Power and Subject: A Critical Analysis of Foucault's Perspective

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Hyderabad

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Philosophy

By

RAGESH A V

Prof. A. RAGHURAMARAJU

(Supervisor)

Department of Philosophy

School of Humanities

University of Hyderabad

Hyderabad, India- 500046

November - 2020

DECLARATION

I, **Ragesh A V**, hereby declare that this thesis titled **"Power and Subject: A Critical Analysis of Foucault's Perspective"** submitted under the guidance and supervision of **Prof**. **A. Raghuramaraju** is my bonafide research work and is free from plagiarism. I also declare that it has not been submitted in full or in part to this university or any other university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I hereby agree that my thesis can be deposited in Shodhganga/INFLIBNET.

A report on plagiarism statistics from the University Librarian is enclosed.

Date: 17/11/2020

Name: Ragesh A V

Signature of Student: 

Reg. No: 14HPPH02

//Countersigned//

Signature of the Supervisor

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **"Power and Subject: A Critical Analysis of Foucault's Perspective"** submitted by **Mr. Ragesh A V**, bearing registration number **14HPPH02** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities is a bona fide work carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.

This thesis is free from plagiarism and has not been submitted previously in part or in full to this or any other university or institution for award of any degree or diploma.

Part of the thesis has been:

A. Published in the following publications:

1. "Foucault's Concept of Power: A Radical Departure from Repression to Productivity." *International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews* 5, no. 3 (July/September 2018), ISSN 2348 -1269, 60-63. http://ijrar.com/.
2. "Disciplinary Power in Light of Foucault and Kautilya: A Philosophical Appraisal." *International Journal of Advance and Innovative Research* 5, no. 3 (July/ September 2018), ISSN 2394-7780, 114-119. http://iaraedu.com/about-journal/.

B. Presented at the following national seminars/conferences:

1. Two-day national seminar on "Philosophy: The Eternal Awakener of Humanity" held in the department of philosophy, Osmania University, on 28th and 29th March 2018, at PGRRCDE, O.U., Hyderabad. Title of the paper presented: "Foucault and Kautilya on Power: A Comparative Analysis".
2. 92nd session of the Indian Philosophical Congress seminar on "Holistic way of life and living" which is held on 5th to 7th January 2018 in Surat, Gujarat at the Holistic Science

Centre. Title of the paper presented: “Nietzsche’s ‘Beyond Binaries’: A Holistic Approach”.

Further, the student has passed the following courses towards fulfillment of coursework requirement for Ph.D.

Course Code	Name of the course	Credit	Pass/Fail
	PH. D - I Semester		
1. PH-801	Topics in Metaphysics	4	PASS
2. PH-802	Topics in Epistemology	4	PASS
3. PH-803	Research Methodology	4	PASS
	PH. D - II Semester		
4. PH-851	Topics in Ethics	4	PASS
5. PH-852	Thesis Related Study	4	PASS

Supervisor Head of Department Dean of School

"There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations."

-Michel Foucault

For my brothers: Madhu, Umesh and Sooraj

Contents

Acknowledgement

The final fruit of this thesis is the outcome of a lot of guidance and assistance from many people. All that I have done is only due to such supervision and support; otherwise, I would not have been able to finalize this research work appropriately. Since many have contributed in big and small ways in the completion of the thesis, I would like to place on record my deep gratitude to each one of them.

First of all, I owe my hearty thanks to my supervisor, Prof. A. Raghuramaraju for his guidance and encouragement in the making of the thesis fruitful as his expertise was crucial in correcting my philosophical deliberation in the process of research. I thank him for his valuable suggestions and comments not only in guiding me to research an area I am most interested in but also for giving great liberty to streamlining my thoughts.

My doctoral committee members Dr Venusa Tinyi and Dr Kavita Chauhan have aided me throughout the research journey by providing constructive criticism and plausible rectifications in refining my study. Dr Ananda Sagar has been an emotional supporter and caretaker as his timely suggestions and assistance have stimulated finishing my research work duly. Dr Laxminarayan Lenka has been one of the significant intellectual inspirations and source of this research work as his academic patronage made my long tenure as a research scholar productive. I am also thankful to Prof. Prajit K Basu, Prof. S. G. Kulkarni, Prof. K.S Prasad, Prof. R.C Pradhan, Prof. Amitabh Dasgupta, Sri Ananda V. Wazalwar, Dr Abhijeet Joshi. Since they have taught me in my Master Degree and Research Course Work, they have been the source of my intellectual motivation and academic encouragement. I am also grateful to and fortunate enough to get constant encouragement, support and guidance from all other faculties as well, namely, Dr Robin Luke Varghese, Dr Shinod N K, and Prof. C A Tomy. I am exceedingly thankful to Dr Lenin C C and Prof. Ramakrishnan, who were my teachers at the Government Brennen College, for their strong support and guidance to join in HCU for pursuing academics.

Also, I would like to extend my sincere esteem to all office staff in the department, specifically, Shashi madam and Krishna uncle, for their timely support in the administrative matters. The department has always been a friendly environment and generous to the scholars by giving them a Research Scholars Room, which has made my research work more enjoyable and

liveable. It has offered me an opportunity to interact with other scholars for collaborative ventures; thereby, my regular connection with the department went a long way in boosting valuable academic conversations.

I am heartily thankful to the University Grants Commission for the award of Rajiv Gandhi National Fellowship, which has provided the financial support for the research work. I am also grateful to the University of Hyderabad for providing facilities to carry out my research appropriately. My sincere thanks to the university library (IGML) as their personnel have been cordial and cooperative.

My friends and colleagues have been instrumental in my emotional and intellectual well-being. My interaction with Anjaneyulu and Chaithanya has sharpened my thoughts on various ideas. I sincerely thank them not only for taking the trouble to comment on my arguments but also for not taking no for an answer and for not accepting my concluding remarks as final. I would like to express my gratitude to Rajiba, Utsav, Vanlal, Archana, Debanath, Shirish, Ramesh, Aren, Bijoy, Narayan, Rekha, Selina, Pooja, Sumit, Manoj, Justrus, Iman, Ananthu, Amit and Joseph not only for contributing their mites but also going for some extra miles to help me. I also thank all my MA classmates, namely, Nizar, Mohan, Kunal, Varsha, Asang and Pichano, for having made my stay in the campus a celebrating one. Also, I am deeply grateful to Shajil, Biranji, Faisal Jayakrishnan, Rinsha and Ramakanth for their love and care.

My dearest Aibin, a core Dionysian and unlikely crazy, has been my philosophical encouragement and catalyst for the sense of humour. My close buddy Abhijith has been an open, receptive and sensible man, whose suggestions and advice for both academics and personal life are undoubtedly incomparable.

My intimate Sooraj, a strong righteous endowed with compassion and patience, has been the aspiration and source of my pride and humility. My bestie Sabina, a true feminist and sharp intellectual, has made my life not only intellectually stimulating but also emotionally blissful. My lovely Amrutha, an enigmatically flamboyant and spiritually blessed, has flourished my life with ease and meditativeness.

My little girl Divya, who has been my inmost feelings and source of trust, has prospered my life worthier and lively. My naughty girl Subina, who has been my deepest emotion and affection, has made my life more devoted and meaningful.

Though the order in which the names listed above does not imply anything important for all that has stated above, without them I could not have achieved this milestone.

Ragesh A V

List of Abbreviations

AK: The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Harper Colophonn, 1972.

AME: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Edited by James Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin UK, 1998.

BC: The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. Translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Routledge, 2002.

BSH: Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

CS: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: *The Care of the Self*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1988.

DC: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1979.

EST: *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Translated by Robert Hurley. United States: The New Press, 1997.

HS: The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1980.

MC: Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Vintage, 1988.

P: Power. Edited by James D. Faubion. London: Penguin Books, (UK), 2002.

PK: Gordon, Colin, editor. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

SD: Society Must Be Defended. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003

TS: *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

UP: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2*: The Use of Pleasure*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1990.

Introduction

Let's begin with a poem as follows:

> This girlchild was born as usual
> and presented dolls that did pee-pee
> and miniature GE stoves and irons
> and wee lipsticks the color of cherry candy.
> Then in the magic of puberty, a classmate said:
> You have a great big nose and fat legs.
>
> She was healthy, tested intelligent,
> possessed strong arms and back,
> abundant sexual drive and manual dexterity.
> She went to and fro apologizing.
> Everyone saw a fat nose on thick legs.
>
> She was advised to play coy,
> exhorted to come on hearty,
> exercise, diet, smile and wheedle.
> Her good nature wore out
> like a fan belt.
> So she cut off her nose and her legs
> and offered them up.
>
> In the casket displayed on satin she lay
> with the undertaker's cosmetics painted on,
> a turned-up putty nose,
> dressed in a pink and white nightie.
> Doesn't she look pretty? everyone said.
> Consummation at last.
> To every woman a happy ending.[1]

This narrative poem, *Barbie-doll,* is written by American writer Marge Piercy during the time of second-wave feminism in 1971, a period when women were seriously concerned and debated about gender, sexuality, family, and workplace. During this time, Barbie was a popular cultural image designed by fixed female body standards and imposed stereotyping gender roles, which portrayed what the ideal American women were supposed to be. Barbie doll is not just a toy, but a representation, description and symbol of female subjectivity. The poem provides complex and multi-dimensional issues of gender construction which excavate the insidious operation of power forging gender by exposing ideological beliefs. How femininity is constructed socially and

[1] Marge Piercy, "Barbie-doll," *Off Our Backs, Inc* 1, no. 19 (March 1971): 1, https://www.jstor.org/stable/i25771211.

historically in the patriarchal society is the issue presented in the poem which has "meanings, not *a* meaning."[2] Essentially, it points out how power (patriarchy) constructs subjects (gender) and the various means by which it is accomplished. It is noted importantly that the very construction of female subjectivity is constituted not through any coercion and violence, but by "pleasing" practices which are subtle and insidious. The principal characteristics of such processes of constructing gender are based on its social and historical conditions such as institutions, sexual moral codes, customs and other patriarchal rules. It is through various beliefs, rationalities and social practices, which are historically contingent and socially produced, that subjectivity is constructed. In other words, subjectivity is forged not by any "natural aptitude" but within the power relations in society through various social and historical conditions as the poem rightly concludes "[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, woman."[3]

Let me introduce this poem as a conceptual link and means of presenting the theoretical issues of the thesis. As indicated in the poem, Barbie doll represents a subject, a constructed feminine subjectivity which illustrates how power and subjectivity are directly related in our day to day social life. Let's delve into the philosophical issues suggested in the poem, apart from the depicted poetical aspects. The philosophical questions raised in the poem, on the one hand, excavate how power exercises in society; and on the other hand, examine how subjectivity is constructed. Importantly, the poetry illustrates, the very construction of femininity is achieved in the patriarchal society not necessarily through coercion but by various moral codes, practices and symbols which normally thought to be neutral and normal. Taking the philosophical assumptions from the given poetry, two significant theoretical concepts can be highlighted in understanding power and subject: analysing historical contingencies and examining social conditions. On the one hand, it assumes the human subject is historically determined; on the other hand, it implies subjectivity is forged by social conditions. It implies that it is essential to investigate, for any analyses of power and subject, the complex historical circumstances and convoluted social conditions. For this reason, how power forges subjectivity and what is their relation, are the research objectives discussed in the thesis. For the same reason, the question of power and subject

[2] Robert Perrin, ""Barbie Doll" and "G. I. Joe": Exploring Issues of Gender," *The English Journal* 88, no. 3 (1999): 1, doi:10.2307/821584.
[3] Simone D. Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 30.

implies that the historical study of social conditions should be seen as a theoretically unavoidable significance. It is in this context that Foucault's radical understanding of power and subjectivity have relevant theoretical importance, which provides not only a unique method studying history but also plausible analysis of social conditions.

The thesis focuses on, strictly speaking, four conceptual investigations. Firstly, it is oriented towards explaining the general historical background of the problem, power and subject; secondly, it deals with Foucault's account elaborately; thirdly, it focuses on the critical analysis of Foucault's perspective; fourthly, it analysis how Foucault's tools can be used analyzing political issues. For this reason, this thesis should be seen as one of the ways of "readings *on* Foucault". Since Foucault's views are widely influential in various disciplines apart from philosophy, "readings *on* Foucault" itself is an intellectual endeavour for two reasons. Firstly, to understand Foucault's ideas plausibly, a conceptual consistency should be constructed because his account is often viewed as theoretical complications with a conceptual inaccuracy. Secondly, though Foucault's theoretical insights have paved new ways for solving and understanding various present philosophical problems plausibly, his novel concepts are not only improperly defined but also inconsistently dispersed throughout his works. However, though this thesis attempts one of such *readings*, it neither deals with a *detailed analysis* of theoretical discontinuity, imprecise historical documentation, logical discrepancy, conceptual complications and theoretical inaccuracy in Foucault's account nor purports to *examine all his concepts* with a thorough examination. Strictly speaking, this thesis is restricted to examine Foucault's main concepts such as power and subject with a critical analysis.

Though the thesis primarily studies Foucault's account of power and subject, my emphasis is not focused on dealing with his account exclusively as the "subject's point of view".[4] Instead, how power and subjects are *problematised* in the philosophical endeavours is the primary issue debated in this study because the thesis is concerned with the *problem* of power and subject rather than recapitulating a particular thinker's viewpoint. For this reason, the research objectives of this thesis aim to examine the relation between power and subject in which Foucault's account should

[4] One of the central arguments of the thesis argues against the essential subject and rejects its foundational ground in the conceptual analysis. Therefore, it is the *problem*, rather than the *thinker's point of view* has given primary importance in the thesis.

be seen as *only* a plausible reference point. In this theoretical excavation, how subjectivities are constructed in the power relations is the main issue discussed, in which Foucault's central assumptions are highlighted with a philosophical account. For this reason, the thesis is divided into five chapters, namely, why study power, the problem of subject, power and subject, a critical analysis of Foucault's perspective, and caste and political issues. The first chapter is intended to evaluate the problem of power in which the traditional views and Foucault account are discussed. The second chapter, however, deals with the problem of the subject in which his anti-subjective hypothesis and methodological frameworks are recapitulated. Whereas, the third chapter elaborates how he has substantiated the relation between power and subject by providing historical examples. However, the fourth chapter describes the critical analysis of Foucault's concept of power and subject. In the fifth chapter, nevertheless, a conceptual analysis of caste issues by applying Foucault's tool is discussed.

Theoretical Issues and Research Objectives

The main objective of the thesis is to evaluate the relation between power and subject in which Foucault's conceptualization is discussed with a critical analysis. Though Foucault's account is the primary plausible reference ground for the conceptual analysis of the thesis, *by criticizing the foundational subject, how he has claimed the subject is historically constituted and socially forged through power relations is the central issue discussed in this study.* Since the thesis has been divided into five chapters, and each chapter is concerned with a particular conceptual problem at hand, the theoretical investigation of the research is developed by analyzing the following research questions.

Though the first chapter is concerned with discussing the problem of power, apart from evaluating the relation between power and subject, it raises the following questions:

1. What is power?
2. What is the status or position of the subject in power relations?
3. Why should one study power to understand the formations of subjects? Or, why power studies are indispensable to evaluate the processes of subjective constructions?

In the second chapter, however, the discussion is focused on the problem of the subject. Unlike the previous chapter, the question of the "relation" is discussed by analyzing the problem of the subject. The second chapter, therefore, inquires the following questions:

1. What is the problem of the subject?
2. What is the role of power in analyzing the problem of the subject?
3. How Foucault has developed the conceptualization of power in analyzing the problem of subjects?

It is to be noted that, in the first two chapters, the discussion is primarily based on analyzing on what grounds the relation between power and subject should be *approached*. For this reason, the first two chapters discuss only the theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches of Foucault's conceptual investigations. However, the third chapter is concerned with on what historical grounds and examples Foucault has substantiated (the question of) the relation between power and subject. Since the question of the relation is the primary concern of the third chapter, it postulates the following questions:

1. How does this *relation* between power and subject constitute?
2. How are subjects *constituted* in this relation?
3. How does power *function* in this relation?

However, the fourth chapter is concerned with a critical analysis of Foucault's perspective. In the first section of the fourth chapter, Foucault's radical conception of power is criticized on the normative grounds. Therefore, the first section raises the following questions:

1. Is Foucault's account adequate without normative content?
2. Is Foucault's account useful for political engagement since it is normatively neutral?

In the second section of the fourth chapter, however, is concerned with the problem of autonomy and agency in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. In this theoretical analysis, the following questions are raised:

1. What is the status of autonomy and agency in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis?

2. Is Foucault's theoretical explanation of autonomy and agency in his anti-subjective hypothesis satisfactory?

The fifth chapter, nevertheless, deals with how Foucault's account is used for analyzing and solving political issues. In this endeavour, how caste issues can be studied by Foucault's tool is discussed. Therefore, this chapter examines the following questions:

1. How can we use Foucault's concept of power and subject in the debate on caste issues which have predominantly occupied an intellectual exercise in the current socio-political debate?
2. Can we understand Foucault's meaning of power and subject better by placing them in the ongoing caste discussions?
3. How one should study power relations and subjective constructions in the caste system?

The Conceptual Framework and the Development of the Thesis

Though the primary objective discussed in the thesis is how power and subject are *problematized*, the study focuses on examining their *relation* in plausible ways. Considering the complexity of the research issue, discussing the *philosophical background of the problem* is the significant theoretical ground of this thesis. The primary reason behind such a starting lies in the fact that the problem of power and subject has a rich and varied historical account in the history of philosophy. Though research starts with analyzing the problem of power and subject, the study progresses with analyzing Foucault's radical conceptualization. A consideration of intersecting and introducing Foucault's account, therefore, is indeed a conceptual issue in organizing the thesis. It, on the one hand, confined the thesis outlining its conceptual frameworks and boundaries by limiting its theoretical debate on specific issues; whereas, on the other hand, it has made the study refining the scope of the thesis by structuring its conceptual discussion on relevant issues. The conceptual map, which illustrates the conceptual boundaries of each chapter, therefore, as follows:

1. The first chapter, which deals with the problem of power, is *restricted* to the conceptual contentions between Foucault's account and conceptual frameworks of *a few* modern thinkers', namely Thomas Hobbes, Nicollo Machiavelli, Karl Marx and Marx Weber.
2. The second chapter, which examines the problem of the subject, is confined to discussing "essential account" versus "social constructive account" by tracing *only their central*

arguments. Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis, discourse analysis, and historical methods, therefore, should be seen as the extended version of the social constructive account.

3. Though the central objective of the thesis is to evaluate the relation between power and subject, in the third chapter, the study is *restricted* to examine their relation on three modes of inquiries, namely, subject as the object of knowledge, subjects as constructed through practices, and subjects as self-constituted.
4. The fourth chapter, which primarily deals with the critical analysis of Foucault's account on the relation between power and subject, is *confined* on two grounds: the critical examination of power and the conceptual analysis of anti-subjective hypothesis.
5. Though the fifth chapter is concerned with analyzing political issues by Foucault's tool, it is *restricted to its* conceptual investigation exclusively on *caste issues*.

Similarly, though the thesis progresses with Foucault's account, the study does not go beyond the selected works of him to analyze the central research question. For this reason, to evaluate the first mode of inquiry (i.e. the subject as the object of knowledge), the thesis refers to two main Foucault's works, namely, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* and *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. Similarly, to examine the second mode of inquiry (i.e. subjects as constructed through practices), the study refers to two other prominent works of Foucault, namely, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* and *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*. To investigate the third mode of inquiry (i.e. subjects as self-constituted), therefore, the thesis refers to Foucault's later works, namely, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure* and *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3*: *The Care of the Self*. However, it is essential to note that though the thesis is a conceptual examination, it is neither a logically built axiomatic study nor intended to be a structural analysis. It should be seen, on the contrary, a "historical study" of a specific sort and a "regional study" with a distinctive theoretical emphasis.

As I mentioned above, the thesis progresses with five chapters with a specific issue discussed. In the first chapter, on the one hand, the historical background of the problem of power is recapitulated, whereas, on the other hand, conceptual contention between Foucault and modern thinkers is discussed. Since power is a multidisciplinary concept and it has a plethora of accounts

in the history of philosophy, the first chapter starts with traditional roots and modern views of power by recapitulating a few significant thinkers' viewpoints. By evaluating them in an ordered conceptual way, a conceptual route to Foucault's viewpoint is built, in which how Foucault's account is advanced is discussed. It has served to formulate the conceptual route of the problem of power adequately on three grounds: firstly, since power is a multidisciplinary concept, it has focused on the objective dealing the relation between power and subject; secondly, it has confined complexity of the problem of power into specific conceptual themes on three models of thoughts; thirdly, it has built a conceptual route to Foucault account to have a theoretical debate. Though the main aim of this chapter is to discuss the conceptual frameworks of Foucault, which is radically different from the conventional views, the chapter is intended to evaluate two substantial objectives; firstly, examining the relation between power and subject; secondly, analyzing the status of subjects in the power relations.

The second chapter, however, aims to describe the problem of the subject in which two main contrasting views and Foucault's account are discussed. By evaluating the central arguments of these two contrasting views in an ordered plausible way, a conceptual route to Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis is built. It has served to formulate the conceptual map of the problem of the subject on three grounds. Firstly, since the problem of the subject has a varied and complex history in the philosophy, it has confined the complexity of the problem into main, relevant conceptual themes which are needed for the conceptual analysis of the thesis. Secondly, it has structured the conceptual analysis focusing on the construction of subjectivity and knowledge production, with a significant theoretical emphasis. Thirdly, it has built a conceptual route to Foucault's view to have a detailed explanation of his account. For this reason, the second chapter describes the theoretical approaches of Foucault, namely, discourse analysis and three historical methods, (Archaeology, Genealogy and problematization). By bringing these approaches in an organized conceptual framework, the second chapter, on the one hand, deals with how Foucault's account is gradually developed; whereas, on the other hand, it evaluates on what grounds his conceptual analysis is different and advanced than the predecessors. By examining the contentions of the problem of the subject, the second chapter, therefore, aims to examine not only the relation between subjects and power but also what is the role of power in studying the problem of the subject.

The central aims of the first two chapters are to demonstrate the "type of approach" and the conceptual framework of power and subject. In the first chapter, by analysing the problem of power, the status of the subject in power relations is studied. In the second chapter, by examining the problem of the subject, the role of power in studying the subjective formations is examined. The third chapter, however, deals on what historical grounds and examples Foucault has substantiated the claims, which have been postulated in the first two chapters, is discussed. For this reason, Foucault's three modes of inquiries, namely, subjects as the object of knowledge, subjects as the construction of practices, and subject as self-constituted are discussed in the third chapter. In these three historical investigations, in the first mode of inquiry, by studying how the subject as the object of knowledge is constituted, it examines two substantial claims: power and knowledge are interconnected, and knowledge constitutes subjectivities rather than liberating. In the second mode of inquiry, by studying how subjects are constructed through social practices, it examines two substantial claims: power is not a possession, capacity and centralized forces as a commodity, but is dispersed throughout the social body; subjects do not exercise power, but, on the contrary, they are constituted by the given power relations. In the third mode of inquiry, by studying how subjects constitute themselves in the discourse of sexuality, it examines two significant claims: subjects are not a mere product of power because subjects can constitute themselves in the given power relations; by self-constituting, subjects not only relate oneself but also exercise one's freedom and resistance in the power relations. On these three historical examinations, Foucault, on the one hand, rejects essential subjectivity and human nature, whereas, on the other hand, claims subjects are socially forged and historically constituted through power relations.

In the fourth chapter, however, a critical analysis of Foucault's perspective is discussed. Whereas the critical investigation in the first section is discussed from the perspective of power; the second section is based on the problem of the subject. The first section of the fourth chapter, therefore, analyses the normative confusions found in Foucault's account on three grounds: in the inadequacy of genealogical method, theoretical ambiguity in the power/knowledge nexus, and inappropriateness in the conceptualization of power itself. Since Foucault's account suffers from normative confusions, this section argues his account is theoretically inadequate and politically unfeasible. In the second section, however, the question of autonomy and agency in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis is debated. In this theoretical excavation, Foucault's conceptual

explanations of autonomy and agency are discussed on various construals. The second section, therefore, focuses on, by analyzing the concept of autonomy and agency in Foucault's subjective hypothesis, how one can understand the subjective construction in the power relations.

In the fifth chapter, nevertheless, by applying Foucault theoretical tools, how "caste issues" can be studied is discussed. How power relations and the subjective formations in the caste system can be examined is the main conceptual analysis probed in this chapter. In this endeavour, firstly, the chapter deals with the political disagreements and conceptual contention between Marxism and Dalit discourse by analysing the relation between power and subjects based on caste and class. Examining the comparative conceptual analysis, on the one hand, how Marxism has rejected caste issues is discussed; on the other hand, why studying the power relation in the caste system in constructing subjectivities is indispensable not only politically but also theoretically is debated. One this theoretical background, how subjectivities are constructed in the caste system and what are the status of caste in the current political scenario is discussed. By employing Foucault's theoretical tools on caste issues, in the fifth chapter, therefore, why annihilation of caste should be the pertinent political task is evaluated.

Chapter 1: Why Study Power?

1.1 Introduction

Power[5] has been one of the salient concepts with its complicated and contested nature not only in philosophy but also in social sciences. The conceptual analyses proposed by traditional philosophers and social scientists have studied power as one of the social phenomena referred to certain aspects of society such as the judiciary, government, state, class, gender, political parties and so on. Apart from their theoretical differentiation, questions such as what is power and how we study it are commonly regarded as the most prominent questions in their analysis. What underlined in these questions primarily were the attempts to show how to think power theoretically and study empirically. However, though such inquiries are relevant to explaining the mechanism of power, why should we study power seriously is turned out to be an inevitable issue in the current intellectual domain. The explicit reasons for such a question are primarily two: (1) on the one hand, the recent debate inculcated subtle features of power which explicate its significance in our day to day life; (2) on the other hand, the same debate acknowledged limiting the "power studies" to specific aspects such as state, judiciary, and class is an obsolete explanation.

