Hintikka²¹ observe, mediate the connection of several different words with reality. This makes the application of the idea of picture grossly inadequate, if not wrong.
3. Language-games have assimilated the naming relations into their descriptive structure without presenting the one-to-one relationship. Language is related to reality in diverse ways rather than in one paradigmatic way.

These evidences are not sufficient to draw the conclusion that Wittgenstein has given up 'picture theory forever. Picture theory has reincarnated itself as theory of language-games. Language now is the all comprehensive universal medium which encompasses all possible relations with the world. Our new pictures of the world are the blurred and hazy images reflected in our linguistic medium.

There are several notebook entries in the MS to show that Wittgenstein evinced much more interest than before in the idea of picture: "A proposition is not simply a picture but a potrait". (MS 107, P.155, 7 Oct., 1929).

My idea that a proposition is a picture was a good one. It is said that thinking is the same as, or something similar to, making a picture for oneself, and thinkable is the same as, or similar to, what is imaginable. And as undetermined as the concept of proposition, is as undetermined is also the concept of picture i.e. a picture is nevertheless a perfect guidespot to the understanding of how a proposition works. (MS 219, p.14).²² (Italics mine)

11. Assertions, Propositions and Language-games

According to Wittgenstein, propositions are articulate. This conception of proposition is found in Wittgenstein's 'early philosophy and also continued throughout the middle period.²³ Propositions have never lost their primacy in Wittgenstein's thought. The connection between language and reality is established through propositions. Propositions express sense and have use or employment in language-games. Besides, propositions have sense because they have articulated structure. The world they represent has an identical structure. Language and the world have the same logical multiplicity (PR, Sect. 32). The problem of assertions was an ever continuing problem with Wittgenstein. For him, there are no unasserted propositions. So he considered the assertion sign as redundant (TLP, 4.442). The later theory of language-games fully demonstrates the superfluity of assertion sign as a logical category. All propositions are assertions and they show that they are such. Wittgenstein's picture theory contains the logic of assertions. The following remark is worth noting:

If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all points. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which has not the slightest similarity with what it represents... This shews you the way in which words and things may be connected (BBS, p.37).

To entertain a shadow between sentence and reality is to require an additional device called assertion-sign. But the sentence itself contains the shadow and so the assertion-sign. Propositions are articulate,. They show what they assert and so contain their sense. The idea of picture continued to haunt Wittgenstein even in the late middle period. G.E. Moore has correctly noted down the struggle with this idea which Wittgenstein has in his Lectures in 1930-33.²⁴

True propositions describe reality whether it is called a picture or not. Propositions have little similarity with reality except in the logical form. This logical fact is mirrored in the grammar of a proposition. Wittgenstein's talks about the general notion of picture that clarifies the grammar of pictures. He writes,

Let us imagine a picture story in schematic pictures, and thus more like the narrative in a language than a series of realistic pictures. Using such a picture - language we might in particular e.g. keep our hold on the course of battles. (Language-games). And a sentence of our word-language approximates to such a picture in this picture language much more closely than we think (PG. Sect.123). (Italics mine).

Thus the idea of picture gets a grip over language inspite of

the fact that language is not actually a picture. Only logically it is so.

Wittgenstein uses in his later writings one characteristic idea. It consist in comparing some sentence not with portraits (historical pictures) but with genre pictures In PI, Sec.522 he writes:

If we compare a proposition to a picture, we must think whether we are comparing it to a potrait (a historical representation) or to a genre - picture and both comparisons have a point.

The genre-pictures tell us something about the world. They keep themselves rearer to reality. Wittgenstein writes,

I should like to say, "what the picture tells me is itself". That is, its telling me consists in its own structure, in its own lines and colours (PI, Sect.523).

Thus pictures are always gramatically relevant. The rigid determinants of a picture have withered away but the essential grairanticality of a picture is still intact.

12. Picture Theory : The Grammatical Requirement

In the above example of genre pictures Wittgenstein is talking of more than basic name-object relationship and their independence of two-place relationship. The name - object relationship is constituted in language games. Not only that, the picture idea itself arises out of a grammatical requirement. Picture is a particular grammatical move that is independent of

our experience of the world. It does not require name - object relationship at all for its possibility. The grammatically required picture precedes our names-object relationship. The picture is a fundamental notion. But it is no more a single notion.²⁵

The claim that Wittgenstein gave up the picture theory of language can be understood only depending on in what sense we are ready to consider the word 'picture' . If the word 'picture' stands for a single name-object relationship, then the later Wittgenstein has the option not to go in for such a standpoint. If it means a general agreement between expressions and reality then 'picture' remains at the core of language theory. Wittgenstein has no objection to the idea that language and the world have an internal harmony. The language-games perfectly represent the inner harmony between language and the reality. As Wittgenstein has made it clear, we could not use such expressions as 'belief, "expectation' and "command' without presupposing that what we expect must itself be expressed in language.²⁶ There must be an internal agreement between belief and what is believed. As Wittgenstein says, "what is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended" (PR. Sec.21). He further says:

If there were no connection between the act of expectation and reality, you could expect a nonsense (PR Sect.33).

What gives us the idea that there is a kind of agreement between thought and reality. Instead of "agreement" one might here say with a clear conscience "pictorial character".

But is this pictorial character an agreement? In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus I said something like: it is an agreement of form. But that is an error (PG I Appendix 4B, p.2.12).

The mere agreement of form is of course an erroneous notion. It goes with application. 'Form' is an incomplete notion without 'use' or application. That is what Wittgenstein says when he talks of the blue-point plus the method of projection (application).²⁷ One can see that both picture and its application were already in the Tractatus. However, the Tractarian concept of use had not been sufficiently enriched like the later concept of use. The picture is a blue-print and it can be used only in a language-game. The language-game contains both the picture and its possible application. The projection lines still take direction from language to reality. Thus the notion of picture survives inspite of the various changes in the picture theory.²⁸

13. Convergence of Language and Reality

Although the notion of picture is absent from the scene Wittgenstein has always talked of reality in his later writings. What does he think about the relation of language and reality?

In his earlier writings Wittgenstein has thought of a gap between language and reality. That gap has to be mediated by picture. It seems that gradually the gap has been bridged and the differences between them narrowed. Ultimately, Wittgenstein

finds no ontological gap between the two. For him language and reality occupy one single logical space. Language and reality go together in a single logical space. Language is part of reality and reality is part of the linguistic continuum. How does this convergence of language and reality take place? It takes place in the concept of grammar. Grammar tells what the reality is and how to represent it in language. Grammar is the decisive element. Grammar encompasses both language and reality. The point of "convergence of language and reality is found in grammar. Wittgenstein hints at this inward convergence in the following passage:

The rules of grammar cannot be justified by one's shewing that their application makes a representation agree with reality. For this justification would itself have to describe what is represented (PG, Sect.134).

Reality first becomes something represented in the process of representation. The fundamental question therefore is How do we represent anything? This requires a grammatical determination. We can say: grammar tells what kind of object anything is (PI, Sect.373).

14. Conclusion

All roads in a sense lead to grammar. The facts of language and its functions are characterizable in grammar. Grammar tells what is having sense in our language-use, and what is not. Grammar, therefore, is the accounts book of language (PG, Sect.44). On the other hand, grammar also tells us what reality

is (PI Sect. 373) and what agreement or harmony it has with language (PG, Sect.112). Reality thus becomes an additional dimension of grammar,²⁹ grammar being the source of the letter's intelligibility. As Wittgenstein puts it.

The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous. (PG, Sect.55).

NOTES

1. P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972), p.151.
2. See David McCarthy "The Philosophy of Logical Wholism", Synthese 87 (1991), 51-123.
3. Ibid..
4. The problem of the relation of language and thought is tackled by Wittgenstein at various stages in a uniform manner. For him thought is logically structured and so it is linguistic out and out. Thoughts are the linguistic articulations manifested in language use. See PI. 330, 332.
5. The prevalent idea that Wittgenstein rejected his Tractarian ontology in his later works is wrong, since instead of rejecting it he only removed the consistencies surrounding the concept of the object and facts. The notion of fact was slowly found redundant, since the concept of object sufficed to take account of all linguistically possible states of affairs. The 'world' of the PI. is a dynamic constellation of objects grammatically BO stationed in the representing mechanism of the language-games. See Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) for a view reaffirming the continuity between the Tractatus and the PI world-views.
6. See G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Hutchinson, London, 1951), Chapter 7 for a discussion on this issue.

Objects are the result of a transcendental deduction rather than a simple logical analysis. The deduction is of the character of an apriori or logical analysis of the possibility of sense. Wittgenstein's following remark at Tractatus 2.0211-2.0212 is worth considering: "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. In that case one could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)".

8. See Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein. Hintikkas argue that the objects in the Tractatus are phenomenological as they are the objects of acquaintance given in the domain of experience.
9. "Big Typescript" (MS 108). Quoted in Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.75.
10. E.K. Specht, Foundations of Wittgenstein's Late Philosophy (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1969) pp.158-59. Quoted in R.C. Pradhan, Language and Experience. An Interpretation of the Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Anu Prakashan, Meerut, 1981), p.110.
11. For detailed discussion on the method of representation as part of grammar, see P.M.S. Hacking, Insight and Illusion, Chapter VI.
12. Eidetic intuition is remarkably an apriori intuition much favoured by the phenomenologists. It is essentially a direct apprehension of essences. However, Wittgenstein does not call it an epistemic process at all. It is linguistic

in character, since language ultimately provides the apprehension of the grammatical essences. At Tratatus 5.4731 Wittgentein wrote: "Self-evidence, which Ressel talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake*" (Italics mine).

The logical essences are self-evident in a characteristically grammatical manner.

13. See P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion for discussion on its transcendental framework of the Tractatus. The following remark is worth considering:

Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental (TLP. 6.13).

14. See R.C. Pradhan, Language and Experience (Anu Prakashan, 1981) for a defence of the transcendental standpoint in the later works of Wittgenstein.
15. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p.145.
16. cf. Hentikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein. They maintain that the language-world relation the main focus of the notion of language-game.
17. Ibid.,
18. The idea of picture eurviews the many changes that have definitely taken place in Wittgenstein's picture theory. However, it has taken a more informal turn insofar as 'picture' has shed its rigid format. Language-games contain the surviving element of pictorial/projective relations between language and the world. See Hintikka and Hintikka,

Investigating Wittgenstein Ch.9. See also A. Kenny, "The Ghost of the Tractatus" in Ludwig Wittgenstein Critical Assessments Vol.1 ed. S. Shanker (Croom Helm, London, 1986). For an opposite view on continuity, see P.M.S. Hacker, "The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory", in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Critical Assessments, Vol.1.

19. See Investigating Wittgenstein
20. Ibid.. p.234.
21. Ibid.,
22. Quoted in Investigating Wittgenstein, p.227.
23. See Big Typescript (MS 213) Sect.43.
24. See G.E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33" in Classics of Analytic Philosophy ed. R. Anunerman (Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Ltd., Bombay, New Delhi, 1965) pp.233-284.
25. cf. James Bogen, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972) p.131. Bogen correctly mentions that the old notion of fact is assimilated into language itself. He writes,

This would show that "fact" need not refer to any entity above and beyond those referred to by a sentence used to assert that such and such is the case without the word 'facts'... If expressions of facts are always assertins or indirect discourse reports of assertions, then to express a fact is to make or report an asertion about entities which are not facts (p.125).

26. See Philosophical Remarks, **Sects** 20-38.
27. cf. Philosophical Grammar. I, App. 4B, p.213.
28. Bogen is of the opinion that picture though essentially depends on the internal relation whereas the use theory is basically dependent on the notion of contingent relationship between language of reality. I think this is not correct. Language-reality relationship has to be internal and so necessary. See Bogen, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language. pp.102-119.
29. For mere elaborate discussion on the grammatical nature of reality, See Finch, Wittgenstein-Later Philosophy :_ An Exposition of "Philosophical Investigations Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1977), pp.149-152.

CHAPTER - III

GRAMMATICAL PROPOSITIONS

In this chapter I will focus on the nature and structure of grammatical propositions. These propositions occupy a unique place in language, according to Wittgenstein. The logical propositions of the Tractatus have appeared as the grammatical propositions in Wittgenstein's later works. The most significant thesis to be discussed in this chapter is that grammatical-empirical distinction which is maintained in Wittgenstein's logic and grammar is redefined in the later works. The uncompromising distinction is diluted to accommodate even the otherwise empirical looking propositions as grammatical. The notion of 'grammatical' is widened to cover the synthetic apriori propositions.

The notion of grammar which I have so far developed indicates that there are propositions which can be called grammatical depending upon what role they play in language. A grammatical proposition, according to Wittgenstein, states the rule or the conditions of use of a word or sentence. Therefore, grammatical propositions set the limits of language, i.e. the bounds of what can be correctly used in language. Seen in this context, grammatical propositions lay down the limits of intelligibility of our linguistic descriptions. They set the "limits of empiricism"!

1. Nature of Grammatical Propositions

Grammatical propositions, according to Wittgenstein, consist of (i) Mathematical propositions (ii) propositions of logic and (iii) a wide variety of other expressions. Examples of these above variety include such propositions as,

"Every rod has a length" (PI, Sect. 251).

"The class of lion is not a lion but class of classes is a class" (RFM, p.182).

"An order orders its execution" (PI, Sect.458).

"I cannot feel your toothache" (BBS, p.49).

"You can't hear God speak to someone else, you can hear Him only if you are being addressed" (Z, Sect.717).

"This body has an extension" (PI,p.251-2).

"White is lighter than black" (RFM. I, Sect.105).

These propositions constitute a wide variety of grammatical sentences. They have one family resemblance, namely, they tell about the concept concerned. They define or bring out the logical structure of the concept and its use in language. Grammatical propositions are, to say the least, conceptual or definitional.

Backer² points out that there may be two types of grammatical sentences dressed in metaphysical disguise viz., (1) the first are grammatical sentences expressed in the modal form

such as "can or cannot", "must or must not" etc. e.g. "I" cannot exhibit my own sensations "(Z., Sect. 134). "Green or blue cannot be in the same place simultaneously" (BB. 56). (2) Secondly, there is a range of completely disguised grammatical sentences, e.g. 'of course, I know what I wish' (BB. p.30). These sentences, amongst others, are disguised grammatical sentences, because, they do not appear to be so. They appear to be metaphysical statements about "sensations", "wish", etc. Wittgenstein supposes that philosophy abounds in such metaphysical looking sentences which are really grammatical. Though they talk about the conceptual essences assigned to a word or expression they do not pose to be metaphysical descriptions of such essences. Wittgenstein gives a striking example of this confusion in the following passage:

The 'private experience' is a degenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a sense to tautology and contradiction). And this grammatical monster now fools us; when we wish to do away with it, it seems as though we denied the existence of an experience, say, toothache (NFL, p.314.).

As Wittgenstein very aptly puts it, "A whole cloud of philosophy [is] condensed into a drop of grammar" (PI, II, XI, p.222).

Mathematical sentences also form another kind of grammatical propositions. Of course, they have the misleading form of verbal expression of mathematical proofs. They show us what makes sense to say, e.g. $2 + 2 = 4$. They are the mathematical rules that regulate our mathematical calculations. "The mathematical proposition has the dignity of a rule" (RFM. I, Sect.165). By

noting a mathematical rule, we really note a deep convention and a conceptual connection that is an underlying necessary truth. Wittgenstein says,

Let us remember that in mathematics we are convinced of grammatical propositions; So the expression, the result, of our being convinced is that we accept a rule (RFM. III, Sect.26).

Thus for Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions stand as the grammatical propositions that hold the key to our understanding of mathematical necessity and mathematical truth. The whole of mathematical necessity is a species of grammatical necessity.³

The logical propositions which Wittgenstein used to call tautologies in the Tractatus are also called grammatical in his philosophy. The proposition e.g. 'A is A' and " $P \rightarrow P$ ", etc., are logical in that they state some obvious, though necessary, truths regarding our language. These truths are the rules of our language. Being rules, they lay down conditions of use of language. Hence, their grammatical character. Wittgenstein writes,

The propositions of logic are 'laws of thought', 'because they bring out the essence of human thinking' - to put it more correctly because they bring out, or shew, the essence, the technique, of thinking. They shew what thinking is and also shew kinds of thinking. (RFM, I, Sect.133).

Logic, it may be said, shews us what we understand by 'proposition' and by 'language' (RFM, I, Sect.134).

Thus Wittgenstein meant the propositions to be grammatical in the sense that they state the necessary conditions of use of language.

The following are some of the important characteristics of the grammatical propositions.⁴

1. They have the form of empirical propositions and appear to be informative.
2. Unlike empirical propositions, however, they do not state facts, but express conditions of stating the facts. They are necessarily true in the sense that without them no empirical truth can be expressed.
3. Grammatical propositions are of the character of rules; therefore, they are unique in language.

2. Grammatical Propositions and Grammatical Rules

Wittgenstein has highlighted the close relationship between grammatical propositions and the rules. According to him, these propositions have the status of rules. Like rules they state criteria and explanations of meaning. The rules as a criteria determine what is a correct use of an expression. The notion of correctness and incorrectness is associated with grammar. In the Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein claims that "the place of word in grammar is its meaning" (PG, Sect.23) and that the explanation of meaning amounts to laying down the rules. This suggests that grammatical propositions are grammatical rules⁵ so far as they function as explanations of meaning. The explanations of meaning are the same as explanations of grammar. Let us briefly discuss some of the views about the relationship between grammatical propositions and grammatical rules.

The view that grammatical propositions are identical with grammatical rules was discussed by G.E. Moore in his account of Wittgenstein's Lecturers 1930-33.⁶ According to Moore, Wittgenstein took grammatical propositions as expressing grammatical rules which themselves are expressions of necessary truths. According G.E. Moore the term "grammatical rule" is used in two different senses⁷ which are never explicitly distinguished:

- a) A rule of grammar allows or proscribes some combinations of words. For example, "Do not call anything a rod which has not got a length" is a rule which allows a certain sentence-expression. No body can call anything a rod which has no length
- b) A grammatical rule is a statement to the effect that certain conditions are fulfilled for the correct use of an expression e.g. "I can't feel our toothache'. Feeling another man's toothache is grammatically ruled out. In the sense of (a) grammatical propositions do not have truth values and in the sense of (b) they seem to be like empirical propositions but really they are not BO. These two sentences have an apparent conflict, but really they mean the same thing, i.e., rules and statements thereof are having a unique status in language.

The relationship between grammatical propositions and grammatical rules is typical of Wittgenstein's conception of

grammar. Wittgenstein has no distinction between grammatical rules and grammatical propositions (statements). The reason is that a rule is a statement of the conditions of the use of an expression. The statement 'Every rod has a length' (PI. Sect.251) is not only a proposition (in grammar) but also a rule. As a grammatical proposition it states something grammatically necessary and as a rule it embodies what is stated as necessary. Wittgenstein writes,

But the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only shew, say, what is called "the length of a rod". And what should the opposite picture be? (Remarks about the negation of an apriori proposition) (PI. p.251).

A grammatical proposition qua necessary is used in the first sense, as a rule which permits, forbids or regulates certain use. It is the availability of such a rule which makes the assertion of grammatical proposition, employed in the second sense i.e. as a statement of the conditions in which language is actually used, true. Thus the conflict between the rule and proposition can be resolved without denying that rules are not true or false in the ordinary sense. Moore is right in saying that grammatical propositions are not either true or false in the sense of experiential propositions are. That only shows that grammatical propositions have the status of rules.

The grammatical proposition "Every rod has a length" can be explained as "For each thing X, if X is a rod, then X has a length" or "if you call anything 'rod' then you must say it has a length". This is a grammatical rule. "Having a length" is an

essential characteristic of those things which we call "rods". Grammar tells us that what we call a 'rod' cannot be without a length. Thus the rule-structure of the grammatical proposition is made clear by Wittgenstein. Calling them proposition does not deny their rule-status.

Moore, while explaining the rule-status of grammatical propositions, gives the example: "You donot say two men was working in the field." There are passages where Wittgenstein seems to conceive of grammatical rules in this way and to equate grammatical propositions with grammatical rules. In the Remarks on Foundation of Mathematics Wittgenstein asks: what sort of proposition is "The class of lions is not a lion, but the class of classes is a class"? (RFM, p.182). His answer to that is: it is a grammatical proposition used to call attention to the fact that the word 'lion' is used in a fundamentally different way from the word "class" (cf. RFM, p. 182). The following claim made in the Philosophical Investigation can be cited in favour of above claim:

"Every rod has a length" that means something like: we call something (or this) "The length of a rod" - but nothing "the length of a sphere" (PI, Sect.251).

This shows that grammatical propositions as rules have a binding character in concept-formation. These rules state that certain expressions are allowed or forbidden in a language. The grammatical proposition thus lays down the way in which words like "lion" and "class" in the above example are used.

Now the question arises whether the grammatical statement about the use of words makes any empirical claim. Debra Aidun says,

It makes an empirical claim about grammar, and is therefore contingently true or false. Grammatical propositions are necessary rather than contingent...their necessity results from their own use as rules of grammar.¹⁰

However, it is not obvious how the statement of a rule can be contingent at all. The rule and its statement are the same in Wittgenstein's sense. We have already seen that grammatical propositions function in the same manner as grammatical rules. As Aidun himself says, Grammatical propositions do not make any transparent claims about grammar. They exemplify or illustrate acceptable usage.¹¹ So the grammatical proposition "Every rod has a length" is true if the rule "we call something the length of a rod, but nothing the length of a sphere" is true.¹² Thus the rule and the proposition coincide in grammar. The application of the rule is vouchsafed for in the totality of grammar. If the proposition is the embodiment of the rule, the rule is its innermost essence.