However, many have questioned whether the concept of power as a theoretical category has any serious deserved significance in studying society and human beings. The reason behind such bewilderment is primarily because unlike the traditional debate, a kind of overwhelming attention and earnest discussions on power have emerged in the last century. The emergence of identity politics is the best example of such findings. The recent debate no longer holds power as an abstract concept and a merely theoretical question. In the contemporary intellectual political debate, power has now become an unavoidable theoretical concept to study society and human beings because it has now been acknowledged as the relatively synonymous term for our socio-political life. Put it bluntly, since power is analysed in the current debates as our day to day life experience, unlike the conventional understanding of power, it has now become "the relevant theoretical category" of studying society and human subjectivity.

[5] "The English noun, power, derives from the Latin, potere, which stresses potentiality and means 'to be able'." (Wendy Brown, "Power after Foucault," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, ed. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 65.)

Though many philosophers have described several explanations of the power, there is no single comprehensive definition of power explaining its various mechanisms. Since power is an interdisciplinary concept, this chapter starts with analysing arguments of a few significant modern thinkers in particular mainly for three reasons. Firstly, since power is an interdisciplinary concept, it is necessary to specify the research question and the scope of our discussion in the first place. Secondly, it is indispensable to know how and where to intersect Foucault's contentions in our discussion. Thirdly, to understand the radical concept of Foucault's power, it is essential to start modern thinkers as Foucault's contention engages with their fundamental issues. By outlining the conceptual framework of modern debates, investigated by their different viewpoints and reflections of the concept, a conceptual route with three clustered groupings such as agency model, commodity model and repressive model has been proposed in this chapter. It serves two tasks: on the one hand, it impedes the difficulties of being power as multidisciplinary; on the other hand, it provides a theoretical ground to discuss Foucault's concept of power.

This chapter, strictly speaking, on the one hand, explains how Foucault's account is more significant and relevant than the modern theories in explaining the relation between power and subject; whereas, on the other hand, elucidates on what grounds power studies are plausible in understanding the subjectivity of human beings. This chapter, therefore, examines why power studies, especially Foucault's conceptualizations are indispensable to evaluate the processes of subjective constructions. To evaluate above mentioned theoretical issues, this chapter, therefore, proceeds with four subsections, namely traditional roots and modern problems of power, arguments against three models of power, the methodological precautions, and the question of power in Foucault. My approach, therefore, is to analyze the significance of studying power in understandings subjectivity, which is theoretically and politically explained by asking the following questions:

1. What is *power*?
2. What is the *relation* between power and subject?
3. What is the *status of the subject* in power relations?
4. Why should one study power to understand the formations of subjects? Or, why are power studies indispensable to evaluate the processes of subjective constructions?

Let's evaluate each subsection as follows:

1.2 Power: Traditional Roots and Modern Problems

It is not coincidental that why the concept of power is central to any understanding of society and the most "contested concept"[6] at the same time, especially in social science and philosophy.[7] It implies how enormously rich and wide the literature of power is and how difficult to comprehend the plethora of its accounts and a variety of arguments to start writing a debate in the first place. This section, thus, makes no pretension or not equipped to trace to describe all the existing literature of power, but relating only to the most prominent theories which are relevant in our discussion. Though each of the theories may be said to have been a great contribution at some time or other, they are treated as the *specific* reference points in our debate.[8] This section, therefore, explores the arguments of a *few* modern thinkers of power, namely, Thomas Hobbes, Nicollo Machiavelli, Karl Marx and Marx Weber.

Though these thinkers have elaborately described the concept of power in their theoretical understandings, this section, however, elaborates only the *main* arguments of each conceptualization. For this reason, by evaluating the main arguments of each thinker, this section confines their *specific* conceptual themes into three lines of thoughts, which draw an evident continuity from Thomas Hobbes to Max Weber. These three clustered groupings are the "agency" model, the "commodity" model, and the "repressive" model.[9] Though they are independently posited, they are compatible with each other as their theoretical connections have overlapping functions. It brings a linking line to trace the doyen of the seventeenth-century theories of power to late-twentieth-century in the widespread intellectual discussion of power in philosophy and

---

[6] Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 4.

[7] According to Mark Haugaard and Stewart R. Clegg, in general, in philosophy, especially in political philosophy, power was theorised in terms of normative sense, that is, "what should be done", whereas, political science studied power as "what is done" in empirical terms. (Stewart R. Clegg and Mark Haugaard, eds., *The Sage Handbook of Power* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), 2).

[8] Though the main reference points of "power theories" in this debate are Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx, and Weber, Friedrich Nietzsche's thoughts of power are not included here. Since the concept of power was never systematically defined in Nietzsche's work, Foucault has taken only its conceptual formula leaving other aspects such as metaphysical and psychological. Nietzsche defined power in terms of "struggle, conflict and war" (*PK*, 88). Foucault extracts from this hypothesis that power is a relational force established at a historical moment and social conditions, which should be understood as "episodes, functions, displacements" (*PK*,89) of war, conflict, and struggle. Since the concept of power is analysed in the social conditions and history in our debate, Nietzsche's notion is not elaborately described here as a "theoretical reference point" because it may lead to beyond the scope of our discussion.

[9] These three clustered groupings are classified by Wendy brown. (Wendy Brown, "Power after Foucault," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, ed. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 65-83).

social science. By explaining the essential thoughts of each model, a theoretical bridge to Foucault's conceptualisation of power is built. However, the main theoretical objective discussed in this section is primarily two: what is the relation between power and subject; and what is the status of the subject in power relations. Let's evaluate the main arguments of each modern thinker's mentioned above as follows:

Since power is one of the most complicated concepts to make sense of, "[T]here is no such thing as a single all-embracing concept of power *per se*".[10] However, its speculations can be traced back to the ancient Athenians, particularly in the works of Aristotle[11], in which he describes the six-fold classification of government to make a social order. Modern thinking of power, however, begins with Nicollo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes by charting new ways of conceptualising power at the outset of modernity. For Machiavelli, the successful prince manages society by exercising power *over* people through manipulation. He explains power as domination and control, which is achieved through strategic exertions over individuals in subtle ways. His conception focused on "what power does"[12] and "interpret the strategies of power".[13] He sees, therefore, power as a means, for instance, the exercise of military forces in seeking strategic advances to secure an ordered totality of power over others.[14]

However, Thomas Hobbes offers another template of thinking power in terms of "what power is".[15] It is premised sovereignty as a base in legitimising power as a presupposition of a commonwealth. The sovereign body, *Leviathan*, is the single unit of the embodiment of the state

[10] Stewart Clegg, *Frameworks of Power* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1989), 4.
[11] According to Aristotle, there are six fold classifications of government by which society could be organised: Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity, Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy. Under the political rule, the function of these governments depends on who rules and whose interests are served. According to Aristotle, the first three work for the common interests of people, whereas the latter three for the private interests of few. For this reason, the first three referred to as "true forms" of government, whereas the last three are "perverted forms". (Clegg and Haugaard, *Power*, 1).
[12] Clegg, *Power*, 5.
[13] Ibid.
[14] I have mentioned Machiavelli's conception of power in our discussion for specific reasons even though it does not have very evident continuity for a long time as did Hobbes's theories. The reasons behind discussing his concept are, on the one hand, to do a comparative analysis with Hobbes, on the other hand, to address the strategic nature of power, which has a theoretical connection to Foucault. Clegg argues that Machiavelli's strategic, local and practical concern of power can be compared with Foucault's non-discursive practices which are also strategic operations of power. Though both are concerned with ordered totalities, in Foucault, it is within the institution and discursive practices, for example, medical gaze, whereas in Machiavelli, it can be seen in "organization". It does not mean to say that both are sharing the same line of thought, but they have confronted a similar problem. (Clegg, *Power*, 5-6).
[15] Clegg, *Power*, 5.

and has a monopoly with a centralized position of will over others according to a uniform principle. Power, therefore, for him, is a resource, a possession which is centralized and focused on sovereignty as the "legitimate power" to control people. Where Hobbes sets out the features of power as the single, finite and originating centre, Machiavelli, on the other hand, initiated more contingent, local and no-totalising strategies of power. Hobbes was interested in providing a rational account of power or explicit model of social order, which the *Leviathan*, the autonomous, self-managing state power could produce. Machiavelli, on the contrary, was interested in not the legislator's model of the social order but the interpretation of the strategic function of the power.[16] In a nutshell, Hobbes's conception was in terms of sovereignty and community, whereas, according to Machiavelli, power was strategy and organization.[17]

Marxism, however, conceptualised power in terms of domination, conflict and repression as the abiding features with a discussion of "hegemony"[18] and "dominant ideology".[19] Its central tenets emphases that "bourgeoisie" hold hegemony, through which capitalist social order and economic relations ensured to subjugate proletariat class. The way by which they maintain such

[16] Clegg, *Power*, 5.
[17] Ibid, 4.
[18] The word, hegemony, is generally attributed to neo Marxian Antonio Gramsci who remarkably developed this concept analysing how the ruling capitalist class establishes and maintains its control. Hegemony is the qualified version of ideology, or it is an ideology in effect, which suggests two primary premises: firstly, it argues the equation of base and superstructure seems to be deterministic and at the same time divisible; secondly, for this reason, ideology can't be total and could be shifted over time. He claims ideology is not necessarily imposed by state, political parties, and legal apparatuses as suggested by classical Marxism; but, it can be channelized through other means. In Gramsci's view, the dominant class cannot control either merely owning economic resources alone or through coercion in the modern world. According to him, the capitalist society consists of two overlapping spheres such as "political society" (it includes, state, legislature, executive and judiciary, and so on) and "social society" (it includes, church, educational system, family, and so on), which operates rules and regulations through force and consent. Hegemony, therefore, is achieved along with political apparatuses, through intellectual, political and moral dominance by nexus of institutions and social relations such as media, universities and religious institutions by the dominant class.(See for brief discussion: Aditya Nigam, "Marxism and Power," *Social Scientist* 24, no. 4/6 (1996): 8-18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517788; George Ritzer, *Sociological Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2017), 43-75; Mark C. Stoddart, "Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A Critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and Power," *Social Thought and Research*, 2007, 192-225, doi:10.17161/str.1808.5226; Pramod K. Nair and Vidya-Mitra, "Hegemony and Ideology," *YouTube*, December 8, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILGUQmUoDps).
[19] Althusser has developed the notion of "ideology" in his work later on. He states ideology functions in two ways: through repressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatus. The former denotes how the ruling class uses the repressive state apparatuses such as government, courts, police, armed forces, and so on, to dominate the working class by controlling the powers of the state (political, legislative, armed). The latter represents how the ruling class uses methods by repressing the subordinate social classes, which include educational institutions, media, churches, family, and so on.
(See for brief discussion: Nigam, "Marxism and Power," 8-18; Ritzer, *Sociological Theory*, 43-75: Stoddart, "Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse," 192-225; Nair and Vidya-Mitra, "Hegemony and Ideology,").

"hegemony" or power is through possessing economic resources and constructing an "ideology".[20] The bourgeoisie class develops hegemonic culture by propagating its own values and norms which help them to maintain their status. As a result, society does have dominant ideas of the ruling class, termed as "dominant ideology" or "false consciousness", which determine what individuals could think, imagine and do, in all domains of social life such as politics, law, morality, religion and so on. This ideology, consequently, legitimizes ruling class hegemony by obfuscating the violence and exploitation charged on the working class and make them incapable of revolting.

For these reasons, according to Marx, power operates in the specific modes of economic productions and social formations as bourgeoisie control over the means of production and modes of production and thereby exploits the working class. Since the capitalist owns the economic resource and earns excessive surplus products solely, working-class induces to sell their labour to sustain life. Revolution, as understood in Marxism, is, therefore, lies in the reorganisation of the economy, through "proletarian dictatorship" by seizing power. Power, therefore, for Marx, is a "social force" obtained by the possession of "economic power"[21], particularly control over means and modes of production. Therefore, the Marxian notion of power can be understood in terms of three essential aspects: conflict, possession and repression.

According to Max Weber, power is the capacity to exercise one's will over others despite any resistance. To illustrate, it is the probability of an individual in the social relationship to accomplish one's own will even in the face of opposition. He defines power as follows: "the probability that an actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests".[22] For him, power has to be understood in terms of intention[23] which is the achievement of intended action by the actualisation of one's will over the other despite their resistance. Since power is an application of will, domination is the central feature in his conception of power. According to Weber, it can be

[20]Though hegemony and ideology are interrelated and have overlapping functions, they do have a specific theoretical difference. Ideology represents "dominant ideas and system of beliefs" exerted in society, whereas hegemony represents the social relations of power exhibited in those ideological effects. Hegemony is the dominance of one group/state over another as the operation of power by which ideology functions as its instrument. (See for brief discussion: Nigam, "Marxism and Power," 8-18; Ritzer, *Sociological Theory*, 43-75: Stoddart, "Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse," 192-225; Nair and Vidya-mitra, "Hegemony and Ideology,").

[21] Nigam, "Marxism and Power," 8-18.

[22] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1978), 152.

[23] Clegg, *Power*, 46.

exercised two ways: either authoritative manner or coercive way. Where authoritative power is seen as securing the legitimacy of subjects who are subjected to the consent, coercion is understood as the enforcement of will against other's wishes or interests.

However, Weber has emphasised on the notion of legitimacy more importantly than coercion as his conception is focused mainly on how "structured social relations" are constituted. He notes that all "genuine domination" involves voluntary compliance, interest in accepting and following that obedience, believing in the legitimacy of such actions and willing to retain its regularity from the dominated subjects. Domination is legitimate when the dominated subject accepts, obeys, practices and considers at least it is to be desirable or not worth challenging. It is the willingness of the dominated that the legitimate form of dominance as an authority constituted. When dominance continues for a considerable time in this manner, it becomes a natural social relationship and thereby, the social structures of society. Examples of such dominance could include parent-child relationships, husband-wife, teacher-student, priest-church member, and so forth.

However, class (economic conditions), social status (honour and prestige) and parties (political representations) are considered by Weber as the social resources to achieve one's own will in society. Unlike the Marxian concept of power, which is based on the economic conditions of society exclusively, Weber sees the operations of power are multidimensional as their basis could be economic factors, social status, and political representations. For Weber, a class is not a community but a "class situation", which is defined as the shared situation of a group of people. A class situation is formed under three conditions: firstly, a significant number of people should have relatively equivalent economic conditions and life chances; secondly, they must share relatively the same possession of goods and opportunities for income; thirdly, their economic interests/conditions should have a commonality in the commodity or labour markets.[24]

Whereas, social status, according to Weber, is defined as the social estimation of honour, which is associated with a particular style of life and the attendant social restrictions. Unlike the class group, which is related to economic production, status groups, which is associated with the consumption of goods produced, normally are communities. However, economic condition is not

[24] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 927.

necessarily the primary cause of "status situation" though it is the key determinant as there are other components involved in it such as marriage systems, residence, status conventions or traditions, and so forth.[25] Political power (parties) is, nevertheless, intersected with interests of class and status, which represents the ability of people or groups to achieve goals in the political order of society. Since the state is considered as an established mechanism of exercising political power in modern social systems, political parties are seen as the organizational means to possess the power. Though parties are commonly operated in the political/legal domain, it is often based on class and status interests or its intersected relations.[26] Therefore, according to Weber, the ability to control power arises from the capacity to manage these "social resources". It shows that power has two dimensions substantially: possession of power and exercise of power.

Let's point out the conceptual words associated with power in our discussion: agency, sovereignty, domination, possession, authority, intention, legitimacy, conflict, repression, capacity, strategy and control. Though each of these conceptual words has a specific meaning and they address different issues of power, their theoretical connotations are conceptually interlinked with each other. That is to say, though these words are radically distinct in their particular usage, they can be complementary with one another to understand a specific form of power. It does not mean that they are interchangeable, but they can have overlapping usage in their meaning. For example, the word domination is the foundation specifically for Weber, Marx and Hobbes, though its meanings and implications are not the same in their conceptualisations. However, to understand the nature of "domination" in the various fields of social practices and forms of life, each of these particular usages of it can be applied, and thereby it does have different perspectives and theoretical understandings. For this reason, the same "rationality" can be applied to other associated concepts of power such as repression, authority, possession, and so on; and it is these overlapping usage of the terms that question of power is contested and has become the central issue in studying society. Not only do they have specific distinctive conceptualisations of power represented at a particular historical period and specific domains of research or social fields, but they can be grouped into the three family groupings, namely, the sovereignty model, the commodity model, and the repressive

[25] Ritzer, *Sociological Theory*, 127-128.
[26] Ibid.

model. Let's evaluate the main claims of each model and how it leads to Foucault's concept of power.

1.2.1 Three Models of Power

By proposing these three clustered groupings, two substantial theoretical approaches, which our debate is intended to follow, can be highlighted: firstly, to illustrate the various traditional arguments of power described above into three *specific* conceptual themes; secondly, to bridge a theoretical route to understanding Foucault's concept of power. Not only do these three models help to ensure the scope and limits of the research analysis adequately but also serves to formulate the objectives of the "power-issues" appropriately. The associated concepts described above, however, are not meant to be treated in this discussion with their "specificity of application" but its general mechanisms of operation. Against these general mechanisms, which have overlapping applications, that Foucault's contentions or criticism are oriented. Under these general mechanisms, strictly speaking, the sovereignty model primarily refers to power's acknowledged source and possession; the commodity model denotes power's means and exercise; whereas the repressive model concerns the nature of power's intention and result. Moreover, the sovereignty model defines power with rule and authority; the commodity model explains power as tangible and transferable substance, like wealth; whereas the repressive model assumes the operation of power should be seen as negative, repressive, and constraining. Now, let's examine the general mechanisms of each model as follows:

1.2.1.1 Agency Model

It is also called the "sovereignty model", which is not only the significant approach of conventional conceptualization but also often viewed as the fundamental concept of the modern state. It is the most common political concept of power as its scope extends from individuals to institutions as power in this view implies, on the one hand, sovereignty in the state; sovereign individuals, on other hand. Its underlying principle is based on "who governs" as it follows the dictum "who does what to whom".[27] Power, according to this view, is assumed to be exercised *over* others by sovereign individuals or institutions, for example, state as they are presumed to have the ability to enact their will. It emphasises "concrete agency" as the source of the operation

[27] Brown, "Power after Foucault,"62.

of power as it emphasises power as the exercise of the ability of an individual or institutions exerted over others. However, from the perspective of the state, in general, power is considered to be authority and rule; whereas, in the case of individuals, power is possession and ability. It not only defines power as "locus of will" to which others have to submit their will, but it also holds exercises of power as the denial of other's will as well. In this regard, sovereign subjects are assumed to have clear preferences and domination by making others do things against their choices, desires and interests.

However, power with this conception can have two possible dimensions: disposition and facilitative characteristics.[28] The former stresses on the set of capacities possessed by the sovereign subject, whereas the latter emphasises the exertion of power as "to get things done".[29] These two aspects emphasize power in terms of ability exerted solely by the "sovereign agency" by which the sovereign individual's goal is materialised. In this sense, the sovereign model equates power exertion as "zero-sum" activity by which others are not only negated but also subjugated. Its supreme exercise, on the one hand, gives no room for subjugated people to have any possibility to escape or free in the power relations. Also, on the other hand, there seems to be no chance for those subjected to the sovereign to recognise and actualise one's will. Essential to this conception lies in the fact that power is something held by people or institutions as a possession exercised *always* "over others". It is also important to note that the sovereignty model presupposes the agency which describes the power in terms of "ruling and being ruled".[30] For instance, power in the institution (for example, state) is a legitimate form of sovereignty as it is associated with the rule: making and execution of the law. Not only monarchical rule but also capitalist class and even representative democracy are premised upon the general mechanism of sovereignty status.

1.2.1.2 Commodity Model

The commodity model casts power as the tangible and transferable substance or thing to be possessed, like wealth. The best example of commodity models is the Marxian notion of power. According to this model, power is the circulating goods or transferable substance as it assumes power as the "concrete thing" that any individual or class can hold. The Marxian notion of labour

[28] Clegg, *Power*, 5.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Brown, "Power after Foucault," 68.

as extractable, commodifiable substance, for this reason, should be seen as on the one hand, the basis of capital, whereas on the other hand, as the foundation for the capitalist power structure. To perpetuate the relations of production and to reproduce class domination, the Marxists economic analysis finds its formal model in the process of exchange, in the circulation of goods, and the actual workings of the class conflict. However, the commodity model of power cannot be restricted in the economic model of power as suggested by Marxists alone. For example, the very possibility of being able to transfer sovereignty from one king to another also assumes power as commodifiable. The commodity model, therefore, assumes power can be a transferable substance as it is a possession of an agent or state. The very exercise of power relation, according to this view, is based on its very nature of the transferable mechanism. Like the sovereign model, the commodity model also presupposes the capacity of the sovereign subject as the exertion of power.

Another significant characteristic of the commodity model of power is based on its mechanism of distribution in circulating power. Since power is transferable, the supreme exercise of power, according to the commodity model, lies in its mechanism of commodifiable circulation and distribution. For this reason, the social contract theory also grants the commodity model both for its legitimating social contract and ensuring liberty in the liberal democratic social structure. Its essential basis, therefore, emphases the execution or the exercise of power as transferred or alienated or surrendered, either completely or partly, through a juridical act or political sovereignty. What runs through all these theories, either juridical operation of sovereignty or exchange of social contracts, is the claim that power is the operation of commodifiable substance or thing. According to this view, power, therefore, is something either surrendered or alienated, or circulated or recuperated as something that is given, exchanged, or taken back. Furthermore, it assumes power is primarily the perpetuation and renewal of the possession and the capacity of the sovereign subject, which is achieved either through a contract or by force. In short, like the sovereign model, it also presupposes some groups or individuals have more power than others as a natural corollary.

1.2.1.3 Repressive Model

The repressive model assumes the very exercise of power is essentially repressive. It emphasizes power relation exists between a dominant and dominated as power is negative, repressive, constraining. The exercise of power is, therefore, essentially repressive as a powerful

agent represses the powerless by subjugating his desires, wishes and so on. According to this model, power is considered as a primal right by which one is surrendered to the sovereign subject as the effect of repression operated by the matrix of power exercised by the dominator subject. However, like the agency model and commodity model, the repressive model also assumes power is exercised between binary oppositions, namely, the dominator and the dominated, or rulers and ruled. According to the repressive model, therefore, power is operated by the fixed subjectivities, or the subjectivity in the power relations are pre-given. For this reason, like the agency model and commodity model, the repressive view also pre-supposes power is the capacity and possession operated by the sovereign subject over others.

Similarly, since the repressive model assumes power works through "binary" opposition, it assumes that power always operates from the "top to bottom" as the single, unified, and homogeneous exertion. For this reason, according to the repressive model, power is not only negative but also undesirable. The fundamental argument of the repressive model, therefore, assumes that power subjugates the individual's freedom and agency as its fundamental function is repression, prohibition, limitation, obstruction and so on. For this reason, those who resist the repressive model of power believe that political rhetoric should be based on "overthrowing power" as it entails freedom to individuals. The best examples for the repressive model is the earlier feminism and the Marxists concept of power. According to the earlier feminists, the patriarchal power structure is essentially suppressive because men repressed women through various ways such as enforced domestic works, negating political rights, limiting wage for jobs, refuting property rights and so on. Similarly, the Marxian concept of power argues that power in the capitalist social order is essentially suppressive as the dominant class exploits and thereby, represses the working class by possessing the economic resources exclusively. In short, the repressive model assumes power is essentially repressive,[31] negative and constraining.

By evaluating the general mechanisms of each model given above, let's summarise their basic tenets as follows:

1 Power is the *capacity* to exercise *over* others: according to Hobbes, the state (*Leviathan)* over the citizens; capitalist class over the working or proletariat class in Marx; For Weber, one's will over others.

[31] The words such as repressive and suppressive used here interchangeably even though they are not synonymous conceptually. Both terms, in this context, denotes power is something always negative and undesirable.

2 Power is the *possession* as it is the function of *control*: according to Hobbes, the state as the centralized will over others; ownership of capital (means and modes of production) in Marx; achieving and maintaining of social resources (class, status, and party) in Weber.

3 Power has the *conscious intention* exercised "from the top to down": according to Hobbes, the state as the commonwealth exercised over its citizens; ideological beliefs inflicted by the capitalist class over the working or proletariat class in Marx; For Weber, the exercise of one's will over others despite the resistance.

4 Power is *a thing or substance* as the *means and source* of its exercise: according to Hobbes, the state is the "power-body" as the legitimating social contract and ensuring the protection of its citizen; capital as the circulating and possession of "goods" in Marx; the possession of social resources in accomplishing one's will in Weber.

5 Power is the *domination* as the function of *authority and legitimacy*: according to Hobbes, rule and law inscribed by the state or *Leviathan*; hegemony propagated by the capitalist class in Marx; accepting and obeying willingly the domination of the dominator by the dominated in Weber.

6 Power is the *binary relation of conflicts*: in Hobbes, between people and state; according to Marx, class struggle between capitalist and proletariat; the exercise of will one over others in Weber.

7 Power is *inherently repressive, negative, and undesirable*; according to Hobbes, the submission of will and the acceptance of the commonwealth or *Leviathan* as the "necessary evil"; oppression and exploitation imposed on the working class in Marx; suppressing the resistance of the other in Weber.

From the general mechanisms of the *relation* between power and subject described above, let's point out the *status* of the subject conceptualised in these three models. From the above descriptions, these three models seem to follow a central conceptual formula of power: "A exercises power *over* B". It implies, according to the traditional formulations of power, the subjects[32] (A and B) are considered to be *given* in the power relations. Furthermore, according to these three models, subjects are *pre-supposed* in the given power relations. Not only subjects are given and pre-supposed, but power is conceptualised as the function or exercise of the subject. Since power exercises or operates one subject *over* others, the very operation of the power is

[32] Throughout the thesis, the term subjects could be state, class, individual and any other human aggregates.

conceptualised as the ability of "sovereign or dominator subject". In short, according to these three models, it is *the* subject (sovereign) who exercises power. However, Foucault criticizes the very conceptualization of the relation between power and subject, and the status of the subject in power relations proposed by these three models. We shall see the arguments offered by Foucault to reject these models in the next section as follows:

1.3 Foucault's Arguments against the Three Models of Power

The methodological assumptions, which are indispensable to the traditional understandings of power depicted in the three models of power, come under three theoretical connotations mainly: the first one defines power in terms of "capacity and possession" and "agency and sovereignty"; the second one, however, demonstrates it as a commodity and centralized homogeneous function; whereas, the third one states it in terms of repressive aspects exclusively. Though these basic assumptions are independently posited, they are indeed interrelated having overlapped theoretical applications. Therefore, in the first subsection of this section illustrates how Foucault has rejected the agency model by criticizing the "sovereign state" and the "sovereign subjects". In the second subsection, however, examines how Foucault has eschewed commodity models of power by critically examining power is not centralized, unitary, symmetrical and homogeneous function. The third subsection describes, nevertheless, how Foucault has rejected the repressive model by critically examining repressive hypothesis and binary operation. Throughout these critical analyses, the primary focus is concerned with not only how Foucault has debunked the "sovereign subject", which defines the subject with a capital "S", but also evaluating how he has proposed manifold construction of "subjectivities", which conceptualizes the subject with a small "s" in the power relations. Let's evaluate each of the argument as follows:

1.3.1 Arguments against the agency model

According to Foucault, power is not the capacity to be possessed by anybody as we should not consider it as an exertion of one individual's enforced and consistent domination over others. Foucault has questioned conceptualizing power as the capacity and possession as it, on the one hand, reduces complex mechanisms of power into the agency and sovereignty of the subject; whereas, on the other hand, it defines power as "A exercises power *over* B". Power relations in this view not only presume subjects are "given" and "presupposed" but also consider power is the

operation of will of the "sovereign subject". Foucault questions the notion of the "sovereign subject", which, on the one hand, assumes "sovereignty" in the state, and sovereign individuals, on the other hand. However, thinking of the "sovereign state" as the locus point of power in the matrix of political system and governance, which is presumed to have the capacity to control over subjects as suggested by the agency model, according to Foucault, is relatively insignificant in the modern world. Considering the shift from pre-modern to modern, Foucault argues, a notable move can be recast from "universal sovereign state" to "individualization technique and totalization of procedures". Two specific operations of power were prevalent in the pre-modern conceptions of the sovereign state: legal model and institutional model. The former inquires about what legitimate power which assumes only the "sovereign body" can have the authority or ability to legitimate and regulate the function of power by assuring the total subjection of subjects. Similarly, the latter advocates by what means power is exercised, which conceptualizes only the institution of state can manipulate or manifest its mechanisms. However, with the emergence of the modern disciplinary society, a new form of power has been materialized, which is, claims Foucault, both "individualizing and totalizing form of power" (*PK*, 213).

In the modern world, according to Foucault, power is diffused and society has become a "disciplinary society" as the mechanisms of power are embodied in several social fields such as criminality, sexuality, health, population, and so on by making the modern social world as "disciplinary society". The very operation of power lies in all cultural practices and social fields, which is no more a function from "top to bottom" prevalent in the pre-modern conception. The new technology of power in the modern disciplinary society works with the aid of complex systems of surveillance by organizing space (e.g. material structure of the institution, for example, prison and classroom), time (setting time for a task or work in the institution) and forming rules and regulations for everyday activities and behaviours, which can be found, according to Foucault, in places such as schools, hospitals, factories and military barracks, and so forth. It is this "individualizing and totalizing" power that modern subjectivities under various institutional settings are forged. Conditions of sovereignty as the political structure which defines power as the matter of rule in organizing polities and controlling subjects, therefore, Foucault argues, should be seen in the modern world as the effect suffused with disciplinary power. Foucault, therefore, argues, rather than thinking power in terms of capacity, agency and possession, one needs to

concentrate on what are the "strategies" and "techniques" as the form of power being exercised in our cultural practices and institutions.

However, though institutions, groups, elites and classes are very significant to analyzing power as enabling and legitimating its various mechanisms through numerable ways, in the modern world, power comes from everywhere[33] as it is embodied in the day to day activities in constituting subjectivities. By claiming power is everywhere, it does not mean that power *comes* from everywhere and *determines* the subjectivity of individuals. Since individuals are constantly interacting in the power relations in various domains such as political, moral, religious, and so on, Foucault argues that power can be found everywhere in society. Since subjectivities are constructed through various institutional norms and social practices, in the modern world, power is exercised by strategies and techniques, with rules and regulations rather than coercive force on individuals. It is in this sense that power becomes "disciplinary" working on the "actions" of individuals by shaping, modifying, training and supervising individuals in the modern disciplinary society. For these reasons, Foucault makes two significant claims: firstly, all subjects should be seen as constructed by power because the mechanism of power embedded in the ensemble of social relations; secondly, an individual does have various subjectivities depending on the social relations one has interacted such as Dalit, lesbian, wife, mother, student, teacher, and so on. One these grounds Foucault makes two concluding remarks: firstly, subjectivities are not given and presupposed in the power relations, they are, on the contrary, constructed by in the mechanisms of power; secondly, rather than thinking power in terms of capacity, agency and possession of the "sovereign subject", one needs to concentrate on "what are the strategies" and "techniques" as the form of power being exercised in our cultural practices and institutions in constructing subjectivities.

[33] The claim that power is everywhere in society should not be read in terms of reductionism and determinism. Though power is omnipresent, it does not mean human subjectivity as "passive subjects" and the mere effects of power.

1.3.2 Arguments against the commodity model

According to Foucault, thinking power in terms of an appropriated commodity or transferable substance is also subject to question. Conceptualizing power as an object to be possessed also pre-supposes *the* subject like the agency model. In this view, the subject is conceptualized in two senses which are interlinked: firstly, it assumes that power is something to be held by the *Subject*; secondly, the *Subject* is considered to be externally positioned in the power relation and is potentially alienable. It is also another way of conceiving the "sovereign subject", who is presumed to have the capacity to hold power, having absolute agency and autonomy exercising power. Strictly speaking, the commodity model also follows the formula "A exercises power *over* B" as supposed by the agency model. Foucault, however, argues that power is not something solely wielded by "sovereign individuals" over others. If power is a substance to be held and manipulated according to the wishes of "sovereign individual", then he/she is not only in a position of "free space" situating relatively away from power relations but also a "successful agent" capable of seizing others consistently to do what he/she wants to do.

Foucault, therefore, argues that understanding power in this way is highly implausible as it reduces the complexity of power relations and considers it has only a centralized, unitary, symmetrical and homogeneous function. He argues power should be seen as "constructing subjectivity" through various strategies, techniques, tactics practiced in many social fields, namely, political, economic, religious, legal, and so on as it has multiple functionalities and various "subjective constructions". Since all individual subjects situated in a broader power structure of society, human subjectivity should be seen, Foucault claims, as historically constituted and socially forged rather than "given" in the power relations. For this reason, no one in a strict sense exercises power, but, on the contrary, everyone is being operated by it through various practices, strategies, political values, moral codes, institutional rules, and so on. On this ground, Foucault states, power cannot be the "object" in society, but it exercises in the form of the relation between the people.

The very definition of power as a relation (social relation) debunks the "sovereign subject" as it no longer takes power in terms of capacity, possession and the property of the "sovereign agent". It is the relationship between individuals or any human aggregates that power is identified and exercised, which takes the subjects as the "vehicles" of its operations, not the holders. Since power is exercised and identified as "relation", it not only represents possible subjectivities one

could have but also states power is not the essential property to be manipulated exclusively by any sovereign subject. For example, between a boss and an employee, there is a power relation exercised, which not only does make an employee what he supposed to be but also how a boss should be. It is the "power relation" between them that the subjectivities of the boss and the employee are constituted.[34] Considering the larger power structure of society, Foucault, therefore, argues power should be seen as the ensemble of social relations. Since there could be ensembles of social interactions, one does not have "essential, universal, sovereign subjectivity" but only manifold subjectivities. By the same token, since subjects have multiple social interactions, it implies that power does not have a single, uniform, homogeneous function but has multiple operations in various levels and means. The very emphasis on "relation" in the mechanism of power, one the one hand, made Foucault pay attention to the complex and manifold functionalities of power, and on the other hand, enabled rejecting sovereign subjects in the power relations.

One these grounds, Foucault, therefore, claims a radical shift from the "sovereign subject" to "manifold subjectivities" in the analysis of power; a theoretical move from capital "S" to small "s" in understanding the constitution of subjects in the power relations. For example, a woman does have various social relations/power relations in many social fields/domains, namely, religious, political, sexual, legal, economic, and so on, which may constitute manifold subjectivities for her such as Hindu, Dalit, wife, lesbian, teacher, and so forth. It implies that she does not have any essential/sovereign/universal subjectivity with a capital "S", (that is, essential womanhood) but she may have manifold subjectivities constituted through the various social relations/power relations with a small "s" described above. On this ground, Foucault proposes two principle theoretical claims: there is no universal human nature, and human subjectivity is socially constructed and historically forged. Power, therefore, argues Foucault, does not presuppose any sovereign subject, but it shapes, modifies and forges subjectivities through its exercises as we all are continually interacting in "power relations". The operations of power should be seen as strategies or political tactics that must be understood as "multiplicity of force relations" exist throughout the social body. Foucault, therefore, claims power studies should be based on analysing

[34] In the given example, without conceiving the "power relation", one cannot conceive the subjectivities of the boss and the employee in the first place. To be the boss and the employee, they have to continue and obey the rules and regulations by which the power relation between them constituted. However, whether such a relationship is right and desirable is another issue which needs empirical studies to be evaluated.

how the application of power regulates in the whole complex of apparatus, institutions and social practices in constituting subjectivities.

1.3.3 Arguments against the repressive model

Another theoretical connotation to be bracketed out is the claim that power is inherently repressive. This repressive hypothesis, according to Foucault, is fundamental to almost all traditional conceptualization of power. It claims power *essentially* represses nature, instincts, a class, or individuals, by following the formula "A exercises power *over* B." The primary problem with such a conception lies in its constant emphasis on the binary structure of power and the presupposition of the fixed subjectivities. It, on the one hand, reduces the complexity of power relation into a binary structure such as master/pupil, state/citizen, husband/wife, and so on; on the other hand, it pre-assumes the subjectivity of the power relation is given. Moreover, fundamental to this hypothesis is the concept of prohibition, which has two central roles. Firstly, it underwrites the operation of power as homogeneous exertion imposed from "top to down" for every level and domain, for example, in family, husband over the wife, in school, teacher over a student, and so on. Secondly, it assumes power is always negative as its function is refusal, limitation, obstruction, censorship, prevention, and so forth. Not only does it conceive challenging power only in terms of transgression but also assumes power is substantially undesirable. For this reason, according to this view, power is always "what says no" as its ultimate manifestation is the pure form of "Thou shalt not" (*PK*, 139-140).

Similarly, conceptualizing power as essentially repressive deprives of analyzing the complexity of power relations as it fundamentally presupposes the operation of power in terms of a single, unified exertion. As I noted above, treating power as the instance of negation, not only it assumes a single and identical operation of power as interdiction but it also applies the same to all forms of power relations in society and at every level of subjection. It conceives a double subjective constitution with a binary conception: the dominator and the dominated. To illustrate, firstly, it conceives the dominator as the *Subject*, which could be either real or imaginary, exerts the interdiction, for example, the Monarch or the general will. Whereas, the *subject*, who accepts the interdiction, is forced to obey power, for example, the citizen under the sovereign state. Power is defined in these negative terms, which can be seen from the classical jurists down to current conceptions, on the one hand, presupposes a sovereign subject who does the prohibition, and on

the other hand, a subject who must say yes or no it. Conceptualizing power in this way, it presupposes the sovereign subject and assumes power functions ultimately one over others. Foucault rejects these characteristic features of the repressive hypothesis as he claims power is neither centralized and possession nor commodity and capacity. Thinking power purely as an apparatus of prohibition and repression of one class or subject over others, therefore, Foucault argues, needs to be resituated with other mechanisms such as non-juridical, institutional norms and social practices, and so on (*PK*, 140-141). What Foucault stresses is that power should not be viewed as a binary operation of repression as a homogeneous mechanism presupposed by fixed subjects because it not only limits but also ignores the complexity of power relations.

Foucault, however, does not reject the repressive aspect exclusively but argues it is more insidious and convoluted than a "simple prohibition" having a whole range of phenomena as the effects of power. If power is negative, narrow, and essentially constraining, Foucault asks, "[I]f it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it?" (*PK*, 119). Power, Foucault argues, is more than a negative instance of repression as it should be seen as producing things, inducing pleasures, forming knowledge, constituting discourses, and above all, constructing subjectivity. For this reason, Foucault claims, power is a complex phenomenon having multiple functionalities at various levels and domains, which runs throughout the whole social body. If one does not accept power has multiple operations, it is indeed difficult to answer what makes power accepted, productive, prohibitive in constructing social reality and subjectivity. Rather than analyzing internal rationality of power as repression, Foucault argues, power relations should be studied as the "antagonism of strategies" (*BSH*, 212) embedded in the socio-historical conditions. Instead of thinking power as a homogeneous exercise of repressive effects, Foucault proposes, one should focus on how its mechanisms, impacts, relations, and numerous apparatus operate at various levels, domains and extensions of a society. One must study, therefore, manifold relations of force constituted by power through its redistribution, realignments, homogenization, serial arrangements and convergence that came into play in various institutions and social practices.

By criticizing these three models of power, Foucault, on the one hand, rejects "sovereign subject" in the power relations; on the other hand, claims subjects should be seen as "constructed" by power relations. *Therefore, he concludes there is no Subject with capital "S" but only manifold*

subjectivities with small "*s*" *in the power relations.* However, how power should be studied and the distinctive characteristic features of Foucault's account of power are yet to be analyzed. We will see these two conceptual features in the following sections.

1.4 The Methodological Precautions

Apart from the methodological assumptions to be bracketed as described above, Foucault suggests six "methodological precautions", which, he claims, sheds light on understanding the complexity of power relations. One might ask if the analysis of power is directed to how it is exercised, then "what is its mechanism all about" (*PK*, 89). Answering how to study power, Foucault, therefore, suggests six methodological precautions: (1) Power is not centralized domination; it should be studied in the regional and local forms: (2) Power should be seen as intentional but non-subjective: (3) Power should be analyzed as something that circulates in the society: (4) The operations of power should not be evaluated in terms of general mechanism: (5) The mechanism of power should not be seen as the products of ideology: (6) Freedom and resistance should not be seen as outside the power relations. Let's evaluate each of them as follows:

1.4.1 Power is not centralized domination; it should be studied in the regional and local forms

Foucault proclaims one of the fundamental aims of the general project of power he has undertaken lies in analyzing the fact of domination by exposing both its "latent nature and brutality" (*PK*, 95). In the first methodological precaution, therefore, Foucault suggests that one should not study the instruments of domination in terms of law and sovereignty. Instead, one should focus on analyzing the whole complex of power's apparatuses, institutions and regulations accountable for its operations as "manifold domination". The domination as the single, stable, homogeneous power structure of sovereignty as suggested by conventional theories, according to Foucault, is an inadequate explanation of power. He is interested, on the contrary, in analysing the multiple forms of subjugation and domination functioned within the social organism. The power relations in the society, which are "more-or-less organised, hierarchical, a co-ordinated cluster of relations" (*PK*, 198), according to Foucault, not only historically constituted but also operates with the multiple functionalities of manifold domination explaining mutual relations between subjects.

According to Foucault, the sovereign model of power, which defines exertion of domination as "solid and global", has considered domination is intrinsic to the operation of power

achieved through the legitimate right of sovereignty and legal obligation imposed on subjects. It defines power not only as violence, oppression, and authority but also as the "centralised force" held by one group of people or sovereign subject over others. According to Foucault, these conceptualizations are the obsolete explanation of power on two grounds. Firstly, it is unable to explain domination, where rule and force are absent in the social world. Secondly, it is theoretically insufficient to describe the production and reproduction of various subjectivities. To substantiate this claim, Foucault argues that power in the modern world does not arise from the "uniform edifice of sovereignty" as an exertion one "over" others. Since there is no single sovereign centre of power as such, and power is diffused across society in a multitude of micro centres, Foucault claims, each of us is constituted as subjects of modern disciplinary power in numerous ways. Instead of studying power in terms of the juridical edifice of "sovereignty and the state apparatuses", Foucault argues, one should concentrate on the material operation of power and its strategic apparatus. To analyse the mechanism of power, therefore, one should concentrate not only techniques and tactics of power but also "forms of subjection and the inflections and utilisations of their localised systems" (*PK*, 102).

According to Foucault, there is no essential domination as such, which is defined as one wields over others, but only manifold subjugation and polymorphous construction of subjectivities. This "polymorphous technique of subjugations" and the various means by which it investigates and operates, according to Foucault, is the historical transition from the old model of "sovereignty and obedience" to the new model of "manifold domination and subjugations" (*PK*, 95-96). For this reason, in the analysis of power relations, the first methodological precaution also suggests power should be examined in its ultimate destinations and extremities. In other words, instead of analyzing "regulated and legitimate forms" of power with the "general mechanisms of its central locations", Foucault insists, one should concentrate, on the contrary, regional and local forms of its operations. For example, instead of analyzing how the "right" of punishment is founded in the mechanism of sovereignty or theory of monarchical rules, one should focus on how its operations are embodied in the local, regional and material institutions as the complex social function. Strictly speaking, one should not reduce the examination of power through models offered by the legal system and of institutional apparatus such as the state. On these grounds, in the analysis of power, Foucault asserts, one needs to concentrate on how power operates at the

extreme points at the local level embodied in the social body, where it becomes "capillary" (*PK*, 96-97).

1.4.2 Power should be seen as intentional but non-subjective

The second methodological precaution states that the examination of power should not be concerned with "at the level of conscious intention or decision" (*PK*, 97). The very assumption of conscious intention, argues Foucault, presupposes sovereign subject as it assumes power in terms of the "internal point of view" as a capacity and possession. Such conception directly posits two significant obvious questions, which are considered as the "central" questions of the traditional conceptualization of power; who possesses the power or who has power, and what is the fundamental aim or intention of holding power? These two questions, however, always presupposes as if power has "conscious intention", which is considered as "completely invested in its real and effective practices" (*PK*, 97). Foucault vehemently rejects this conceptualization as power, according to him, cannot be held by anyone exclusively in society. Since power is seen or functioned in the ensemble of social relations exhibited in various social practices, what is indeed needed in the power studies is the analysis of detecting its manifold functionalities.

The analysis of power, for this reason, should be concentrated on its external visage, immediate objects and targets, direct and instant relations, and above all, its field of applications, where power "installs itself and produces its real effects" (*PK*,97). It replaces the age-old traditional questions such as who dominates, why they dominate, and what they seek. Instead, it inquires about the power's "overall strategies", its functionalities at the level of subjugations, and its "continuous and instant processes" over bodies, behaviours, mind, and so on. For this reason, the question of sovereign subject and power, which is concerned with the symmetrical and homogeneous application of power by the single sovereign will, should be abandoned in the analysis of power. Instead, one should concentrate on how subjects are constructed in its "material instance" in the power relations through its multiplicity of functionalities embedded in the socio-historical conditions. In the analysis of power, one should reject, therefore, analyzing how individuals are reunited under the "centralized sovereign state"*;* and, one should study, instead, the construction of the various subjects as the result of the effect of power.

However, one might ask, does Foucault reject the notion of "intentionality" in power relations? Or what is the status of intentionality in his conceptualization? Or how one understands

or identifies intentionality in the operation of power? Answering these questions, Foucault claims, power relations are both "intentional and non-subjective" (*HS*, 94-95). It may look a contradictory statement as one might ask how is it possible that power is intentional when it does not presuppose subjects. Or how is it possible that power is non-subjective since there are no power relations without aims and objectives (intention)? Or how one can attribute the responsibility of intended action if power is non-subjective? According to Foucault, all power relations do have aims and objectives or intentions, but it does not qualify to claim that power essentially "results from the choice or decision of individual subjects" (*HS*, 94-95). If power is essentially derived from the subject, then it assumes the sovereignty of the subject, which he has vehemently rejected as an obsolete understanding of power. There are neither "subject-less objectives" nor essential holders of power because subjects, strictly speaking, do not choose to exercise power but are being exercised by it.

However, in all the specific or individual cases of power relations, it does have specific intentions and goals, but power in its manifold functionalities should not be seen as having a *conscious* intention resulting from the intentionality of the subject exclusively. The emergence of the modern penal system, for example, described in the *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* is not exactly the outcome of *consciously* organized intended acts of reformists and humanists, but is the result of the change happened in the "process of punishment", which is the complex social function having scattered locations with overlapping functions and innumerable localized multiplicity of minor processes both in the economic and political realms. The emergence of the modern prison, for Foucault, is the result of the new power/knowledge regime as it should not be seen as a conscious intentional process with a true set of "conscious" desires or objectives performed exclusively by any specific individuals. The intentional acts of reformists and humanists, however, should be seen as the "historical outcome or change" operated or happened within the "power regime" prevalent during that period. In other words, according to Foucault, the function of reformists should be seen as "indissociable" from the system of socio-political institutions, cultural, economic and historical conditions of that period.

To put it bluntly, in the specific instance of power relations, it does have "intention"; however, power as the complex social function, which Foucault intends to evaluate, does not have any "conscious" intention as such. Foucault's concept of power should be seen, as Peter Digester

rightly claims, an "unintended consequence of intentional action" as there is (only) "indirect connection between intention and power".[35] Similarly, since Foucault's is not an ontological concept of power or the essential theory of power, there is no such thing called "Power" as such with a capital "P" but only "power relationship"[36]; individuals, therefore, should be seen as vehicles of power, not the holders. Individuals should be seen as "positioned" in the power relations as they are not only "elements of its articulations" but also "both the *subjects* and *objects* of power".[37] Considering the multiplicity of its functionalities as a complex social function, power does not have any "conscious" intentions, and therefore, it is non-subjective; however, considering the "specificities" of power relations, it does have intentions, objectives and aims, and therefore, subjects or individuals are not *mere effects* of power.

1.4.3 Power should be analyzed as something that circulates in society

According to Foucault, the third methodological precaution proclaims that power should not be taken as an activity of one individual's or group's or class's "consolidated and homogeneous domination" (*PK*,98) as an exclusive possession and the capacity over others. It must be analysed, instead, as something which "circulates or functions in the form of a chain" (*PK*, 98). Similarly, thinking power in terms of binary assumption exclusively, namely, the "holders" of power (who exercise it) and the people (who are "being submitted" to it), is the obsolete explanation as power has multiple functions, objects, and targets exerted at various levels in society. Since there is no sovereign subject, who retains and holds power, power is neither localized nor in anybody's hand (*PK*, 98). As power is not the capacity and possession of an individual or class or group exclusively, it is neither a commodity nor piece of wealth nor a "thing" to be held. Individuals, for this reason, should be seen as circulating between its threads and "positioned" in undergoing and exercising power simultaneously (*PK*, 98). Since power does not presuppose subjects, individuals should be seen as "the vehicles of power, not its point of application" (*PK*, 98). Similarly, as power does not have true interests and objectives consciously made, it should be seen as "employed and exercised through a net-like organisation" (*PK*, 98). Moreover, individuals should not be conceived as "a sort of elementary nucleus, inert material and primitive atom" on which power has

[35] Peter Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," 984.
[36] Kevin J. Heller, "Power, Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault," *SubStance* 25, no. 1 (1996): 80, doi:10.2307or 3685230.
[37] Heller, "Power in Foucault," 80-81.

its ultimate exertion, but they are "one of its prime effects" (*PK*, 98). Power, strictly speaking, not only constitutes subjects as its "prime effects", but also they are its "vehicle" at the same time. On these grounds, Foucault concludes that power exists throughout the entire social body through its strategies and tactics; however, none is exclusively operating it but all are constantly interacting and being exercised by it.

1.4.4 The operations of power should not be evaluated in terms of the general mechanism

The fourth methodological precaution elaborates the question, how does power circulate in the entire social body? Or what does it mean by "power is everywhere in society"? Answering these questions, Foucault argues, though power works as "net-like organization" or "in the form of a chain", it does not mean to say power is the best or equally distributed thing in the social world. The very circulation of power is distributed neither democratic manner nor anarchic way, although power establishes a network and is dispersed in the entire social world. Thinking power in terms of the equal or best distribution in society, according to Foucault, deprives "a kind of deduction" as it assumes not only the imaginary stable center but also "general mechanism" for each power relations. Foucault, however, rejects this general mechanism of power and proposes, on the contrary, "an *ascending analysis* of power" analyzing "infinitesimal mechanisms" of power of which each *case* of power relations has its own "history, trajectory, techniques and tactics" (*PK*, 99). The analysis of power, therefore, should study how these infinitesimal mechanisms of power have been "continued, invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, and so on" (*PK*, 99). Whereas the general mechanism supposes "a kind of deduction" as it presupposes a "global domination" in each power relations at the most molecular elements of society, the infinitesimal mechanisms, however, concentrates on how the techniques and the procedures of power are exercised at the most elementary levels.