The relationship between grammatical rules and grammatical propositions can be better understood within the game-model analysis of language. According to Aidun, the two senses of grammatical proposition adumbrated above may correspond to the internal and external¹³ aspects of the grammatical proposition. Rules define the moves in a language game: They define the

limits within which an expression is used in a language-game. The sense of the expression is strictly defined within the language-game. Thus rules are internal to the very possibility of the symbol having a place in the language-game. Thus when we take grammatical propositions as actual expressions of rules in language-games, we are taking the internal standpoint.¹⁴ The external standpoint consists in the statement of the rule as "in English we use the words ...". However, the external standpoint is a misnomer and it cannot be stated so. Aidun's claim about external standpoint is based on a misnomer.

Baker and Hacker¹⁶ have recently defended the internal standpoint as mentioned above according to which the grammatical propositions are themselves rules determining the norms of representation in language. Rules which involve a variety of linguistic conventions (including the criteria, paradigms and samples in language) are the norms of representations that set the bounds of sense or limits of empiricism. Baker and Hacker write,

What philosophers have called 'necessary truths' are, in Wittgenstein's view, typically rules of grammar, norms of representation, i.e. they fix concepts. They are expressions of internal relation between concepts which are themselves used in stating truths about the world.¹⁷

According to Baker and Hacker, what is remarkable about the grammatical propositions is their normativity and necessity in grammar. They are normative being the determinants of concept formation and necessary being the only constitutive conditions of

sense. To put in their words,

Necessary propositions do not describe the limits of what is possible, fencing us in from impossible possibilities. They are norms of representation constituting the bounds of sense, delimiting what it makes sense to say. They fence us in only from the void.¹⁸ (author's italics).

Grammatical propositions are necessary propositions which Wittgenstein tried to demarcate from the empirical propositions. Empirical propositions are defined as the description of facts whereas the necessary propositions are only the framework propositions constituting facts.¹⁹

3. Saying and Showing

The distinction between empirical and grammatical propositions is the distinction between saying and showing which survives from Wittgenstein's early philosophy (Cf. TLP, 6.12). The logical propositions show the logical form of language and the world according to the Tractatus. Likewise, the grammatical propositions, e.g. "Every rod has a length" shows what is the internal property of being a rod. This proposition states the essence of something being called a 'rod' and nothing else. Grammatical propositions do not, however, say anything. They are not descriptive propositions.²⁰ They constitute the facts rather than describe them.

An empirical proposition, on the other hand, says that something is the case; it asserts the existence of some fact and is true if the fact exists. Grammatical propositions show but do

not say that words may be combined in a certain way to yield meaningful sentences. The tautologies in logic represent a limiting case of propositions. They do not make assertions about the world. They say nothing, but by the very fact that they are true under all circumstances they show something about the grammatical or syntactical properties of language. Besides, they show the form of the world, that is, what the world must be in order to make sensible assertions in language at all. Thus, grammar, like logic, is the domain of what can be shown rather than said. The logical and the grammatical essence are one and the same. They are shown in the very use of language. Grammatical propositions, therefore, are not propositions proper, they are propositions by courtesy of if they are "taken right".²¹ They are concerning the syntax or the logical structure rather than how language is actually formed. Grammatical propositions are thus intended to show how words are used, i.e., the syntactic features of language. Wittgenstein both in his early and later philosophy holds that a grammatical proposition would show something about the semantic as well as syntactical properties of language. That is, it would reveal or mirror the logical structure of language.

In the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics he claims that mathematical propositions are a species of grammatical propositions which show how new conceptual connexions are laid down in mathematical proofs. These propositions set the limit of what one can say, i.e., what we can call a mathematical

operation. As Wittgenstein puts it, "What I want to say is: Mathematics as such is always a measure, not thing measured" (RFM, III, Sect.75). In the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein likewise claims that a grammatical proposition presents a picture or a model of reality rather a fact. For example, in the grammatical proposition "I know.... only from my own case" (PI, Sect.295). What is at issue is not a fact of experience but "a full-blown pictorial representation of our grammar. Not facts, but as it were illustrated turns the of speech". (ibid). It says nothing but shows something about the semantical rules of language. That is to say, the grammatical propositions show how the future application of an expression is anticipated in the rules of grammar. The possible moves in a language-games are laid within the rules of grammar. Grammar defines what is possible and what is impossible. Wittgenstein writes,

Compare "logically possible' with "chemically possible'. One might perhaps call a combination chemically possible if a formula with the right valencies existed (e.g. E - O - O - O - H). Of course, such a combination need not exist; but even the formula HO₂ cannot have less than no combination corresponding to it in reality (PI, Sect.521).

That grammar, like logic, only shows what are the important and essential truths regarding language-use is further corroborated Wittgenstein's insistence that logical/grammatical truths are shown or mirrored in the practice of language. Practice of language is the home of logic or grammar. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein puts it aptly as follows:

Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You roust look at the practice of language, then you will see it (OC, Sect.501)

What grammar shows cannot be said. This is to echo Tractatus 4.1212: "What can be shown, cannot be said". To say the unsayable is to commit oneself to nonsensical statements. Therefore, paradoxically, grammatical statements try to say what is to be shown. Debra Aidun puts it in the following words,

When we try to put into words what shows itself in the grammar of language, grammatical propositions result. These only show and do not say anything at all. They exemplify certain grammatical connections and point to these rather than to any empirical state of affairs. Nonsense results, when we regard these propositions as saying something, as expression of metaphysical truths, for example.²³

Grammatical truths, to be precise, are the epitomes of conceptual regularities in our language and the necessary correlates of what can be revealed in the operations of language. Logic or grammar is the essence of language.

4. Grammatical Propositions and Analytical Truths

Now the question arises: Are grammatical propositions analytic? Interpreters of Wittgenstein have generally compared grammatical propositions to analytical statements.²⁴ However, it has been argued by others that grammatical propositions cannot be analytic for the reason that they are neither true nor false.²⁵ E.K. Specht,²⁶ however, has argued that grammatical propositions can be compared with the synthetic apriori propositions.

Wittgenstein is not concerned with the analytic-synthetic distinction as such. This distinction is as old as Kant,²⁷ if not earlier and has a characteristic history of its own. As stated by Kant and accepted by the later philosophers, analytic propositions are those whose negation is a self-contradiction. For example, the proposition "All material bodies are extended" tells us an obvious truism since its predicate is already contained in the subject.²⁸ Thus analytic propositions are non-informative since they do not add any new knowledge. Synthetic propositions are, on the otherhand, informative statements in which the predicate adds to our knowledge of the subject. This distinction was accepted by the contemporary logicians since these fitted into the proposed class of logical propositions recognised by Frege²⁹ and Russell.³⁰ Wittgenstein introduced the tautologies as the logical propositions which are identical with analytic propositions (Cf. TLP, 6.11).

In view of Wittgenstein's preference for analytic statements as constituting the domain of logic, it is arguable that he considers the grammatical statements as analytic. There are two reasons why this is so: (1) analytic statements are logically necessary and so are the grammatical statements. Their opposites cannot be conceived, and (2) like analytic statements grammatical statements do not say anything empirical; they are factually empty. Thus grammatical statements e.g. "The colours green and blue cannot be in the same place simultaneously (BBS, p.56) make no factual claim about language and experience and so their

status is marked off from the empirical statements like "This flower is blue". As Hacker writes, "None of these sentences have a recognizable canonical -form of a rule-sentence. However, their truth does not depend upon the facts in the world, but upon linguistic convention."³¹ Like analytic statements the grammatical propositions are of the form of conventions that necessarily regulate the use of language. Conventions are syntactic laws that determine use of grammatically intelligible sentences. For example, "All bachelors are unmarried" does not speak of marriage or social customs, but only of what can definitionally be called a 'bachelor'. This points to the fact that analytic statements are of the form of rules. Wittgenstein has recognized the rule-status of analytic propositions. Given the background it is not surprising that grammatical propositions include analytical statements as well. However, there is no direct definitional identification of grammatical statements with analytic truths. Baker and Hacker write,

Wittgenstein's conception of a proposition of grammar does not mesh with the standard notion of an analytic truth. He did not argue that every proposition of grammar is a type - sentence which is either (an instance of) a law of logic or reducible to a law of logic by the substitution of the definitions for certain expressions. The analytic synthetic distinction is* framed in terms of the forms and constituents ,of type-sentences whereas whether an utterance expresses a grammatical proposition depends not only on its form, but on its roles on occasions of utterance.³²

The collapse of analytic - synthetic distinction in the hands of Quine³³ does not affect Wittgenstein's grammatical - empirical distinction since the later distinction does not derive

from the former. Analytic - synthetic distinction in its modern form has its origin in the language experience³⁹ divide introduced by the positivists according to Quine. This divide is an unfortunate aberration because of the holistic character of the system of language and the attendant conceptual scheme. Quine's main argument is that language cannot simply entertain two disparate groups of truth such as analytic truths dependent on language and synthetic truths dependent on experience. In our holistic framework Quine holds, all truths belong to one system: the analytic truths are core-truths and synthetic ones are peripheral ones. Thus Quine's scepticism regarding analyticity is based on a fair acceptance of holism. Wittgenstein would have welcomed Quine's holistic view of language if it is presented as a foundational concept rather than as a conceptual construct. So he would have welcomed the idea that analytical truths are not removed from the use of language. For him they are the grammatical statements that regulate use of language. Hence, the grammatical - empirical distinction³⁶ is based purely on grammatical considerations and not on language-experience dichotomy.

5. A Priori and A Posteriori

Wittgenstein claims that the propositions of grammar bring out the objective criteria of language-use and thus lay down conventions as conditions of concept-formation and of constitution of experience (RFM, III, Sect.30). Our grammar may

be said to have immanent conceptual moulds in the form of grammatical propositions which provide conditions for making experience possible.

The grammatical propositions, which include propositions of logic and mathematics, state rules of language. So the grammatical propositions expresses the necessary conditions of experience. For, example, the grammatical propositions like "Every rod has a length" and "Every body has extension" are such as express necessary rules for the use of the concepts like 'rod' and 'body' respectively, and of the language-games in which they occur. These propositions present a grammatical picture which conditions the intelligible context of a language-game. Therefore, we can claim that these propositions are apriori. They are apriori precisely because they cannot be derived from experience. They, in fact, constitute experience. Wittgenstein says,

'But the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only shew, say, what is called "the length of a rod". And what should the opposite picture be? (Remark about the negation of an apriori proposition) (PI. Sect.251).

All apriori propositions, as we know, are independent of our empirical experience. These propositions, according to Wittgenstein, lay down necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. They have a different role in language, which is quite different from that of empirical propositions. Empirical propositions express matters of fact whereas the former express

the conditions of the possibilities of these matters of fact. The grammatical propositions determine the ways of our looking at things i.e. our forms of representation. Thus they are the apriori criteria of intelligibility of our language. As Hurbert Schwyzer writes:

"A grammatical proposition is an encapsulation of what can count as a move in the language game, a frozen record of what it makes sense to say³⁷.

That is to say, grammatical propositions show the conditions of language-game. Language-games are our basic form of our experiencing the world; since they themselves are conditioned by grammatical propositions, our thought and experience of the world must conform to the conditions laid down by grammatical propositions. A world not conforming to the apriori grammatical propositions is unintelligible according to Wittgenstein. Thus, Wittgenstein integrates the notion of apriori into the concept of 'grammatical' and paves the way for founding the epistemic notion of apriori in the wider network of grammatical relations.

The grammatical propositions appear to be metalinguistic in the sense that, as Herbert Schwyzer³⁸ points out, that they are not themselves language-games nor are they moves in the language-games. They are on a different level altogether. They are (a) universal being the apriori grounds of language-games in general (b) necessary as the indispensable conditions of particular moves in language-games. Thus grammatical propositions share what Kant³⁹ call the constitutive conditions of all experience.

Experience as well as objects of experience are constituted in the language-games. But it is grammatical propositions which provide the necessary principles of their constitution i.e. their necessary internal features. E.K. Specht has put it in the following way:

"Now, the apriori propositions express those properties of an object which necessarily belong to it on the basis of the linguistic rules for its name: its truth value thus depends on the way in which we have gathered objects together and on the linguistic rules that are consequently fixed.⁴⁰

Thus grammatical propositions constitute the essential features of all that we can experience, i.e., the apriori conditions of all that is possible in the objective world of experience. That is to say, grammar is the domain of all that is essential in the domain of experience. It is the home of the apriori. The aposteriori truths fall outside the domain of grammar.

6. Are Grammatical Propositions are Synthetic Apriori?

Now the question arises whether we can characterize grammatical proposition as synthetic apriori. According to Kant, there are synthetic apriori propositions which are transcendently indispensable for the possibility of experience. Synthetic apriori propositions are the principles which contain the necessary grounds of the possibility of experience. Synthetic apriori propositions are so called as they not only and to our knowledge but also are apriori. Kant writes.

Principles apriori are so named not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of our judgement, but also because they are not themselves grounded in higher and more universal models of knowledge ... such principles lie at the foundations of all knowledge of objects.⁴¹

The synthetic apriori propositions are universal and necessary. They are the general conditions of experience e.g. the principle of causality. Besides, they are necessary conditions experience e.g. $2 + 2 = 4$. The principles of both mathematics and physics,⁴² according to Kant, are synthetic apriori in nature and are the foundations of our experience/knowledge of the world.

Wittgenstein's grammatical propositions are synthetic apriori in the above sense. Like Kantian synthetic apriori judgements grammatical propositions also provide universal and necessary conditions of experience. Both kinds of propositions are identical in content, though not in form. Synthetic apriori propositions are grammatical in that they tell us how to understand our world. They are the essential conditions of our account of the world. However, Wittgenstein entertains no transcendental justification for the synthetic apriori proposition. For him grammatical propositions only show what the world must be like, whereas Kant's synthetic apriori propositions say that world has a particular structure. Secondly, while Kant was concerned with the investigation of the apriori forms of pure reason, Wittgenstein was concerned only with the grammar of ordinary language. Wittgenstein's grammatical propositions can

be said to provide transcendental grounds of the possibility of experience, even though there is no transcendental deduction of such proposition. Grammar is transcendental⁴³ in the sense it reveals the essences of language and thought. Wittgenstein derives necessity from grammar rather than from the supposed transcendental structure of the thinking mind. He does not recognize such a mind. He continues to believe that a thinking subject is illusory. In the absence of thinking and judging mind', (TLP. 5.631) there is no room left for a Kantian transcendental deduction of the synthetic a priori propositions. In Wittgenstein's scheme all synthetic a priori propositions are grammatical in that they have locus only in grammar, i.e., the necessary structure of language.

Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution consists in situating the synthetic a priori propositions in grammar, since the domain of consciousness is abolished as a metaphysical illusion. Grammar takes the place of transcendental domain and the categories are subsumed into the rules of the concept formation. Consciousness is nothing but our linguistic awareness of rule-following. Synthetic a priori propositions and grammatical rules become identical.⁴⁴

7. Necessity and Contingency

Wittgenstein addresses himself to the problem of necessity as one of the basic issue in logic and grammar. Necessary truths for Wittgenstein are heterogenous. There are differences among

necessary truths. Tautologies and contradictions are the necessary truths in logic. The propositions of arithmetic which are necessary are different from tautologies. In the Tractatus, mathematical propositions are equations, not tautologies (TLP, 6.2). Thus Wittgenstein is willing to admit a variety of necessary propositions. What he is interested in is the location of necessary propositions. He believed that necessary propositions have a unique status in language. They are what he often called the rules or the laws rather than propositions proper. The necessity -contingency distinction is, for Wittgenstein, something inviolable.

To clarify the distinction between necessary and contingent proposition in an illuminating way we must focus upon the differences in their use (PI, Sect.421). The difference is often obscured. What is necessary is determined by its position in a language-game and not by its appearance. For example, the proposition "This is called 'red'" may not appear as necessary propositions. But as an extensive definition. It can be called a necessary proposition.⁴⁵ A contingent proposition, on the other hand, is a factual statement, that is, a statement that is used to state something that is the case e.g. "This flower is red". Here the statement is a statement of a fact and not of a rule. The fact-rule distinction is underlying the necessity-contingency distinction.

As a result, Wittgenstein's segregation of grammatical from

empirical propositions diverges from the traditional demarcation of necessary from contingent propositions. First, traditionally necessary propositions are taken as necessarily true or necessarily false. But Wittgenstein rejects the notion of necessary truths by denying that there is a discoverable domain of necessary truths. Logic as well as grammar has no subject-matter (TLP 6.124). The so called necessary truths are rules or laws according to Wittgenstein. Secondly, traditionally the necessary propositions are a priori. That is, they are independent of experience. Wittgenstein rejects the epistemic apriority as a criterion of necessity. Necessary propositions are grammatical and so are constitutive of experience. Hence a priori propositions lose preeminently. If the propositions of grammar could be equated with necessary propositions, Wittgenstein's position could be that the terms 'empirical' and 'contingent' are co-extensive. One might even claim that he assumed that there can be no necessary empirical truths. Such claims are misleading formulations of his ideas. There was a strong tradition prior to Kant that necessary truths might be discovered in experience. This is prominent in Locke's discussion of real essences, and Kant's idea of synthetic a priori judgements. This idea is certainly one for which Wittgenstein had no sympathy, at least in the Tractatus. where he claimed that all necessity is logical necessity (TLP. 6.3751).

The distinction between necessary and contingent proposition is drawn by reference to the roles of such propositions in our

language. The idea that there might be necessary empirical propositions is consistent with this requirement.⁴⁷ The dichotomy between necessary (grammatical) and contingent (empirical) depends upon what they do in language rather than how they are formulated. They may play related roles in giving descriptions, in forming explanation, and in making conceptual connection. So the dichotomy cannot be an uncompromising one. Both necessary (grammatical) and contingent (empirical) belong to the language game. They have the same locus i.e. language but have diverse roles. Depending upon the role, they are identified as necessary or contingent. In On Certainty, Sect.96,97) Wittgenstein has characterized this dichotomy in more reconciliatory terms. For example, he brings in the river-bed analogy to show that necessary propositions are like the bed of the river wherein the experience flows. So, the experiential propositions are shifting and contingent. But it is not ruled out that what is shifting now may become a hardened rock deposited in the river-bed. An empirical proposition because of its role may appear in a grammatical proposition. The following is what Wittgenstein writes,

But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: The same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another time as a rule of testing (OC, Sect.98).

However, Wittgenstein has identified necessary truths with rules of grammar. Thereby he has maintained the dichotomy even in its subdued form. If there were necessarily empirical

propositions they would have to be like rules of grammar. But such rule-like empirical propositions are inconceivable. If a proposition like "The Earth had existed for million of years" is grammatical (OC, Sect. 84), it is so because it has left its empirical role and has assumed the status of a grammatical rule. Necessity accrues to it as a rule. Necessary truths are in Wittgensteinian view typically rules of grammar or norms of representation. They fix concepts and their internal relations. Necessary propositions i.e. grammatical propositions are no more descriptions, either of the world or of a super-empirical reality.⁴⁸ Thus it is essential that Wittgenstein should maintain the grammatical (necessary) and empirical (contingent) distinction.

8. Conventionalism

It may be interpreted that grammatical propositions are only human conventions which act as necessary rules within a particular linguistic context. So, they do not express transcendental necessities. Conventionalism accepts the rules of language as facts of human convention which are the results of arbitrary human usage and practice. Grammatical propositions, thus construed, never lay down any necessary truth about forms of language and thought. But Wittgenstein opposes any such interpretation when he says our grammatical principles are anchored in our very forms of life.⁵⁰ He thereby means that the grammatical propositions represent not only the limits of any

possible language but also limits⁵¹ of our form of our life and thought. So, it can be concluded that grammatical propositions represent the transcendental limits of our thought and experience of the world.

Thus Wittgenstein's theory of grammatical propositions cuts the ground off conventionalism by suggesting that grammatical rules, though conventional appearance are genuine necessary truths. What is necessary about them is their role in language and their rule-status. For example, the mathematical rule $2 + 2 = 4$ is stating a norm rather than describing a supesensible reality. Hence, its necessity in its appearance as a linguistic convention.

Even from a linguistic standpoint, Wittgenstein rejects the naively empiricist/positivist approach to language and experience. He believes that our language represents a systematic framework which we hardly ever be able to discard at our own will. This belongs to the foundation of our thought and experience, i.e., "it forms the basis of action and therefore, naturally, of thought" (PC, Sect.411). Wittgenstein again writes,

So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschawing.' (OC, Sect.422).

This world-view which is basic to our general experience is something which is implicit in our language. Conventionalism has

to reckon with this basic fact about our language. As Wittgenstein has said repeatedly, what belongs to the basis of all conventions is not itself conventional. It is not conventional that we have rules in our language. It is a necessary truth about language.

9. Grammatical Certainty

Several passages in Wittgenstein's later writings suggest that Wittgenstein views certainty which characterises grammatical propositions as a direct consequence of their use as rules in language. In the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Wittgenstein claims that "to accept a proposition as a unshakeably certain - I want to say - means to use it as a rule. This removes uncertainty from it" (RFM, p.81). Wittgenstein is speaking specifically of mathematical propositions in this passage; however, mathematical propositions are a species of grammatical proposition and what is asserted of mathematical propositions can be claimed of grammatical propositions in general. Thus the "unshakeable certainty" of grammatical propositions, i.e., the fact that we "cannot imagine the opposite" (PI, 251) of what these propositions express, is a result of their use as grammatical rules. Thus the certainty of a grammatical proposition is the certainty pertaining to the language-game itself. Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations; "The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game" (p.224).

This shows that all certainty is grammatical certainty. Certainty does not depend on objective certainty. It is purely objective certainty pertaining to language alone.

In On Certainty Wittgenstein explores the roots of grammatical certainty. He brings out those propositions which play the role of norms or descriptions of rules of all representations. These propositions have the certainty which can be called grammatical certainty. Necessity and certainty become identical since both are derived from grammar. For example, the propositions "The Earth has existed for millions of years" and "I have two hands" are no more descriptive propositions but are the framework propositions that are presupposed by our so called descriptions. These propositions are the hinges or the bedrock on which our language-games are based (PC, Sect.498) The OC_-model of grammatical certainty replaces the epistemic model of certainty.⁵²

10. Logic, Mathematics and Grammar

Mathematical propositions, as earlier said, are given grammatical status by Wittgenstein. According to him, mathematics, like logic, is a technique of demonstrating the conceptual necessities in our language. Both logic and mathematics are found in language. They are grammatical in nature.