According to Foucault, what needs to be analysed is how procedures of power are displaced, extended, altered, invested and annexed at the minute elements and levels of the society rather than assuming general mechanism with global domination. Thinking power in terms of the general mechanism of domination is inappropriate and should be discarded in the analysis of power because such an attempt is incapable of analyzing complex functions of power. For example, the subjective construction of infantile sexuality and madness since the sixteenth or seventeenth century can be deduced from the "general domination of the bourgeois class" as they were (the

mad and infantile) useless to industrial production. Foucault rejects this simple deductive approach of the "global domination" having "general mechanisms" as it simplifies the complexity of power (*PK*, 100). On the contrary, he suggests that one should study the historical investigation concerning how the infinitesimal mechanisms of power exercise at the lowest level of the social body. In the above-given example, examining the confinement of the insane and interdiction of children's sexuality, instead of analyzing or deducing the general domination of the bourgeoisie, according to Foucault, one needs to analyze the phenomena of repression or exclusion with their instruments and inner logic (for examples, the apparatuses of surveillance and the medicalization). Apart from that, one should concentrate to study how it works at the effective level and most basic units of society, for example, family and the responsible agents such as parents, doctors, and so on. Foucault, therefore, claims power studies should be focused on how the mechanisms of power come to be effectively incorporated at the micro-level and the minute elements of the society.

1.4.5 The mechanism of power should not be seen as the products of ideology

The fifth methodological precaution stresses that power should not be analysed in terms of "ideological functions" as suggested, generally, by Marxism. According to Foucault, power study should not be limited as the function of ideological apparatuses exclusively as he claims ideology is an inadequate concept for analyzing power on three grounds. Firstly, he argues, ideology, generally, stands as "virtual opposition" to "truth" as it presupposes there is an essential or absolute truth to be unveiled. It strictly assumes that one of the fundamental functions of power is to undermine truth; and, liberation from power relation, therefore, is seen as achieving the "veiled truth". Secondly, ideology refers "order of subjects" as it presupposes a pre-given human subject either collective or individual (in Marxian terminology, proletariat and bourgeoisie) endowed with a consciousness (in Marxian terminology, class consciousness) on which power is to be seized. It obstinately restricts the question of subjectivity and power relations in terms of binaries such as truth or false, proletariat or bourgeoisie, and consciousness or ideology. Thirdly, in studying the complexity of power relations, ideology seems to be "insufficiently analytical" to explain its infrastructure, mechanisms of hierarchies, economic determinants, apparatuses, and so on. It erroneously assumes there is knowledge without deception, a quasi-transparent form of knowledge without error and illusion behind the operation of the ideological function of power (*PK*, 117).

However, Foucault argues that the very production of knowledge should not be seen as the instrumentality of ideological construction as "false knowledge or consciousness". It should be seen, on the contrary, as the production of effective instruments of power exercised through various subtle mechanisms such as "methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control" (*PK*, 102). According to Foucault, power should be seen as producing knowledge rather than creating false knowledge because knowledge does not liberate but constitutes subjectivities. Similarly, truth, according to Foucault, should not be viewed as opposite to power as the property to be achieved in the absence of power as there are no "absolute truths" irrespective of power relations but only constituted "truth games" resulting from the effects of power. The concept of ideology, for these reasons, seems to be inadequate to explain how the effects of truth, knowledge and subjectivity are produced by power, which is constituted within a historical framework. It is erroneous to say, on these grounds, that power is the homogeneous function of ideology with the same mechanisms of hierarchies and organization applied over subjects, truth and knowledge.

Above all, ideology pre-supposes the repressive hypothesis as it claims the ultimate function of power is to repress knowledge, truth and subjectivity. Emphasizing the operation power in terms of repression is the belief that power always works from the top to bottom as it, on the one hand, presupposes power is always negative and constraining, and on the other hand, it reduces the complex functionality of its operation by assuming it has only single, unitary, and homogeneous exertion. For example, Marxism has denounced class domination as essentially repressive in the Western capitalism, which is, however, argues Foucault, reluctant to analyze how the mechanism of power is exercised within themselves to form a dominant class in the first place (*PK*, 116). Those who employ ideology as the appropriate function for the adequate explanation of power assume that liberation is the overthrow of power. They also presuppose that longing for *freedom* from power relations or behind the concept of repression, there seems to be a power "without a bludgeon" and is "innocent of all coercion, discipline and normalization" (*PK*, 117). For example, it is an obvious question, which Marxists have faced and much-discussed within itself, that what is the nature of power relation after the capturing of state apparatuses or proletarian dictatorship? (*PK*, 59). Nevertheless, Foucault does not reject "ideology" vehemently by claiming it does not have any function to explain the operations of power. What he claims is that thinking

power in terms of "ideology" exclusively is subject to reductionism as it is inadequate to examine the complexity of power's operations.

1.4.6 Freedom and resistance should not be seen as outside the power relation

Another methodological assumption to be taken into consideration is the concept of freedom and resistance. Though Foucault has not made these two concepts as methodological precautions as such, they should be seen as fundamentals to understanding his conceptualization of power. However, these two concepts are not separately postulated by Foucault, but they are deduced from the previous methodological precautions suggested by him. Since power, according to Foucault, is not essentially repressive, he claims that power relations are productive. He argues, for example, if power is essentially suppressive, then individuals cannot consciously work according to the rules and regulations instructed in the institutional mechanism of power to improve and train themselves. However, one should not think Foucault claims "power is productive" as contrary to "power is repressive". Instead, he asserts, quite theoretically different fashion, power can be productive as it is not always "inherently" repressive. On these grounds, Foucault argues power is productive as it not only works on free subjects but also assumes multiple points of resistance in the power network. In other words, unless one is not accepting or resisting the rules and regulations of power mechanisms as a free subject, one cannot become a "productive subject" as a docile body in the given power relations. Therefore, Foucault claims "power is exercised only over free subjects" (*BSH*, 221), and "where there is power, there is resistance" (*HS*, 95). Since all are subject to power and "one is always 'inside' power, there is no 'escaping' it" (*HS*, 95), according to Foucault, freedom and resistance should not be seen as in a position of exteriority to power relations.

1.5 The Question of Power in Foucault's Account

Apart from the general criticism of three models and the methodological precautions described above, Foucault's account is more significant and relevant than conventional theories on three grounds. Firstly, Foucault claims power should be historically understood and socially analyzed. Secondly, he claims power constructs *subjectivities.* Thirdly, he states power is not essentially repressive, and it can be productive. For this reason, Foucault's account of power takes an entirely different outlook than the conventional theories because it, on the one hand, no longer

restricts power studies in the political domain alone; on the other hand, it extends the application of power relations in the day to day social life. This "radical departure" itself makes Foucault's notion of power a significant theoretical category in studying the social world and human subjectivities, unlike the traditional approaches. To elucidate the distinctive characteristic features of Foucault's account of power, let's evaluate the above-mentioned claims as follows:

1.5.1 Power should be historically understood and socially analyzed

Though Foucault has given a deeper understanding of studying power in uniquely appropriate ways, it is erroneous to say that he has proposed a "theory of power". He declines the very approach in understanding the different mechanism of power by proposing a "general theory of power" on two grounds: firstly, such a theory, an essential theory, which is foundationalist and universal, is subject to reduce all complexity of power relations into its theoretical genesis; secondly, it deprives of abandoning historical contingencies and complex social variables of power relations into defining logical axioms in analyzing the complexity of power mechanisms. The fundamental problem of power relations, argues Foucault, lies in the fact that power cannot be a theory irrespective of historical conditions and social circumstances. It should be seen as, on the contrary, a historically constituted complex strategic system. It is the reason why Foucault nowhere has given any logical axioms defining power throughout his works and intellectual endeavours. He has considered his approach as "analytic" rather than a theory (*BSH*, 184). A general theory usually is obsessed with the theoretical question "what is power?" which, according to Foucault, is inappropriate on two grounds: on the one hand, it is oriented towards providing an answer to "everything"; on the other hand, it deprives of assuming "a prior objectification" (*P*, 327; cf: *SD*, 13). The general theory of power is an a priori account, which not only assumes a priority of theoretical stands over the empirical investigation of how power works but also proposes a "set of necessary and sufficient conditions" for its relations. Foucault, therefore, calls for the re-elaboration of the "theory of power" as he thinks power should be analyzed in the cultural practices, institutional rules, political values, ethical codes, and so on as the "politics of everyday life". For this reason, Foucault has suggested "power studies" should be focused on various institutional sites such as the factory, asylum, church, school, family and so on. In short, he claims power studies should not be "context-free, ahistorical, objective description" (*BSH*, 184).

He claims it is not possible to have the comprehensive and all-encompassing theory of power irrespective of history and social conditions as it should be seen, instead, as an "ensemble of mechanisms and procedures" embedded in all the social practices and discourses. For this reason, Foucault eschews the traditional question "what is power" and thereby the "theory of power"; and proposes, instead, an "analytic" concerned with "how power works". According to Foucault, questions such as what is power and who exercises it are an obsolete understanding of power. Instead, Foucault asks how power exercises? The question of "how", however, does not imply how it "manifests" itself, but rather how it "operates". For this reason, Foucault rejects the essential account of power, which is ahistorical and universal, defines primarily "what power is". He claims "power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered" (*PK*, 89) as understood by the traditional essential account of power. Instead, power, for him, is a "relation of force" that exists only in our action (*PK*, 89); it can be understood by analyzing how it is exercised. Since power is not a theory as such, there cannot be any logical, universal claims regarding the concept of power. Therefore, Foucault claims *power should be historically understood and socially analyzed*. He, for this reason, deals not with what power is, but how it functions both its historical contingencies and social conditions. In short, power is not merely a theoretical question for Foucault but is part of our day to day life experience (*BSH*, 209).

1.5.2 Power constructs *subjectivities*

The foremost aim of Foucault's theoretical analysis is to examine the mechanisms of power relations by which, in our culture and history, how human beings are forged as subjects. To understand how subjectivity is constructed, Foucault says, one should evaluate the power relations embedded in the social practices, institutions norms and knowledge productions, and so on. Foucault, for example, has studied madness, psychiatry, and punishment in the institutionalized social structure to show not only how mad and criminal subjectivities are constructed but also how others or normal are constituted themselves *indirectly* through "excluding" them socially. Foucault argues, in the very process of constructing subjectivities either of madmen or criminals, who are historically alienated and socially excluded, should be seen as the result of institutionalized power structures. He is interested in how madness or criminality is confined in an institutional space, what tools and strategies are invested in regulating them, what are the processes and knowledge used to distinguish them, and, above all, what are the power relations, thereby, underlined in them.

It is in this sense that Foucault argues power constructs subjectivities. Since power is embedded in social practices and norms, which can be found in all social fields such as politics, medicine, religion, psychiatry, state, and so on, Foucault makes a "radical" claim that power is "co-extensive with the social body".

The mechanisms of power, therefore, operate through various local, institutional and cultural practices by several strategies and techniques. In the modern world, according to Foucault, the function of power is widespread as it lies "at the bottom of all social practices". Since power has multiple functions at various levels, which does not make homogeneous subjective constructions as *it does not construct subjectivity, but subjectivities*. Since power is dispersed in the society, which is embedded in cultural practices, rules, regulations, and norms, it constructs various subjectivities, for instances, parents, students, patients, the insane, and so on. It is in this sense that disciplinary power, according to Foucault, operates as massive control, which can be seen in a variety of institutions such as prisons, mental asylums, schools, and hospitals with various applications and targets. Power, in modern society, therefore, operates as the disciplinary mechanisms, which not only embodied in the daily activities of individuals but also aims at modulating their behaviours, attitudes, gestures and actions. However, though in the modern "disciplinary society", power works with rules and regulations, with certain strategies and techniques, it operates not necessarily through physical force but on our actions by modifying the behaviour, beliefs and thoughts, and so on. Power in this manner classifies, modifies, shapes, and thereby, constructs subjectivities. Therefore, Foucault makes the radical claim: *since power constructs subjects, and power is socially analyzed and historically understood, Foucault claims, subjects are historically constituted and socially forged.*

1.5.3 Power can be productive

According to Foucault, power is not essentially repressive as it can be productive. However, power, according to him, is productive on three grounds: firstly, it produces subjectivities; secondly, produces knowledge; and thirdly, increases the utility of institutions and docility of individuals. Since power works through specific techniques and procedures on our action, the mechanism of power, according to Foucault, *produces subjectivities*. As power is not essentially suppressive, Foucault argues, subjects should be seen as the production of power as they can impose the rules and regulations embedded in the mechanism of power relations to work

upon themselves consciously to regulate, improve, supervise, and train oneself. In the modern disciplinary society, power, according to Foucault, operates "effectively" because it does not function as physical torture or coercion on the body, but it exercises upon the "action" of individuals to modify and train the subjectivities of individuals. As power works through techniques and strategies, with rules and regulations, politically speaking, it functions as surveillance by which an individual is always under its scrutiny. Two functions can be noted in such operations: firstly, individuals think that they are under observation which imposes them to work according to the rule and regulations: secondly, individuals willingly impose strategies upon them to improve, regulate and train them better. For example, if a student willingly accepts the exams, assignments, seminars, and other forms of educational methods from a teacher, it may improve the student's knowledge, skills and ability, and so on. It is also the same case with the teacher, who needs to check, correct and verify all the works of the student. Power, therefore, trains and supervises both the teacher and student in a more efficient way in the educational institutions. For this reason, both subjectivities are "docile-bodies" under power's surveillance as the operation of power increases their docility.

Similarly, according to Foucault, power is productive because the disciplinary exertion of power *increases the utility and effectiveness of institutions*. Since subjects are constituted through the rules and regulations in the disciplinary society, politically speaking, there is no need for an active "sovereign individual" to exercise power. As there is no need for any external force to regulate power, it functions effectively. For this reason, politically speaking, as power functions as surveillance in subtle ways, it arouses only a little resistance from subjects. Economically speaking, claims Foucault, application of power involves low expenditure as it functions through rules, strategies, and techniques. In the disciplinary society, as power works economically and politically in this manner, the application and effectiveness of power's operations work at its best. For this reason, the effectiveness of power can be extended with maximum intensity without any failure and interval and can be effectively enhanced in various institutions such as educational, industrial, medical, and so on. Disciplinary techniques of power, therefore, increase the docility and utility of institutional systems.

Furthermore, power is productive as *it produces knowledge*. To substantiate this claim, Foucault argues that knowledge should be seen as constructed historically by power relations

rather than the invention of creative subjects or foundational subjects exclusively. For this reason, he claims not only knowledge but also subjects are historically constituted and socially forged through power relations. Therefore, Foucault states knowledge does not liberate subjects as suggested by essential account but constitutes their subjectivities. For example, when the modern criminal and madmen are constructed historically, various disciplines such as psychology, sociology, medical knowledge at the same time developed by studying what is "crime" and how criminal activities take place, and so on. Not only does knowledge have emerged historically, but it also produced various other subjectivities to authorizing experts for regulating such knowledge. On the one hand, it produces subjectivities such as abnormal, patients, criminals, and so on, who are constituted by knowledge or human sciences; on the other hand, it produces various other subjectivities such as warden, psychologist, doctor, and so on, who can regulate the knowledge as an authority. Foucault's historical investigation, therefore, claims that these subjectivities are constituted historically through the emergence of human sciences. Power, on the one hand, produces knowledge, whereas, on the other hand, constructs subjectivities. For this reason, Foucault argues, *knowledge and power are mutually constitutive in constructing subjectivities*.

From the three subsections, namely arguments against three models, the methodological precautions and the question of power in Foucault, the following insights can be summarised:

1. Power is not a thing or property but a multiplicity of force relation because it is possessed neither by institution nor by any sovereign individuals.
2. Power is not "simply repressive" as "it can be productive"; it produces subjectivities and knowledge.
3. Power constructs subjectivities by modifying a particular type of behaviour and regulating people's everyday activity.
4. Power operates at "the most micro levels of social relations" as "it is omnipresent at every level of the social body".
5. The exercise of power is not a capacity or a possession as it is a complex strategic social process.
6. Constituting subjectivities, knowledge and power are inextricably related.

7. Power should not be seen as operating with a single, unified, homogeneous exertion as it is not an appropriation limited between binary relation of subjects such as the relation between the state and citizen or simply between classes.
8. The subject should not be seen as exercising power; on the contrary, they should be seen as "constructed subjects" in the power relations.

Throughout this chapter, the central research question discussed is to evaluate the relation between power and subject, and the status of the subject in the power relations. The conventional theories of power, which are conceptually depicted by three models of power, advocate that it is the subject who exercises power. However, according to Foucault, the traditional approach of power is "obsolete approach" as it is a limited explanation on three grounds: firstly, it confines power relations into binaries such as dominant or dominated; secondly, it pre-supposes fixed subjectivities such as the sovereign or dominant and the subjugated; thirdly, it assumes the operation of power as single, unified, homogeneous exertion from "top to bottom". However, unlike these conventional approaches, Foucault's account of power advocates that subjects should be seen as *constructed* by power relations. To put it bluntly, since all subjects are *inside the power relations* constituted by various historical practices and social conditions, Foucault claims subjects are constructed by power relations. As subjects are socially forged and historically constituted power relations, Foucault argues that *there is no sovereign subjectivity but only subjectivities.* On these grounds, Foucault makes the radical claim that subjects should not be seen as exercising power as suggested by traditional theories; they should be seen, on the contrary, a constructed subject in the given power relations. Therefore, Foucault concludes that subjectivities are not pre-given or essential or universal but they are constructed by the power relations embedded in the various historical conditions and social practices.

1.6 Conclusion

As the title of the chapter indicates Foucault has argued it is essential to analyse power relations to understand the formation of subjects as he has substantiated subjects are the construction of power relations. For this reason, unlike modern thinker's views, Foucault's conceptualization is different on two grounds. Firstly, his conception is not restricted in the political domains such as state, class, and so on exclusively as power, according to him, is coextensive with society as the day to day life affairs. Secondly, power is not a capacity,

possession, execution of the will, commodity, and repression as suggested by modern thinkers, but is a complex strategic social process. On these grounds, Foucault argues subjects should not be seen as exercising power, they are, on the contrary, constructed as subjects by the power relations. Similarly, unlike the conventional views, Foucault does not study power as an essential concept with a prior objectification having necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, he takes power itself as a historical process as it can be studied only by proposing methodological precautions without any prior logical axioms irrespective of history and social conditions. For this reason, Foucault studies not what power is but how power works because his concept of power is not an essential theory but a conceptual tool. Foucault, therefore, suggests evaluating the complex process of subjective formations, one needs to study power relations embodied in the socio-historical conditions.

Since power, according to Foucault, is historical, and it rejects the essentialist approach, the same is applied to the subjective formations as well. Foucault, for this reason, vehemently discards the sovereignty of the subject, and advocates the subject is socio-historically constituted. On this ground, Foucault argues there is no essential subjectivity but only subjectivities constituted by power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions. Foucault's account of power, therefore, analyses several historical processes and institutional practices to study various subjective formations in history. Power, for this reason, according to Foucault, is not only the synonymous terms for social life but also the politics of everyday life in understanding subjectivities. Therefore, to analyze how individuals perceive, comprehend, and interpret the world around them as subjects, Foucault argues, it is essential to examine the operations of power not only in the institutional practices but also in the knowledge process. On these grounds, Foucault claims that the status or the role of the subject in the power relations is not given or pre-supposed as the essential, sovereign and foundational subject, but they are socially forged and historically constructed in the power relations embodied in them. Though Foucault claims subjects are constructed by power relations in contrast to conventional theories of power, one might ask *how he has arrived to study power relations to examine subjective formations*. For this reason, we will see in the next chapter how Foucault has formulated his concept of power as a theoretical tool in understanding the formation of subjectivities.

Chapter 2: The Question of the Subject

2.1 Introduction

In the first chapter, we have examined two central questions, namely, the *relation* between power and subject, and the *status* of the subject in the power relations by mapping the general mechanisms and framework of Foucault's account of power. The first chapter, therefore, oriented towards examining the status and position of the subject from the perspective of analyzing power, which has marked a radical theoretical change from the traditional understanding of power and subject. However, it is *specifically noted* that it is not first made a theoretical framework of power that Foucault has studied the status of the subject in power relations. On the contrary, it is by studying the "problem of the subject" in history and social conditions that the theoretical assumptions of power Foucault proposed. It is for this reason that Foucault claims his account of power should not be seen as a "theory" but a theoretical tool. This theoretical tool, however, is *gradually developed* by Foucault through his historical account in studying the subject. For this reason, in this chapter, the same questions probed in the first chapter are reversely postulated:

1. What is the problem of the *subject*?
2. What is the *relation* between subject and power?
3. What is *the status or role of power* in analyzing the problem of the subject?
4. How Foucault has developed the conceptualization of power in analysing the problem of subjects?

Answering the questions such as what is the subject, and how the subject is constructed through power relations, it is essential to know in the first place what the "problem of the subject" is. For this reason, two prominent views of the problem of subject, namely *essentialist account* and *social constructivist account* are discussed primarily in this chapter. While describing the essential contentions of these two accounts, a conceptual route is built leading to Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. Since the anti-subjective hypothesis postulates the subject is socio-historically constructed by power relations embedded in them, this chapter is also devoted to pointing out the general frameworks of its arguments and claims. It leads, however, bringing a detailed explanation of Foucault's methodological frameworks in studying history and society. Since the subject is historically constructed, three historical approaches such as *archaeology*, *genealogy* and *problematization* are discussed, which not only shows three phases of Foucault's

theoretical project but also deals with how the question of subject and power gradually developed in his intellectual endeavour. As the subject is socially forged, his another theoretical concept called *discourse* is also discussed, which not only demonstrates how the subject is socially constructed but also illustrates how it is connected with these three historical approaches. It directly answers the questions, namely, the *relation* between subject and power and the *role* of power in analyzing the "constituted" subject. By making the conceptual route in this way, this chapter illustrates not only Foucault's account of the problem of the subject but also how Foucault has developed his conceptualization of power studying the formations of subjectivities. Let's examine each conceptual section mentioned above as follows:

2.2 Problem of the Subject an Overview

This section presents a conceptual analysis of the "problem of the subject", developed in the history of Western philosophical thought, in which Foucault's theoretical understanding of "subject" is studied. It is indeed a very tedious task to begin to write the problem of the subject as the term subject has a rich and varied philosophical history in the West. For this reason, this chapter makes no pretension to analyze the detailed history and the various conceptualization of the subject dealing with its diverse issues as such a venturing attempt is not needed here, and it may lead beyond the scope of our research. Bearing this in mind, however, I shall start with providing the general meaning of the word "subject", which I think may reduce the difficulty, at least introducing the problem. Nevertheless, considering the different implications and complexities of the philosophical debate of the problem of the subject, two broad and complex avenues of the problem are introduced. Having described the general meaning of the word "subject", I will analyze these two major perspectives which are fundamentally contrary to each other. The first view defines the subject as "biologically given" which is the foundation or origin of thought and action. The other viewpoint, however, emphasizes that subjectivity is "socio-historically" constructed.[38]

Strictly speaking, this section discusses the debate between the essential, foundational subject versus subject as a complex and variable function of socio-historical conditions. Evaluating the arguments of both views, this section, therefore, studies the *problem* of the subject to build a conceptual map to Foucault's account. The first version argues socio-historical structures are

[38]Robert M. Strozier, *Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity: Historical Constructions of Subject and Self* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002), 9-10.

irrelevant in constituting subjectivity as the human subject is autonomous, free and after all capable of determining social structures. The second account, however, explains subjectivities are culturally as well as historically determined as humans are finite subjects. Though philosophers would vary in their conceptualization dealing with such issues, historically speaking, the former viewpoint generally held by the modernists, whereas the latter postmodernists. For that very reason, theoretically speaking, this chapter also deals with the debate between modernism and postmodernism in understanding subjectivity. Let's evaluate their central features as follows.

2.2.1 Essentialist Account

Let's begin with providing the general meaning of the term subject. According to Simon Critchley, the generic meaning of subject originates from the Latin word "subjectum" which denotes "something being 'thrown under' or succumbed to a subordinate role vis-à-vis something else".[39] Nevertheless, the term subject can be evaluated, in general, in two senses: narrowly and broadly. The former defines the subject as an individual who possesses the conscious experience, which includes beliefs, desires, feelings, and so on.[40] Whereas, the latter suggests that subject, who has agency and autonomy.[41] However, Robert M. Strozier states that the term "subject" is generally applied to "human nature" though there are disagreements how it has to be conceived. In general, among philosophers, such debates consist mainly in terms of what constitutes human nature and how subjectivity is forged.[42] There are two general contrasting views on this issue analyzing what human nature is: essentialist account and social constructivist account.[43]

Let's point out the general features of the essential account primarily. According to this view, the subject is considered as a foundation, an origin of thought and action, and is given biologically, which claims there is a "*human nature*" irrespective of socio-historical conditions. This account not only emphasizes absolute and creative role to the subject despite any cultural, historical and social forces but also proposes homogeneity of subjects. For this reason, according

---

[39]Simon Critchley, *Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought* (Brooklyn: Verso, 1999), 51.

[40] Robert C. Solomon, "Subjectivity," in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 900.

[41]Amy Allen, "Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10, no. 2 (2002):131-149.

[42] Strozier, *Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity*, 9.

[43] Peter Wilkin, "Chomsky and Foucault on Human Nature and Politics," *Social Theory and Practice* 25, no. 2 (1999): 177-210, doi:10.5840/soctheorpract199925217.

to this view, human nature is *universal* regardless of the socio-historical circumstances. It claims there is a bio-physical structure underlined in human nature which enables us, both as individuals and species, to understand the world and lead a social life. This relatively fixed human nature is not only biologically given and unchangeable but also the foundation, which guides our social as well as intellectual activities. Holders of this view argue unless there is human nature, how is it that individuals in every society are able to learn and think creatively. For them, essential human nature is primary and universal not only understanding the world but also conceiving what we are. They ask if there is no "innate governing principle" inscribed in human nature, how from the partial set of experience, genuine scientific knowledge is possible?[44] Furthermore, unless there is no relatively fixed human nature, they claim, it is hard to explain what we acquire as knowledge. Therefore, according to this view, the subject is *given* (biologically), *foundational* and *universal.*

Since the subject is foundational and universal, the essential account argues, the subject is the sole guarantor of knowledge as whose creativity alone produces the knowledge. As the subject is the "legitimate epistemic warrant" as the central basis for all knowledge, knowledge is not only considered as absolutely inscribed in human nature but also *objectively* known. For that reason, the foundational subject determines not only what knowledge is but also how knowledge is possible. However, the essential cognitive aptitude inscribed in human nature, according to this view, is the *reason* as it provides the accurate, objective, reliable foundation for "knowledge". Since reason is *the* cognitive capacity of the subject, it only plays a significant role in acquiring knowledge but also makes the subject the "creative individual". For this reason, knowledge production is seen as historically progressive and constantly developing which is solely attributed to the subject as the sovereign "*inventor* of knowledge".

The foundational subject proposed by the essential account also maintains two other significant concepts as well: *autonomy* and *agency*. In other words, the cognitive apparatus attributed to the foundational subject, according to this view, possesses autonomy and agency as their essential characteristics. Autonomy signifies individuals can "govern oneself" in making one's own decisions, judgments, reasons irrespective of any external forces, either coercive or

[44] Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 3.

manipulative.[45] The agency, on the other hand, represents the individual's capacity to act in given situations, which can be classified as voluntary, intended and goal-oriented.[46] However, autonomy and agency cannot be understood without considering another two significant characteristic features of human nature, namely, *will* and *freedom.* According to essential accounts, human beings are capable of choosing different courses of action freely with a rational deliberation as they do possess "will" inscribed in their nature. It implies that humans are not only *the* responsible agent for their own actions but also their existential reality. Human beings, therefore, should be seen as the sole responsible for their progress whose ultimate existence is freedom, which manifests through the refinement of reason and will. For this reason, the essential account maintains "*individualism*" as the highest expression of autonomy and agency by exercising freedom and will.

Provided the general frameworks of essential account, two major thinkers of this view can be noted: Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant. Though they differ in conceptualizing the foundational subject, they follow the general framework of essential account. Descartes has declined to acknowledge views of his predecessors regarding the certainty of knowledge as he wanted to find the unquestionable, indubitable and certain foundation from which all knowledge is conceivable. Since "I" is indubitable, upon this foundation, according to Descartes, all knowledge claims can be not only referred but also assigned. From this foundation, Descartes claims, individuals are equipped to understand the world and capable of knowing reality. For this reason, the subject, for Descartes, is the solid foundation; therefore, knowledge inherits its epistemic status on it. Therefore, according to Descartes, the subject is the indubitable foundation for any knowledge claim.

Similarly, Kant maintains Descartes's conception of the knowing subject, the *cogito,* as the indubitable foundation for the knowledge. Instead of asking what knowledge is, Kant inquired how knowledge is possible. The real task, according to him, was to discover the conditions that must fulfil to have knowledge. In a strict sense, what is involved in having knowledge was the main

---

[45]John Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2018 Edition)," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. and Edward N. Zalta, accessed September 18, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/autonomy-moral.

[46] Markus Schlosser, "Agency (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2018 Edition)," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed September 18, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/agency/.

philosophical problem for Kant. According to him, the knowledge of the world is known according to a "certain fixed (i.e. categories) pattern" inscribed in the subject. It indicates that all conceptions and qualities attributed to objects of the external world are actually inherent in the subject itself. That is to say, the subject is structured with certain features in order to have experience of the external world. For this reason, knowledge is possible on the ground that "how things appear to us", not "how things are in themselves". In other words, all objects or the empirical world is a representation by the subject as we know not the thing as it is in itself, but only its appearances which are given to the mind through senses. Therefore, like Descartes, Kant also maintains the sovereignty of the subject by claiming "the subject is the foundation for knowledge".

The *historicity* of this foundational subject, particularly suggested by Descartes and Kant is very much evident in the last two or three centuries as the basis for doing philosophy. This essential account of the foundational subject has constituted what Foucault calls the "philosophy of the subject"[47] which established the foundation for modernity. Let's summaries the indispensable features of the essential account or the philosophy of the subject as follows:

1. There is an essential human nature irrespective of historical contingencies and social conditions.
2. The subject is given (biologically), foundational, homogeneous and universal.
3. Knowledge is absolutely inscribed in the subject as he/she is the foundational "legitimate epistemic warrant".
4. Since knowledge is invented by the foundational subject, knowledge production is historically progressive and constantly developing.
5. Since reason is the essential cognitive capacity of the subject, knowledge is "objectively" known.
6. The subject is the autonomous agent having free will and freedom.
7. The subject is the sovereign individual who is the only responsible for his/her existential reality and actions.

[47] To quote Foucault: "[t]wo or three centuries ago, Western philosophy postulated, explicitly or implicitly, the subject as the foundation, as the central core of all knowledge, as that in which and on the basis of which freedom revealed itself and truth could blossom....(I) n the field of what we call the ''theory of knowledge'', or in that of epistemology...it seems to me that the theory of the subject has remained very philosophical, very Cartesian and Kantian" (*EST*,178).

According to Foucault, the philosophy of the subject should be seen as an umbrella term which includes all these basic theoretical concepts proposed by the essential account. Either explicitly or implicitly, the general frameworks of the essential account can be seen not only in modernity but also in the enlightenment projects and humanist movements. The scientific revolution in the Enlightenment projects, for example, rejected the dogmatic, supernatural and conventional religious knowledge and beliefs based on this general framework of the foundational subject. Similarly, humanism, on the other hand, valued the free will and individual liberty of human beings in taking the responsibility and advancing "human progress" from the absolute monarchy and the fixed dogmas of the Church. Above all, modernity has pre-supposed individualism, autonomy and the sovereignty of reason not only in attaining "maturity" from the dogmatic slumbers (superstition, prejudice, and conventional beliefs) of the pre-modern values but also employing an authoritative guide in the practical life. However, it is against this conceptual framework that Foucault's arguments are grounded. Though Foucault rejects the conceptual scheme of essential account, he is not the first person who advocates critical rhetoric against its arguments. He should be seen as one of the major thinkers who have criticized the essential account. The opposite view of the essentialist account, however, is called social constructivism which not only rejects foundational subject but also advocates subject is socially forged and historically constituted. Let's evaluate what its essential features are as follows:

2.2.2 Social Constructivist Account

According to social constructivist accounts, the subject is socially forged and historically constituted. The subject is the construction of political, historical, economic, cultural and other social conditions as he is endlessly engaging and interacting with the surrounding social world. According to this view, the socio-historical conditions not only affect, modify, constitute or construct the subjects, but the subjectivity cannot be thought irrespective of the socio-historical conditions. For this reason, this view is concentrated on evaluating various social structures and historical conditions as the primary concern, unlike the essential account. Whereas the essential account gives priority for the subject over socio-historical conditions, the constructivist account advocates significance for the socio-historical conditions over the subject. This account, therefore, gives prior importance to study various cultural regulations, institutional practices, social orders and historical conditions. Importantly, how the subject is constituted and what its mechanisms and procedures are the primary concern for this account.

Importantly, the constructivist account rejects the central tenets suggested by the essential account for the following reasons. As the subject is the result of socio-political, economic and cultural aspects, as per this view, different or diverse subjects are constituted by socio-historical conditions. According to constructivist accounts, therefore, there is no essential foundational subject; there is no *essential subjectivity*, but only *subjectivities.* This view, for this reason, also emphasizes social conditions for primary importance rather than the creative, autonomous subject, who has biologically specified essential characteristics which are universal. It rejects primarily two basic propositions of the previous view: the existence of the universal human nature, which is based on biologically given specific essential properties; and the creative, autonomous subject, who is the sole guarantor of knowledge. For these reasons, this view proposes two theoretical claims: firstly, it emphasizes the heterogeneity of the subject instead of homogeneity of the subject; secondly, it proposes decentering the knowledge production away from the subject.

As mentioned in the beginning, these two views, namely, essential account and social constructivist account are theoretically contrary to each other regarding the issues such as the production of knowledge, object of knowledge and nature of the subject. The constructivist account, though, on the one hand, proposes the subject is socially forged and historically constituted; it, on the other hand, offers three criticisms against the essential account. These three primary criticisms can be classified on the grounds of determinism, reductionism and authoritarianism, which not only reject the essential account but also constitute the essential features of the social constructivist view. However, the criticism which comes under determinism and reductionism not only interlinked but also share common grounds for their argument formulations because they primarily reveal how socio-historical conditions constitute subjectivity. However, the third criticism is specifically concerned with analyzing power relations in the socio-historical conditions in constituting subjectivity. Though these three criticisms are independently posited, they should not be treated separately as they are complementary to each other. Put it bluntly, it is analyzing the first two criticisms that the third criticism should be analyzed.

Let’s evaluate how the essentialist account commits the error of reductionism primarily. Social constructivists argue if one accepts human nature exists essentially, it follows that the truth and the definition of the knowledge should be seen as elaborated according to this nature. Once this knowledge is known, it becomes universal as it can be applied to all human beings irrespective

of the social conditions across time. If the essential human nature determines what knowledge is and how knowledge is possible, it entails that objectivity and universality of knowledge are validated to all. In other words, the assumption that the individual is capable of contributing the specific content of the knowledge, which is based on essential human nature derived from scattered and limited experience, is objectively known and predictive or probabilistic. According to constructivist accounts, these claims proposed by essential accounts are subject to question primarily two grounds: firstly, it reduces all social and political phenomena and its complex mechanisms to the foundational subject; secondly, it cuts across the differences of culture, history and society.[48] It leads to thinking social sciences in terms of the predictive and probabilistic account by reducing them to fundamental biological drives and dispositions. It, on the one hand, neutralizes different interpretation, opinions and judgments of heterogeneous subjects; on the other hand, it classifies and orders society and history into simple components and fundamental key variables denying its rich diversity and complexity.[49] As it attempts to deny the importance of differences in human identity and culture, it may lead to critical evaluations inappropriate in explaining the various mechanisms by which human identity has been suppressed in the compulsive socio-historical conditions.

Secondly, deterministic criticism shows that the essential account commits the error of homogenization in understanding both subjectivity and society. The constant search for a biological foundation for subjectivity, the proponent of essential account in the modern period, presupposed the priority for "essential unity of the human species" and "homogeneity of social order". For this reason, human nature as the ultimate essentialist category presupposed an absolute truth and values in the social and political thought that enable us to settle the good, egalitarian and just society once and for all. It is for this reason that humanistic ideals and enlightenment projects of modernity emphasized the linear and homogeneous social order as the essential human condition. However, the deterministic criticism argues the homogenization of essential accounts simplifies not only differences among human subjectivities but also complex power relations in the society. Similarly, the essential account commits an inaccuracy in explaining the diversity and

[48] Wilkin, "Chomsky and Foucault,"179.
[49] Ibid, 180.

complexity of social conditions and how individuals placed into various social categories can be determined by assigning human nature as the deterministic condition.

In a related fashion, the essential account proposed by humanistic ideals and enlightenment projects also proclaimed the agency of human beings, individually and collectively in the intellectual movements of modernity. However, the constructivist account argues that the essential account or "the biological bases of human understanding have led towards deterministic theories that deny the possibility of meaningful agency".[50] If human nature causes us to act in a particular way, then it is a deterministic view that predicts the regularity and continuity to human behaviour over time, which rejects any influence of external conditions. Similarly, if there exists a certain human nature, and it can determine social conditions and historical contingencies, then it should actualize its possibility in society. Since various human beings marginalized and suppressed in our society is a fact, human nature seems to be at the same time ideal and real. It follows that essential human nature is subject to reductionism and determinism in explaining not only how subjectivity is constituted but also studying the complex socio-historical conditions.

Giving priority to socio-historical conditions, the social constructivist argues that human subjectivity and knowledge productions are tied to power relation in society. Not only representations of physical and biological reality including race, sexuality, and gender, but also truth and knowledge are socially constructed. Truth, knowledge and subjectivity are constructed within the power struggles as they are associated with authority embedded in the social structures. As we have seen, the essentialist account argues that the subjectivity of the knower is based on proper epistemic attitude, universal reason and objective stand, which assumes the difference among the "knowers" are irrelevant in the knowledge production. The epistemic validity, therefore, presupposed a rational subject who is irrespective of socio-historical conditions. However, social constrictive account argues that knowledge production and the subjectivity of knower are correlated. For instance, Feminists and Marxists argue that the legacy of modernity has continued with authoritarianism as knowledge was the possession of social elites whether they are religious readers, capitalists, male-scientific community and so on. The members of non-elites such as ignorant peasants, irrational women and unreasonable savages were marginalized from its project. On these grounds, the social constructivist, on the one hand, argues power, knowledge

[50] Wilkin, "Chomsky and Foucault,"182.

and subjectivity are interrelated in the socio-historical conditions; on the other hand, it rejects universal human nature, objective truth and sovereignty of reason as suggested by essential account. Similarly, politically speaking, though humanism and enlightenment have projected "universal human being", the social constructive account argues that the "human", on the contrary, correlated power relations associated with privileged social rank, class, and so on. For instance, from the feminist point of view, those rational subjects throughout the history of modern philosophy had been dominant male elite whether they are scientists or philosophers. Though the humanism and enlightenment movement have proposed universal human nature and brotherhood of man, it has allowed only very particular subjectivity, that of male elite, to structure its project.

Let's summaries the fundamental tenets of social constructivist account as follows:

1. There is no essential subjectivity which is universal and biologically given.
2. Subjects are socially forged and historically constituted.
3. Knowledge and the subject are constituted by the socio-historical conditions.
4. There is no sovereignty of reason, autonomous creativity of individual and objective truth as subjects are socially forged and historically constituted.
5. Knowledge production is interrelated with the power relations in society.
6. There is no essential *subjectivity* as such, but there are *subjectivities* constructed by the socio-historical conditions.
7. The constitution of subjects and power relations in society are directly related.

Though there are many prominent philosophers, who follow the basic views of social constructivism, the noticeable thinker among them is Karl Marx. Marxian conceptualizations of power, subject and knowledge have substantial meanings and relevance in the very approach of *doing* philosophy itself. Unlike the traditional philosophers, Marx has conceptualized human subjectivity is historically contingent and socially forged. He also advocated that knowledge should be seen as distorted by class power as through constructing false knowledge that one of the significant ways subjectivity is constructed. The radical interpretation given by him in terms of the economic aspect of social life has explained how the power structure (for Marx, it is the class struggle) of the society forges subjectivity and produces knowledge. Three significant theoretical concepts conjoined in Marxian philosophy: history, socio-economic condition, and power. As

Marx famously argued, history is constituted by power relations between two classes, which is based on the economic conditions of the given society at a historical period.

Though the revolutionary departure in understanding power and subject in the philosophical endeavour, without any doubt, started notably with Marx, Foucault's conceptualization also followed the same line of thought suggested by social constructivists. Though Foucault follows the basic tenets of social constructivists, he has offered a distinctive, radical, and plausible explanation in understanding subject, knowledge and power. To deconstruct the essential subject, which was pre-supposed for all philosophical endeavours and methodological inquires by modernity, especially in the work of Kant and Descartes, Foucault has studied various historical subjective constructions in the modern period. Some of them are socially excluded by "modern normativity" (for examples, criminal in the discourse of penal system); and some are objectified through knowledge (for examples, madmen and patient in the discourse of medical and psychology); some of them are self-constituted (for example, homosexuals in the discourse of sexuality). Therefore, Foucault's account of the subject has its own theoretical frameworks what Foucault calls as "anti-subjective hypothesis". Let's evaluate what its basic tenets are.

2.3 The Conceptual Frameworks of Anti-Subjective Hypothesis

Though Foucault follows the fundamental tenets of social constructivism, his anti-subjective hypothesis has its own specific characteristic features. Strictly speaking, two main arguments can be highlighted within Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. On the one hand, it tries to eliminate the "universal human nature" and thereby reject all universal theories, first principles or universal categories which are based on the biologically determined, foundational subject. On the other hand, it emphasizes the significant influence of social conditions on human beings and evaluates the subject as historically contingent being. In Foucault's interpretation, one of the drawbacks of Western philosophy is its obsession towards searching for the essential ground, abstract concepts, theories based on universal human nature. It is a hope in vain, Foucault claims, because by imagining on those utopias, it is not possible neither to evaluate existing complex social conditions nor formulate any particular set of absolute truth or knowledge. The socio-historical conditions are "complex, multiple, non-individual formation, not 'subjected to the subject".[51]

[51]Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature* (New York: The New Press, 2015), 20.

According to Foucault, there is no "abstract universal theory" and foundational subject that is beyond social conditions and history as human endeavours are created and regulated by what socio-historical conditions constituted. Therefore, according to Foucault, it is essential to evaluate various social practices and historical conditions, which are complex and variant, in constituting subjectivities. For this reason, Foucault has postulated five theoretical assumptions in his anti-subjective hypothesis. Let's evaluate the basic characteristic features of the anti-subjective hypothesis as follows.

1. Human nature does not exist in any kind of substantial way

In a theoretically radical fashion, Foucault argues that human nature does not exist essentially as there is no outside realm of definiteness or certainty as such beyond history and social conditions. In reality, it is not the biologically given human nature which defines what it is to be human. Any claims concerning fundamentals about us is the result of historical, social and political conditions, and so on, which are regulated within the society in a particular historical period. Therefore, according to Foucault, instead of asking the abstract question whether any human nature exists, it is significant to inquire "how has the concept of human nature functioned in our society".[52] In other words, one must analyse how has our understanding of human nature been constructed in the socio-historical conditions, and what alternatives have been marginalized by doing so.[53] Human nature, for Foucault, should be seen as one of the epistemic categories which functioned historically in the field of knowledge production in understanding what it is to be human. However, strictly speaking, he does not refute the subject as such, but his consistent response is to historicize and socialize him. The concept of human nature, according to him, gets meaning only in the context of practices such as political, economic, and cultural and so on. For this reason, Foucault has undertaken the theoretical analysis without referring resources to the foundational subject or the universal human nature. Therefore, according to Foucault, the problem of human nature is not ontological but historical and political.

[52]As Foucault puts it: "You can't prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilization, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy". (Chomsky and Foucault, *On Human Nature*, 20.41).
[53]Wilkin, "Chomsky and Foucault,"181.

2. Rejection of absolute creativity and autonomous subjectivity

Since Foucault aims to examine the relation between bodies of knowledge, the formation of subjectivity and socio-historical conditions, he claims, the "personal creativity" has not only limited function in the development of any knowledge, but it is also not the influential contributing factor in the process of knowledge production. Not only models of knowledge are generated in the social and historical context, but also knowledge itself is produced and is constituted through the various social practices. That is to say, both the "conditions and validity of knowledge" rely on the social practices which are situated in a particular historical period. Creative thinkers should be seen as the sites by which knowledge is developed, or they have to be conceived as the vehicles of knowledge production. What Foucault argues is the claim that the creativity of the individual or autonomous subject can only operate within the socio-historical conditions by which theoretical and epistemological realms are constructed. The creative thinker is positioned in specific historical "theoretical terrain" and "epistemic field" and addresses the issues that appear from within it. The creative subject can be taken into account only from wherever they find themselves situated at specific social conditions and the historical juncture not only to conceive what they are but also what they could do creatively within. In short, theoretically speaking, knowledge is not necessarily acquired through the creative ability of the subject; instead, knowledge, as well as subject and object of knowledge are constituted by the socio-historical conditions.

3. The subject is historically constituted and socially forged

According to Foucault, the subject is not "something simple, merely a conscious doer, but is something that must be constructed".[54] Put it bluntly, "subjectivity to be something constituted" (*EMT*, 290), and especially "something historically constituted" (*PK*, 117). According to Foucault, the subject is constituted in different forms at different times in history under the influence of various social practices as there is no historically invariant essential subjectivity. However, the subject is not just a word applied to an "appearance of unity" to something historically constituted but is constituted when the "concept" of the subject historically constructed through myriad social practices. For example, the modern construction of madmen is constituted only when the "concept" of madness is formulated by various human sciences such as psychology, medical sciences and so

[54] Mark G E. Kelly, "Foucault, Subjectivity, and Technologies of the Self," in *A Companion to Foucault*, ed. Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 513.

on. Since the subject is constituted by various historical practices, according to Foucault, there is no essential subjectivity but only subjectivities. Since historical practices are subject to change, subjectivity is not given by nature, and it should not be seen as a fixed, unified foundational subject.

Similarly, from the perspective of analysing social conditions, Foucault argues that subjects are discursively forged as discourse represents the system of thoughts, beliefs, norms and cultural practices. Since social practices and historical conditions are discursive construction, the historical analysis of Foucault, therefore, concerned with how discourses are formed historically in forging subjectivities. For this reason, the subjectivities constituted by socio-historical conditions, Foucault argues, can be understood only through analysing discursive formations. For example, though homosexuality, its activity, behaviours and events had been in the past, Foucault argues, this concept is historically developed only in the late nineteenth century through various discourses. The "concept" of homosexuality came into existence in the late 19th century primarily through medical, legal and moral discourses as an object of knowledge, which, Foucault claims, constituted the subjectivity of homosexuals. Though Foucault states that subjectivity is historically constituted and socially forged through various discourses under consideration, one should not take subjects as "determined" by reducing them merely into socio-historical conditions.

Subjects, according to Foucault, should not be seen as mere construction in the discourses because they not only locate themselves defining their role in the discourse but also adopt a subjective position to make their subjectivities. Subjectivities should be seen as always in the process because they are subject to reproduction or transformation through discursive practices. For this reason, for the same individual, there could be various subjectivities such as worker, wife, whore, and so on because subjectivities are not absolute but always relational. Though each of these subjectivities is a possible signifier of self, they are always defined in terms of difference carrying complex, shifting and relational subjective positions. Subjects in the discourse, according to Foucault, should be seen both historically and socially as contingent, provisional, achieved rather than intrinsic to universal human nature.

4. Knowledge and power are interlinked

Foucault has, in a radical fashion, stated that power and knowledge are interrelated as they are reciprocally connected. Though coined their relation as "power/knowledge", Foucault neither

claims knowledge is power nor vice- versa. Instead, he is interested in studying their relation in understanding the construction of various subjectivities by analysing power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions. According to Foucault, knowledge is the exercise of power because knowledge not only assumes authority but also constructs subjectivity once it is applied in the social world. Similarly, power is the function of knowledge because it entails constraints, regulations and the disciplining of practice once knowledge is applied to forge subjectivities. On these grounds, Foucault argues, power/knowledge is inextricably related because "there is no power without a field of knowledge" (*DP*, 27); and "knowledge without the correlative constitution of power relations" (*DP*, 27). By claiming power and knowledge should not be seen as separate independent entities, Foucault challenges the traditional assumption that knowledge liberates. Foucault, therefore, on the one hand, claims knowledge is historically constituted and socially forged; on the other hand, states knowledge and power not only intrinsically related but also mutually constitutive.

Substantiating knowledge does not liberate but constitute subjectivities, Foucault's historical investigations, therefore, have oriented towards explaining how subjectivities are constituted through the power/knowledge regime. For example, in the *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, Foucault traces how the relationship between patient and doctor is constituted through medical knowledge. Foucault argues that the discourse of medicine in the modern world, which has come to existence with the birth of the institutional apparatus called the clinic, is considered, on the one hand, patient as the object of knowledge. Whereas, on the other hand, in the same medical discourse, the doctor, who is the regulator of medical knowledge, is constituted not only as an authority to regulate medical knowledge but also the "subjectivity" to conduct medical treatment. Not only the power relation between doctor and patient is sanctioned by medical knowledge but also these two subjectivities are trained and manipulated through the operation of disciplinary technologies under the institutional settings of clinics. Therefore, Foucault claims knowledge and power has a reciprocal relationship in constituting subjectivities.

5. Power constructs subjects

The fundamental argument Foucault has made throughout the anti-subjective hypothesis states that power constructs subjects. The historical investigations he has excavated, therefore,

aims at evaluating how various subjectivities are constituted by power relations through different discourses. However, Foucault has proposed power in two senses of the term: technology of domination and technology of the self. Whereas the first sense of the term indicates how power constructs subjects through external factors, the second one illustrates how subjects constitute themselves. These two approaches, therefore, should be seen as two methodological strategies in understanding the subjective formations. By providing these approaches, Foucault argues that subjects should be seen as a mere effect or socio-historical product of power as "determined" subjects. Subjects not only constructed by power relations by locating their subjective positions but also adopt their possible subjective formations. For this reason, all subjects, according to Foucault, are the vehicles of power as the mechanism of power is embedded in socio-historical conditions as the day to day social life affairs. Foucault's historical investigation, therefore, studies how individuals become subjects of power. Foucault's historical studies, therefore, suggest three modes of subjective constructions by which individuals become subjects, namely, subject as the object of knowledge, objectifying subjects through social practices, and subjects constitute themselves as the object of their identities. Therefore, Foucault claims that it is essential to analyze power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions to understand various subjective formations.