Wittgenstein says, that mathematics has no foundations. It

needs no foundations either. He writes,

"What does mathematics need a foundationa for? It no more needs one, I believe, than propositions about physical objects -, or about sense - impressions, need an analysis. What mathematical propositions do stand in need of is a clarification of their grammar, just as do those other propositions (RFM, V, Sect.13).

The foundation of mathematics are grounded in our language. It is incorrect to say that logic provides the foundation of mathematics. As Wittgenstein says,

"Or : logic as the foundation of all mathematics does not work, and to shew this it is enough that the cogency of logical proof stands or and falls with its geometrical cogency. (RFM. 11, Sect.43).

Wittgenstein claims that there is no metamathematics i.e. there is no mathematics to describe mathematics. Mathematics has no realm of truths of its own which demands justification. Mathematics is a calculus. Wittgenstein writes,

Since mathematics is a calculus and hence is not really about anything, there is not any metamathematics. (PG, Sect.290).

This is a reaffarimation of his early view that mathematics is a method of proof rather than a science containing its own truths. This is clear from the following passage.

I should like to say: mathematics is a MOTLEY of techniques of proof. - And upon this is based its manifold applicability and its importance (RFM, III, Sect.46).

Thus mathematics is a procedure of calculation i.e., a form of

activity which derives its significance from its application in our language. Therefore, Wittgenstein claims that the mathematician is an inventor and not a discoverer (cf.RFM, I, 169).

Mathematics is a formal system with its propositions as grammatical rules. The mathematical propositions are of the nature of syntax. They express rules of grammar. For, according to Wittgenstein, "to accept a proposition as unshakeably certain —means to use it as a grammatical rule ... (RFM. III, Sect.99). He also writes,

Let us remember that in mathematics we are convinced of grammatical propositions; so the expression, the result, of our being convinced is that we accept a rule (RFM, III, Sect.26).

Thus mathematical propositions stand as paradigms in our language and function as grammatical rules. A mathematical proposition has a two fold character as "law" and "rule" (RFM, III, Sect,21) i.e. it not only works a rule but is also law. It is self-contained and autonomous like any grammatical rule containing its own truth and falsity within itself (PR, Sect, 122). Such a proposition is recognisable in itself, i.e. provide an 'insight' (PR, Sect.174) into itself. It is self-evident.

Wittgenstein agrees with Kant on the fact that mathematical propositions are synthetic apriori. For Kant those propositions are synthetic as well as apriori being based on intuitions which are themselves apriori. For Wittgenstein, mathematical

propositions, being one kind of grammatical propositions, are synthetic a priori because they are based on rules of grammar, which are themselves a priori and necessary. He has always opposed the view that mathematics consists of tautologies or analytic truths. In the Tractatus he had characterised mathematical propositions as equations and not as tautologies. Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Remarks writes,

I said earlier about the nature of arithmetical equations and about an equation's not being replaceable by a tautology explains - I believe - what Kant means when he insists that $7 + 5 = 12$ is not an analytic proposition, but synthetic a priori (PR, Sect. 10).

Wittgenstein answers that the mathematical propositions are necessary because we cannot but accept them i.e. we cannot think without them, if we are to speak and think meaningfully at all. For example, the forms of inferring and calculating which we have are inexorable for human beings. Wittgenstein writes,

--- thinking and inferring (like counting) is of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but by natural limits corresponding to the body of what can be called the role of thinking and inferring in our life. (RFM, I, Sect. 116).

Wittgenstein believes that the necessity of the mathematical proposition is founded in us i.e. in our forms of life and not in anything else, because ultimately "it is we that are inexorable in applying these laws" (RFM, I, 118). For us, they draw the limits of our thinking in 'general i.e. they determine what is thinkable at all. The mathematical 'must' in this sense,

demonstrates the necessary limits of our thinking. It is not, however, due to a grammatical decision that we accept mathematical propositions as necessary but because they represent the limits of what we think.⁵⁴

11. Anti-realism

Now the question arises: is Wittgenstein a realist or anti-realist. So far as the notion of grammatical truth is concerned, the most dominant view espoused by Dummett⁵⁵ and Wright,⁵⁶ is that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist. The central thesis of anti-realism is that no truth whatsoever is verification - independent.^{*} Truth is given to the cognizing mind as something constructed. As Wright has made clear, mathematical truths are, for Wittgenstein, creations of the mathematical mind rather than are like super-sensible facts. Mathematics is not a domain of mathematical facts.⁵⁷

For an anti-realist, there are two central claims to make:

- a) Truth is sensitive to the cognizing mind.
- b) The meaning of the propositions is given not in the truth-conditional mechanism, but in the way the propositions are used. So meaning is a verifiable component of all propositions.

Whereas thesis (a) has a far reaching semantical consequence namely that, it rejects correspondence theory of truth, (b) rules out the possibility of a semantics based on truth. Both thesis

are against realism.

Our present concern is not whether anti-realism is true or false. The question is whether it is plausible. Its plausibility follows from the fact that the Wittgensteinian rules are the necessary ways in which we can think. In that sense, they are not Platonic realities. They serve as transcendental limits of thought rather than objects of thought. Thus anti-realism gains plausibility vis-a-vis the Platonist interpretation of mathematics and logic.⁵⁸

12. Conclusion

Wittgenstein recognises grammar as the domain of truths that show themselves. They are truths because they are internal to our ways of thinking and using language. Hence they could not be relegated to the domain of reality. Rather, they manifest themselves in activity, i.e., language-games and forms of life. Grammatical propositions as rules are the ever present limits of our meaningful language use. Hence their dispensability. But that is shown, not said.

NOTES

1. See Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics ed. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1956; revised edn. 1978) VII, Sect.21, (To be abbreviated as RMF). He writes, "The limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct; they are ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act" (RMF, VII, Sect.21).
2. F.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Clarendon press, Oxford, 1972), p.154.
3. The concept of grammatical necessity is a widely used concept in Wittgenstein's later works. According to this doctrine, the distinction between mathematical (logical) necessity and grammatical necessity is dissolved. See PI. II, p.224.
4. See Debra Aidun, "Wittgenstein on Grammatical Propositions" in Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments. Vol.11, ed. S. Sanker (Croom Helm, London, 1986), p.143.
5. The word 'rule' has a wider meaning in Wittgenstein's writings. Rules are not merely those which are stated as directions or commands. They can be merely conventions or practices which are given a unique status in language. See PI Sects. 181-242. and RFM. VII, Sect.47-60.
6. G.E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933" in Classics of Analytic Philosophy ed. R. Annneran (Tata Graw-Hill Publishing Company, Bombay-New Delhi, 1965).

7. See Debra Aidun, "Wittgenstein on Grammatical Propositions" p.143.
8. Ibid.
9. G.E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933", pp.244-246.
10. Aidun, p.146.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p.147.
15. Ibid.
16. See G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein; Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985) pp.263-272.
17. Ibid., p.269.
18. Ibid., p.271.
19. For a detailed discussion on the fact-norm distinction, see Backer, Insight and Illusion, pp.166-177.
20. Cf. Finch, Wittgenstein - Later Philosophy : An exposition of 'Philosophical investigation' (Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1977), pp.150-152.
21. Cf. Debra, Aidun, p.148.
22. Cf. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p.148.
24. P.M.S. Backer is one of those who take grammatical propositions as analytic. See Insight and Illusion Chapter VI. See also Newton Garver "Analyticity and Grammar", The

- Monist, 51 (1967) p.423.
25. See Aidun, pp.148-149.
 26. E.K. Specht, The Foundations of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, trans. D.E.Walford (Barnes and Noble, Inc., New York, 1969), note 11, p.149.
 27. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. N.K. Smith. (MacMillian, London, 1929; repinted 1970).
 28. Ibid.
 29. See Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1950, Second edn. 1953).
 30. See Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
 31. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p.154.
 32. Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity, p.
 33. See W.V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, Second edn., 1980).
 34. Ibid.
 35. Ibid.
 36. For a detailed discussion on empirical - grammatical distinction see Philip P. Bailie "Wittgenstein's Grammatical - Empirical Distinction", The Journal of Philosophy. Vol.LX, No.20 (1963), pp.564-578.
 37. Hubert Schwyzer, "Thought and Reality : The Metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein", in Ludwig Wittgenstein :_ Critical Assessment Vol.11, (Croom Helm, London, 1986), p.156.
 38. Ibid.

39. Schwyzer has very shown the simlairyty between Rant's and Wittgenstein's approaches to apriori propositions which are not analytic. See Schwyzer. For further discussion See R.C. Pradhan, Language and Experience (Anu Prakashan, Meerut, 1981).
40. E.K. Specht, P.155. Quoted in R.C. Pradhan Language and Experience, p.211.
41. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.188.
42. Ibid.
43. See Stanley Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgestein's Later Philosophy", in Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. Pitcher (Macmillan, London, 1966).
44. See PR. Sect.108.
45. See Backer and Hacker, Wittgenstein; Rules. Grammar and Necessity.
46. Wittgenstein would have endorsed Kripke's distinction between epistemic necessity and metaphysical necessity but would have rejected the independence of epistemic necessity as a viable category. Besides, for Wittgenstein, the so-called metaphysical necessity is ultimately grammatical. See Kripke, "Naming and necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, eds. Davidson and Barman (D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland, 1972).
47. See Bailie, "The Grammatical-Empirical Distinction" The Journl of Philosophy.

48. For further discussion on grammar and necessity see Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity.
49. See Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", in Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. Pitcher (MacMillan, London, 1966), p.420-447.
50. See Barry Stroud, "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity", in Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations ed. Pitcher, pp.477-496.
51. For further discussion See R.C. Pradhan, Language and Experience, Ch.IV.
52. Wittgenstein rejects Moore's analysis of certainty as fallacious for the reason that Moore attempts to provide an epistemological justification for certainty. Wittgenstein's grammatical model of certainty shows that "I know" way of grouping statements is out of place and grammatically fruitless. See OC, Sects.3-10.
53. See D.S. Shwayder, "Wittgenstein on Mathematics", in Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein ed. Peter Winch (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969).
54. See Stroud, pp.477-496
55. Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", pp.420-47
56. C. Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (Duckworth, London, 1960).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. See also Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity.

CHAPTER - IV

RULES AND RULE - FOLLOWING

The availability of rules in language explains the possibility of grammar. As one can see, logical syntax is possible because rules demand a perspicuous representation. Similarly, in the context of language-game, the syntax of language-game is possible so far as the language-game is rule-bounded. In that sense, grammar, providing a syntax, assumes the role of "an account book of language" (PG, Sect.44) which shows the actual transaction of language. Grammar therefore is a rule-book representing its rules in a systematic manner. It consists of conventions (PG, Sect.138) which determine what is sense and what is non-sense in a language.

The primary concern of Wittgenstein's grammar, however, is not to raise an account book of language in an empirical manner but to examine the conditions for the possibility of grammar itself. Therefore, Wittgenstein addresses himself to the foundations of normativity or grammaticality which consists in the availability of rules.

1. Rules in Grammar

Now assuming that language is constituted through rules two main questions arise.

- i. How are grammatical rules constituted?
- ii. What is the foundation of rule-following?

The first question relates to the central theme of the concept of language-game; the second one relates to the significance which rule-following has in language-use. Both are, however, inter-connected.

The grammatical rules are manifested in the language game. They define the possible moves in a language-game and therefore, set the limits of our thought and experience. They set the limits of empiricism (RFM, III, Sect.71; IV, Sect.2,3,4,5). Rules are like channels through which we are permitted to move; they are like rails on which our language moves. (Z, Sect.371). In that sense, the rule-book, that is, the grammar is "for us a pure calculus (not the application of a calculus to reality" (PG, Appendix, 15, p.315). Thus grammar can still retain its purity or rigour without losing its foothold in the reality of natural language. All the while, it is assumed that the grammar we are talking about is the grammar of natural languages, that is, languages considered as natural phenomena, not as merely a formal system.

How are rules to be constituted then? For Wittgenstein rules have their home in language. Rules only matter in language and not anywhere else. Rules abstracted from language do not mean anything at all. In that sense there is no grammar unless it is located in the ongoing business of language. That is to

say, rules emerge only when the question of correctness of use of language arises. Rules, as I have already indicated in Chapter III, are like rules or laws. They are rules of use, or the laws of correct application. They come into being as soon as a language-game comes into being.

Rules govern language-games and the possibility of language' games presupposes the possibility of the rules. That is, according to Wittgenstein, our uses of language can broadly be called rule-bound. We follow rules since we use language, i.e. play a language-game. The basic problem that arises is: could language use be possible without rules and rule-following? This issue suggests well for philosophical discussion on this concept of "rule" and "rule following".

Now the problem is: where do rules emerge? For Wittgenstein, language resembles a game (Spiel) as both have employment of rules and thus are rule-governed (PG, I, Sect.26). Basically, we get a clear idea about rules in games e.g. chess-game, ball game etc. The chess-game is played in accordance with certain rules. Rules define the possible ways of moving the pieces on the chess board. In this sense, rules are important and essential (PI. Sect.567). It is true that without players and chess board, the game cannot be played. On the contrary, without rules both players and chess-board have no function. No sense can be given to a game merely having certain players and the required apparatus of the game. The basic requirement is to do something with the apparatus, that is, to move pieces in

certain ways which lead to a particular end, for 'the game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point' (PI, Sect.564). The game is to be played and to play is to achieve some goal. That is to say, the players have to obey certain rules which they engage in the game. Thus rules make a game possible.

Rules do emerge in language too. Rules of language, for Wittgenstein, constitute its syntax, its grammar. Grammar describes the ways in which words can be used. According to Wittgenstein, rules of language are not fixed and given once for all. In the use of words and expressions in the proper human context, that is, in the stream of life, rules come into being and become known (PG, I, Sect.26). For example, we use colour words such as "red" blue, "green", etc. and recognize samples in a colour-chart because they are based on certain established conventions, e.g. "Standard sepia" or "paradigms" (PI, Sect.50-53). A rule is a paradigm.

Wittgenstein's main contention is that rules presuppose language-game and vice-versa. The question of priority¹ of one over the other does not arise, since there is no sense in calling rules pre-linguistic. Rules are linguistic par excellence. So, language is rule-bound. In this context, it is bound to follow that rules are always followed in the use of language. Rule-following is a sine qua non of there being rules at all. This satisfies the requirement that rules are grammatically accessible

to the language users. (I shall discuss this in more details in a later section of this chapter).

2. The Paradox

Recently Saul Kripke² has raised the issue that sceptical paradox underlies the Wittgenstenian conception of rule-following. Wittgenstein himself hints at the paradox in the following passage:

This was our paradox: No course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule (PI, Sect, 201).

Kripke thinks that this can undermine the so called foundations of rule-following and language use on two grounds: (i) In rule-following any rule could be followed since there is no objective ground of knowing what is the correct rule to be followed; (ii) The sceptical solution of the paradox commits us a communitarian view of language and rules which reduces rules to agreed social practices.

According to Kripke, one's previous knowledge of the application of a rule gives no guarantee that he will apply the same rule in future. This is called the sceptical problem. One's past history and external behaviour cannot tell us whether one is following the same rule or some other rule. Let us take as an example, the continuation of an arithmetical series such as "1002, 1004, 1006, 1008, _____". Here one follows the rule '+2'. For the sceptic, however, there is room for doubt as to whether

one is following the same rule at different stages of the continuation of the series. He raises the following questions:

- a) How do we know that one is following the particular rule '+2'?
- b) How do we know that our way of understanding the rule is correct?
- c) What is for an action e.g. continuation of a series, counting, calculating to be in accord with a rule?

According to the sceptic, there is nothing in any instruction given to one which justifies him to write 1002, 1004, 1006, 1008 —, rather than "1004, 1008, ..." Equally nothing in one's mind constitutes the fact of his meaning to go on in this way rather than in any other way. Kripke³ raises the following questions on rule-following?

- 1) Suppose God looks into our mind at some such moment when we are following a rule. What fact would God observe in our mind?
- 2) What happens in our mind that was our meaning 'addition' (plus) rather than "quaddition (quus) or some other function by +?
- 3) What is the mental state at the moment in the past which makes it correct for us to cite "125" rather than "5" as the value of '57 +68'?

Kripke believes that no definite answer can be given to

these questions, and that there is a sceptical paradox underlying all the supposed answers. The paradox is: no answer as to why "'57+68' is 125" rather than '5' can be given by an act of 'meaning' addition '+' because any answer can be made out. to accord with the act i.e. addition function. It leads to scepticism about our being able to know whether we are following a rule in accord with what we meant by the rule. As a result, we are not certain about what rule we appear to follow. Any rule appears to be alright as any other rule. This is the crux of the paradox Kripke⁴ extends the same to all aspects of language use and rule-following and concludes that there can be no such thing as meaning by an expression. Every new use of a word is a leap in the dark.

Though the sceptical problem has wide ramifications and implications, fundamentally it involves two questions such as (i) what is the fact that constitutes the meaning of plus by '+'? (ii) what is the fact that forces me to follow a particular rule in a new instance?

Kripke's sceptical question demands that there should be a definite answer to these questions, so that rule-following is founded on solid grounds. The fact that is being demanded is that which necessitates to follow the sane rule in new circumstances. According to Kripke, this fact does not consist in dispositions which the rule-follower may acquire in course of his rule-following practices. According to him, no one is disposed to give correct answers to the questions. Most of us

are disposed to give mistaken answers to some questions. The dispositions are causal happenings and not normative principles. So, they cannot determine whether a rule-following is correct or incorrect. Kripke therefore concludes that the standard answer to the sceptic's doubt in terms of dispositions⁵ is out of reckoning because it does not supply the normative fact that the sceptic demands.

Kripke argues that a dispositional account confuses the factual question i.e., "what answer would be given?" with a normative one, i.e., "what answer should one give?" The factual questions do not concern the normative conditions of rule-following. To describe under what factual conditions a man follows a rule is not to tell why he does so. The latter is the main problem of philosophy of rule-following whereas the former belongs to descriptive psychology. We do not want to say that "whatever is going to seem right to me is right" (PI, Sect.258). For Wittgenstein the relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. Accordingly the rules of language are communal norms for how one should go on rather than a mere description of communal dispositions. For example, when as rule-followers we intend to write 125 as the result of '58+67' rather than '5', it is not the case that we are naturally disposed to do so, rather we are taught to follow the rule of addition that way. The normative aspect is revealed to us in the "must" of the rule of addition. Kripke's account thus allows for there to be a difference between what one does in following a

rule as opposed to what one should do. This enables us to distinguish between thinking we are following a rule and actually doing so. The former occurs when one intends to follow a rule and the latter is confirmed when one's rule following activities conform to the standard or norm already set in the language concerned.

Kripke considers the suggestion that meaning "addition" by '+' and not 'quaddition' should be analysed by appeal to some special introspectible experience. That is the proposal to justify rule-following by the internal evidences. Wittgenstein himself repeatedly discussed this issue in PI, Sect, 152-155, and 167-177 in order to show that the so called internal evidences themselves need outward criteria and cannot be taken as evidences for rule-following as such. Kripke endorses Wittgenstein's anti-introspectionist argument and shows that rule-following is not given as an act of consciousness nor as revealed to us in a flash of introspection.⁶

Finally, Kripke discusses and rejects the Platonist suggestion that rules are laid down in a non-physical and non-psychological domain of reality. For a Platonist rule-following is derived from the fact of rules being eternally and infinitely contained in the metaphysical domain of possibilities. A realist therefore presupposes that a rule is potentially followed by a person in an infinite logical space, so that each particular instance follows from it as a matter of necessity. Wittgenstein

has rejected this conception of rule-following as a picture of rule-following containing all the possibilities before the instances take place. (Cf. *PI*, Sects, 193, 194).

Kripke thus concludes that scepticism about following a rule virtually leads to the fact that language-use as a rule-governed activity is impossible. According to him, there are no facts⁷ (or substantial contents) with which meaning a certain word in a certain way can be identified. So, one cannot know that in the current application of a rule one is following the same addition rule. The application of rule, for Kripke, is an unjustified stab in the dark.⁸

3. The Sceptic Solution

Kripke characterizes the solution of the paradox as the sceptical solution because it admits the validity of the sceptical premise regarding rule-following. It admits that there are no facts of the matter that determine our rule-following and that we could follow any rule in any manner we like. Thus Kripke admits that there is no such thing as using a word in accord with a rule and no such thing as meaning something by a word. This sort of scepticism, however, is a theoretical one without affecting the practical business of our language-use. In a manner reminiscent of Hume,⁹ Kripke's Wittgenstein offers a practical solution of the paradox. The paradoxical conclusion that we follow no rule is restrained by our practical rule-following considerations. It is a social fact that we follow

rules successfully and that too with a greater degree of consensus. That is a standing guarantee that we follow rules in a linguistic community. To follow a rule is a matter of a social consensus which is quite advantageously exploited to safeguard the practical rule-following.

As Wittgenstein remarked in the Tractatus 6.51, scepticism is not irrefutable though it is meaningless. Ultimately universal doubt regarding rule-following can be refuted as of no practical concern, since it leads to the impossibility of rule-following. Doubt is possible if there is certainty. Without presuppositions of certainty, even doubt becomes meaningless (OC, Sect., 115). Wittgenstein, Kripke believes, has not despaired of the practice of rule-following at all though he is unable to provide any justification at all. Hume has in a similar vain said:

We may ask, what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But it is vain to ask, whether there can be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasoning.¹⁰

Wittgenstein, Kripke says, could say the same about rule-following. The fact remains that we all follow rules but without theoretical or rational justification.