However, to analyse how subjectivities are constructed by power relations, it is essential to examine Foucault's two conceptual frameworks, namely discourse analysis and history of thought. Whereas the first conceptual scheme aims to examine how the subject is socially forged by analysing social conditions, the second methodological approach studies how subjects are historically constituted. Since Foucault's intellectual endeavours are the historical investigations of discourse analysis, there are three methodological themes, which he has taken for each theoretical phase. As noted by Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Foucault's earlier works were exclusively emphasised examining non-discursive issues; the second phase, however, is aimed at explaining cultural practices and power in connection with knowledge and practices; the third stage, nevertheless, is focused various political technologies of the subjectivities in association with disciplinary power and bio-power (*BSH*,184). For this reason, Foucault's methodological approach also has changed periodically as earlier works are the archaeological study; however, the second phase is genealogical investigations; whereas, the third stage is known as problematizations. Though these intellectual phases are not exclusively treated and independently

functioned, not only a theoretical continuity can be bridged between them but also each methodological approach serves for each other in understanding the formation of various subjectivities. Each of these methodological themes with its specific scopes and implications, which have overlapping usages, has proposed one significant basic question: how power is related to truth, knowledge and subjectivity. For these reasons, Foucault has analysed the formation of the subject in two senses of the term: subjects as the discursive formation and the subject as the historical constitution. We will see how Foucault has formulated these two conceptual themes in the next sections.

2.4 Turn towards the Discursive Subject

2.4.0 Introduction

Answering the question of how the subject is socially forged, Foucault introduces a new theoretical framework called "discourse". Since the subject is constructed by social practices and institutional normativity, Foucault claims, subjects should be seen as "discursively formed". As social practices and institutional normativity discursively formed, Foucault claims, the subject should be considered not only a "discursive subject" but also the *function* of power. However, the term, discourse used by Foucault, Carol Bacchi and Jennifer Bonham argue, has different meanings on many occasions with distinct theoretical connotation throughout his intellectual phase. According to Lara Lessa, Foucault's concept of discourse can be defined roughly as "systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak".[55]However, Cousins and Hussain claim, Foucault's use of the term discourse is distinct as he is not intended to produce a "general theory of discourse" but a "tactical".[56]According to Foucault, the term "discourse" substantially denotes to explain historically contingent social conditions that produce knowledge and constitute subjects.

Discourse, according to Foucault, has two substantial aspects, namely discursive practices and non-discursive practices. Foucault's archaeological investigation, strictly speaking, devoted to study only the discursive practices as the material conditions for knowledge and subject

[55] Lara Lessa, "Discursive Struggles within Social Welfare: Restaging Teen Motherhood," *British Journal of Social Work* 36, no. 2 (2005): 285, doi:10.1093/bjsw/bch256.
[56] Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, *Michel Foucault* (London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 1984), 78.

construction. However, his genealogical approach studies the non-discursive practices such as institutional practices, political events, scientific activities, economical processes, and so forth by examining the power relations embedded in them to study the constitution of knowledge and subjects. These two fundamental connotations can be seen in Foucault's discourse analysis evidently in which, the former indicates embodied rules of discourse, whereas, the latter signifies the function of power in the formation of discourse. Since this distinction is not exclusively made, and their usage sometimes overlapping and interrelated, this has caused many difficulties in understanding Foucault's appropriate usage of the term. For this reason, to provide a comprehensive view of discourse, this section proceeds with a conceptual route consisting of three subsections, namely the discursive practices, the non-discursive practices and the discursive subject. Let's analyze each subsection as follows.

2.4.1 The Discursive Practices

According to Foucault, discourse refers "[A] group of statements which provide a language for talking about - a way of representing knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical moment".[57] Let's take, for example, the discourses of madness. The discourse of madness refers to the knowledge formation of madness which includes its objects, concepts, theories and epistemic norms in a particular historical period. However, one might ask how the formation of this discourse is constituted. The discursive practices, therefore, according to Foucault, refer "rules governing a knowledge"[58], which denotes two themes at a time, "the conditions for its existence" and its "discursive formation". However, Foucault's concept of rules should not be seen as, opine Bacchi and Bonham, principles of structures, but *sets of relationships*[59], "a complex group of relations that *function as a rule*" (*AK*, 74). As Foucault rightly puts: "[w]hen one describes the formation of objects of discourse, one tries to locate the relations that characterize a discursive practice" (*AK*, 54). The "discursive practice", therefore, represents the body of rules that enable the "discursive formations" of knowledge and its "conditions for existence" regarding its types of statements, the ordering of objects, and regularity of concepts (correlations, functioning, and transformations) (*AK*, 38).

[57] Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997), 44.
[58] Cousins and Hussain, *Foucault*, 94.
[59] Bacchi and Bonham, "Discursive Practices," 180.

However, discourse should not be seen as a mere clustered group of statements, signs and concepts, but is a "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (*AK*, 48-49). As Foucault rightly puts: "discourses are *practices* or, more specifically, sets of practices",[60] which have "regularity in terms of its own forms of sequences and succession" (*AK*, 169). The discursive practices, therefore, systematically constitute objects, statements, and concepts *for* knowledge. On this ground, Foucault claims that not only knowledge is the possible effect within the field of discourse but also "[k]nowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice" (*AK*, 182). Discursive practices, thus, in a strict sense, construct the object (madness, in our example) and subject (madmen, in our example) in the "discourse of madness" by allowing and limiting its operational levels and conditions for existence. Moreover, the discursive practices not only construct the subjects and objects but also determine "the ways by which" they should be spoken within the knowledge production. The discursive practices, for this reason, determine "what can be known" and "who can be known" by constituting the subjectivity and object of knowledge in a particular discourse with its "governed rules". In our example, "how madness can be known" and "on what way they should be known" are decided by the knowledge of madmen such as psychology and psychiatry, which are, however, historically constituted by the "discourses of madness".

The discursive practice, therefore, facilitates and limits or enables and constrains "what can be said" and "who can say them" in the knowledge production. In our example, the knowledge production of madness, not only constitute what can be said about madness by constituting the object of madness and the subjectivity of madmen within the knowledge of psychology and psychiatry, but the same knowledge also decides only psychologists can say about madness since only they have the *right* to regulate the knowledge about them. The discursive practice, therefore, denotes the domain of objects, subjective positions, the field of concept's constitution and its possibilities of use and appropriation (*AK*, 182-183). For this reason, the discursive practices as the rules of formation define discourse in terms of "the limits and forms of the *sayable*" and "what is it possible to speak of"[61] at a given period and society. Discourse, therefore, provides "*language*" (not in the linguistic sense) for selecting the field of objects, legitimating the epistemic position of

[60] Bacchi and Bonham, "Discursive Practices," 174.
[61] Michel Foucault, "Politics and Study of Discourse," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 59.

the subject, and determining the epistemic normativity regarding the explanation of concepts and theories. The discursive practices, therefore, constitute both knowledge and subjects; the subjectivity of madmen as the object of knowledge (psychiatry); and for the regulation of its knowledge, it constitutes the subjectivity of doctor. Foucault, therefore, concludes that the production of knowledge is not inscribed in the foundational subject or the individual's "individual effort" to knowing the medical truth of madness, but, on the contrary, knowledge and subjectivity are constituted by the discourse historically.

However, one should not misunderstand that discursive rules are constituted because discursive formations have coherence constituted by unity of statements, objects and concepts in the production of knowledge. On the contrary, it is the disagreement and division constituting "dispersion" of statements, objects and concepts that discursive rules are formed, which construct a particular object of knowledge and subjectivity. For example, psychopathology in the late nineteenth century as a discourse has various objects and statements dispersed in connection with other concepts such as "sexual aberrations" and "criminality" along with "madness". Similarly, the same discourse has conceptual dispersion with other discourses as well such as medicine, psychology and legality. Psychopathology, therefore, is not a single object but a whole slew of different objects existing in relation with various statements of madness in formulating their rules of division. It is in this sense that rules of formation of discourse constitute the conditions of possibility of "what can be said" about knowledge. Discourse, for this reason, should not be seen as "medium" for knowledge production, but rather it *constitutes* the knowledge and the subject within its governed rules. On this ground, Foucault argues that there is no *objective truth* of "madness" and a *foundational subject* (madman) in history and our social world.

Foucault's fundamental argument is that unity of discourse is formed by differences of statements, objects and concepts constituted through "discursive practices", which is not a "coherent group" but "rules of formations" determined by "existence, coexistence, modification, disappearances of statements and objects" (*AK*, 38). This "discursive practices", which is constituted by "rules of formations", however, forms a regularity in terms of "an order, correlations, positions and functioning, transformations" (*AK*, 38) among dispersed and heterogeneous statements, objects, concepts, and thematic choices. Foucault, thus, identifies the rules of formation constituted by the individualizable group of statements with their location,

arrangement and replacement as the "condition for existence". However, the "condition for existence" of discourse is also constituted by the "*law of division*" formulated by the *relations* of "difference and dispersion" of statements, objects, and concepts. For example, the conditions for the existence of the discourse of psychopathology in the late 19th century is based on the interplay of the relation between the dispersion of statements, objects, concepts found in the law, religious casuistry, and in medical diagnosis. Discourse, therefore, concerned with how the object of knowledge is emerged and constituted through discursive practices in the given social field and historical period. Since knowledge and discourse are "discursively formed", Foucault discards objective truth and foundational subject.

2.4.2 The Non-Discursive Practices

Since the archaeological method investigated only the rules of discourse, Foucault has realized that it has certain limitations as it did not analyze the influence of social practices in constituting discourse. According to Foucault, in the discourse analysis, describing only "governing rules" of the discursive practices is limited and inadequate unless one examines the non-discursive practices such as institutional regulations, social norms, political relations, and so on. For this reason, according to Foucault, to examine the conditions of emergence and functioning of discourse, one must also analyze the non-discursive practices. As Foucault rightly states: "the *function* that the discourse under study must carry out *in a field of non-discursive practices*" (*AK*, 68), which includes "institutions, political events, economic practices and processes" (*AK*, 162). However, non-discursive practices do not *determine* discourse, but opens up its conditions of emergence as it opens up the field of possible objects and their formations by various social practices. Since discourse constituted through various non-discursive practices, which are socially forged and historically constituted, the function of discourse is always associated with power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions. For this reason, according to Foucault, discourse should be seen as "both an instrument and effect of power" (*HS*, 101). In the discourse analysis, therefore, one should examine the complex and unstable process of power relations embedded in the various social practices which enable and limit the emergence and constitution of discourse. Discourse analysis, therefore, comprises discursive and non-discursive practices for the production of knowledge and the construction of subjectivities, which, however, is incomplete without scrutinizing the question of power.

Since the function and emergence of discourse depended on a broad range of social practices exemplified in various ways, the operation of discourse, therefore, transmits, reinforces and produces power. The production of discourse in each society, for this reason, claims Foucault, "at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures".[62] The order of discourse in society, therefore, is based on the various procedures, which, Foucault claims, facilitate the function of power. According to Foucault, these procedures, which describe the *order* of discourse, take the form of exclusion/inclusion in the non-discursive practices. There are three main procedures, which take in the form of exclusion/inclusion, namely, prohibition, the distinction of speech, and division between true or false.[63] Though they are independently posited, they are interconnected, and any discourse could be a complex network of these procedures. Let's evaluate each of them as follows:

The first procedure of exclusion/inclusion, according to Foucault, is the notion of "prohibition". Prohibition, claims Foucault, is well-known and common in our social practices as the evident function of power. According to Foucault, the general forms of prohibition can be seen in three ways in our day to day life: "in the object of speech, in rituals of the circumstances of speech, and the privileged right of the speaking subject".[64] These three types of prohibition, which "intersect and reinforce each other", [65]*constitute* the "object of speech, norms of circumstances, and exclusive right of the speaking subject".[66] The complex grids of these three types of prohibition, which are constructed, transmitted and validated through non-discursive practices, constitute the discourse.[67] For example, the early discourse of madness in the 16th and 17th century considered "mental disorders" are the possessions by evil spirits. As a result, talks about mental disorders, and its places of conversation are prohibited; but these discourses are confronted that religious authority has the exclusive right to speak about "mental dysfunction".

The second principle of exclusion (i.e. the distinction of speech), described by Foucault, is not necessarily the procedure of prohibition, but a "division". To substantiate, Foucault gives the

---

[62] Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in *Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young (London: Routledge, 1981), 52.
[63]Sara Mills, *Michel Foucault* (London: Psychology Press, 2003), 57-58.
[64] Foucault, "Order of Discourse," 52.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] However, the extreme form of prohibition is considered as "taboo"; it not only prohibits the topics as a forbidden speech but also constrains the way we talk about them.

example of the distinction between the mad and the sane, which is primarily constituted by the opposition between reason and madness. The speech of madmen, "what was said, how and why", he argues, throughout the discourse of madness in Western history founded on "division and exclusion". Foucault claims, for centuries in Europe, the speech of madmen was either treated as if it did not exist or taken the word of truth as "more rational than that of the sane".[68] In the whole framework of knowledge, madmen's speech, strictly speaking, did not exist, but only viewed by others or in the eye of sane. It is only at the end of the eighteenth century that their speech is deciphered and recognized through the whole network of institutions and authorities such as doctors or psychoanalysts, who investigated them through "reason". However, "they were never recorded or listened to"[69] but only viewed by the "normal" as the object of mental illness. According to Foucault, it is the division between reason and madness constituted through various institutional non-discursive practices that madmen's speech is recognized. However, the very recognition of madness, according to Foucault, is the discursive construction produced through modern medical institutions by the monologue language of "reason". The non-discursive practices embodied in the institutional practices, therefore, on the one hand, *regulate* specific objects and statements as *true*; whereas on the other hand, eliminate other statements as *false* through the procedure of "division and exclusion". In this way, the non-discursive practices through the procedures of exclusion/inclusion guarantee the operation of power in the given discourse.

The third exclusionary practice illustrated by Foucault is the division between true and false, which explains "who can speak the truth". According to him, the truth should not be considered as self-evident because it is constituted by the whole range of non-discursive practices exercised in the institutions, namely, governments, university, scientific bodies, family, and so on. However, truth is not only produced in the institutional practices but also regulated by "truth speakers" or "experts" who are assigned to be the authority of truth. For example, the discourse of madness in the late nineteenth century has initially constituted a normative deviation and a "margins of tolerance" for madmen through the institutional fields such as family, social group, working place, and so on. The other associated social fields, namely, arts, sexuality and criminality also apparently created a "social exclusion" for madmen, which, nonetheless, intermingled with various other institutions such as clinic and mental asylum in constituting objects like madness to

[68]Foucault, "Order of Discourse," 53.
[69]Ibid.

be described, separated and classified (*AK*,40-49). The truth about psychopathology, for this reason, Foucault argues, was constituted and regulated through the various institutionalized non-discursive practices by the authority of "experts" called doctors and psychologists. The truth speakers or experts (in our example, psychologists and doctors) in the given discourse, who have authority assigned, therefore, *authorize* the truth claims of the discursive object (in our example, madness) as *valid*.

On these grounds, Foucault argues, truth should be seen as the product of power relations, which is embodied in the institutional practices. Foucault, therefore, claims there is no absolute truth but only a "regime of truth", which is constituted through the production, distribution, regulation, circulation, and operation of institutional procedures embodied in the non-discursive practices. However, the truth claims validated through the institutional practices and the discursive rules not only constitute authoritative experts to speak and regulate them but also fence off other statements out of circulation through the procedure of exclusion/inclusion. Discourse, therefore, should be seen as confrontations and struggles of power relations, which on the one hand, constitute certain knowledge as valid; on the other hand, disqualify other "subjugated knowledge" through its functional arrangements and systematic organizations of non-discursive practices. Combining the discursive and non-discursive practices, discourse, therefore, constitutes the formation of objects, legitimate agents for regulating knowledge, fixing norms for concepts and theories through the multiplicity of power relations. The discourse (psychopathology, in our example), therefore, constitutes two subjectivities at a time: on the one hand, the subjectivity of truth speakers as the authority to regulate its knowledge; on the other hand, the subjectivity of the madman as the object of the same knowledge. Therefore, subjectivity and knowledge forged through discourse, according to Foucault, are not essential foundational subjects and objective truth because they are historical and institutionally constrained.

2.4.3 The Discursive Subject

The subject constituted by discourse, according to Foucault, has four essential meanings. Firstly, since the subject in the discourse is historically constituted and socially forged, Foucault claims, there is no essential human nature or foundational subject as such. Secondly, since the discourse is constituted by an ensemble of power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions, he claims, power constructs subjects. Thirdly, since the discourse facilitates and limits,

or enables and constrains "subjective positions", subjects are not mere production of power, but they can also constitute themselves. Fourthly, as discourses are historically constituted, neither discourses are fixed and permanent nor the subjectivity and knowledge constructed by them. For example, the idea of homosexuality came into being as an "identity" or subjective position of a person only in the late 19th century through various discourses such as "sexual, medical, moral and legal discourses".[70] Individuals forged as homosexuals, therefore, are primarily seen as "sick, illegal, and to be punished".[71] However, later on, with the emergence of identity politics, homosexuals are viewed as distinctive subjective positions in the numerous and competing discourses of sexuality in the socio-political power relations. Sexual subjects, therefore, Foucault claims, is not a "biological drive" of the essential human nature, but is historically constituted and socially forged.

Foucault has studied the subjective construction in the discourse primarily in two ways: from the perspective of power in the early works and the perspective subject in the later works. In the earlier works, according to Foucault, "A" (subject) can be "A" only when he/she is classified as "A" within a discourse. For example, the madmen are constructed only when they are classified from sanity and normality in the various discourse of madness. The theoretical focus of Foucault, however, in these endeavours was to investigate how power *constructs* subjects. Nevertheless, in his later works, Foucault has studied how subjects *constitute* themselves in the given power relations. For this reason, Foucault claims, we are not *merely* constructed within discourse, but we locate ourselves or position ourselves in discourse. The subjects should not be seen as the *mere effect* of discourse as he/she is not just accepting the social practices and thereby, power relations in constituting them as subjects. Since power, for Foucault, is both constraining and productive, subjects should not be seen as a mere effect or cultural product of power. According to Foucault, for this reason, there is always a possibility of freedom to adopt or constitute "subjective position" in the given discourse.

Though these two approaches of studying discursive subjects are evident in Foucault's account, there are two significant *ways* subjects are forged in discourse: through knowledge and by social practices. Though knowledge production and the socio-historical practices are

[70] Graham R. Gibbs, "Discourse Analysis Part 2: Foucauldian Approaches," *YouTube*, May 6, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_ffCsQx2Cg.
[71] Ibid.

interlinked, their specific functionalities in Foucault's discourse analysis have definite significance in the formation of the subject. According to Foucault, since knowledge is produced in the discourse, it constitutes subjects. It constructs subject in two ways; on the one hand, subject as an object of knowledge; and on the other hand, subject as the regulator of knowledge. For example, with the emergence of psychology, it has constructed two subjects: madman as the object of knowledge; psychologist as the regulator of knowledge. Similarly, since discourse constituted by social practices as the exertion of power, it constructs subjects in two ways; directly and indirectly. For example, with the emergence of institutionalization of madmen, it has constructed two subjects: on the one side, madman as the abnormal; on the other side, the subjectivity of "normal".

Since subjects are discursively forged, Foucault, on the one hand, substantiates subjects are socially forged and historically constituted, whereas, on the other hand, he rejects essential human nature. Whereas knowledge is discursively forged, Foucault, on the one side, argues knowledge is socially formed and historically constituted; however, on the other side, he discards the objectivity of knowledge. As knowledge is discursively constituted, according to Foucault, knowledge is not inscribed to the foundational subject as the invention of creative genius. In knowledge production, on the contrary, Foucault argues, the objects, the subjects and the modalities of knowledge are historically constituted and socially formed. Since discourses are socially forged and historically constituted, and they are the effect and instrument of power, according to Foucault, both knowledge and subjects should be seen as the construction of power. Therefore, Foucault states that to know how the subject is socially constructed and historically constituted, it is essential to analyze how the ensemble of power relations operates in both knowledge production and social practices discursively.

2.5 Subjects as Historically Constituted

Answering the question of how subjects are historically constituted, Foucault has introduced three new historical approaches. Therefore, Foucault's approach to studying the "problem of the subject" is, strictly speaking, a historical study of a specific sort, what he calls the history of thought. He has adopted distinctive approaches at different phases for his historical investigations in understanding the constitution of the subject, namely, "archaeology",

"genealogy" and "problematization".[72] Since Foucault's historical investigations aim at analysing the complexity of various discourses in understanding the subjective constructions, the earlier works of Foucault are precisely the archaeological studies; and the subsequent one is genealogies; whereas, the final one is problematization. These approaches, however, do not exclude strictly each other as they have consistency and coherence in hypothesising a sequential theoretical order. For Foucault, therefore, each historical phase resides the questions of power relations and the issue of knowledge and subjectivity in its own manner serving the theoretical continuity. Before delving into these three approaches of historical investigations, which have unfolded new avenues to exploring and reviving the question of the subject and power in the Western philosophy, it is essential to explain three significant points: the theoretical difference between traditional history and Foucault's history; Foucault's critique against the traditional historical approach; the characteristic features of Foucault's three historical methodological approaches. Therefore, this section has four subsections, namely, history proper and history of thought, archaeology, genealogy and problematization. Let's analyse each of them as follows:

2.5.1 History Proper and History of Thought

According to Foucault, the traditional approach of history is termed as "history proper", whereas the new (Foucault's) approach of studying history is called "history of thought" (*AK*, 12). According to traditional historians, Foucault argues, history consists of a series of events with a continuing regularity. They conceived history as a single unified process in which events are causally connected, and therefore, historical descriptions have straightforward narratives of events. For this reason, traditional historians studied their investigation in terms of checking causal links in order to find out the origin as they thought "excavating the origin" is the solution for any historical inquiries. Finding out the genesis, according to them, Foucault claims, reveals motive, purpose, drive and the meaning of the events as they believe, from the "origin" everything is contained. Theoretical endeavours such as finding a causal connection between disparate events, establishing causal succession between them, setting continuity among events, and defining thereby totality among such connections were the principles underlined in the traditional historian's approach (*AK*, 4). For these very reasons, they claim that there is a single, objective

[72]Thomas Flynn, "Foucault's Mapping of History," in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28.

meaning to events out of which various social practices and knowledge can be analysed systematically. Searching only the stable and irreversible process, they have focused their investigations only in the long "periods" or "centuries". For example, the history of "governments, wars, and famines" (*AK*,4), which are studied by the traditional historian as the linear succession of events in a long period without considering the shifts, transformations, discontinuity and changes have occurred during the time.

According to the history proper, history should be seen as a continuous narrative of events in terms of a linear development because history itself is "teleological". Furthermore, the history proper claims, history is not only the homogeneous narrative of events but also inherently progressive. Since history is a singularity of events, which is not only causally connected but also rationally processing, according to the history proper, not only knowledge production is progressive, but also historical events and knowledge do have objective truth or monotonous finality. Importantly, the "teleological and continuous history" proposed by the history proper, Foucault claims, has pre-supposed "sovereignty of the subject". According to the traditional historian, historical narratives are attributed or founded from the viewpoint of *the* subject, who is considered as rationally progressing. Notably, the supremacy of subject in the form of historical consciousness is considered the essential founding function for traditional historical approach because, according to the traditional historian, everything eluded historically can be restored to *the subject*. This constant theme of the sovereignty of the subject, in various forms in the history proper, argues Foucault, emphasised the foundational subject. The best example for the sovereign subject in the history proper is humanism.

However, the history of thought, states Foucault, has changed the conventional path of conceiving history by dismantling the unifying "teleological approach" through investigating the "rupture and discontinuity" of history. Detecting the incidence of interruptions along with isolating its strata and system of relations, whose status and nature vary considerably, the history of thought has shifted the focus of studying history from "continuities of thought" to "disruptions". Focusing on the threshold and searching for various rationalities, this new historical approach suspends the continuous accumulation of knowledge by tracing the contingent affinity of history with its division and limit. The central focus of the history of thought, therefore, is to conceive discontinuity("threshold, rupture, break, mutation, and transformation") (*AK*,5) and specify

different concepts and their very constitution such as a science, an *oeuvre*, a theory, an idea, and a text by the questioning the historical documents. The history of thought, therefore, is most interested in discontinuities, displacements and transformations, which are no longer concerned with the unifying causal connection of events and the progressive refinement of rationality. This new method has a multiplicity of frameworks uncovering what Foucault calls "*recurrent redistributions*", which, nevertheless, reveal "several pasts, several forms of connexion, several hierarchies of importance, several networks of determination, several teleologies"(*AK*, 5), for the same body of knowledge and events. On this ground, the history of thought focuses, strictly speaking, not how continuities are set right but concerned with detecting the system of relations ("hierarchy, dominance, stratification, univocal determination, and circular causality") in the history(*AK*,4). For this reason, according to Foucault, the subject should not be seen as the authentic source of knowledge and locus point of historical consciousness but is a *function* constructed in the material conditions of history.

Another significant difference is based on how both approaches of history consider the questioning of the documents. The documents are taken by traditional historians, Foucault argues, considered as a "decipherable trace" based on what they "*simply say*", whose primary task, in a strict sense, is an interpretation endeavouring to determine the significant values and truth underlined in them. In other words, the document is seen as "inert material" of what men have done or said through which the traditional historian *reconstitutes* the events. The new historian, nevertheless, considers "the documentary material itself unities, totalities, series, relations" (*AK*,6-7) by establishing succession between the relevant one, discovering elements to defining unities, detecting system of relations and organising documents through dividing, ordering and arranging its levels (*AK*,6-7). The traditional history seeks to find deep, hidden and stable structures, which consider documents as a mere vehicle for historical studies primarily as a *memory*, whereas new historian takes them examining more ruptures and discontinuities, which takes document materials importantly in and of itself as artefacts or *monuments* (*AK*,7). In other words, traditional historians transform the events into documents left by men, whereas, the new historian takes the material documents (books, institutions, laws, techniques, objects, customs, and so on) to be grouped as the relevant one to form totalities.

2.5.2 Archaeology

This new view of history (i.e. history of thought), in which the subject is the function of historical conditions, now aspires to be an "archaeology". Apart from the significant characteristics of the history of thought as described above, archaeology has a few theoretical characteristics of its own to be noted. Unlike the history proper, archaeology is interested not in searching "Arche" (origin), but for "Archives" (conditions of possibility). Archaeology, according to Foucault, studies knowledge production and subjective construction as the function of discourse, which "establishes statements as events, with their own conditions and domains of appearance" (*AK*, 128). Archive, therefore, indicates setting "conditions for what counts as knowledge" and subjectivity construction in a particular historical period. The archive not only represents events that occurred but also "things said" with "their own possibility and field of use in the discourse" (*AK*, 128). To put it bluntly, archaeology, Foucault illustrates, investigates to examine discursive formations in their own conditions of the emergence, development and transformation rather than logical content or meaning, or their individual or collective expressions. Archaeology, therefore, takes all practices, theories or disciplines and institutional systems at the level of an "ensemble of traces" constituting a domain with certain invariant common traits. It is this analysis of discourse in its modality of the archive as historical a priori of knowledge and the subject that archaeology is called "the science of archive".

The linguistic understanding of "archive" is usually taken to be the total set of collected texts in a given historical period for a historical investigation. Foucault, however, modifies its historical usage by referring the archive to the set of primary practices as the conditions of existence, which defines a set of relations enabling statements to continue to exist in the intersections of various discourses. He, therefore, considers discourse itself as practice (*AK*, 46) and studies the formation and transformation of statements as discursive relations. In that sense, the archive is an "accumulated existence of discourse" having its own "scarcities, economies and strategies".[73] In the archaeological investigation, the archive, therefore, is not the document to be interpreted and deduced as collective knowledge, but it should be discovered and encountered. Foucault, therefore, paradoxically considers archive as the "historical a priori" having its own consistency, differences, internal regulations and law of formation. One, therefore, should not take

[73] Thomas Flynn, "Foucault's Mapping of History," 29.

the archaeological investigation as a theory studying relations of words and things as the very discursive formation it examines, strictly speaking, is "neutral" to truth and meaning. Archaeology, therefore, is the study of the "historically anonymous body of rules" (*AK*, 117) concerning discursive formations with its *operative level existence* (Foucault calls it as positivity) and transformation of statements and their possible relations (what Foucault calls the "level of things said"). Archaeology, therefore, studies the conditions of possibility of "things said" in their emergence and transformations without considering a single, unified content and collective meaning of statements.

The archaeological investigation seeks to examine "discursive formations" at its operative level existence by detecting the unity formation of a whole set of objects, types of formulations and theoretical choices of the given science or bodies of learnings (*AME*, 324). However, the unity of this discursive formation is constituted by implicit knowledge or *Saviour*. This "domain of knowledge", which ensures the possibility of the production of knowledge and subjective formation, refers to the conditions that are necessary for knowledge and subjects to be known in a given historical period and society. Therefore, the archaeological investigation consists of three aspects: discursive formation (formation of statements in its unity and dispersive level), positivity (the operative existence that governs the dispersion of objects, types of formulation and theoretical choice associated with statements) and *Saviour* (the conditions of knowledge involved model of formulations, the formal and semantic rule required, domains of objects, formations of concepts, types of language used, and so on, which are, in a strict sense, internal to the given discourse, and only defined by it). For this reason, archaeology does not describe the history of knowledge and formation of the subject through discourse, but it excavates the "history *of* the discursive formations" in their emergence and transformations. Archaeology, therefore, addresses the entire field of discursive formations describing the "field of constraints" and "enabling conditions" constituting the historical a priori.

2.5.3 Genealogy

Archaeology is, strictly speaking, an investigation to study discursive formations as anonymous rules of the governed system, which is, however, not deemed "non-discursive practices" such as institutional practices, political events and economic changes, and so on in the discourse formation. For this reason, archaeology has not examined the question of power in the

discourse analysis. As a result, thematising the relationship between truth, knowledge, subjectivity, institutional normativity and social practices in which the discursive practices have emerged, Foucault adopted a new methodology of historical analysis called genealogy. Introducing genealogy does not mean that archaeology should be rejected, but archaeology serves genealogy in distinguishing discursive objects and isolating its rules of formations in demonstrating "discontinuity" of discursive formation. Genealogy, therefore, mainly investigates the relation of power, knowledge and subjectivity in society at a particular historical period.

Genealogy is an approach to study history which also follows the characteristic features of the history of thought described earlier. However, Genealogists do not study various knowledge, values, beliefs and social practices by focusing on a singular *dominant discourse* from the accumulated historical documents as investigated by traditional historians. Instead, Genealogists investigate *discourses* by assuming they have different possibilities of emergencies with their dispersed relations rather than concentrating on single discourse, unlike the history proper. Genealogy, therefore, primarily directed to replace the assumption of the continued chronology of reason by tracing the endless origin as a series of events to finding the relation between successions and types of events at different levels of history. Secondly, genealogy emphasises the discontinuity of history, which involves "decisions, accidents, initiatives, discoveries" (*AK,* 8) of history, as the significant aspect and pervasive role in the historical studies. For genealogy, discontinuity, which traditional historians thought as a stigma of temporal displacement to be removed, should precede the work of historians as genealogists choose the discontinuous levels of history not only for possible levels of analysis but also for accurate excavations.

According to genealogy, the document materials addressed should be viewed as "both an instrument and an object of research" (*AK, 9*) as it exhibits the historical limits, division and discontinuity, unlike the history proper. For this reason, genealogists reject the "total history", which assumes a homogeneous relation of causal links between events of "well-defined spatio-temporal area" (*AK, 9*), proposed by traditional historians. For the same reason, according to genealogists, addressing events in "stages or phases" of history assuming a great unity, a world view, singular meaning, and single law for historical events suggested by history proper should be discarded. Instead of this "totalising history", genealogy suggests one should concentrate on heterogeneous forms of relations embedded in events deploying "space of dispersion" (*AK,* 10). For this reason, genealogy rejects the assumption that history is a linear development and

teleological as suggested by traditional historians. On the above-mentioned grounds, genealogy, therefore, discards the three basic assumptions proposed by traditional historians: (1) presupposing monotonous finality or objective truth of historical events (2) history is the progressive rationality (2) knowledge and subjects are historically progressive.

Furthermore, genealogy also rejects the very approach of assuming continuity for dispersed events as suggested by history proper. For this reason, genealogy rejects two other basic assumptions of proper history: events have an essential origin and events have objective truth. Genealogy, on the contrary, assumes that an event or outcome or knowledge has different causal links in a particular historical period as they could have different explanations and directions in the historical process. According to genealogists, history, therefore, should not be evaluated as a continuous rational process because it involves transformations, discontinuities, breaks, and ruptures as there are numberless beginnings for events in history. Genealogy, therefore, seeks to explain the contingency of events in its disparity and tries to illustrate varying and shifting accounts of knowledge and subjectivity which traditional historians considered immutable. Genealogy, therefore, claims that in history, there is "no finalities, no hidden underlying significations, no metaphysical certainties" (*BSH*, 106). As there is no origin and foundational certitude in history, genealogist claims, knowledge and subjectivity are historically constituted.

Since genealogy is concerned with studying the non-discursive practices, it studies power relations embedded in various social practices at a particular historical period. However, though genealogy is concerned with the evaluation of social practices, it examines "practices in themselves". It is concerned with the process, procedures, operations and apparatus of social practices in themselves as "incommensurable networks of social practices".[74] Instead of assuming hidden meaning and the specific content of social practices, genealogy, nevertheless, is concerned with its procedures and functionalities in themselves. It is these "meticulous procedures of practices" as "meticulous rituals of power" embedded in the social practices that Foucault's genealogy is focused on. Similarly, studying the mutual constitution between power and knowledge in constructing subjectivities, genealogy is concerned with procedures, practices, apparatus and institutions as their conditions themselves. It is this whole complex nexus of practices, procedures, institutional norms, and an apparatuses' mechanism "in themselves" that the

[74] Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," *Praxis International*, no. 3 (1981): 275, https://www.ceeol.com/.

genealogist studies the power and knowledge interrelations. Genealogy, therefore, studies not only the mutual relations between power and knowledge in constituting subjectivity with its transformations, displacements, and strategies but also how they have come to exist historically. In short, the primary aim of genealogical study focuses on evaluating the relation between power and subjects.

2.5.4 Problematization

The methodological concept of problematization though appears in the last phase of Foucault works, it is also based on the primary concepts that define the common grounds of the history of thought. Both archaeology and genealogy, therefore, provides the theoretical foundations for defining this new methodological framework which attempts to describe how a particular form of historical "problem" is "problematized" or why a certain way of problematizing appears at a particular historical period. By problematization, Foucault means that how is the mutual constitution of power, knowledge and subjectivity problematized through various forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural conditions at a particular historical period. To evaluate this mutual constitution, in its rules of construction, the concepts it uses, its formal systematizations, and its day-to-day operations, the problematization is concerned with how the meticulous struggles of power relations constitute subjectivities. Problematization, therefore, is a distinctive historical study, which excavates how the process of subjectification becomes a problem by being "characterized, analyzed, regulated and treated" in the given confrontations and struggles of power relations. For this reason, problematization seeks to answer how and why specific subjective constitution became a problem at a particular historical period.

Following the archaeological method, problematization describes the formations of discourses, which enables and delimits particular "historical problems". It, on the one hand, addresses the entire field of the problem without focusing on single unified meaning; on the other hand, it is concerned with how a particular historical problem comes into existence and defined by "enabling conditions" of discourse. However, following genealogy, problematization assumes events, practices, knowledge, and power relations are intrinsically linked as it is concerned with "constituted rationalities" and the "field of constraints" by which subjectivities are forged. For this reason, it describes historically specific social structures and conditions by which the power relations enable and constrain "specific historical problem" regarding the construction of subjects.

On these grounds, problematization as a historical method combines and rearranges archaeology and genealogy by which the former is applied to examine the *forms* of problematization themselves, whereas, the later accounts power relations embedded in the social practices by analysing their modifications.

However, problematization is not only a method of analysis concerning the historical process but also critical thinking as it is concerned with the "subjective constitution" itself is a problem. Since Foucault does not propose problematization as a "logically built axiomatic study", it abandons not only the "focalized viewpoint" but also "pro or con approach" in examining the process of subjective constitution. For this reason, by re-evaluating subjective constitution as a problem, Foucault asks on what grounds such problematization is formed historically. For example, in the later works of *The History of Sexuality*[75], Foucault analyses how in different historical periods, "sexuality problematized" or how sexual experiences have been formed to constitute sexual subjectivity. Three main factors, however, involved in the analysis of problematization: firstly, the formation of discourse or the historical material conditions; secondly, the power relations embedded in its practices; thirdly, forms and modalities within which individuals recognize themselves as subjects *(UP*, 4). Since problematization as a methodological analysis is introduced in the last phase of Foucault's intellectual endeavour, its conceptual framework aims at analysing the process of "self-constitution" in the given power relations. Problematization, therefore, denotes how by self-constituting, one turns to be a subject and on what forms one relates to others and to oneself. It, therefore, inquires under what moral, political, economic, cultural conditions individuals are given to recognize themselves as subjects. In short, the fundamental aim of problematization is also to evaluate the relations between the subjective constitution and the mechanism of power.

2.6 Conclusion

In the first chapter, I have outlined the general framework of Foucault's account of power to evaluate the status of the subject in power relations. However, in this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical frameworks of Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis to evaluate the role of power

[75] It includes the books, namely, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure* and *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3*: *The Care of the Self.*

in studying the problem of the subject. Though both chapters' main objective is to explain the *relation* between power and subject, unlike the previous chapter, this section has studied the *question of relation* from the perspective of analyzing the problem of the subject. To evaluate the question of the relation between power and subject, Foucault, in his anti-subjective hypothesis proposed that *the subject is socially forged and historically constituted through power relations embedded in them*. The theoretical project Foucault has undertaken, therefore, rejects the central tenets of the essential account, especially, the foundational subject. Substantiating this claim, by describing the conceptual framework of discourse analysis, this chapter has explained *how subjects are socially forged*; whereas, by recapitulating the theoretical framework of archaeology, genealogy and problematization, this chapter has shown *how subjects are historically constituted*.

However, the conceptual explanations of these methodological frameworks have shown only the "type of approach" Foucault has pursued as it is demonstrated what role does power play to claim the subject is socially forged and historically constituted. Therefore, how this relation between power and subject has constituted is yet to be explained. In the two chapters, we have seen *only the conceptual frameworks* of Foucault's project in analyzing the relation between power and subject on two theoretical perspectives: from the viewpoint of studying power and from the perspective of examining the problem of the subject. Providing the general mechanisms and methodological precautions of power, in the first chapter, I have pointed out Foucault's main claim that the *subject does not exercise power, they are, on the contrary, constituted by it*. However, in this chapter, I have explained the role of power in constituting subjectivity in the socio-historical conditions. The discussions elaborated in these two chapters, nevertheless, are interrelated and complementary as their theoretical focus aimed at examining the *relation between power and subject*. These two discussions, however, have raised a third theoretical question: *how* power constructs subjects or *in what ways* subjects are forged in power relations. For this reason, to claim subjects are socially forged and historically constituted through power relations, in the next chapter, we will see on what historical examples Foucault has substantiated this question of the *relation.*

Chapter 3: Subject and Power

3.1 Introduction

In the first two chapters, I have explained two conceptual frameworks in studying the relation between power and subject. In the first chapter, by explaining the main tenets of Foucault's radical conception of power, I have illustrated the status of the subject in power relations. Whereas, in the second chapter, by recapitulating the central characteristic features of anti-subjective hypothesis and methodological approaches, I have shown the role of power in studying the formation of the subject. With these two types of conceptual frameworks, however, Foucault has shown *only* how the relation between power and subject to be *approached*. For this reason, it has posited a question: on what historical examples Foucault has *substantiated* this question of the *relation* between power and subject. The third chapter, therefore, inquires three significant questions which are as follows:

1. How does this *relation* between power and subject constitute?
2. How are subjects *constituted* in this relation?
3. How does power *function* in this relation?

These questions imply on what historical documents and examples Foucault has substantiated the question of *relation.* For this reason, to claim subjects are socially forged and historically constituted through power relations, Foucault has examined three modes of inquiries by which a person becomes a subject. Answering how power constructs subjects, or how power functions in the process of constituting subjectivities, Foucault has provided mainly three modes of inquiry, which has been studied by three historical methods and discourse analysis. The first mode of inquiry explains *how the subject is constituted as the* "*object of knowledge*" by which human beings turn into subjects. It studies how subjects become the object of a study by objectifying the subject as the status of knowledge. The basic inquiry highlighted in such study indicates how human beings become subjects when they are the object of study. The examples given by Foucault are the doctor and patient in the medical discourse and the mad and the normal in the various discourse of madness. The second domain of inquiry is oriented towards analysing *the objectivising of the subject by* "*dividing practices*". It analyses how individuals are led to exercise certain practice to recognize or acknowledge themselves and others as a subject. It

examines, by exercising various social practices, how individuals are turned out to recognize themselves as specific subjectivities either inside themselves or divided from others. The examples given by Foucault are the homosexual and the heterosexual, and the criminal and the good. The third mode of inquiry examines *how a human being turns or chooses himself as a subject*. It explains how human beings constitute themselves to think about their own nature or self when they perceive themselves as a subject. The example given by Foucault is how men have learned to identify themselves as a desiring individual or came to see as subjects of "sexuality".

By presenting the three modes of inquiries, this chapter has three main subsections, namely, subjects as the object of knowledge, subjects as the construction of practices and subjects who constitute themselves. In the first subsection, by analysing the central arguments given in the *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* and the *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, how subjects are constructed through knowledge production is examined. In the second subsection, by scrutinizing the main arguments proposed in the *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* and the *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, how subjects are constructed by various social practices is investigated. In the third section, by examining the main arguments and type of approach he has pursued in the *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure* and the *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self*, how subjects are constituted themselves by the technologies of the self is studied. Throughout the analysis, apart from evaluating the relation between power and subjects, the fundamental aim of this chapter is twofold: *how Foucault has criticized the essential account or foundational subject; how subjects are socially forged and historically constituted*. Let's evaluate each mode of inquiry as follows.

3.2 Subjects as the Object of Knowledge

In the first mode of inquiry, to evaluate *the subjective construction as the object of knowledge through power relations*, Foucault has excavated two genealogies: medical knowledge and discourse of madness. In these historical excavations, Foucault makes the following claims:

1. Power and knowledge are not only related but also reciprocally functioned.
2. Knowledge and subjects are historically constituted and socially forged.
3. Knowledge does not liberate subjects but constitutes them.
4. As knowledge is constituted by power, there is no objectivity as such.

5. Since knowledge is constituted by power, subjective construction as the object of knowledge neither is a foundational subject nor is naturally given.
6. Since knowledge is constituted by power, subjects should be seen as the construction of power relations.

To evaluate these claims, let's examine each genealogy as follows:

3.2.1 Questioning the Subject: The Discourse of Medicine

Foucault's historical account of the "genealogy of subject", traced particularly by "medical discourse", provides a genealogical history of how human beings have become the object of knowledge and the target of power. Its central point is the concept of the "medical gaze", which denotes the medical optimization of power in constituting the subjectivities of doctor and patient. In his book, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, Foucault describes the construction of the subjectivity of patient and doctor in the scientific understanding of medical discourse. What most interests Foucault is to analyse how our current understanding of life, death and disease produced a way of "constructing subjects" (particularly, patient and doctor) within the history of the development of medical knowledge in the Western world. The central tenets of the book concentrate on the concept of "medical gaze" and the sudden re-configuration of medical knowledge at the end of the 18th century traced by the working of the institution called the "clinic".[76] What Foucault investigates is the development of health disciplines by examining the social repercussions of the medical standards and discourses from classical age (from the late 17th to 18th centuries) to the modern period (from the late18th and the 19th centuries).

Foucault claims a historical shift from "medicine of species" to "clinic-based" medicine has been triggered at the end of the 18th century, which has paved the way for modern medicine. Foucault, therefore, has excavated how the "conditions of medical discourse", which is constituted by the function of disciplinary power and the development of medical knowledge, has been changed historically at the end of the 18th century. This radical shift in the medical discourse, argues Foucault, is the result of instrument effect of the power relations exhibited in the economic, state administration and political life of the 18th century. In Foucault's view, the birth of modern medicine, particularly clinical medicine was not a mere progression or gradually acquired

[76] By clinic, he refers to both clinical medicine and teaching hospitals.

reformation in the configuration of the medical perception of life, death and diseases, but rather a decisive shift in the very construction of the knowledge production and the power relations. The epistemological rupture occurred in the history of late 18th-century medicine, according to Foucault, is the result of the emergence of modern disciplinary power. It is the mutual function of power/knowledge nexus that the cornerstone for the birth of clinical medicine is constituted rather than the result of the individual's contribution to knowing the medicinal truth.

For evaluating the Foucault's genealogy of medicine, this section proceeds with two subsections, namely, the institutionalization of medicine and the emergence of disciplinary power, and the characteristic features of modern medicine in which the relation between power and subject in the medical discourse is studied. Let's evaluate each subsection as follows.

3.2.1.1 The Classical Age: Institutionalization of Medicine and the Emergence of Disciplinary Power

The exemplified question of medical discourse in the 18th century was, as Foucault puts it, "what is the matter with you". It is a question which signifies the relationship between patient and physician, and also implies the nature of the medical conception of life, death and diseases in the 18th century. The 18th-century medical discourse, according to Foucault, established a model of "species of disease" for medical diagnosis, which is based on the question "what is the matter with you" representing "medicine of tissues". In other words, medicine has operated based on the "classificatory structure of species of diseases", which is considered "the disease is given an organisation, hierarchized into families, genera, and species" (*BC*, 3). The classical medicine, for that very reason, on the one hand, approached identifying various species and their defining features to be classified and ordered; on the other hand, to know the nature of the disease, it established an intimate personal relationship between doctor and patient in the medical diagnosis. The role of medicine and physician, therefore, was getting right back the diseased organism functioning "naturally".

However, classical medicinal perception began to disappear by some specific institutional changes. The first change, according to Foucault, was the "collaboration of private home care with state supervision". Family and home were considered as primordial and natural spaces of diagnosing diseases in the 18th century. However, since health awareness became a task of the state, "medical care" had to be supervised and thereby given legal status. The second noticeable

change occurred with the emergence of institutionalization of epidemic medicalisation. As a result, the political authorities imposed a double check over the practice of medicine in the name of investigation, supervision and recording treatments. Therefore, the epidemic became more than a medical issue, an issue for the entire nation (*BC,* 24-43). These political events played a significant role in the new medical configuration as it led to the dispersion of the "medical gaze" at the national level. Most significantly, it headed a new totalization of knowledge; started with controlling the epidemic patients, it gradually became an authority of all medical activity as an "official organ". It also worked as a "health police", by gathering statistics and information of all kinds which eventually enhanced a central force of the life and health of the nation.

However, this new turn in the medical discourse, Foucault observes, supported by two great myths, namely, nationalised medical profession and total alleviation of disease throughout the social body, around the time of the French revolution. On the one hand, the first myth worked positively as "strict, militant, dogmatic medicalisation of society"(*BC,*36); on the other hand, the second myth functioned negatively as "the volatilization of disease in a corrected, organized, and ceaselessly supervised environment, in which medicine itself would finally disappear"(*BC,*36). It strengthened the medical administration to coordinate medicalisation of human bodies as well as the life and wellbeing of the country.[77] As a result, instead of the negative recovery of health, medicine was given a task of positive retaining of health and well-being. Most importantly, the configuration of the medical discourse associated with the function of the state at the practical level, which has guided the nation to ensure the perpetual well-being of the people. For these reasons, in the new medical configuration, life, health and disease are seen and measured in terms of "normal and pathological".

Foucault also notices how the institutionalization of medicine has been elicited by the power relations embedded in the economic system as well. Since hospitals were seen as representing poverty and sickness of the nation during that time, with the emergence of new medical discourse, however, a new question has been raised: by what right one can become an

[77] Foucault says, according to Sabarot de 1 Averniere, priests and doctors were appointed for two missions in the early years of the French revolution. As the "natural heirs of the church", they were appointed for "consolation of soul and alleviation of pain". Importantly, since church and nation coordinated for the well-being of the country spiritually as well as materially, doctors were appointed as the server of the nation. For this reason, patients were given free treatment in the same way how the higher priest, the clergy, consolidated suffering souls. As a result, "medicalisation" was perceived as the old "spiritual vocation of the church (*BC*, 36-37).

object of clinical observation. Since the diseased body diagnosed by the new medical knowledge is based on "precarious gaze", not only "to observe" has become criteria for knowing the disease, but also dissecting the body is considered as teaching medical knowledge. For this reason, the distinction between rich and poor is regarded as "necessary violence" in the new medical diagnosis. Though the "sick poor" is considered as a "spectacle" for the health and well-being of the nation, their treatment of diseases was mediated by the rich. Whereas the wealthy gained utility, by funding the institutionalization of medicine through making extensive knowledge of the illness, the poor have become the object of medical knowledge. This new "contract" between rich and poor in the emergence of new medical discourse made the body of the "poor" as the object of "precarious gaze" of "medical scrutiny" as an individual case of medical truth and the subject of medical observations. The "*objective interest*" for medical diagnosis" paid by the poor and the "*vital interest*" invested by the wealthy, therefore, triggered a new agreement between the physician and patient in the new medical discourse.

3.2.1.2 The Characteristic Features of Modern Medicine

The institutional changes described above eventually gave birth to the modern clinic in which the patient was considered as the object of knowledge, whereas the doctor is seen as the regulator of medical knowledge. The birth of the clinic, therefore, triggered changes in the diagnosis of diseases in the medical configurations by which "medicine of tissues" is replaced by "medicine of symptoms". According to Foucault, clinics should be seen as a discourse which constitutes a "mode of perception" and "regime of truth" involving all statements regarding medicinal diagnosis and disease. The very field of medical discourse, thus, should be seen as a set of rules and procedures, which configure and diagnose the diseases and the health in medical knowledge. For this reason, a clinic is not merely a place of practicing medicine, but the "discursive practices" constituting knowledge of disease and health. This very change in the medical discourse made "the patient in a situation of almost perpetual examination" (*BC*, 15) in the medical knowledge. It is this "medical gaze" that the clinic is seen as an "examining apparatus" and a "site" of practicing medical knowledge.