Kripke makes a distinction between a sceptical solution and 'straight solution'.¹¹ According to him, a sceptical solution is a solution to a sceptical problem. It does not solve the problem, but avoids it. The sceptical conclusion is avoided. It

is thus a solution that admits the cogency of the sceptic argument but denies that this invalidates the beliefs which the sceptic has set out to demolish. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein's solution is a sceptical solution because he offers a solution where the sceptical counter-arguments still remain irrefutable. The sceptic's conclusions are not invalid but are ineffectual. Let us illustrate this in the following way. For example, in mathematical calculation one follows the rule of addition (the meaning given, to '+') and gets '125' as the sum of $68+57$. But no apriori argument is possible against someone who claims to follow the rule of quaddition i.e., (+*) and get '5'. However, as a matter of practice, we all follow the rule of addition. It is a fact of our form of life. There is no necessity in following the rule of addition. Thus the sceptical solution lies in admitting the contingency in our rule following behaviour. It does not invalidate the sceptical argument that there is no logical necessity in following the rule of addition rather than the rule of quaddition. This, however, does not deny the possibility of rule-following in the contingent sense. Kripke rightly shows that there is Humean contingency in our rule-following activities.

A straight solution is a solution to the sceptical problem according to which scepticism proves to be unwarranted. The notable example is Descartes's cogito-ergo-sum. Descartes's cogito-ergo-sum argument makes him sure about the existence of his own self and consequently proves that universal doubt is not

justified. This is, according to Kripke, a straight solution where scepticism is proved unwarranted and ultimately groundless. Kripke's argument is that Wittgenstein's argument is not a straight solution in the Cartesian sense. According to him, Wittgenstein did not attempt to refute scepticism, rather he circumvented it by appealing to the communitarian basis of rule-following.

Kripke poses the following questions as a matter of inviting the communitarian solution to rule-following. They are

- i) How can one tell whether I am following the rule of 'plus' or 'quus'?
- ii) What are the circumstances under which one can meaningfully ascribe rule-following to me?
- iii) When can one claim that this particular application of rule is justified?

There is no straight solution to these question in the sense of finding a necessary fact which can be the basis of answering these questions. Only there is a communitarian solution to these problems. If we take the rule-follower as a member of a community there will be no problem left. One can easily tell whether one is following a particular rule correctly or incorrectly. We follow rules as a member of a community and not in isolation. Hence the relevance of the commutarian solution.

If a rule-follower is a member of community the notion of

rule and its application get its significance. One will be in a position to tell whether I am following a rule or not, if he finds (i) that the response which I give i.e. the way I use the sign agrees to his response; (ii) if I interact with other fellow members of the community to which he belongs; (iii) if the rules which he ascribes to me have an application in our shared communal life, and (iv) if a person is said to follow a rule only when his/her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other fellows of the community.

The so-called behaviour of the community is a form of life. So, following a rule and making an application of it in an actual case is constitutive of the custom or practice of the community. Following a rule is therefore a communal practice (PI, Sect.202) As a practice it has the implications of being shared, publicly checkable and also followed with communal agreement.

Wittgenstein makes it consistently clear that rule following in isolation is an unintelligible concept, because, this institution of rule-following does not have any 'substantive content'. It becomes meaningful only when we regard the rule-follower as a member of a wider community communicating with one another. Others will have justification for attributing correct or incorrect rule-following to the subject, provided he belongs to their community or at least follows the rules which they themselves follow. In the circumstances they have a shared response to the rule-following situation. This response makes the rule-follower confident that what he does is a rule-following

activity and not a wishful thinking of rule-following. Similarly other members of the community are entitled to say that the rule-follower means, for example, addition by 'plus' if they find that the rule-follower's behaviour agree with theirs. So, whether one follows the rule correctly or incorrectly has to pass the test of community. His reponse has to agree with those of the community. The way they check this is, in general, a primitive part of language-game.

However, the communitarian solution thus outlined has its limitations. The fact that community ratifies a linguistic practice i.e., the practice of rule-following does not rule out that the norms of ratifications are not themselves not communal practices. Norms are practices in a general logical sense but, when the norms are for evaluation of other practices, they cease to be contingent like the practices which are assessed. As Wittgenstein has pointed out, the standard metre in Paris is not itself one metre long or not one metre long. It has a special status in our language-game (PI. Sect.50). It is a paradigm, so it is non-contingent. It is a grammatical rule. In that sense, it is difficult to argue that communitarian solution rules out the possibility of a straight solution. Kripke in his exploration of the communitarian view has further proposed that rules are contingent upon the assertion conditions of the statement of the rule. The communitarian view squarely depends upon whether a rule-application is communally assertible or not. This follows from the fact that one follows a rule when his or

her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other fellows of the community that is, its 'form of life'. The form of life is the basic frame of reference within which alone we can understand the rule-following.

4. Forms of Life and The Anti-Thesis of Private Rule-Following

The fact that the rationality of rule-following is embedded in the forms of life of the rule-followers proves itself to be the anti-thesis of private rule-following. Private rule-following, according to Wittgenstein, is a misnomer. He writes,

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PI, Sect.202).

This is to suggest that a private rule is much grammatically repugnant as private rule-following, since a private language is impossible to conceive. To think of a private language is to think of a sham form of life. A form of life and language not sharable and understandable by many is inconceivable. As Wittgenstein puts it,

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? But that is not what I mean (PI, Sect.243).

Such a language is obviously impossible to imagine. The reason is that even if we imagine one, it will not be called a

language in an accepted sense. The form of life which language represents is totally missing in this case. For example, in our language when I have pain and I express it in so many words, others respond to me in many ways. This response is institutionalized in language. But in a private language this institution is missing. Hence, there is nothing called following a rule there. The private rules are no rules at all since there is no ratification of such rules in an exclusively private language. Wittgenstein puts this as follows:

Are the rules of private language impressions of rules? -
The balance on which the impressions are weighed is not the
impressions of a balance (PI, Sect.259).

In other words, the distinction between a rule and a sham rule is abolished in a private language. Therefore the distinction between right and wrong application of rule is abolished. (PI, Sect.262-69). A private language is an anti-thesis of the general rule-following behaviour of mankind.

Kripke's communitarian interpretation of rule-following has shown why the possibility of private language is sharply opposed to the very concept of language we have.¹²

.5. Forms of Life and Rule-Following

As Kripke has said, a person is said to follow a rule when his/her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other fellow members of the community, that is, their form of life. The form

of life is the home of all rule-following. A form of life is a form of activity, i.e. a way of using language. In PI, Sect.23. Wittgenstein says:

Here language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life.

Each language-game is a form of life. Each is related to a form of using language i.e. doing something with the language. Language is intimately related to life. Each activity in a language is a kind of life. It is related to a life situation. In order for an expression to be meaningful it is not essential that it is governed by rules of syntax alone but also it must be employed in appropriate contexts or circumstances, and its various uses make up our natural history. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein says "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (PI, Sect.19).

Kripke agrees with Wittgenstein's idea of "form of life" in a communitarian sense when he says "the set of responses in which we agree, and the way they interweave with our activities is our form of life".¹³ That is, language is embedded in the network of activities that we happen to undertake in the communal life. For example, 'How are you?' is meaningful in the context where one greets somebody. We follow the rule '+' and arrive at '125' (not '5') as the result of calculating '57+68' because we are the same form of life in making such a calculation. A form of life implies a way of life that every one shares in a community.

Forms of life differ just as language-games differ. That is to say, human beings have the option of having alternative forms of life. There are natural constraints on our forms of life, though. These, however, do not prevent there being language-games which we have never played. Wittgenstein seems to contemplate the availability of alternative natural histories which explain the nature of forms of life and language (PI, II, X; Z Sect.38).

However, this fact does not rule out the necessity ingrained in our present forms of life. The fact that they are the forms of life we are constrained to accept as given (PI. II, p.226). suggests that we are bound to accept them as necessary. Hence the rule-following entailed by the present forms of life have the potentiality of being the constitutive conditions of language-use. The communitarianism of Kripke fails to explain how forms of life apparently taken as contingent can also be taken to be necessary. This also tells why the communitarian solution can at least explain the contingency of rule-following and not its necessity.

6. Limitations of Communitarianism

A critical understanding of communitarianism reveals the fatal flaws it suffers from. Communitarianism depends on premises which presuppose a behaviouristic understanding of rule-following. These presuppositions are as follows:

- a) Rule-following is socially assented to and ratified in the behaviour of the community
- b) Community behaviour is itself not subject to further non-communal test.

Wright puts it as follows:

It is a community of assent which supplies the essential background against which alone it makes sense to think of individuals' responses as correct or incorrect ... None of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment of language save by reference to the authority of securable communal assent on the matter, and for the community itself there is no authority so no standard to meet.¹⁴

According to Wright the totality of community's dispositions determine the norm of correctness of an individual's response to the rule-following situations. The community is the supreme ratifier¹⁵ of an individual's behaviour. There are two ways in which an individual can feel assured that he is following a rule correctly: (i) he has deliberately chosen to participate in the community's forms of life, and (ii) the community has the final authority of sanctioning what is right or wrong in one's public behaviour. Both ways there is responsible public behaviour, since there is a strong appeal to communal assent. If communitarianism is right, then it shows that the truth of rule-following has no intrinsic merit and must be derived from a more authoritative source found in the linguistic community.

Now one can argue, will the communitarian proposal serve the purpose of explaining the normative character of rule-following?

The communitarianism can easily explain whether any given actual communal disposition is itself correct. The normative elements defy the communal constraint. So the problem is: Does communal consensus command the sort of respect which is characteristic of truth as a cognitive value? Blackburn¹⁶ for instance, argues that communal consensus does not have the same respectability as truth because there is no incoherence in the suggestion that all the members of a linguistic community have collectively gone wrong in the application of a given rule, say '+'. Blackburn does not rule out the possibility of the community itself facing the private linguist's dilemma regarding the correctness of rule-following. The suggestion is that what Wittgenstein can at best hold is that rule-following is not systematically a communal practice but rather a practice as such so that the individual can participate in it in a pre-communally given normative sense.¹⁷

Communitarianism is offering an analysis of the ordinary notion of truth which amounts to a displacement of it. So one can doubt whether the communitarians are subscribing to any kind of truth at all because they are not committed to the truth and falsity of any communal consensus in relation to rule-following¹⁸ Communitarianism, as Kripke envisages, is committed to justification-conditions of-assertions and not to their truth conditions. Truth-conditions are replaced by justification-conditions.¹⁹ Thus communitarianism fails to explain how truth can be accounted for. Besides, it is problematic how there can be any objective meaning determination in the communitarian

account. To say that meaning is that which is communally determined is to say that meaning is reducible to community judgements. This may result in a reductionist theory of meaning.²⁰

McDowell²¹ has an interesting analysis of the communitarianist viewpoint. According to him, communitarianism is a product of misunderstanding. He recognises that Wittgenstein presents the model of a 'bed-rock' that is co-lateral with the notion of the normative. That normative bedrock is not the same as communitarian agreement. McDowell writes,

By Wittgenstein's lights, it is a mistake to think we can dig down to a level at which we no longer have application for normative notions (like "following according to the rule").²²

Accordingly, grammar provides us the meaning of any discourse because that shows the correct and incorrect use of an expression. So, McDowell warns us not to form a picture of 'bed-rock*' that goes beyond language and grammar. The bedrock is part of language itself.²³ It is the moral of rule-following considerations that correctness of rule-following can exist only in the practice of language and not in anything that excludes our normal use. McDowell expresses this point in the following way:

Wittgenstein warns us not to try to dig below 'bed-rock', but it is difficult, in reading him, to avoid acquiring a sense of what, as it were, lies down there: the web of facts about behaviour and "inner episodes", describable without using the notion of meaning. One is likely to be struck by the sheer contingency of the resemblances between individuals on which, in this vision, the possibility of meaning seems to depend.

This should result in making a distinction between the normative bed-rock and the natural and behavioural one. It is the former that matters for meaning and rule-following.

The communitarian proposal that communal practice and behaviour is responsible for the meaningfulness of our discourse shows that rule-following is said to consist in the conformity with our fellow beings' responses. This is at best a partial fulfillment of the condition of meaningfulness of an expression. McDowell's²⁵ rejection of this partial condition of meaningfulness is the result of his appreciation of the fact that normativity is substantially different from communality. Communality is factual but normativity is logical.

The problem is : How is the necessity of 'orderly communal' practice to be defended? From what does the demand for orderliness flow? McDowell's answer is that necessity is a feature of the normative structure of rule-following and not of its communal meeting of minds. Communitarianism fails mostly for softpedalling the notion of necessity.

Baker and Hacker²⁶ point out that necessity flows from the grammaticality of the rule and not from the contingent communal agreement. For them, rule-following is internally related to rules and rules are practices in the irreducible sense of being embedded in language. Grammar tells us when rules of grammar are correctly applied. In that sense, grammar provides the criteria of correctness of rule-application, not their a communally agreed

character. Language is normative at least in its rule-structure.²⁷

The opposition to the communitarian view is very strong because grammatical norms function to establish the criteria of use and the meaning of expressions without bringing into consideration the facts of communal agreement as the determinant of meaning.²⁸ Meaning is factually communally shared, but that is not a logical fact about meaning. The internality of the rule to language-use is the sufficient logical fact that meaning is independent of the communal decisions.

7. Harndess of Natural Facts : From Grammar to Natural History

Kripke's argument for communitarianism faces rough weather as we recognise the hard natural facts of language use and forms of life. Wittgenstein's supposed paradox at PI Sect.201 gets dissolved as we take into account the fact that we cannot misinterpret our rule-following behaviour. That is why Wittgenstein rules out interpretation as a method of understanding rule-following. The rule-following facts speak for themselves. They are what they are and are invested with a natural necessity. The grammatical necessity of rules is dependent on naturally necessary facts. This is emphasized by Wittgenstein in his insistence that the facts of rule-following are all that there are for philosophers to take account of. These facts are the hard data presented to us without the

mediation of any interpretation. Philosophy puts them as they are without interpretation and therefore without distortion. As Wittgenstein puts it,

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (PI, Sect.126).

Thus philosophy puts a premium on facts, but these facts are not hidden nor are they anything other than what language presents to us. The facts of rule-following are the interpreted forms of life which come imposingly forward for recognition. Philosophy needs no special intuition to recognize them. The following passage makes the point clear:

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are as it were entangled in our own rules (PI, Sect.125).

Wittgenstein's rejoinder to the sceptic, therefore, is that our grammar is not in constant risk of breaking down since grammar itself tells us what the facts are. Grammar is not based on those facts. It only presents their internal connexions. Besides, grammar itself is not based on a thin layer of common agreement, so that there is the possibility of its breaking down by a slightest sceptic touch. As Wittgenstein, repeatedly reminds us, the agreement is not an agreement in opinion but in forms of life. (PI, Sect.241). Grammar represents the basic agreement in our rule-following and forms of life which constitute the bed-rock of our thoughts and actions. (PI,

Sect.217). Hence it is hardly convincing to Bay that there is a communitarian foundation for our rule-following. Communitarianism does not solve the problem. It is another name for scepticism. The fact that grammar represents the facts of rule-following and that it shows the necessary roots of common agreement in rule-following it becomes obvious that the communitarian argument gets defeated. The agreement is a fact but grammar which shows the agreement is not factual. Grammar is the common ground of our rule-following behaviour.

8. Grammar and Natural History

In the view of above, it is imperative that Wittgstein must relate grammar to the natural history of man. What is natural history? The natural history of man consists in our natural activities like thinking, speaking, commanding, and counting (PI, Sect.25). The following passage makes the point clear:

What we are supplying are really remarks on natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted but which have escaped remark only because they are before our eyes. (PI, Sect.415).

The remarks intended here are quite expectedly the remarks on the forms of life of human beings i.e. the language-games that reflect their activities. These remarks are not explanations or justifications but only descriptions of language-games. In this sense by bringing the natural history to the fore we can make our grammar more perspicuous since the more the natural history is

open to view the better the understanding of language and grammar is.

Natural history is the common back-ground of both philosophy and grammar but it does not justify either philosophy or grammar. Grammar cannot be derived from natural history. Grammar is the formal account of our natural behaviour; it presents the calculus of our natural language. The following passage from Wittgenstein is revealing:

Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between the concepts and very general fact of nature. (Such facts mostly do not strike us because of their generality). But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history since we can invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. (PI, II, XII).

Philosophy, like grammar, is not a natural science nor a natural history. It is always a grammatical investigation into the facts of nature (PI. Sect. 90). That is to say, it investigates grammar, the calculus of our natural life and language. However, it is the forms of our language and life that matter for philosophical grammar. The forms can be described in the syntax with elaborate rules. Therefore, the description of the rule-structure is the core of philosophy and grammar.

9. Natural Facts and Rule-Following

The concept of natural history brings into prominence the natural facts about language-use. But the grammatical remarks on

these facts cannot be anthropological²⁹ descriptions because they are grammatical propositions which define our natural activities themselves. Wittgenstein thus offers the grammar of natural history of man as a normative enterprise which not only describes what happens or takes place in our natural life but also what can happen. That is to say, grammar does not tell only what happens, but tells what are the possible happenings (PI Sect.90). Thus grammar presents us the domain of possibilities of natural facts. Grammar presents the essence of reality.

The propositions which describe the world-picture³⁰ constitute a kind of mythology (OC, Sect. 98) in which their role is that of grammatical rules. This mythology containing grammatical propositions may change its course by allowing the fixed propositions to become shifting ones and shifting ones to become the hardened propositions (OC, Sects. 96.97). But, even then, there will be a mythology containing a world-picture which the grammar projects through its rules. The mythology which the grammar describes contains the principles which constitute reality. Therefore, it is ultimately grammar which determines what reality is (Cf. PI. Sects. 371, 373, 383, 401). Thus our grammar tells us the possibilities of natural history.

The facts of rule-following are facts of natural history. These facts constitute the bulk of linguistic data. Grammar shifts the facts into those which are essential and those which are inessential. The essential facts of rule-following are those which we cannot imagine to be otherwise. That $2+2 = 4$ is

an essential fact and needs no special justification for being true. It is true as a matter of grammar and as a fact of our being human at all. Therefore rule-following considerations are so intimately ingrained in our being human at all. The rules do not tell about our cognitive interests or non-sceptic resistance to rampant scepticism. They tell us what we basically are. Forms of life involving rule-following are autonomous and are closed to any external justification. That alone tells why our grammar is not contingent. Grammar is necessary for us because we cannot really understand the alternative forms of life and the alternative grammars. What we can understand is really part of our grammar and so it is necessarily part of our natural history. The necessity of rule-following is the result of the internal correlation between grammar, and natural history, and so between language and world. Rule-following would have been contingent and so sceptically threatened, if it were not rooted in our forms of life, that is, in natural history and if our grammar would not have been a guarantee against the sceptics attack.

Thus to follow a rule is to participate in language and be part of a natural history. This has the additional guarantee that grammar is on the side of the rule-follower.

NOTES

1. This question is raised by Hintikka and Hintikka in their Investigation Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), and according to them the language-games are prior to the rules.
2. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982).
3. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp.7-54.
4. *Ibid.*, p.
5. *Ibid.*, pp.22-37.
6. The introspectionist approach seems to push rule-following back into the realm of consciousness which decidedly abolishes the descriptive - normative distinction. Wittgenstein writes at PI, Sect.191:

"It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash", Like what e.g. can't the use - in a certain sense - be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not?"-
7. Kripke, p.13.
8. *Ibid.*,
9. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1888) Book I, Part IV, Section I, p.187.
10. *Ibid.*. Book I, Part IV, Section II, p.187.
11. Kripke, pp.56-113.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p.96.

14. C. Wright, "Rule-following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning," in Wittgenstein? to Follow a Rule, eds. Steven B. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981), pp.104-105.
15. Ibid.. p.102-103. See also C. Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (Duckworth, London, 1980) Chapter II.
16. See S. Blackburn, "The Individual Strikes Back", Synthese., 58 (1984), 281-301.
17. Ibid.
18. See Paul A. Boghossian, 'The Rule-Following Considerations', Mind. Vol.98 (1989), pp.507-549.
19. See Kripke, pp.72-85.
20. See Paul Boghossian, "The Rule-following considerations", pp.540-542.
21. John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", Synthese, 58 (1984) pp.325-63.
22. Ibid., p.341.
23. Ibid., p.341.
24. Ibid., p.348.
25. Ibid., pp.325-363.
26. Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein; Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) Chapter VI.
27. See Ibid., V. See also Baker and Backer, Scepticism. Rules and Language (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984).

28. See C. McGinn Wittgenstein on Meaning (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984).
29. See Jonanthan Lear, "Transcendental Anthropolgy", in Subject. Thought and Context eds. P. Pettit and J. McDowell (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp.267-298.
30. Wittgenstein's notion of world-picture and mythology have only heuristic interest since they suggest us that our conception of the world has a root only in grammar. Grammar contains the world pictures which compete amongst themselves to give the essence of the world. Rules are situated at the heart of the world-view that gives the essence. These rules are grammatical propositions.

CHAPTER - V

THE AUTONOMY OF GRAMMAR

In this chapter I seek to explore the grounds on which Wittgenstein's so called theory of autonomy of grammar is based. The chapter IV has shown that the sceptic's challenge to grammar, and its rules has made no dent in the latter's structure. Grammar remains immune to the sceptic's anti-foundationalist attack, since there is no possibility of proving that grammar lacks foundations. However, this does not entail that philosophy needs to provide foundations for grammar. Philosophy has no such project to defend grammar against scepticism. According to Wittgenstein, grammar, like logic, must speak for itself. This thesis may broadly be called the autonomy thesis. I will make a modest attempt to entangle the issues involved around the concept of autonomy which has a wider usage in the literature¹ on Wittgenstein.

1. Autonomy and the Language-world Nexus

The question of autonomy arises exactly where language seems to be free of the control of the facts in the world. This is how majority of Wittgenstein interpreters² have taken this question to have arisen. According to this view, language is autonomous to the extent there is no factual or natural constraints on language. That is to say language is liberated from the clutches of the world. P.M.S. Hacker writes,

The doctrine of the autonomy of grammar is closely related to the doctrine of the autonomy of language. If language had foundations in metaphysical simples, grammar could not be autonomous. The doctrine of the autonomy of language is a repudiation of the Tractatus conception between language and reality. The consequent doctrine of the autonomy of grammar is a dramatic transformation of his earlier views.³

According to Hacker, if language has foundations in metaphysical simples grammar could not be autonomous. He suggests that the theory of autonomy of grammar is an heir to the doctrine of (a) indescribability of limits of the thought (b) inexpressibility of essences (c) the distinction between saying and showing.

The formal isomorphism between language and reality - the fact that language is the mirror of the essence of the world - can only be shown in language but not expressed by means of it. This is the central thesis of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in general. The doctrine of autonomy is logically derivable from this. Hacker explains this in the following passage.

We are continually tempted to take our grammar as a projection of reality, instead of taking our conception of the structure of reality to be a projection of grammar. For we are driven to justify grammar by reference to putative facts about the world, e.g. 'But there really are four primary colours'. So, we think of our concepts of colour justified, for they characterize the world as it is. For I would look in vain for a fifth primary colour; we put four colours together because they are similar, and we contrast colour with shapes and notes because they are different (Z, 331). It is against the conception of this sort of justification, which is analogous to the idea of justifying a sentence by pointing to what verifies it, that the claim that grammar directed (Ibid). The relevant sense in which grammar is arbitrary is the doctrine of autonomy of grammar.⁵

This thesis, however, rests on the idea that autonomy of language and grammar precludes the fact of the world being the basis of the former. This indirectly shows that autonomy is not possible as long as language is projected into the world. However, I shall try to show that Wittgenstein is very much concerned with the autonomy question in the Tractatus itself. Wittgenstein asserts: "Logic must look after itself"⁶ (TLP, 5.473) .

2. Tractarian concept of Logic and Autonomy

What Wittgenstein says about logic in the Tractatus applies to grammar in his later works. Wittgenstein holds that logic and application of logic cannot overlap; they must be kept separate. Second, that nothing can come between logic and its application; they must be side by side (T.5.557). In case of grammar, the use of signs or possible use of signs cannot determine the actual occurrence of language. Besides, nothing can mediate between grammar and its actual application, because that which mediates must itself belong to grammar.⁷ Wittgenstein has supposed that logic, like grammar, does not depend upon its application. Application is external to it, since it only tells us at what point it can come into contact with the world. The world, according to Wittgenstein, is contingent whereas logic and grammar are necessary. Thus logic has to be self-contained. Wittgenstein writes:

Men have always a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to question are asymmetrically combined - a priori - to form a self-contained system:

A realm subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri. (TLP 5.4541).

This has the further implication that logic must have its own laws which safeguard it against any possible mistake, e.g. contradiction, etc. The illegitimacy of the syntactic construction is ruled out by the logical syntax itself. Wittgerstein very clearly puts this autonomy thesis as follows:

Logic must look after itself. If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted (The reason why "Socrates is identical" means nothing is that there is no property called "identical. The proposition is non-sensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.) In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic. (TLP, 5.473).

Thus the Tractarian autonomy thesis has the peculiarity of making logic autonomous of reality and it then extends the same to language. Autonomy of logic entails the autonomy of language. That is because language having logic as its essence cannot but be independent of the world so far as its logical form is concerned. The following passage tells this:

Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not arbitrary - that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else is necessarily the case. (This derives from the essence of the notation) (TLP 3.342). Again he continues:

A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And this is generally so in philosophy; again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world (TLP 3.3421).

The autonomy thesis thus earmarks the room for the logical structure of language speaking for the structure of the world also.

3. Autonomy Thesis in the Calculus Model

Wittgenstein's calculus model which I have discussed in Chapter I entertains the possibility of the autonomy of language and grammar. First of all, language conceived as a calculus must follow the lead of logic and declare itself autonomous of all the epidemic and metaphysical supports. Like logic language must take care of itself. Secondly, the calculus model claims that language is something already given as a part of human organism and is endowed with a logical structure or form entirely underived from anything more ultimate. The logical form of language is the basic nonderivable fact which logical syntax shows through internal connexions of the grammatical rules. Therefore, neither logical form or nor the grammatical rules can be constituted by metalogical rules. The rules of the calculus are internally possible as the constitutive principles of symbolism. There is no external mechanisms for the generation of such rules.

The thesis as regards the internal relationship between language and reality reinforces the autonomy thesis insofar as the latter proposes that the relationship is not an external relationship. Language and reality share common logical form

because of which alone language is a logical picture of reality (TLP 2.17, 2.16, 4.12). Thus we can say that the logical form is collateral with the form of reality. That does not entail that the reality is the source of the logical form. The form of reality is logical and is revealed in language. So the logical form is independent of the fact that the world shares the same with language. It is a logical fact that language and the world have the same form. Now, according to Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition consists in its being a logical picture of a possible situation (TLP 4.027, 4.03, 4.031) and that is internal to the proposition and can be demonstrated within the calculus of language itself. The essence of a proposition reflects the essence of the situation it speaks of, and so its sense follows from its essence. Grammar tells us how sense and essence internally constitute the use of a proposition. The autonomy of language-use follows from the autonomy of sense and essence. This is reflected in Wittgenstein's idea that the notion of possible is grammatical. As he puts it, "so it depends wholly on our grammar what will be called possible and what not i.e., what grammar permits." (PG. Sect. 82). This shows that what is possible is grammatically permitted owing to the fact that there is nothing left either ontologically or epistemically except what is permitted by grammar. This supremacy of grammar over what is the case (fact) and what is likely to be the case (possible) is the basis of autonomy thesis. The grammatical purview includes the language-world relations as well. Wittgenstein writes,

The connection between "language and reality" is made by definition of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous (PG, Sect.55).

The autonomy of language originates in the fact that the definition of words already logically establishes the word-object relations. Objects are not external to grammar - they must already inhere in the grammatical structure of words (including the Tractarian 'names'). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein called objects formal concepts (4.1272) and thus indicated that the formal syntax itself takes care of what objects there are in the world (Cf. TLP 3.33). Syntax or the logical grammar is, therefore, autonomous.

4. Autonomy and Non-Justification of Grammar

Wittgenstein's way of looking at language throughout his career may be summed up in a formula: Grammar comes before facts. Grammar in turn does not depend upon facts. Grammar itself is not a fact. The principal thesis is that grammar constitutes facts and therefore does not depend upon facts.⁸ Grammar is world-constituting.⁹ As Finch¹⁰ rightly points out, for Wittgenstein, grammar presupposes the existence of the world which is unsayable in itself and therefore does not determine it. It determines all that can be said. In Finch's words, "since it gives all the ways of speaking about the world, there is no further way by which we could say how the world itself is so that grammar might conform to it. The world is having an ultimate

character in itself".¹¹ In fact, for Wittgenstein, world and language have the identical structure, and therefore, one cannot go beyond grammar to tell what the world really is. Grammar tells what the world really is by permitting the different ways of speaking about it. For Wittgenstein world and reality are the same because there is no metaphysical gap between what is the case and what is really the case.

The facts, i.e. the world as what is the case is intertwined with our ways of speaking. A fact is a way of speaking, that is, a method of representation. It requires a language game in order to talk about the world. Language-games are, therefore, ways of speaking and acting in the world. The world is a partner in the language-game as Hintikka¹² has said in his theory of game-model semantics. This partnership is due to the fact that language logically needs the world though it is not dependent on it. Wittgenstein argues that there is an intimate bond between what we say (i.e. our concepts) and what there is (i.e. the objects). That is a deep fact. Wittgenstein articulates this in the following passage.

If any one believes that certain concepts are absolutely correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize-then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (PI., p.230).

This does not suggest that the concepts which constitute our grammar are dependent upon the very general facts. It only

suggests that there is a "correspondence" between concepts and the general facts about nature.¹³ The general facts of nature include the regularity of natural phenomena which obey the laws of nature. Our natural world is a systematic and orderly cosmos. Therefore, it perfectly fits our linguistic framework that evolves the method of grammatical representation of nature. Our speaking, knowing and acting all together make it obvious that the world is perfectly a partner in our language-game. World is the other side of grammar. They make one whole.

The autonomous character of grammar means not only that grammar comes before facts and cannot be justified in terms of facts. Grammar has no justification as such since grammar is fundamental and ultimate. Facts need justification, that is, they need connections amongst themselves. The scientific explanation of nature is a justification of facts. For example, it can be justified why the sun appears to rise in the East and why the sun emits rays. But it needs no justification that the statement "The sun appears to rise in the East" states the fact that the sun appears to rise in the East. That a statement states (pictures) a fact is grammatical in character. That is something fundamental so far as our ways of speaking are concerned. The autonomy Wittgenstein is concerned with is that of speaking rather than of what is spoken about. Autonomy resides in the ability to represent, that is, in the speech. The world, on the other hand, is impervious to this question.

5. Saying and Showing

The autonomy thesis is closely related to the Tractatus thesis of the ineffability of what is shown by language. In the Tractatus, logical syntax shows the logical form of language and the world. It cannot say what the logical form is like, since in saying it already presupposes it. Wittgenstein writes.

Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world (TLP 4.12).

The presupposed logical form or structure of language and the world is an ultimate fact about language and grammar and cannot therefore itself be said in another language. The logical structure is displayed in language itself. The structure is part of grammar of language and so cannot itself be justified. What seems to be the structure of the world is itself determined by grammar. So the question of grammar being justified by the world does not arise. Any attempt to justify grammar by appeal to the world will yield nonsense.

Grammar can have no more Tightness or wrongness than the choice of a unit of measurement. Grammar cannot also be justified by an end, goal or purpose, which is external to language itself. In that sense the grammar of language is autonomous. Wittgenstein writes.

The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement. But that means no more than that the choice is independent of the length of the objects to be measured and that the choice of one unit is not 'true' and of another 'false' in the way that a statement of length is true or false. Of course, that is only a remark on the grammar of the word 'unit of length' (EG, Sect. 133).

The unit of measurement is a standard or norm accepted independently of the things measured. So, it can be said that the unit of measurement is 'arbitrary', that is, it is chosen prior to measuring anything. The rules of grammar reflecting the logical form of language and the world are part of the very framework of language that makes intelligible the concept of rule and its application. In that sense, it is neither true nor false. It is arbitrary (I shall discuss in detail the concept of 'arbitrary' later). This continues the Tractarian idea that logical form expresses or shows itself in language. Language shows its rules and thus the logical form of propositions. There is no other language in which the rules themselves can be embedded.¹⁴ So, they are autonomous. This explains why Wittgenstein's calculus makes language a self-explainable system of rules which makes our notion of reality itself intelligible.

6. The Game Model and the Autonomy Question

The game-model addresses itself to the autonomy question as the central question relating to the language-world nexus. Autonomy is an integral feature of language-games and their rules. A language-game, i.e. a language-use is a determinate

form of activity bounded by rules which define what is a possible move within the language-game. As we have already discussed in Chapter IV without rules, a language-game is impossible Wittgenstein writes,

We are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules according to which we are inclined to use words (PG, Sect.32).

The availability of rules as a part of language-games is the basic-notion of grammar in the game-model. Rules constitute the inner mechanism of grammar so as to make it the all - embracing framework of language. The autonomy of the rule-structure derives from the fact that without rules no language-game is possible. This is connected with the fact that, like logic, grammar is an internal feature of language. Wittgenstein writes,

There cannot be a question whether these or other rules are the correct ones for the use of "not" (that is, whether they accord with its meaning). For without these words the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too. (PG. Sect.133).

Thus rules are internal to the language-game and speak for themselves. There is nothing else that we can do about them except that we record what they are. That the rules of grammar or syntax enjoy autonomy is the legacy of the calculus model which we have already seen. The same appears relating to the availability of grammatical rules in the language-games. The grammatical rules define the possible moves in a language-game

and therefore set the limit of our thought and experience, they set the 'limits of empiricism' (RFM. III, Sect.71).

Now the question is: Is there an ultimate justification of rules? Wittgenstein has always struggled with this question and ended up with a negative answer. Grammatical rules along with the language-games which they define are not to be justified. Wittgenstein thinks that no justification can ever be provided for the rules in grammar. Grammar must take care of itself. Wittgenstein says,

The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said: that is how we do it. (RFM, III, Sect.74).

What prompts Wittgenstein to reject justification of grammar is his conviction that grammar is autonomous and that it can hardly be justified through any external facts such as the facts of the world. As we have already said, grammar must come logically before facts. So the question of empirical justification of grammar does not arise.

For Wittgenstein, the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the way rules of cookery are not. When the rules of grammar are violated we play no game or we play a different game. The rules of cookery are fixed by the goal of making good dishes. They are our creations or at best justified by our culinary habits. But not so are the rules of grammar. These rules have no other

purpose than speaking or using language. They are not regulated by our linguistic habits, they constitute them. Thus there is no logical gap between following a rule and using language in a certain way. Hence, rules of grammar are beyond justification. Wittgenstein writes,

Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because I think of the concept of "cookery" as defined by the end of cookery, and I don't think of the concept "language" as defined by the end of language (PG, Sect.133).

This is connected with the fact that in instituting the rules of language there is nothing else that is at stake 'except the language itself. But in cookery what is at stake is the eating and the related ensuring taste, but not cooking itself. Cooking is a means of satisfying taste. The following passage tells us the importance and the uniqueness of rule of grammar. Wittgenstein says,

The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary" if that is to mean that the aim of grammar is nothing but that of the language. If someone says "if our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts" - it should be asked what "could" means here (PI, Sect.497).

7. The Notion of 'Arbitrary'

Wittgenstein writes:

Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition" (PI, Sect.372).

This statement has far reaching implications so far as the autonomy question is concerned. First of all, an arbitrary rule is intrinsically necessary. Secondly, that is the only thing that a rule-like proposition can tell us about language. Wittgenstein insists that rules of grammar, that is, 'the necessary propositions' are arbitrary "Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary". (PG, Sect.133). That is, there is nothing that the necessary propositions in grammar are accountable to. They are what they are and not otherwise.

As Baker and Hacker¹⁵ have rightly pointed out, the rules of grammar are not arbitrary in the ordinary sense of the term. Ordinarily 'arbitrary' means capricious. A capricious government may be irrational and unfounded. Arbitrariness is a matter of irrationality in the ordinary sense. It is either a fact or convention (without reason) that stands for an arbitrary rule. But grammatical rules are not a matter of caprice and cannot be irrational either. Far from being capricious they are absolutely inexorable and inviolable. Nor need grammatical rules be arbitrary in the sense of being unimportant.¹⁶ To say that a system of rules is arbitrary does not mean they are unimportant. The importance of grammatical rules is too obvious to be proved otherwise. In this sense, only the most fundamental rules are called arbitrary. Besides, rules of grammar are not arbitrary in the sense of being a matter of individual choice or decision.

On the contrary, we are constrained by the rules to make a particular move in language. We are almost bound by the rules. We are not free to decide that $2 + 2 = 5$ or that white can be darker than black. Rules determine what we can or cannot do. Hence they are necessary. They constitute the language-game.

There is another sense in which rules can be arbitrary. That is that there may be alternative system of rules just as we have alternative units of measurement. For example, there are different ways of measuring time. The ancient methods have been replaced by modern methods of measurement. This applies to all methods of measurement. There is nothing final about them. Thus one can argue that there is arbitrariness about these methods. But grammatical rules are not arbitrary in this sense. Though Wittgenstein argues that there is parallelism between the rules of grammar and the units of measurements (cf. PG, Sect.133), yet the rules of grammar determine the meaning of the sentence and so are more fundamental. In that sense, they cannot be arbitrary. There are no alternative ways of constituting meaning. We mean in one way rather than in another. So, we cannot say that a different grammatical structure can serve certain purposes better than the present one. A different grammatical structure will mean a different language. So, "arbitrary" does not mean 'dispensable' in this sense. Alternative possibilities themselves are the creations of rules of grammar. Wittgenstein writes,

Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our style of painting arbitrary? Can you choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian, for instance.) Is it a mere question of pleasing or ugly? (PI, p.230).

The claim that rules of grammar are arbitrary is aimed at disproving that "our grammar, our rules for the use of words, our rules of inference or of mathematics are answerable to some kind of reality".¹⁸ We are misled into thinking that our grammatical propositions such as "Red is darker than yellow" or "They are only four primary colours" correspond to the reality of colours. We are grammar is a reflection of an independent colour-reality. This supposition leads to the conclusion that colour-grammar is at the mercy of the world. This speaks of their heteronomy. but Wittgenstein argues against this empiricist doctrine. He believe that grammar is not a kind of science. Its truths are not contingent and so dependent on the world. Thus, for him, that grammar is arbitrary is one and the same thing as that grammar is autonomous.¹⁹ Autonomy follows from grammar's independence of empirical world. Wittgenstein writes:

"One is tempted to justify rules of grammar by sentences like "But there really are four primary colours'. And the saying that rules of grammar are arbitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification, which is constructed on the model of justifying a sentence by pointing to what verifies it. (Z., Sect.331).

Thus we come to the conclusion that our colour-grammar, does not reside in the nature of colours (Z, Sect.357), since it is our rules for the use of colour-words which determine what we call the essence of colour as such.²⁰ The colour-grammar tells

us what colour is and how they have a role to play in our life. That is to say, colour-grammar is rooted in our nature, rather than in the nature of colour itself. Thus in the Zettel, Wittgenstein makes the remarkable statement that colour-system is rooted in us. He writes,

Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of things? How are we to put it? Mot in the nature of numbers or colours (Z_, Sect.357).

He further continues.

Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin to what is arbitrary and what is non-arbitrary (Z., Sect.358).

Thus the disassociation of grammar from empirical reality is complete, since this explains both what is arbitrary as well as what is non-arbitrary in Wittgenstein's sense. Grammar is arbitrary in that sense that there is no independent metaphysical support for it. Secondly, it is non-arbitrary because it is necessary as determining the very structure of reality. This is the peculiarity of grammatical propositions,²¹ as we have seen in Chapter III.

As we have already said, the rules of cooking are not arbitrary (autonomous) because cooking is defined by its goal which is here the production of good food. The latter is causally dependent upon the former. But rules of grammar are not conditions by any such external goal. The goal of language is language itself. In speaking a language we may communicate but

that is what language is all about. Besides, communication is not external to language. Language determine itself, its activities and its goals. One does not stand outside language to point out what its goal is. By going outside language one does not speak another language but no language at all.

Baker and Hacker summarize the point in to following way: "Grammatical rules are arbitrary, autonomous. There is no such thing"justifying grammar by reference to reality. For grammar determines the bounds of sense, what it makes, sense to say. Hence it determines what is to be called a "description of reality', (whether that description is true or false is another matter, which is settled by reality)".²² That is to say that grammar is not dependent on empirical facts. As we have put it earlier, grammar can never retain its necessity if it were derived from reality. The necessity of grammar lies in his non-justifiability and non-derivability. That is its ultimate character and also its autonomy. That is what it is. It could not have been otherwise. Wittgenstein expresses this as follows.

If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the conventions superflous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my saying. Conversely, if the conventions were necessary, i.e., if certain combinations of words had to be excluded as non-sensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a property of colours that make the convention necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the colours should not have this property, and I could only express that by violating the conventions (PR, Sect.4)

8. Alternative Grammars

Alternative grammars are possible. Now the question is whether there is always the possibility of there being alternative sets of rules and concepts. Wittgenstein conceded the possibility of different forms of life which do not share the features of ours. To say that grammar is arbitrary may suggest that our grammar is not unique and so not necessary. But we have seen that Wittgenstein has rejected this suggestion. But the question of possible grammars different from us has not been settled.

In a deeper sense, according to Wittgenstein, our grammar is final for us. It is deeply rooted in our nature, that is, in our forms of life. Therefore, there cannot be grammars which we understand to be utterly different from ours. If they are different we do not understand them at all.²³ Bernard Williams has very aptly argued that there are no genuine alternative forms of life. William writes,

The imagined alternatives are not alternatives to us; they are alternative for us, markers of how far we might go and still remain within our world - a world leaving which would not mean that we see something different, but just that we ceased to see.²⁵

This only suggests that the idea of alternative grammars is of limited availability. It has only a heuristic value. It only shows that we cannot say that ours is the absolutely correct one. Wittgenstein tells us that there are underlying natural limits to

our grammar. Had the world been different, our grammar could have been differently constituted. Grammar is in some way "responsible to reality"²⁶ in the sense that were the world different in some specific ways, our grammar would have different structures. Similarly, if human nature were different some parts of our grammar might be no more in use. And if we had a different grammar we would say and do quite different things. Wittgenstein makes this clear in the following passage from the Philosophical Investigations;

I am not saying: If such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But : If anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize - then let him imagine very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (PI, II, XII).

Nevertheless the grammatical structures that we have told us something about the world which we describe in our grammar. Our grammar tells us about the necessary structure of the world. Wittgenstein writes,

In a way ... you might say that the choice of units [of measurement] is arbitrary. But in a most important sense it is not. It has a most important reason lying both in the size and in the irregularity of shape and in the use we make of a room that we do not measure its dimension in microns or even in millimetres. That is to say not only the proposition which tells us the result of measurement but also the description of the method and unit of measurement tells us something about the world in which this measurement takes place.²⁷

This idea has a striking resemblance with the Tractarian notion

that the alternative scientific descriptions of the world only present a priori insights about the forms on which the propositions of science can be cast. Wittgenstein writes,

Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tell us nothing about the world but what does tell us something about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means (TLP, 6.342).

Thus the alternative descriptions are ultimately based on the precise idea of the world. Grammar allows for the possible descriptive systems insofar as form remains the constant feature. Hence it is misleading to argue that alternative grammars are possible in any absolute sense. Only alternative structures are possible to the extent they agree on the common form that the alternative systems share. Besides, the world and its logical structure impose a great constraint on these possible systems. Thus the arbitrariness of grammar is constrained by a non-arbitrariness or necessity of the logical form that grammar and the world share.²⁸ Wittgenstein therefore talks of the kinship between the arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness of the system in the following passage:

Then is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin both to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary (Z, Sect.358).

9. Grammar As Non-arbitrary

The non-arbitrary character of grammar follows from the deep necessity it presents as a structure of rules and concept

formations. Non-arbitrariness is the inner truth about grammar whereas arbitrariness is its outer form. To be what it is and not otherwise is grammar's being arbitrary, whereas grammar's telling us what must be the case if any thing is possible and thus dictating to nature is its non-arbitrariness. Thus non-arbitrariness is really the other face of necessity. By accepting a grammatical rule we commit ourselves to a certain form of action and are under the logical obligation to follow a pattern of life. A rule is a normative commitment, it is a standard procedure that controls all future use of language. Language becomes a timeless structure with its future use captured by the rule. But there is still the contingency that is attached to the application of rules. Grammar is not affected by this contingency. Hence grammar is timeless, normative and logical. That is its non-arbitrariness.²⁹

The second aspect of non-arbitrariness can be brought out as Hacker³⁰ points out, by bringing into view the social aspect of language. The social aspect of language is its being independent of the individual speakers. Grammar is not anybody's personal creation. It is socially eternal and beyond anybody's guess. Yet it is a shared phenomenon; it is deeply rooted in the social practices and behaviour. Grammar is the storehouse of common experience, standards and norms. It is the commonly acceptable and accessible domain of rules and conceptual connections. The rules represent *the* limits of our thinking as human beings. Thus grammar is bound to be non-arbitrary.

Wittgenstein gives another proof in the Philosophical Investigations for the non-arbitrariness of grammar. According to him, grammar is no more arbitrary than a style of painting is (PI, II, XII). As we have already seen, a style of painting reveals the inner depth of a culture or tradition. Therefore it is not arbitrary in the ordinary sense. A style of painting is the language of the soul of the people. So also grammar by analogy is far deeply rooted in the life and mind of the people. Grammar transcends the temporality of the style of painting. Grammar is, therefore, ahistorical whereas style of painting is historical. Even then they share a common character they are non-arbitrary.

However, as we have already noted in Chapter III, grammar, though ahistorical, is not completely indifferent to natural history. Grammar is responsible to nature and natural history. Wittgenstein writes,

Yes, but has nature nothing to say here? Indeed she has - but she makes herself audible in another way.
"You'll surely run us against existence and non-existence somewhere! But that means against facts. not concepts (Z., Sect. 364).

Thus nature has a subtle way of telling us that our grammar is in large measure in conformity with nature. The existence of the world is the absolute presupposition of grammar (Cf. Tractatus. 5.552, 5.5521).

The natural limits of grammar are facts which are grammar's

absolute presupposition and yet grammar is independent of them. This point is emphasized by Wittgenstein to remind us of the fact that grammar is normative and so comes before facts. Grammar has the dignity of the rule and the law. So, its autonomy is guaranteed by its status. Wittgenstein writes.

The rules of grammar cannot be justified by shewing that their application makes a representation agree with reality. For this justification would itself have to describe what is represented (PG, Sect. 134).

The agreement with reality is internal and so is taken for granted. There is no question of justifying grammar by sanctioning it through the facts.

Wittgenstein convinces himself of the autonomy of grammar and also of language by arguing that our experience of the world does not finally explain the possibility of grammar and therefore cannot provide any justification for the latter. It is true that rules of grammar are constrained by the facts of nature, but that does not mean that rules of grammar are justified by the latter (PI. II, XII). They, in fact, lay down the conditions of the use of language and also of the facts which language describes. Rules are, as Wittgenstein metaphorically puts it, like the rails on which our language moves (Z, Sect. 375). Thus the possibility of grammar is not explained by the world. Rather grammar tells us what the world is like. That only suggests that grammar must have an origin in the normative functioning of the human reasoning. Grammar is the product of the self-generating linguistic habits of man. This is not to ascribe to

Wittgenstein's grammar the status of a natural science. It is not a science of nature since it does not describe nature but rather provides methods of description for the latter. As Finch puts it,

—Wittgenstein's conception of grammar as a description of the use of signs (PI, 496) does not mean a description of grammar as fact (in the way that a linguist might describe it), but rather means a description of grammar as normative or supplying the basis for the distinction between correct or incorrect.³¹

Grammatical rules as paradigms are neither true nor false and hence cannot be characterised as right or wrong, correct or incorrect, because they set the standard of what is right and correct. For example, the standard metre cannot be said to be a metre long. So, too, it is false to say that it is a metre long, (cf. PI, Sect. 50).

Wittgenstein characterizes the rules in grammar in the following way:

To accept a proposition as unshakable certain - I want to say - means to use it as grammatical rule. This removes uncertainty from it (RFM, III, Sect. 39).

It follows that, unlike empirical proposition, rules of grammar are unshakable truths. A grammatical proposition like "Every rod has a length" states an unshakable truth about the fact that we cannot imagine the opposite of what a grammatical proposition expresses. It does not make any sense to assert the opposite of "Every rod has a length" (PI, Sect. 251). We cannot conceive of

a possible rod which has no length at all. We have discussed this point at length in Chapter III.

Thus the ultimacy of grammar as the framework for understanding language and the world has the status of logic which is employed to bring the basic features of normative discourse. Grammar thus reflects the necessary structure of our language and the world. Therefore, it does not share the contingency occurring to particular language-use and the changing features of the world.

10. Concept of Criteria and Autonomy

For Wittgenstein, grammatical rules as norms function as criteria of the use of language. They constitute the semantic aspect of the use of language. They constitute, as P.M.S. Hacker points out, the criterial semantics which specifies "the conditions which non-inductively justify the assertion of a sentence and in terms of which the sense of the sentence is to be accounted for."³²

The concept of criterion³³ introduces a new aspect of semantical analysis by determining the justificatory ground of the statements we make in our language-games. According to Wittgenstein, criteria represent rules of grammar which justify the use of linguistic expressions. The criteria are the defining grounds of linguistic expressions because they mention the grammatical conditions of the expression (BB, p.25). The

criteria of a given assertion define the limits of our language-game. So, in this sense, criteria are not the causes of our cognitive statements but their logical grounds which justify them. Wittgenstein makes this distinction between causes and criteria in the following passage:

The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to what we believe. Not so the grounds which are grammatically related to proposition and tell us what proposition it is (*Z*_, Sect. 437).

The sense or meaning of these statements is defined by these criteria which constitute the only semantical grounds of any knowledge claim. Thus the objectivity of rules of grammar as criteria or paradigm remains "unshakeably certain".

The identification of criteria with rules brings into consideration the fact that the so called criterial grammar is a rule-structured or normative grammar. This presupposes that the criteria and symptoms are veritically divided criteria alone belong to grammar whereas symptoms are the contingent features of our symbolism. Symptoms are the causal conditions³⁴ which may accompany any language-use. But they do not make difference to grammar. The criteria, however, do make a difference Wittgenstein says,

The criteria which we accept for 'fitting' 'being able to', 'understanding', 'are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved - the role of these words in our language other-than we are tempted to think (*PI*. Sect.182).

Thus we arrive at the following conclusions regarding the criteria.

- a) Rules of grammar function as standards or criteria by which particular cases are judged.
- b) Agreement on them is necessary for engaging in any practice i.e. playing language-games which employ them.
- c) They cannot be explained or justified since they set the limits of what can be said and thus nothing can be said about them. They are shown in the very rule-following activity i.e. practice.

It is (c) that is most important in this context, since it holds that criteria are autonomous. Criteria qua rules are not justified by any meta-criteria or meta-rule. They themselves make all justifications possible. Wittgenstein does not accept hierarchy of rules as criteria. Hence they are expressed in application or practice and are shown in our language-use. Language use takes care of what criteria (rules) govern its meaning or sense. There is no additional element called 'criterion' to be added to the already known practice of language. Criteria and practice go together. Hence the autonomy of language-practice and the criteria thereof.

11. Autonomy of Language and Autonomy **of** Grammar

The question that remains still to be resolved is whether the autonomy of language and the autonomy of grammar are distinct

and if so, how they are distinct. This question is related to the distinction between language and grammar. It is well known that Wittgenstein makes distinction between language and grammar. Whereas language is a spatio-temporal phenomenon, grammar is not. Language is the actual application of rules of grammar. Thus there is a conceptual distinction between rules (grammar) and application (language-use). But it cannot be the case that rules and its application are externally and so contingently related as Finch³⁵ has advocated. This thesis has been foisted on Tractatus 5.557 where it has been maintained that logic and its application must be independent of each other. But Wittgenstein's intention here is to show that logic has to be applied in the world where application has to take into account the contingent features of the world. But this does not rule out the fact that logic can be applied according to its inner necessity and so must "pervade" the world' (TLP 5,61). Application in that sense must be determined by logic. This is evident in the case of rules of grammar which internally determine the use of language. The rules and rule-following are internally related as has been emphasized by Baker and Hacker.³⁶

From this it follows that language and its grammar are internally related. Grammar is only the account book of language (PG, Sect.44). Grammar has no other subject-matter than the rules of language. Its entire concern is language and not anything that transcends language. Grammar therefore is language-immanent. On the other hand, language is grammar-embedded. Its

historicality is harmonized with the ahistoricality of grammar. Wittgenstein writes,

The thing that's so difficult to understand can be expressed like this. As long as we remain in the province of the true-false games a change in the grammar can only lead us from one such game to another, but never from something true to something false. On the other hand, if we go outside the province of these games, then we don't any longer call it 'language' and 'grammar', and once again we don't come into contradiction with reality (PG, Sect. 68).

This reflects the distinction between language-use (true-false game) and grammar as such. The latter is what determines the language-game itself. Beyond grammar there is no language just as there is no grammar beyond language. Thus autonomy of grammar is related to the autonomy of language. If grammar is autonomous, so is language.

That is to say, if grammar cannot be determined by extra-grammatical reality, language also cannot be determined by anything beyond itself. Language and its use are all that we have and so we can at best say: Language is used this and this way. That is to leave language as it is (Cf. PI, Sect. 124). Hence language is autonomous.³⁷

12. Anti Foundationalism and Autonomy

Wittgenstein's autonomy doctrine is associated with his anti-foundationalism in philosophy. Anti-foundationalism is the Hallmark of his philosophy in general according to which philosophy does not provide foundations for language or logic or

mathematics. Philosophy describes the uses of language and systematizes them without providing any explanation. He writes,

philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language.; It can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. It also leaves mathematics as it is, as no mathematical discovery can advance it. A "leading problem of mathematical logic" is for us a problem of mathematics like any other (PI, Sect. 124).

That is, philosophy has no goal of presenting the explanation or justification of what happens in language. It only notes what languages does. Wittgenstein further claims

What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; We are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes. (PI, Sect. 415).

These remarks on natural history amount to philosophical description of what Wittgenstein calls the grammar of our language. Grammar is all that matters in that it describes the use of language, and also the practices and customs that constitute language. As Wittgenstein puts it,

Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such - and - such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs (PI. Sect. 496).

Since grammar has no foundation except those of language, there is no philosophical foundation for grammar. Similarly, since language itself is a matter of practice and is like our form of life, it has no foundation in the sense that there is

nothing hidden which philosophy has to find out. So, **as** Wittgenstein says, "we must do away with all explanation and description must take its place" (PI, Sect. 109).

Wittgenstein makes a radical distinction between explanation and description. Description is putting everything clearly before eyes, so that a perspicuous representation of grammar is possible (Cf. PI, Sect. 122). The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us (PI, Sect. 122), since it gives the overview of language and grammar. Explanation, on the contrary, is a search for ultimate causes which are lurking behind a phenomena. This is the peculiar method of science which Wittgenstein considers empirical (Cf. BBS, p. 18 and PI, Sect. 122, 128). Thus philosophy dispenses with all scientific explanations and opts for the description of grammatical phenomena. He writes.

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us (PI. Sect.126).

The argument Wittgenstein offers in defence of language and facts look like a commonsensical argument, answering the sceptic by stressing the fact that philosophical doubt does not get a hold in our ordinary way of behaviour. Philosophical explanations are ruled out because there is no room for philosophical scepticism Wittgenstein points out that if everything were doubted, understanding would be impossible. We

do presuppose some kind of certainty which is presupposed in our language and life. The examples Wittgenstein offers include such statements as "12 x 12 = 144" "I have just had lunch" "I have never been on moon." These examples show that the sceptical doubt about everything is impossible for "the game of doubting itself presuppose certainty (OC, Sect.115). These 'undoubted truths' are the grounds of all that we assert. They provide objective grounds for our system of beliefs. They come directly into play in our knowledge -claims. They constitute the justification conditions of all our language uses. They are the undoubted truths which philosophy wants us to take note of.

Wittgenstein can be a Kantian up to the point that both of them recognise grammar as transcendental. Kant, however, goes to recognize the categories as the conditions of all facts and provides transcendental justifications (deduction) for them. Hence Kant's grammar is theoretical and must be justified by philosophical reflection. But Wittgenstein's grammar takes care of itself. Wittgenstein does not take recourse to experience to justify grammar. For Wittgenstein grammar constitutes experience. Experience does not justify grammar; rather experience is intelligible due to grammar. Grammar is autonomous. This point is expressed by Guignon in the following way.

In so far as our grammar constitute what can count as reality for us, there is no exit from language to non-linguistic "facts" About ourselves or our world which could ground the grammar we have. But neither is it correct to think we create our language-games or grammar: "a language game does not have its origin in considerations (or reflection). Consideration (or reflection) is a part of a language game (Z, Sect. 391) ... A language-game is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable) It is there like our life:."(OC, Sect. 559).³⁸

Thus the autonomy of grammar results from the fact that grammar is not in need of foundations which could be provided by philosophical explanation.

NOTES

1. See Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972) and also Baker and Backer, Wittgenstein : Rules, Grammar and Necessity. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).
2. Ibid.
3. Backer, Insight and Illusion, p.159.
4. Ibid., pp.159-161.
5. Ibid., p.160.
6. The autonomy question in the Tractatus is linked with the idea that logic is a self-contained system and so must be governed by its own laws independently of what the world happens to be. In the Notebooks (22-8-14) Wittgenstein wrote:

Logic must take care of itself. If the syntactical rules for functions can be set up at all, then the whole theory of things, properties, etc. is supefluous. It is also all too obvious that this theory is not what is in the question either in the Grundgesetze or in Principia Mathematica.
Once more: Logic must take care of itself. A possible sign must also be capable of signifying. Everything that is possible at all, is also legitimate. Let us remember the explanation why "Socrates is Plato" is nonsense. That is, because we have not made an arbitrary specification, MOT because a sign is, shall we say, illegitimate in itself
7. See Henry Finch, Wittgenstein - Later Philosophy, An exposition of "Philosophical Investigations. (Humanities

- Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1977) Chapter 10.
8. of. Ibid., p.154.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Ibid., p.154-155.
 12. For a full discussion on game-model semantics, See Hintikka, Logic, Language-games and Information (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973) Chapter 2. Also see Hintikka, "Language-games" in Ludwig Wittgenstein : Ciritical Assessments, ed. by Stuart Shanker, (Croom Helm, London, 1986).
 13. See Finch, P.155.
 14. Hintikka and Hintikka have argued that Wittgstein held fast the doctrine of ineffability of semantics throughout his career. According to this doctrine, the semantical relations between language and the world are shown and not said in another language. Language, accordingly, is a universal medium. If expresses its own internal structure. See Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), Chapter I.
 15. See Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein : Rules Grammar and Necessity (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985) pp.329-330.
 16. Ibid., p.330.
 17. Ibid.
 18. Ibid.
 19. cf. Ibid., p.331.
 20. Ibid.

21. In this connection Baker and Hacker quote and translate an apt passage from Wittgenstein's unpublished writings:
- "The rules of grammar are arbitrary means: their purpose is not (e.g.) to correspond to the essence of negation or colour - but is the purpose of negation and of the concept of colour. As the purpose of the rules of chess is not to correspond to the essence of chess but to the purpose of the game of chess. OR : the rules of chess are not to correspond to the essence // the nature// of the chess king for they give it this essence, but the rules of cooking and roasting should indeed correspond to the nature of meat - This is, of course, a grammatical remark (MS, 160, 6)."
- (Quoted in Wittgenstein :_ Rules, Gramar and Necessity, p.331).
22. Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity, p.332.
23. For a detailed discussion on alternative grammar and conceptual systems, see Barry Stroud, "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity," in Wittgenstein "_ Philosophical Investigation ed. G. Pitcher (Macmillan, 1966), pp.477-96.
24. B. Williams, "Wittgenstein and Idealism", in Understanding Wittgenstein (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Vol.7 1972/73) (Macmillan, 1974), pp.75-95.
25. Ibid., pp.91-92.
26. See Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein; Rules, Grammar and Necessity, p.333.
27. MS, 166, 12 off. Quoted in Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity, p.333.

28. cf. *Ibid.*, pp.334-338.
29. Hacker has well argued for the non-arbitrariness of grammar. See his *Insight and Illusion* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972), pp.165-166..
30. *Ibid.*, p.166.
31. Finch, p.158.
32. P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, p.283.
33. For detailed discussion on interior, see P.M.S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, Ch.X.
34. See Milton K. Munitz, *Contemporary Analytic Philosophy*. pp.302-3.
35. cf. Finch, p.156.
36. cf. Baker and Hacker, *Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity*.
37. cf. Munitz, p.273. Munitz writes, "Grammar is autonomous, thought (and the language that conveys it) has its internal structures as articulated by the grammatical rules that belong to it. Thought (language) is structured by human conventions; it brings to reality its own structure. In order to describe reality (one must use the pre-established "forms of thought" (rules of grammar)", (p.273).
38. Charles Guignon, "Philosophy after Wittgenstein and Heidegger, " *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.1, No.4, (June, 1990), p.666.

CHAPTER - VI

PHILOSOPHICAL GRMMAR : NATURE;STRUCTURE AND LIMITS

1. EMPIRICAL VS PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR

In this chapter I will attempt to bring out a comprehensive outline of Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar and draw the limits of such a grammar vis-a-vis the empirical grammar and their logical counterparts in linguistic theory. My main contention is that philosophical grammar is not bound by the empirical constraints which appear in the structure of a non-philosophical linguistic grammar.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between two sorts of grammar, the one of the traditional linguistic variety to be called the empirical grammar and the other one of the logical variety to be called philosophical grammar. Traditional descriptive grammar concerns parts of speech (such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, etc.). It examines forms of pluarlizing nouns, regularities and irregularities in the conjunction of verbs and so on.¹ All the above problems seem to have nothing to do with philosophy. Philosophy is concerned with philosophical grammar. As Moore² puts it, grammar is a sort of thing one teaches small children at school e.g. we do not say "Two men was in the field but "Three men were in the field". And what has that to do with philosophy? According to Wittgenstein, the above example has

nothing to do with philosophy. It only tells what people do in a particular language. It only describes the particular grammar e.g. English grammar. It has nothing to say about what grammar is all about or what one does in following a grammatical rule. Philosophical grammar is concerned with the latter issues in that it is a reflection on grammar itself. Philosophical grammar therefore, is a reflection on grammar. In this sense philosophical grammar is more general and comprehensive than traditional grammar. It contains no information as to how a particular grammar works but concerns itself with the general issues relating to the availability of grammar as such. We may say here that there are not two kinds of grammar but two approaches to the study of grammar. They represent two kinds of interests in the rules of a language determined by different purposes. Philosophy is concerned with rules of grammar, i.e. rules for the use of expressions. It sheds light upon these problems. So, the range of its concern is wider and more comprehensive. Philosophy thus concerned with rules is philosophical grammar itself. Philosophical grammar is as wide as the concept of rule itself.

A grammarian in a narrower sense concerns himself with a particular natural language or languages and its forms and structure. A philosopher of language, on the other hand, is typically concerned with forms shared by many languages. Of course, it precludes language-specific enquires like to syntactic structure of sentences of a particular language, e.g. English,

Sanskrit, etc. Philosophy does not aim at producing a universal grammar; it even does not aim at producing a grammar at all. Rather it aims at resolving philosophical issues concerning grammar, its structure and limits.

The grammarian classifies parts of speech into noun, adjective etc, and states rules for them. The philosopher will typically concern himself with different classifications, e.g. sensation words, words for feelings, emotions, moods, attitudes etc. The philosopher can resolve conceptual puzzles concerning these words and resolve confusions arising out of their (mis) uses. He can clarify our knowledge of the world by arranging and contrasting the different rules for the use of perception words.⁴ An example of the philosopher's concern is: "I see better, more distinctly, than you" makes sense but, "I feel pain better, more distinctly than you" makes no sense. What is philosophically important here is the rules of use (grammar) of the words 'see' and 'feel'.

Grammarian's interest fall outside the interests of the philosophers, since while the latter's interest includes issues of more general kind, the former's interests do not go beyond what is interesting for a particular language or all languages taken together. The more complex problems concerning the nature and limits of language do not concern the empirical grammarian. For Wittgenstein, philosophical grammar is an account book of language (PG, Sect.44). It determines the limits of sense by

examining the nature of rules. The philosopher is primarily interested in the limits of sense in so far as they are determinable by examining the rule-structure of the languages concerned. Wittgenstein's notion of philosophical grammar is aimed at solving the problems of the limits of sense.

Wittgenstein, in a general way, may differentiate philosophical grammar from empirical grammar in the following ways: Firstly, philosophical grammar is concerned with rules for the use of words just as ordinary grammar is, except that where ordinarily grammar specifies and classifies those rules, philosophical grammar examines their structure. Philosophical conclusions about rules affect the very concept of language we have. Philosophical grammar does not discover anything new. It only puts language in a certain logical perspective. Secondly, the important difference between grammarians' interest in the use of words and philosophers' lies in their purposes.⁵ Though grammarians may concern themselves with meaning, they hardly raise questions, about whether meanings are at all possible, whereas philosophers do raise fundamental questions about the possibility of meaning e.g. whether meaning is extensional or intensional or whether meaning itself is an ontological entity, etc. Thus the grammarians' distinction between syntax and semantics which separates meaning from the structure of language is hardly binding for the philosophers. Philosophers do see the whole problem as one. Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there is no essentially dividing line in the patterns of the use of words

between the two called syntax and semantics.⁶ For him the study of syntax involves the study of the semantical questions and vice versa, as the philosophers' goal is to study the whole of language.

Lastly, Wittgenstein takes grammar as covering, in the widest sense, all the conditions and methods necessary for comparing the propositions with reality (PG. Sect.88). Philosophers' interest is in the language-world relations; therefore, for him, grammar must take into account how language, though autonomous and self-contained, is yet related to the world. Language becomes a significant phenomenon only against the backdrop of the phenomenal world of which it itself is a constituent. The signs are spread over the world. So the study of the signs is a study of the world. What is, however, philosophically significant is that for grammar studies "the harmony between reality and thought to which indeed a form of our language corresponds" (PG, Sect.88).

Philosophical grammar studies primarily "the question of sense as we have indicated earlier. Hence the distinction of sense and non-sense is fundamental for philosophical studies of grammar. There is a distinct idea of grammatical nonsense. The sentences, 'Green ideas are 'idle', 'Socrates is identical', etc. are philosophically nonsense, though they may appear as well-formed. Philosopher's major concern with grammar lies in detecting well concealed form of nonsense. It is this nonsense which pervades language and the philosopher's task is to bring

them to light. Wittgenstein writes,

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery (PI, Sect.119).

2. DEPTH STRUCTURE AND DEPTH GRAMMAR

a. Surface Structure and Deep Structure

Chomsky⁷ has formulated two distinct types of sentential structures. These are surface structure and deep structure. Surface structure, according to Chomsky, is the observable grammatical structure of a sentence. The phonological component of a generative grammar operates on surface structure. This is a product of syntactic rules and is responsible for the phonological representations of the sentence. Depth structure is distinct from phonological representation. It is associated with the underlying grammatical form of sentences.⁸ Depth structure accounts for the grammatical relations which are not observable on the surface structure. It explains how the infinite sentences of the natural language are generated. Thus Chomsky's generative grammar has a stake in the concept of depth structure of sentences.

Chomsky has given an interesting example⁹ to support the above point: (i) "John is eager to please." (ii) "John is easy to please." Both the sentences have the same surface


structure. They have the form 'Noun + Verb + Adjective + infinitive'. But there is an underlying grammatical difference between the two. We cannot paraphrase (i) in the following way. (i) "It is eager to please John"; though we can paraphrase (ii) as (ii) "It is easy to please John". Thus the sentences (i) and (ii) are different though their surface structures are alike because they have different deep structures. Chomsky's theory explains the similarity of the surface structure in terms of the operation of transformational rules which convert the deep structure into the respective surface structures. Surface structures are derivatively linked with the depth structures.

b. The Model

The distinction between surface structure and deep structure is introduced in the transformational model of grammar. This distinction is a part of the syntax of language. According to Chomsky, syntax is logically prior to semantics. In other words, meaning depends on the structure of the sentences. The semantic component of language depends upon the deep structure postulated by the grammarian. The transformational generative grammar has the following model¹⁰ built into it.

SYNTACTIC COMPONENT

base rules



In this model the base rules generate the fundamental grammatical relations of the language and produce deep structure of the sentences. There are transformational rules which convert the deep structures into surface structures. The phonological and morphological component operates on those structures to produce 'phonological representations. Besides, the amalgamation rules operate to produce semantic interpretation. The surface structure of language resulting in semantic interpretation accounts for meaning. Meaning (semantics) is thus linked with the depths-structure (syntax).¹¹

c. Structure and Meaning

From the above description of the TG model one can find that Chomsky makes a clear-cut distinction between structure and

meaning. The semantic theory is built upon the theory of structure proposed in TG grammar. The significant semantic relations are derived from the nature of the dictionary entries and their interpretation.¹² Lexical entries are specified by the deep structure. The semantic interpretation is the built-in device of language to generate meaning out of structures.

Chomsky says rules and categories of deep structure are universal. That is to say, they are universally applicable to the structure of sentences in any language. Universal grammar is the underlying reality of all the languages.¹³ It is the common structure of all empirically available languages. Universal grammar is the core of Chomsky's model of grammar, since it explains how the particular languages and their particular grammars are possible. (We shall have more discussions on this later).

Another significant aspect of Chomsky's theory is that universal grammar is mental, since it is the innate feature of human languages. Language in this sense is out and out internal regardless of the external features which vary spatio-temporally. Universal rule-structure is the innate as well as the normative feature that describes how language is possible.¹⁴

d. Wittgenstein on Depth Grammar vs Surface Grammar.

The philosophical distinction between depth grammar and surface grammar is a basic feature of Wittgenstein's philosophy

of language. Wittgenstein writes,

In the use of words one might distinguish "surface grammar" from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use-one might say - that can be taken in by the ear - And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean" with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect (PI, Sect.664).

As already discussed in Chapter I this passage is crucial to understanding Wittgenstein's distinction between depth grammar and surface-grammar. The surface grammar, in short, represents the observable features of a sentence while the depth grammar represents the logical features.

It can be argued that depth grammar can be determined by going beyond linguistic signs. In that sense, depth grammar is the logical grammar reflecting the logical form of sentences that is exclusively the philosopher's concern. On the contrary, the observable grammatical features which include the grammatical rules must be with in the preview of the grammarian.¹⁵ This may be called surface grammar according to Wittgenstein. Grammar philosophically stands for the necessary conditions of language-use i.e. the rules which non-contingently determine the significance of language-use. The rules which constitute the groundwork of semantics of language are not themselves products of semantic theory but are the presuppositions of semantics as such. The logical rules including truth, reference and meaning are the a priori features of all semantic systems. Wittgenstein's depth grammar, in contradistinction to Chomsky's, stands for

these logical rules which are the necessary conditions of meaningful use of language.

e. Ineffability of Semantics

It has been suggested that Wittgenstein's concept of grammar is exclusively semantical since he fails to recognise the importance of syntax in understanding language.¹⁶ This suggestion is based on the assumption that Wittgenstein makes a clear-cut distinction between syntax and semantics in the grammarian's sense. However, according to Wittgenstein, grammar includes both syntax and semantics. Although Wittgenstein is interested in formulating a depth grammar in contrast to surface grammar, he is not concerned with either syntax or semantics in the grammarian's sense. Syntax, for him, is logical syntax that specifies the rules of grammar for making sentences meaningful.

The semantical issues of meaning and truth are taken for granted in formulating the logical syntax. Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka have rightly pointed out that for Wittgenstein, semantics is ineffable in that meaning or sense and the language-world relations are the underlying presuppositions of understanding of language. If syntax takes into account the formation of sentences and their employment in language-game, then semantics dealing with sense must be already shown the use of sentences. Sense, therefore, is not a further desideratum for grammar. Syntax mirrors sense and other semantical rules that

account for the sentential structure of language. Wittgenstein writes,

In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown. (Not some sort of preparatory provisional one); This by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.

Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us? - Well, your very questions were framed in this language, they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask! (PI, Sect.120).

Ineffablility of semantics is directly linked with the fact that we can adduce the syntactical facts about language but we cannot mention the semantical facts in the same way. Hence they must be presupposed in the language we study systematically.¹⁸

In the transformational linguistic theory, syntax and semantics stand in separate footing. While syntax is concerned with the syntactic components and their rules, semantics is concerned with the interpretation and endowment of meaning on the structures. Therefore transformational grammarian brings semantics into existence by providing the theory of semantic interpretation of syntax. Unlike in Wittgenstein the grammarian's semantics is a part of surface grammar, so semantics is posterior to the analysis of the syntactic deep structure. For Wittgenstein, on the contrary, semantics is presupposed in the depth grammar. It is co-eval with depth grammar.

The transformational linguist requires that "grammar" be interpreted univocally. Secondly, he demands that language functions according to the principle of creativity which explains

how an infinite number of rules of sentences can be generated from a finite rule-structure. This principle is a psychological principle explaining the existence of the complex structures of language. Depth grammar, according to Wittgenstein, is concerned with neither of these goals. Depth grammar, is the logic of language and so goes beyond the empirical demands of grammar. Thus the chief difference between depth structure and depth grammar lies in the fact that what constitutes deep structure is narrower than the scope of depth grammar. Semantic interpretations depends on prior specification of deep structure. But depth grammar accounts for the logical structure of both the syntactic and semantic facts. Depth grammar is the logical basis of both syntax and semantics. Thus, for Wittgenstein, grammar is not syntactical nor is it semantical. It is the presupposition of both. It studies rules or norms that explain how syntax and semantics are possible.

3. LOGIC AND GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein's concept of grammar reflects the universality and necessity of logic. Logic and grammar become one in their normative structure. Neither logic nor grammar is concerned with the empirical facts of syntax and semantics. So Wittgenstein writes,

Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs (PI. Sect.496).

This explains how the need of grammar arises from the need of the knowledge of the use of language. The factuality of use is not the object of grammatical description; it is its essentiality that matters for grammar. The essence of use is its rules or norms. These are the underlying logical features of language. As logical, they are universal and so must precede the description of linguistic facts. In that sense, though use is language-specific, its rule-structure is universal and necessary. This fact is captured in the following summary statement by Wittgenstein :

Grammar does not address itself to empirical universality but to a universality of the ultimate rules of the game whose validity is beyond appeal (See PG, p.215).¹⁹

The dividing line between logic and grammar is completely blurred if grammar is taken as a normative structure.²⁰ Otherwise the empirical grammars have to be bracketed along with other empirical sciences in order to distinguish between grammar in the logical sense and grammars of the descriptive kind.

The issue of grammar being logical is itself decided by the way grammar is being defined. If the object of grammar is to seek the empirical foundations of language, then grammar is bound to be hypothetical. If, on the contrary, its aim is to see the essence of language and its rule-structure, then it is trans-empirical and so logical. Itkonen writes.

A grammar is a theory of language. A theory is empirical if and only if, it is testable on the basis of space-time entities, i.e. events or actions. There are two ways in which the theory may be non-empirical: Either it does not deal with space-time entities at all, ... or it deals, at least apparently, with space-time entities, but is formulated in such a way as not to be falsifiable by them.²¹

Wittgenstein's grammar is non-empirical in the former sense. It has nothing to do with spatio-temporal entities. Its subject matter is rules and not the factuality or contingency of language-use. The conditions of significant use i.e. criteria are the concern of logic and grammar. Use as such is a phenomenon which grammar takes note of but that is not what grammar talks about. As it has been summarily put,

The foundation of grammar is the distinction between sense and non-sense. I would like to say: 'I must begin with the distinction between sense and nonsense. Before that nothing is possible. I cannot justify it (PG, 81} Having presupposed this foundation grammar consists combinations (See PG. 138).²²

Grammar seeks to understand how signs, being what they are, are employed as symbols in a meaningful discourse. It is solely concerned with the possibility of language and thus demands to be non-factual.

4. COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE

The linguist's approach to language stands in sharp contrast to the philosopher's approach. The linguist is primarily interested in how the sentences are produced out of a finite base

through recursive rules. It provides a model which relates signs to one another and explains how complex systems come into being. The grammarian takes depth structure as a completely syntactic notion and this abstracts language from the world and the linguistic community. Hence, the concept of empirical grammar fails to explain how it itself is possible. It not only fails to relate itself to the world but definitely makes language self-closed and insensitive to the world.

Katz²⁴ has advocated that semantic interpretations provided by the semantic theory are in no way contextually controlled. Syntactic context alone is relevant to semantic interpretation. The social or natural contexts of use do not enter into consideration.²⁵ Thus language-world link is snapped and language remains immersed in itself. Grammar becomes a systematic exposition of the underlying structures. Semantics becomes a matter of structural interpretation.

Transformational grammarians further claim that they are interested in a speaker's ideal competence of language-use and not in his actual use. As Chomsky has made clear, grammar is interested in competence²⁶ and not in performance. Competence is regarded as prior to performance, and in that sense performance requires the competence. Language-use is thus embedded in the network of competence packed into the language user's mind. Chomsky writes,

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogenous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly, and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.²⁷

Transformational grammar while defining competence of the speakers presupposes that there is an innate grammatical structure that lies packed in the speaker's mind. This mentalistic hypothesis is a sine qua non of the competence model. Performances which consists in actual language use are underrated for the reason that a competence speaker under ideal conditions knows the language so perfectly well that there is little that can be added by the use of that language. Our knowledge of grammar is the competence of internalizing rules that manifest in performance under suitable circumstances. As Chomsky claims,

Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing, for the most part, with mental processes that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness ... Thus a generative grammar attempts to specify what the speaker actually knows, not what he may report about his knowledge.²⁸

Wittgenstein, quite obviously, has no interest in the mental picture (model) of grammar since it, according to him, produces no explanatory hypothesis. All explanation of grammar fail to situate it in the proper perspective. This is one of the reasons why Wittgenstein emphasizes the application or use of language in the world. Use is neither a unilateral feature nor is it manifesting a hidden mental mechanism. Therefore the mental

mist surrounding grammar must go. The mental processes, if there are any, are purely external to what rules are internalized and followed. Rules, according to Wittgenstein, are the regular practices that we are trained to adopt in the relevant world-situations. Therefore rules are rules of use rather than mentally transparent structures. Wittgenstein dismisses the very idea that rules are present in the mind prior to their application in the language-use. Wittgenstein writes,

The grammar of a language isn't recorded and doesn't come into existence until the language has already been spoken by human beings for a long time. Similarly, primitive games are played without their rules being codified, and even without a single rule being formulated. (PG, Sect.26).

But does this mean that Wittgenstein rejects competence in favour of performance? Obviously not. The reason is that this distinction does not bother Wittgenstein. In fact, his emphasis is on the ability to learn a language and the consequent mastery or the application of language. Competence arises in collaboration with performance. There is a unitary situation that makes a holistic frame of competence-cum-performance available. Language use bears this dual relationship. A competent speaker is one who can perform successfully and similarly a successful performer is a competent speaker who has mastered the language. Thus Wittgenstein presents a holistic grammatical model that gives a total view of language.

5. UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE AND UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

Chomsky²⁹ makes a distinction between language and grammar. He considers grammar as a theory of language. He makes a further distinction between particular grammars of particular languages and the universal grammar. Universal grammar (UG), according to Chomsky, provides the basic structure or system of rules innately built into mind or brain. UG is a biologically innate language faculty given to the human species. It can be activated through experiences and other environmental factors, according to Chomsky.³⁰ Thus the biological model of UG stands in sharp contrast with Wittgenstein's notion of grammar.

Chomsky takes language as a derivative and epiphenomenal³¹ concept and makes it rather less important and less revealing a term in his linguistic theory. For him, UG is the bedrock phenomenon (biologically speaking), and so the particular grammar (p-grammars) are the evolutes and branches of universal grammar. P-languages are twice removed from UG and thus partake of the accidental features of the factual natural epiphenomena. There are two points to be noted.

1. Language is a natural phenomena and is a part of the world. But it is less an original phenomenon. It is only a particular organisation of the UG, the bedrock phenomenon.
2. UG as the ultimate bedrock of the natural languages is also a natural phenomenon. It is the origin of all P-languages. So UG has dual status, the ontological one of being the

genetic source of languages and the epistemic one of being the source of the derivability of P-grammars and their P-languages.

The consequence of this way of looking at grammar and languages is that grammar becomes a naturalistic theory of language. Besides, UG becomes a universal phenomena without being a universal medium of anything, while language becomes a particular phenomenon without being any particular entity. Languages have restricted scope since they are accidental in comparison to the biologically embedded universal grammar.

The duality of UG and P-languages throws up many other consequence which we shall discuss now. UG as a theory of languages (P-languages) provides all that we wish to know about language. Knowledge of languages consists in the knowledge of competence as distinguished from performance. That is, knowledge of rules and their application. This distinction between competence and performance reminds us of the rationalist distinction of reason and experience. It suggests that competence (rules) is a matter of rational (conscious) knowledge while their application or use is a matter of experience dependent on the environment, linguistic conventions, and practical abilities. Thus, knowledge of language, truly speaking, is not the knowledge of use, performance and rule application and of so called linguistic habits. It is state of mind for two reasons; namely.

- a) It is the initial state, state O , which evolves with the steady state S_s of the mind though it is largely unconscious.
- b) It is the faculty of language, the 'mental organ' deeply seated in the central mechanisms of the brain.³²

Chomsky thus takes knowledge of language as implicit in the mechanism of the brains. Thus he abolishes the possibility of learning language altogether because learning is ultimately possessed by the language faculty which is already biologically accomplished. So, learning a language is not a skill or ability. It is innately given in the brain.

Now the question arises, Is Chomsky's cognitive linguistics based on the idea that the theory of language (grammar) is a psychological theory consistent in exploring the knowledge of language as we understand it? Chomsky's answer is that he is not concerned with ordinary knowledge of language, that is, the notion of language as an ability or practice. He is concerned with what we have in our cognitive possession of language and grammar and what we become when we acquire a language. Hence his idea that grammatical knowledge is a state rather than process, a competence rather than performance, and ultimately a faculty of the mind or brain which is richly endowed with a rule-structure.

Chomsky calls grammatical knowledge unconscious . It is unconscious because it is an innate rule-structure that yields a

rich variety of the humanly accessible grammars and so cannot be the object of metagrammar. It cannot, therefore, be the object of a grammatical enquiry. Thus, a question arises: Is there any meta UG? Chomsky says 'NO', because as soon as he admits that it is there then UG cannot be a universal grammar. It will become the object of a higher grammar. For Chomsky, UG is the base-grammar and so it is unconscious. By 'unconscious' he means that the possessor of UG, say a child, is not aware that it possesses UG though it is having it as the built-in system of its brain. That is, UG is not an item of consciousness, since, for Chomsky, consciousness is only a fraction of the vast store of human mind/brain structure. Thus in a sense there is no contradiction in saying that innate knowledge is not necessarily a conscious process.

The impossibility of metagrammar³⁴ leads to a lot of difficulties. We will not have a language in which we can express UG itself. UG is not itself a language, UG is the rule-structure of all humanly possible grammars i.e. the P-grammars. If we admit a language to express, UG, then UG becomes a P-grammar and if we don't, UG is inexpressible and unconscious. Chomsky has the second option because he cannot admit higher-order grammar than UG. UG is universal in the sense that it is the common root of all P-grammars and it itself contains the possibility of language and so it cannot be a language as such.

6. Is UG is unconscious or ineffable?

Chomsky's answer would be UG is not a matter to be acquired or empirically learnt. Of course, it is to be empirically discovered and there is a grammatical theory to embed it. The grammatical theory is an innate structure in the human brain. So, one can conclude, UG is a system of a universal rule-structure. The thesis of unconscious UG only implies that it is not an item of consciousness and possibility there is not higher order of language that can include UG homophonically. It stands for rules that explain how language as such is logically possible. So there is a difference between the universality of logical grammar and Chomsky's physicalistic - mentalistic theory of grammar.

Wittgenstein proposes a theory of universality of language which contains a universal grammar. Wittgenstein is concerned with the universality of grammar which is the logical grammar of the language. Logical grammar begins with Frege and continues in Wittgenstein's work. It stands for rules that explain how a language as such is logically possible. So there is a difference between the universality of logical grammar and Chomsky's physicalistic - mentalistic theory of grammar. Chomsky downgrades language and thereby the so called logic of language. Wittgenstein's universality claims for outstrip the empirical boundaries of UG. For Chomsky, language is an epiphenomenon. So the so called logic of language is nothing but a pale shadow of what he calls universal grammar. For Wittgenstein, however, the

logic of language is more universal than universal grammar because UG itself conforms to the principles of logical grammar. The logical grammar is normative and so is more basic than empirical grammars, including universal grammar. The duality between logic and empirical grammar is marked in the nature of the two disciplines.³⁵

From Wittgenstein's point of view, Chomsky's model of grammatical can be considered inadequate for the simple reason that Chomsky has no notion of universal language. He has no conception of language as a universal medium. The notion of language is foundational and universal for Wittgenstein. He considers grammar as derivative and expressible in the language itself. Although grammar is rule-structured according to Wittgenstein, it has no peculiarities of Chomsky's universal grammar e.g. its being an innate endowment of the brain. For Wittgenstein, language is universal not because it is an innate structure of the brain but because it is the medium of everything including logic, grammar and philosophy. It expresses all that is effable i.e. what can be said. Natural language is the great home of all that could be talked about, acted upon or played with in an unbounded way.³⁶

Thus, from Wittgenstein's point of view, Chomsky's theory of language gives us a picture of the accidental characteristics of language. Language, is at best a mental feature of human beings. Nonetheless, it is accidental because man's brain could have been otherwise. So language loses its universality. Besides, UG,

being an innate endowment, becomes a mystery of mysteries UG, remains, however, the background phenomenon, i.e., the ultimate genetic code of all languages and so it is the only natural phenomenon which brain sciences must discover through empirical means. Wittgenstein has nothing to do with brain sciences. He has therefore no conception of an empirically discoverable universal grammar of the Chomskian sort.

Wittgenstein would reject any distinction between I - language and E-language³⁷ which Chomsky makes because he believes language is itself a unitary, a holistic phenomenon. For Wittgenstein there is no distinction between competence and performance because he does not admit a gap between rules and their applications Wittgenstein believes that there is no competence (rule-structure) unless that is exactly displayed in the complex network of performances (Use/language-games). Competence is not a deep mental occurrence which has no correlate in the use of language. Use involves competence just as competence is expressed in language-mastery. Chomsky cuts off the inner chord between language and grammar because he makes grammar contingent. Besides, he makes UG unconscious, though mental, because language is not considered as a universal medium. UG has no language to express itself, since it is the physical root of all languages. Wittgenstein makes the distinction between language and grammar in language itself. For him language and grammar are in the same logical space. Wittgenstein is not against mental as such but against the mental which is queer,

inscrutable and unconscious. That is why he cannot accept anything which is laid in the dark chamber of the mind and can never be expressed in language itself.

7. QUINE ON LOGICAL GRAMMAR

Among the champions of logical grammar Quine is most prominent. Quine, like Wittgenstein, proposes a grammar that can be the logical basis of all languages. He agrees with Wittgenstein on the rejection of the mentalist-empiricist³⁸ grammar of Chomsky. For Quine, grammar includes the logical structure of language.³⁹

Quine makes a distinction between immanent and transcendent grammars.⁴⁰ Immanent grammar is a particular grammar of a particular language. The immanents e.g. der words in German are peculiar to a particular language. Lexicon can be taken as an example of an immanent notion. Lexicon simply comprises those words or morphemes that are assigned to particular languages. On the contrary, the transcendent grammar, according to Quine, is concerned with grammaticality in general. It is directed to languages generally. It is related to the formal structure of languages. So, it is applicable in advance to any unspecified language. The logical grammar is therefore a transcendent grammar since it applies to all languages.

Quine's notion of transcendence, as he admits it, is of the Husserlian type. The notion of grammatical category is a

transcendent concept. We have to define the grammatical category by interchangeability Salva SCongruitate. As Quine writes.

If, having started with some satisfactorily transcendent notion of grammaticality we were to proceed to define the notion of a grammatical category simply by interchangeability salva congruitate in Husserl's way then the notion of a grammatical category would likewise be transcendent.⁴¹

Quine has taken logic as grammatical category. It is a kind of grammatical analysis. Grammatical categories, however, can be demarcated strictly on the basis of interchangeability salva congruitate. Grammar considers the logical categories viz., two-place predicates, quanfiers and so on. Quine gives the example of variables, like 'X;', 'Y', 'Z' etc. as part of the logical vocabulary. The rest of the logical grammar consists of further grammatical constructions. Quine gives a map of logical grammar. It consists of two-place predicates, logical connectives like conjunction and negation and existential quantification. Thus the logical map of language presented in the logical grammar provides the clue to our understanding of the structure of all languages. Quine accepts the universality of logical grammar.

8. QUINE VS WITTMENSTEIN ON GRAMMAR

The following observations can be made on Quine's vs Wittgenstein's notion of logical grammar.

Firstly, Quine is a logician. He is concerned with the logical study of language. Logic is important for him, not

language. Although he takes all logical notions as grammatical categories, nevertheless he thinks logic is a device to solve all problems of language. Wittgenstein is on the contrary, concerned with language primarily and so deals with logic as a method of understanding language. He thinks that logic is a part of grammar. There is no logic without language, according to Wittgenstein.

Secondly, Quine does not give importance to the transcendent notion of grammar although he admits that study of the 'grammatical' is the philosopher's concern. Here, he subscribes to the Wittgensteinian view that logic is transcendent or transcendental in the sense of the Tractatus. 6.13 because its truths are outside the domain of accidentality or contingency. Wittgenstein agrees with Quine that grammar is transcendental because in grammar we are seeking the underlying conditions for the possibility of language i.e. the essence (logical) of languages. Lastly, interestingly enough, Quine thinks grammar is a logical product of language. This means his notion of logical grammar vindicates Wittgenstein's view on language and grammar. For Wittgenstein, grammar is comprehensive enough to include logic in its domain. However, according to him, both logic and grammar are contained in language, language being the universal medium. Logic and grammar reveal the rule-structure of language. Quine cannot, however, deny that language is pre-logical and pre-grammatical in the sense that without language we cannot just think of what logic can be. Unlike Frege,⁴² Quine did not

conceive of logic as a universal language, since he could realize, like Wittgenstein, that language is the universal medium and logic is contained in language.

9. STRAWSON'S NOTION OF PERSPICUOUS GRAMMAR

Strawson⁴³ in his conception of grammar stresses the importance of non-empirical character of grammar in contradistinction with Chomsky's empirical grammar. Non-empirical grammar, according to him, demonstrate the logicity of its rules and their consequent universality.

Let us consider first what Strawson means by perspicuous grammar. A perspicuous grammar represents the ideal speaker's ability to understand, produce and criticise indefinitely many new sentences of his language. Grammar ideally represents the various components viz (a) the ontological vocabulary (b) a semantic vocabulary (c) functional vocabulary for combining different elements (d) a vocabulary of formal devices.⁴⁴ An ideal grammar is perspicuous for the reason that it throws light on what languages of certain type must broadly share in the structure. Strawson names this condition as the condition for the possibility of perspicuous grammar. The perspicuous grammar, to say the least is non-empirical.

According to Strawson perspicuous grammar needs true explanatory foundations. Philosophers are ready to accept grammar if it is provided with true explanatory foundations.

Philosophy tries to reach the grammatical form of sentences which lies deep down the surface structure. As Strawson says, the philosophical investigations of the foundations of grammar are non-empirical.⁴⁵

Philosophers are generally concerned with the logical conditions of meanings and not with the formal arrangements by means of which functional relations are actually represented. He will have a conception of meaning element on the one hand and of systematic modes of combination of them (syntactical relations) on the other. The semantics and syntax are within the philosophers purview in a logical sense.

Strawson always stresses perspicuous conditions for meaningfulness of language. Naturally that leads to the conception of non-empirical linguistics. It involves a theoretical model of language. Thus perspicuous grammar is closely similar to the ideal language of the logician. Like a logician, the philosopher-grammarian exposes the ideal structure of language. So, non-empirical grammar will be concerned with every point at which structure is needed to contribute to the overall meaning of language. Structure must be exposed at every point and understood.

Strawson distinguish two types of grammar one is the intrinsic or essential grammar of language-type and the other one is the alternative invariable grammar of language type.⁴⁶ Strawson defines language-type as specifying (i) the semantic or

broadly logical type of meaning elements it contains and (ii) the types of significant combinations into which they enter to form sentences. Essential grammar is apriori since its components are ideally determined . The rules of essential grammar show that all combinations are perspicuously laid down. According to Strawson, the essential grammar is of the subject-predicate⁴⁷ type which is the underlying grammar of ordinary language. Subject-predicate structure holds the key to the perspicuous character of grammar.

There are similarities between Strawson and Wittgenstein approaches to grammar. Both Strawson and Wittgenstein are interested in the perspicuity of the conditions of the meaningfulness of linguistic units. They want each and every linguistic unit to be clear and well-defined in order to present the logical conditions of language-use. Secondly, for Wittgenstein a linguistic unit gets its meaning in the form-of-life embedded in a language-game. Forms of life can provide the basic conditions or locus standi of all grammatical rules constituting the structure of language. For Strawson, language is remotely modelled on forms of life, and so he will argue that grammar indirectly represents the essential features of our conceptual system.

Both Wittgenstein and Strawson lay stress on the grammar of ordinary language and both believe that philosophy can only describe the essential structure of language. Strawson's claim

that there is a central ahistorical⁴⁸ core of our conceptual scheme can be compared with Wittgenstein's idea that ordinary language is our form of life and involves the constitutive elements or categories of our thinking.

10. HUSSERL ON PURE GRAMMAR

The concept of ideal or pure grammar finds a bold echo in Husserl's philosophy. Husserl spoke of "pure grammar" analogous to Kant's "pure science" of nature. For Husserl, pure or formal grammar comprehends the entire domain of a priori structures of language and experience. The assumption behind this conception of grammar is that there exists a common grammatical form which is valid for all languages and which can be determined a priori. According to Husserl, natural languages obey certain a priori laws and manifest an ideal framework' which is stable in spite of the empirical and accidental differences proper to each particular language.⁴⁹ Language has thus both essential and inessential elements. It is with the essential elements, i.e., a priori laws that grammar is concerned. Grammar, for Husserl, is the theory of the a priori laws of meaning and the syntactic combinations.⁵⁰

Husserl shares with Wittgenstein the concept of the grammatical. He makes it clear that he is not concerned with the empirical grammars. The grammar that he deals with is a priori and purely logical. Husserl, like Wittgenstein, explores the conditions for the possibility of grammar. He explores the possibility of a universal grammar.⁵¹ That represents the

apriori features of all possible experience. It is universal in the sense that all apriori representations are universal and necessary in Kant's sense. Husserl has the Kantian concept of the apriori as his model. In the sphere of grammar, Husserl finds standards or apriori norms. As in logic apriori elements are distinguished from the inessential features, so in grammar the so called purely grammatical i.e. the apriori elements are separated from the empirical ones. In this respect, logic and grammar are both concerned with the apriori structures. In both cases the empirical element is determined by the universal and necessary structures of language. The apriori in either case is demonstrated in the fact that language embodies the experiences that concern the natural world. The apriori is not divorced from the empirical and natural.⁵² O

Husserl located the apriori grammar in the logical structure of language. The structure of language is the guide to the structure of experience according to him. Experience, phenomenologically speaking, is the bedrock level of our reconstruction of the world. The reconstruction involves language. So, grammar studies the basic structure of experience by studying the apriori structure of language. As Husserl points out, the study of the grammatical is the first level of the logical reflection.

Now there are two aspects of the phenomenon of experience, viz. (i) the experience of the world and (ii) experience of language,⁵⁴ for the reason that experience is itself structured

through language. The experience in language is the experience of the world. For Husserl, experience of language is the experience of meaning itself. Experience of language requires a phenomenological reduction of the world. So there is the full concentration on the meaning themselves as separated from their empirical instantiations. They construct the domain of the significations⁵⁵ - the apriori domain of the "sense" or 'the meant'.

Formal logic studies this apriori domain of meanings. Grammar supplies the categorial framework for understanding these meanings. Now, the implicit phenomenological reduction takes a linguistic turn as it turns away from the world towards language itself. Thus it results in the discovery and analysis of the grammatical. Husserl calls it the study of the pure morphology of significations - 'pure apriori logical grammar.'⁵⁶

11. HUSSERL VS WITTGENSTEIN ON THE GRAMMATICAL

Husserl's concept of grammar has close affinity with that of Wittgenstein's. Grammar is the structural description of the apriori rules in both Husserl and Wittgenstein. In this sense, "the study of grammar is purely logical and apriori. Pure logical grammar, according to Husserl, is the first branch of formal logic which establishes the formal grammatical rules necessary for any statement to be meaningful at all; it is prior to the question of the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is concerned with meaning and not with truth.

Both Husserl and Wittgenstein agree that a judgement must instantiate an a priori grammatical rule in its well-formed structure. A sentence is well-formed if it is grammatically sound and therefore embodies a grammatical rule. The following sentences do not have meaning since they are not well-formed. The statements are

1. Kings but where seems end
2. This frivolous is green
- 3 Red is world.
4. A man is end.

The above strings of words are devoid of any unified meanings. The words have individual meanings, but when they are arranged ungrammatically they have none. It is the task of pure logical grammar to derive from the original form of judgements the laws which govern the potentially meaningful sentences of various forms. Wittgenstein would agree that the logical form of a sentence must be derivable from the underlying grammatical rules. Accordingly, the purely formal grammatical rules are independent of truth or falsity of statements. The sentences which are grammatically permitted are meaningful; otherwise, they are meaningless. Formal grammar saves us from meaninglessness (unsinn).⁵⁸

Wittgenstein comes very near to Husserl when he says that grammar is the analysis of the formal conditions of thought. Both take the study of grammar as anti-psychologistic. The main

task of grammar is to study the apriori rules which explain the formal structure of sentences. Wittgenstein has been insistent on the view that rules are not accidental to a language-system. They are the formal and necessary features of any symbolism. Therefore, for both Husserl and Wittgenstein, logic is a grammar of rules and their application in the construction of symbol systems.

However, Husserl's concept of grammar fails to be free of phenomenological rootedness in human experience. Though grammar is transcendent still its connection with the empirical domain is preserved, though bracketed. Wittgenstein makes grammar completely transcendental for the reason that for him grammar is autonomous and so is free of all causal and empirical connections with the world. In Wittgenstein, grammar constitutes the world, while in Husserl, the world is reduced to an empirical and contingent set of experiences. Thus the Husserlian grammar is still Platonist and fails to overcome the dichotomy between grammar and the world.

12. PHILOSOPHY, GRAMMAR AND THE SCIENCE OF TRIVIALITIES

Pure grammar establishes rules which are always understood and already taken for granted in all formal systems. These rules establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaningful expressions. Philosophy, therefore, as deeply interested in grammar, states the necessary and the grammatical in language.

Husserl takes special interest in the fact that philosophers are concerned only with a priori and the logical in our experience. This makes him closer to Wittgenstein on the conception of philosophy as the study of grammar, i.e. the logical and the a priori. Both believe that philosophy discovers nothing new. It only describes the essential structures of language and experience. Hence philosophy is acceptedly a description of essences of grammar and the world. But this is not philosophy of novelties but of the trivialities⁶⁰ that are so obviously true.

The nature of philosophy as a study of grammar becomes nondistinct from logical grammar itself. Philosophy as the reflection on the grammatical is itself a grammatical enterprise. Wittgenstein therefore calls philosophy a philosophical grammar. The philosopher's interest in the logical and the a priori as found in Husserl, Quine and Strawson, reiterates the fact that the limits of philosophical grammar are those of philosophy itself. There could not be an extra-grammatical philosophy at all since grammar extends to the domain of the intelligible and formally possible. In that sense, both grammar and philosophy are transcendental. They do not occur in time nor are they on the same level as the linguistic activities. Language is historical and therefore subject to change and evolution. But philosophical grammar, like philosophy, is self-contained and independent of the historicity of language. We can therefore say that language can never be perspicuous; only grammar can be BO. It is the task of philosophy to make grammar perspicuous.

The dichotomy between pure logical grammar and the empirical grammars is the dichotomy between philosophy and natural sciences. Grammar logically structured belongs to the heart of philosophy. Empirical grammar is the subject-matter of the science of language. Wittgenstein, commenting on the nature of grammar, says,

One can discover nothing in grammar. There are no surprises. When we formulate a rule, we always have the feeling: You have always known that. All we can do is to formulate clearly the rule that we have applied unconsciously. If I understand the sense of a sentence at all then I must understand the syntax of the expressions occurring in it. There is nothing to be discovered in grammar, all we can do is to clarify.⁶¹

NOTES

1. See Jespersen, Philosophy of Grammar. (Allen and Onwin, London, 1924; Reprinted 1975).
2. cf. G.E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures 1930-1933" in Classics of Analytic Philosophy, Ed. R. Ammerman (Tata McGraw Hill, Bombay, New Delhi, 1965).
3. See Wittgenstein's Lectures. Cambridge 1932-35 from the notes of Alice Ambrose and MO McDonald. Ed. Alice Amborase (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.31.
4. See Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein : Rules, Grammar and Necessity, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See Noam Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
8. cf. G. Benjamin Oliver, "'Depth Grammar' as a Methodological concept in Philosophy", International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.12, No.I, (1972), 111-30.
9. Chomsky, "Current Issues in Linguistic Theory" in The Structure of Language, eds. J. Fodor and J. Katz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964).
10. cf. Oliver, p.114.
11. For detailed discussions on the syntax-semantics link see J. Katz and J. Fodor, "The Structure of Semantic Theory", in The Structure of Language, pp.479-518.

12. See J.J. Katz, Linguistic Philosophy (George Allen and Unwin. London, 1972), Ch.V.
13. See Chomsky, Rules and Representations. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980). See also Chomsky, Knowledge of Language (Praeger, New York, 1986).
14. See Esa Itkonen, Grammatical Theory and Metascience (Amsterdam/John Benjamins B.V. 1978).
15. cf. Oliver, p.120.
16. See J. Moravcsik, "Linguistic Theory and the Philosophy of language" in Foundations of Language. 3 (1967), p.226.
17. cf. Merrill B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), Ch.I.
18. See R.C. Pradhan, "Semantics, Ineffability and Wittgenstein's Grammar" in Wittgenstein; A Re-Evaluation.
19. G. Brand, The Central Texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979). Remarks: 252, p.146.
20. Esa Itkonen has extensively argued that Chomskian grammar is a normative structure and is closer to logic. However, Wittgenstein's notion of grammar completely dissolves the distinction between grammar and logic. Both are normative. See Itkonen, Grammatical Theory and metascience,. Chs.6,7-10.
21. Ibid, p.155.
22. G. Brand, The Central Texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks 245, p.145.
23. cf. Oliver, pp.113-129.

24. See J.J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, (New York, 1967), pp.151-75.
25. See Oliver, pp.113-129.
26. See Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax. Ch.I.
27. Ibid., p.3.
28. Ibid., p.8.
29. See Chomsky, Rules and Representations and also his Knowledge of Language.
30. Ibid.
31. See Chomsky, Knowledge of Language.
32. See Chomsky, Rules and Representations especially Chapter 6.
33. Ibid.
34. See Gilbert Barman, 'Linguistic competence and Empiricism' in Language and Philosophy ed. S. Hook (New York Univ. Press, New York, 1969). Also See Chomsky, "Comments on Harman's Reply", in Language and Philosophy, ed. S. Hook.
35. For further discussion on the relative similarity and disimilarity between logic and grammar, see Itkonen, Grammatical Theory and Metascience. pp.276-293.
36. The idea of language as a universal medium is highlighted by Hintikka in Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) and also elsewhere. This idea finds place in Gadamer's hermeneutic conception of language. See Gadamer, Truth and Method. (Cross Roads, New York, 1975) pp.397-431.
37. See Chomsky, Knowledge of Language.

38. For discussion on Quine-Chomsky's differences on the nature of language, See Words and Objections, eds. Davidson and Hintikka, (D. Reidel, Dordrecht/Holland, 1975).
39. See Quine, Philosophy of Logic. (Prentice-Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), Ch.2.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p.19.
42. Frege believed that logic is a language and not a mere calculus. He believed that logic is universal. See Van Heijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and logic as Language", Syntheses. 17 (1967), pp.324-330.
43. See P.F. Strawson, "Grammar and Philosophy" in Logico-Linguistic Papers, (Methuen, London, 1970).
44. Ibid., p.144.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. See P.F. Strawson, Individuals (Methuen, London, 1959).
48. See P.F. Stranson, Individuals (Methuen London, 1959), Introduction.
49. See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Vol.11, trans. J.N. Findlay (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970), Investigation IV.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.

54. See J.M. Edie, "Husserl's Conception of "The Grammatical" and Contemporary Linguistics", in Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, ed. J.N. Mohanty, (Martinus Nijhoff/the Hague, 1966), p.137-161.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. For further discussion on the comparison between Husserl and Wittgenstein see Don Isde, Wittgenstein's "Phenomenological Reduction" in Phenomenological Perspectives, (Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague, 1975), pp.47-60.
60. See J.M. Edie, "Husserl's Conception of "The Grammatical" and Contemporary Linguistics" in Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations.
61. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.77.

CONCLUSION

There are two major findings of the present essay viz.

1. The thesis regarding the distinction between grammar and language in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
2. The thesis regarding the relation between grammar and reality.

The first thesis I will call the 'logical network' thesis. The second thesis I will call the 'ontological thesis'. These two theses cover much of what Wittgenstein calls philosophical grammar.

1. So far as the first thesis is concerned I have come to the conclusion that grammar is a distinct category in relation to language. Grammar relates to the logical structure of language. That is why Wittgenstein calls grammar an 'account book' of language. The significant point is that whereas language is a spatio-temporal phenomenon, grammar is, like logic, a timeless and a historical reality. The timelessness of grammar is reflected in the fact that rules of grammar are neither in the medium of human mind nor are they products of our experience of the world. That is where, one can say, grammar is autonomous. Therefore, Grammar takes care of itself and its relation to language. The dichotomy between grammar and language is logically maintained by showing that language in spite of being a part of natural history can still claim to be autonomous. So the

autonomy of language follows from the autonomy of grammar. I have shown that the distinction between grammar and language remains ever present in Wittgenstein's philosophy in order that a philosophical grammar is possible. In this respect philosophical grammar comes closer to logic as a study of syntax of language. Whereas logical syntax takes semantics for granted, Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar makes it integral, though ineffable, part of philosophical grammar. Grammar explains how meaning is possible. But it does this only by giving the description of the syntax of language. Syntax, broadly speaking, is the network of logical rules. Philosophy has a vital interest in grammar of these rules. Hence the demand for a perspicuous representation of the logical form language.

2. Philosophy has a vital interest not only in syntax but also how syntax projects the world. Syntax, though formal is not without connection with the world. According to Wittgenstein the world is the background of both logic and grammar and needless to say, it is where language is located. Since both logic and grammar are concerned with language the world becomes logically the focus of the philosophical investigation into the nature and structure of logical grammar. Philosophy, as Wittgenstein has repeatedly declared, does not change anything; it only describes. Its descriptions are concerning how the natural language and natural world are nested together. Philosophy has no reason to separate language from the world. Nor has it any reason to dissociate life from the world. Life, language and the world

constitute the bedrock phenomena which philosophy must reckon with. Philosophical grammar is not a reform or reconstruction of these phenomena. Philosophy is only interested in how these three, i.e., life, language and the world constitute the ontological limits of the philosophical grammar itself. The philosophical grammar is ontologically bounded by the forms of life and the facts of natural history. It only sets fourth the unlimited logical possibilities contained within the forms of life and natural history. However these possibilities are the only facts that philosophy is concerned with.

Finally, philosophy of grammar is not different from the philosophical grammar. The way of understanding the philosophical grammar is the philosophy of grammar. This is not to suggest that the philosophy of grammar is distinguishable from the a philosophy of language. Both philosophy of grammar and philosophy of language constitute philosophical grammar. Thus the symmetry between the philosophy of grammar and philosophy of language is manifested in the single philosophical activity called the grammatical investigations. Wittgenstein provides a single framework for understanding the diversity of phenomena both linguistic and non-linguistic. Hence the importance of the monolithic term "philosophical grammar".

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