As I mentioned earlier, in the classical period, the relationship between patient and doctor was close as the medical concern was "what is matter with you". In the classical period, the patient was seen as an individual, and the disease was a natural disorder, where the medicine aimed to get

the individual back in the right natural order. However, with the emergence of clinics, the medical concern was "where does it hurt" as it was concerned not with the "symptomatic surface" but the "diseased inferior". For this reason, individuals are seen as only the object of diseases with an "optimal perpetual distance" to be measured and observed. Unlike the classical period, with the emergence clinic, there was no actual contact between the physicians with the body of the "sick" because the doctor positioned in a "safe" and "sanity" distance in the diagnosis process. It is not the moral prohibition that made the "contract" between physician and patient "distance", but the emergence of new disciplinary power. The invention of the stethoscope, for instance, argues Foucault, therefore, resulted in diagnosing the uncleanness of "dirty poor body", which on the one hand, objectified the patient, on the other hand, placed doctors as "safe" and "sanity". On these grounds, the birth of the clinic, which has brought up the knowledge of modern medicine, according to Foucault, on the one hand, constituted "subject" or individual patient as the object of knowledge; on the other hand, it has constituted "subject" or individual patient as the target of disciplinary power.

In this way, by segregating, measuring, and ordering through disciplinary procedures, patients in the new medical discourse, Foucault claims, has become the target of disciplinary power and object of medical knowledge. Similarly, by collecting data, compiling medical observations, documenting diseased bodies, and verifying details of diseases, doctors in the clinic have become not only the regulator and authority of medical knowledge but also the vehicles of disciplinary power. Through thorough examination (gazing) of the body of patients, which is achieved through the optimization of disciplinary power in the clinic, the doctor deduced symptoms, illness, and causes of the diseases in understanding the patient completely. It signifies the structure of organising medical knowledge is the function of the disciplinary procedure because modern medical discourse has considered the human body or patient's body as the optimal perpetual object of power/knowledge nexus. In this way, this "science of man" (i.e. medicine) has provided a theoretical basis for constructing the subjectivity of doctor and patient in the modern medical discourse, which, according to Foucault, should be seen as the construction of the disciplinary power. In this historical investigation, Foucault, therefore, concludes disciplinary power and medical knowledge intrinsically related as both are reciprocally constituted each other in constituting subjectivities of doctor and patient.

3.2.2 Questioning the Subject: Discourse of Madness

Like *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* also examines the "construction of subject", however, by studying the genealogy of madness in the age of reason. Though it explores the changing relationship between "madness and reason", its consistent theoretical approach insists that madness is not a natural, permanent concept, but is constructed by cultural, socio-historical conditions. Foucault's historical account, however, explains "material conditions of madness" resided in the Western cultural "space" which provides a broader picture than perceiving madness as a mere disease and mental state. In writing a history of madness, beneath the socio-cultural structures, construction of madness, Foucault argues, depends upon changing patterns of knowledge and power relations. This theoretical approach of examining deep structures and discourses extended him to write a history of madness rather than individual madmen. Similarly, Foucault wished to write a history of madness which is, on the one hand, a devastating critic of subjective construction of madmen and on the other hand, questioned the commonly accepted view that liberation of the madman with the emergence of modern psychiatry.

Foucault traces the construction of the madmen through three historical phases: the Renaissance (from the15th to the beginning of 17th centuries) the Classical Age (from the late 17th and the 18th centuries) and the modern period (from the late 18th and the 19th centuries). In this historical investigation, by explaining how madness has been viewed in these three historical periods, Foucault claims, madness is socially forged and historically constituted rather than merely a biological dysfunction as understood generally. The modern understanding of madness with the emergence of modern psychiatry and medical discourse, Foucault argues, is not the rational progress and human emancipation, but is the outcome of the disciplinary power emerged in modern society. In this genealogical excavation, Foucault makes a central argument that "madness is a social construction", and is not a biological referent inscribed in human nature. The modern madmen, argues Foucault, is constructed through with the emergence of human sciences[78] constituted by disciplinary power. Therefore, Foucault claims, the modern madman is not liberated

[78]Human sciences are bodies of knowledge which have "human" as their object of study. Psychiatry, criminology, sociology, psychology and medicine are the main human sciences.

with the emergence of the modern mental asylum and human sciences but is constituted by the power/knowledge nexus exhibited in the modern disciplinary society. To evaluate how the madmen are constructed by power relations in Foucault's genealogy of madness, this section proceeds with three subsections such as madness in the renaissance period, madness in the Classical Period, and madness in the modern world respectively. Let's evaluate each of them as follows.

3.2.2.1 Madness in the Renaissance Period

According to Foucault, at the beginning of the renaissance period, madmen were considered dangerous and enigmatic figures. Since unreason signifies to those people whose experiences are beyond reason, madness in the renaissance period was represented by unreason, or it was the locus of madness's possibility. At first glance, in the literature of tales and moral fables, madmen or folly are depicted "at the heart of reason and truth". However, from the fifteenth century onwards it is observed that, initially as a theme of death, madness haunted the imagination of the Western mind. The fascination developed around madmen both in the painting and text shows that madmen possessed certain kinds of forbidden knowledge: absurd figures and knowledge related to the end of the world. Since madness exhibited intense experience of human life with a rigorous continuity in the Western world, it showed like the experience of leprosy, the very presence of threat and death.[79]

However, at the end of the renaissance period, new forms of madness developed slowly where madmen's status moved from the "possessor of dark knowledge" to "human weakness". Though madness is linked to knowledge, it was considered fake knowledge that leads to madness. In the same period, Foucault observes, the folly or madmen are understood as "throngs of all human weaknesses". For instance, though knowledge is important to madness, it is because "madness is the punishment of a disorderly and useless science" (*MC*, 25). Similarly, the truth of madman's knowledge was regarded as "absurd" as it was the result of "false learning". In this delusive attachment, madmen were considered as someone who accepts "error as truth, lies as reality, violence and ugliness as beauty and justice" (*MC*, 26). As a result, concepts such as

[79] Foucault claims that works of literature were written around fifteen centuries such as Van Oestvoren's *Blauwe Schute*, Brant's *Narrenschiff, Moria rediviva* of Flayder and Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* etc. have confronted all these discussions. Nevertheless, the theme of death dominated can be seen, for example, in the painting of *Danse Macabre or Dance of Death* (*MC*, 17).

weakness, dreams and illusion were attributed to madness and thereby, madmen were considered someone who invents irregularities and excessiveness in one's conduct.

Furthermore, "*romantic identification*" of madness in the literature also led to new ways of "madness construction" in the renaissance period.[80] Likewise, in the moral world, madmen were depicted as unveiling the truth in the pain of punishment, and at the same time, they are seen relieved with imaginary presences. Foucault claims that these illustrations of madness not only have rearranged and reconstructed the concept of madness but also portrayed madmen as someone who misleads the truth. It marked the appearance of madness as a cultural figure since the theme of death was replaced by the concept of "cultural disorder". This disorder (of course, not cast by bodily dysfunctions), however, also presented in the different type of people such as the fool, the vagabonds, the bungler, the drunkard, the simpleton, the criminal, the lover as they all possess certain excessiveness and irregularity. Eventually, madness is identified as an image of punishment, fake, an imbalance of mental state rather than having a real existence. At the end of the renaissance period, therefore, the "unreason" possessed by madmen was not exactly the opposite of "reason" but had a complicated relationship with it. In other words, unreason was not necessarily a distortion of reason as such but had a solely different attitude towards it.

3.2.2.2 Classical Age: The Great Confinement and the Emergence of Disciplinary Power

However, in the late seventeenth century, at the dawn of the age of reason, madmen were retained and maintained with the establishment of the "madhouse". In other words, though "madness was at the heart of things and men", new requirements generated to tame the madmen. A prominent change occurred in the status of madness is the "great confinement" implemented in the late-seventeenth century. All leper houses across Europe turned into the "house of confinement" which, Foucault claims, represented a "conceptual shift" of madness from the "diseased bodies" to "sick minds". Foucault argues that the "great confinement", which has drastically changed the construction of madmen, should be seen as the *function of power*. The confinement has involved a series of measures, segregation, supervision because it has worked as the instrument and apparatus of the function of disciplinary power. The very institutional operation

[80] To substantiate the claim, Foucault cites Cervantes and Shakespeare. There is "*the madness of vain presumption*" in *Don Quixote* of Cervantes as tremendous anxiety is depicted concerning relationships between real and imaginary. Similarly, as in the *Ophelia* and *King Lear*, disappointed love is conceived with "*desperate passion*" as madness, claims Foucault, is depicted, in death, lovers never to be separated.(*MC*,30-31)

of the confinement, according to Foucault, functioned as the dividing practices making a distinction between aberrant and normal. Since madmen were seen as the "moral error" as the outcast, the institutional practices of confinement have functioned as the imposed punishment on them. Foucault also points out that the confinement was, however, not indeed started as a medical establishment with humanitarian concern. Instead, it was a semi-judicial and administrative implementation of government as the operation of power. It has implemented disciplinary power over its inhabitants where the government and church worked together for its achievement. This surveillance operation of power made the madmen situate in an "optimal perceptual distance" to be observed and measured.

Importantly, in the classical period, it was not only madmen but also the criminals, the poor, vagabonds, recalcitrant, sick, peasants, promiscuous, disbanded soldiers, rebellious children, and irresponsible parents were confined. The proximate cause of categorising this motley crew, Foucault argues, was the power relations resulted in the economic crisis. In the classical period, Foucault claims, since bidding beggars in the city, reduction of wages and the unemployment crisis had to be settled, confinement was considered as the ultimate resolution for all these issues. Confinement, therefore, was seen as the general solution for poverty or economic crisis because the "confined" were forced to work for low wages to contribute prosperity for the nation. Strictly speaking, it has played a double role: on the one hand, it tried to reabsorb unemployment; on the other hand, it undertook to reduce labour cost. This "social internment", the whole categorization of people, led to new modes of the economic structure and disciplinary society where labour was considered as both "moral and a social imperative". Therefore, Foucault argues that though confinement was the first stepping stone for the later developed medical, psychiatric and human sciences, it came into existence not out of humanitarian concern. On the contrary, the constitution of madness through the institutionalisation of confinement, argues Foucault, should be seen as the function of the power operated through semi-judicial administration, economic crisis, operation of punishment, and sovereignty of church and government.

Though the age of reason enclosed certain people, the "madmen" had a distinct position in the world of confinement. When madmen were confined, unlike the renaissance period in which madmen were allowed to speak freely, they were not only silenced but also reclassified. Similarly, as madmen were confined with other social deviants, their social status also eventually changed.

However, unlike other confined, madmen's status appeared with a specific modulation through the general sensibility of "unreason" in the classical period. In the classical period, however, the "reason" sought to define unreason through social deviance. Thus, reason had a complex and changing relationship with unreason as madness was defined or understood with the other social deviants. Through this sensibility of unreason, madness was called "insane, deranged, demented, extravagant" without any exact semantic distinction. Therefore, in the classical period, since madmen were viewed as anti-nature, a necessity to tame them became an issue. For this reason, it was considered that the only way to curb madmen was *disciplining* and *brutalizing* them through confinement.

3.2.2.3 Madness in the Modern Period

It is the institutionalisation of confinement that the modern understanding of madness is constituted. Foucault, for this reason, argues the therapeutic medication and its administration should not be seen distinct from the treatment which prevailed in the confinement. Like prevailed in the classical period, the emergence of the mental asylum also has blended two motives: taming the madmen and eliminating the undesirables for the protection of society. The physical separation of madmen through the institutionalisation of confinement, therefore, made madmen to be segregated, measured, and objectified. This constant *objectification* constituted madmen "under constant scrutiny" of disciplinary power as it triggered not only a conceptual distinction between the mad and the rational but also a power relation between their subjectivities, namely normal and abnormal. Furthermore, the physical separation of madmen constructed by confinement made them conveniently available under the supervision of medical doctors. The madness, therefore, is seen in the modern world as a *natural object* of study in the medical discourse. As a result, madness soon has become an object of knowledge for the therapeutic discipline (for example, psychiatry) as well. Eventually, the authority of psychiatry, which is the language of reason about madness, constituted madness as a mental illness to be cured. However, according to Foucault, the treatment of the madmen in these modern medical institutions is as cruel and controlling as prevailed in the classical period confinement. The treatment of madmen in the mental asylum is similar to the confinement houses because the institutionalization and the emergence of knowledge, according to Foucault, serve the same social function: to classify, control, discipline and regulate subjectivity of madmen.

For this reason, the institutionalisation of madness enacted not only the separation between the modern man and the madman but also silenced the communication between them. Therefore, it is erroneous to claim that madmen are liberated with the emergence of the modern mental asylum and human sciences. Furthermore, Foucault also claims that it is not with the humanitarian concern that madmen are institutionalised under medical and psychiatric discourses but is the product of the function of power. Therefore, Foucault concludes that the madness is not the *natural disease*, but is a historical construction which is resulted through the disciplinary power in the establishment of confinement. As a result, power in the modern discourse of madness has created two subjectivities: the madmen as the object of human sciences and the psychologists as the authority of knowledge. Foucault makes, therefore, three substantial claims: madness is not a natural, permanent concept, but it is a historical construction; knowledge does not liberate but constitute subject; knowledge and power are interrelated in constituting subjects. On these grounds, Foucault concludes modern madmen is socially forged and historically constructed by the power/knowledge regime.

From the two historical explanations described above, Foucault has illustrated how subject as the object of knowledge is constituted by power relations in two discourses: "patient" as the object in the medical knowledge and "madmen" as the object in the human sciences. Since the process of knowledge in these discourses is historically constituted by the consequences, changes, events, and effects of the instrumental operation of power, Foucault makes four claims. Firstly, knowledge and power are not only related but also constitute each other; whereas knowledge is the exercise of power, power is the function of knowledge. Secondly, subjectivities (patients and doctors in the medical discourse and madmen and psychologists in the discourse of madness) are constituted by power/knowledge nexus. Thirdly, since knowledge is historically constituted and socially forged by the power relations, knowledge is not the invention of the foundational subject. Fourthly, as knowledge is constituted by power, the subject as the objective knowledge neither is a foundational subject nor has objective truth. Therefore, Foucault concludes that since knowledge is constituted by power, subjects as the object of knowledge should be seen as the construction of power relations because knowledge does not liberate subjects but constitutes their subjectivities.

3.3 Subjects as the Construction of Practices

In the second mode of inquiry, to evaluate *the subjective constitution as the construction of practices by power relations*, Foucault has excavated two genealogies: the discourse of punishment and history of sexuality. In these historical excavations, Foucault makes the following claims:

1. Power is not a capacity, possession, substance, repression as suggested by conventional views; it represents the ensemble of social relations.
2. The subjects can't hold power as an exertion of will exclusively as proposed by traditional theories; they are, on the contrary, should be seen as constructed by power.
3. Power is not a centralized force as claimed by three models of power; it is, on the contrary, diffused throughout the social body.
4. Power is not essentially repressive as it can be productive; power is productive as it produces subjectivities and knowledge and increases the utility and productivity of the institutions.
5. Subjects should not be seen as exercising power; they, on the contrary, should be seen as constructed by power.
6. Since power and knowledge are reciprocally constitutive, knowledge does not liberate subjects but constitutes them.
7. Power should be historically understood and socially analyzed.
8. Since power constructs subjects, there is no essential subject or human nature but only "constructed subjects".

To evaluate these claims, let's excavate each of the genealogy as follows:

3.3.1 Questioning the Subject: Discourse of Punishment

In the *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault provides the "genealogy of the modern subject", which is constituted through disciplinary technology and normative social sciences, by examining the historical account of punishment and its changing power relations. The central arguments Foucault raised with this historical endeavour primarily deal with two aspects: examining the relation between the evolution of modern subjectivity of criminal and the development of human sciences; evaluating the humanistic concept of liberation and the emergence of disciplinary power. Firstly, he puts forward that the rise of the modern individual

and the modern industrial society is the result of changes that occurred in the structure of the very power relations in the classical age (from the late 17th to 18th centuries). Secondly, he claims that the emergence of modern society as a "collective humanization of liberation" from the monarchic rules and old social repressive systems, which claims the authority of autonomy of the sovereign individual, is not the triumphant "progressive rationality of history" as understood by humanists. Foucault, therefore, intended to study how the production of a specific kind of knowledge (criminality), the institutional practices (the prison), and technicians assigned for evaluating such practices (jail wardens, magistrates, psychologists and other professionals) created a subject (the prisoner) in the modern world. What he claims is that the objective science of society (particularly, human sciences), which studies social facts and practices, and the construction of "modern subjectivities" are the results of "instrument-effects of specific historical forms of power" (*BSH,* 143). Foucault's theoretical problem is, therefore, oriented towards evaluating the "relation" between power, knowledge, and subjective construction.

This section, therefore, evaluates the "genealogy of punishment" on three grounds: the pre-modern concept of punishment, humanistic reformations, and the emergence of disciplinary power (*BSH,* 144). Let's analyze each of the subsections as follows.

3.3.1.1 The Features of Punishment in the Pre-Modern Period

According to Foucault, "public torture" was the prevalent punishment in the pre-modern period. In the classical period, according to Foucault, is the regime of the absolute states in which power is exercised in vertical fashion by which sovereign king is positioned always on the top, whereas the subjects or people on the bottom. During this period, in the domain of punishment practices, the public torture was given to the "criminals" as a "political ritual" of king maintaining his authority. It primarily had two functions: displaying the authority and legitimacy of the king's power over subjects and retaining power through crushing any resistance against his authority. The very public torture imposed over the "criminal" as part of the rituals of punishment, on the on hand, maintained the "totality of king's power"; on the other hand, it functioned as a "confession technology". The ritual of the confession, Foucault argues, is a peculiar political ritual in that period in which the criminal was forced to confess the "crime" to the public and king. This very political ritual, claims Foucault, does have certain rules and internal logic as it on the one side justified the torture by the act of confession; on the other side, it re-asserted the power of the king

by showing the guilt or truth of the crime of the criminal. The exertion of the power in that way, therefore, serves two primary functions: the re-assertion of the integrity of the will of the sovereign and the preservation of the "affront" created through the violation of the law by the criminal. In this fashion, in the pre-modern power regime, Foucault claims, the political rituals of punishment combined truth and power (*BSH*, 146).

However, the rituals of punishments had been questioned for the following reasons. Though the excessive power imposed by the sovereign in the body of accused is essentially the ritual of atrocity, the same also, argues Foucault, displaced its limitations. In this power struggle between accused and sovereign, there was always a possibility of destroying the accused body in the ritual of public torture. It shows the limitation of sovereign power because the death of the accused, on the one hand, exhibits a threat against the king's authority, whereas, on the other hand, questions the inappropriate function of sovereign power. Similarly, since the public space often has become a social disturbance for exercising the power of the sovereign, it often happened that "authority is mocked and criminals transformed into heroes" (*DP*, 61) while performing the rituals of public torture. Therefore, there was a historical necessity for reordering of punishment's political rituals, reapplication of laws and reactivation of the social order, which, Foucault argues, exhibits the limitation of sovereign power and possibility of resistance.

3.3.1.2 The Humanistic Reformation

Apart from the historical changes mentioned above, petitions against executions, public torture, and authority of sovereignty have increased in the 18th century as the rituals of punishment became shameful and revolting. During the same period, a group of "humanist reformers"[81] questioned the rituals of punishment and illegitimate exercise of sovereign power. The reformers not only demanded rational distribution of power and justice but also condemned "the brutality of the king" and "excessive atrocity in public torture". The new demand articulated by humanists proclaimed for a lenient change of "public torture" and "immoderation" of king's rule, which subsequently made awareness among people thinking new interpretation of punishment. The abolition of the "theatre of atrocity" was the foremost demand of reformists as they claimed, "instead of taking revenge, criminal justice should simply punish" (*DP*, 74). Apart from that, it

[81]Foucault has mentioned many humanists. Their names are as follows: Beccaria, Servan, Dupaty, Lacretelle, Duport, Pastoret, Target, and Bergasse (*DP*, 75).

was also seen that the very failure of the system of punishment is not only the atrocity regarding public torture alone but also the inadequacy of the "criminal investigation" and the "ceremony of execution" in detecting crime. Consequently, the issue of the punishment rituals was considered as the "social issue" as a matter of inappropriate function of the social system as a whole.

Since the right treatment for punishment has become an unavoidable obligation of the society as a whole, an inevitable need and awareness for addressing right and wrong deeds among people throughout the society gradually emerged. An implicit realization regarding modulating and appropriating punishment rituals, not only among individuals but also from the side of authority, consciously aroused. It indirectly made an awareness that the standard of implementing justice no longer in the hand of the king and the truth of confessions. For this reason, a new understanding of crimes and responsibility of criminal actions have become a problem to be solved as a social matter. It eventually made a sense among people that the reformation of punishment is a necessity. Subsequently, it is established that "the limit of punishment and its target is the humanity of each subject" (*BSH*, 148).

The very immediate necessity and urge for ordering and maintaining the "right" arrangement of social life made people rethink the mechanism of punishment in terms of "rightful" and "useful" systemization of the "social order". It, on the one hand, readdressed the criminal activities or crimes; on the other hand, intended to bring back the culprits in the right "ordering" of the social structure. This "requalification" of the subjects, arranging him in the "proper" and "legitimate" order of the social life relied on the need for "appropriate function of power" and "the whole technology of representation" (*DP*, 104). For this reason, since the criminal is the "odd" in the "order of social life", he needs to be rightly replaced in order to maintain the social order. The theory of judicial representations, therefore, has taken punishment as a "remedy" imposed to correct the accused according to the nature of the crime committed. The "representational punishment", for this reason, is a lesson and deterrent remunerating the social order implemented with the intelligible procedures of "human values" both on the criminal and society as a whole. The intelligibility and justice relied on this representational application are based on the correspondence between the act committed and the correcting procedures. The "transparency" achieved by the new mechanisms of punishments, according to humanists, is based on human values to correct the order of the society by discarding the arbitrary will of the sovereign. It is for

these reasons that humanistic reformists claim the new mechanism of punishment, that is the modern prison, is “effective” and “humane”.

3.3.1.3 The Emergence of Disciplinary Society

The prison as the new form of punishment suggested by humanistic reformists, however, according to Foucault, emerged not out of “humanitarian concern” but the change happened in the very power relations. According to Foucault, the beginning of the 18th century saw the emergence of disciplinary power replacing the sovereign power of the pre-modern period. The humanist’s reformation, Foucault claims, therefore, should be seen as the “effect” of the larger social change led to the disciplinary society in the modern world. The humanistic reformation, for this reason, should not be seen functioned out of humanitarian concern as *their fundamental problem was the inappropriate, unpredictable, unevenly distributed function of sovereign power*. Since sovereign power is ineffective, limited and uncontrolled in the rituals of punishment, for humanists, claims Foucault, power should be more evenly distributed to make a correct social order. The new reformation in the political rituals of punishment (the modern prison), argues Foucault, should be seen, for this reason, as part of the larger “disciplinary society”. The modern prison, therefore, should be seen as one of the institutions in the modern disciplinary society along with hospitals, factories, schools, mental asylums and so on. Therefore, Foucault claims that humanist reformation has not materialized, but it only transformed into a new mode of disciplinary power.

With the emergence of disciplinary society, in the domain of punishment, Foucault has observed two significant changes: construction of the subjectivities and development of new knowledge. Since modern prison concerned criminals to be “segregated” through training, observation, control, and disciplining, the whole process of new reformation of punishment is now based on “individualisation”. This classification of criminals corresponded to the punishment practices, therefore, argues Foucault, directed to the “objectification” of “crimes” and “criminals”. The development of the modern penal system in Europe, therefore, directed studying the prisoners and the wrong deeds committed, in which crimes and criminals became objects of human sciences such as psychology, medicine, criminology, and so on. Since the judgment meant to be stated on the motives, intentions and instincts of the culprit, new professionals or subjectivities are assigned such as doctors, psychiatrists, and jail warden, and so on. In this way, the prison as one of the modern disciplinary institutions, not only provided the modern meanings for “criminal”, but it has

also given modern understandings for "bad", "good", illegal, and "lawful" as well. The modern power regime, therefore, on the one hand, constituted the subjectivity of criminals as "bad" and "illegal", whereas, on the other hand, it indirectly constituted the subjectivity of (other) modern individuals as "good" and "lawful". For these reasons, Foucault substantiates two claims*: knowledge and power are inextricably related and directly imply one another in constructing subjectivities; since power and knowledge are reciprocally constitutive, knowledge does not liberate subjects but constitutes them.*

Since the modern industrial age or disciplinary society have various disciplinary institutions in which subjects are "under the surveillance of power", Foucault argues, prison *serves the same social function* as schools, mental asylums, family, hospitals, and factories: *to train, classify, control, discipline and regulate subjectivities of individuals*. On this ground, Foucault makes three claims. Firstly, power functions through "set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets" in constructing subjectivities which is "multiple, local, and diffused throughout social relations" (*DC*, 27). Secondly, since disciplinary power is "local, continues, productive, capillary and exhaustive"[82] concerned with the smallest and most precise aspects of human affairs, it is not only *diffused* throughout the social body but also it *does not have any particular centre* as in the pre-modern sovereign power. Thirdly, since the modern form of power operates on the "actions of individuals", rather than "coercions on the body" in the ensemble of social relations, its ultimate function is "disciplining and normalizing" of subjects. For these reasons, the new disciplinary regime in the modern industrial society or disciplinary society not necessarily operated by specific people against others as understood in the pre-modern, but involves all individuals with a subjective position, where no one, strictly speaking, exercises power but, on the contrary, all are being operated by it. Power, therefore, Foucault claims, should be conceived as a "complex shifting field of relations in which everyone is an element" (*PK*, 142). On these grounds, Foucault makes the following conclusions. Firstly, power is not a capacity, possession, substance, repression as suggested by conventional views; it represents the ensemble of social relations. Secondly, subjects can't hold power as an exertion of will exclusively over others; they, on the contrary, should be seen as constructed by power.

[82] Nancy Fraser, "Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," 276.

According to Foucault, since modern power is disciplinary in nature, modern society itself is a "multitude of subjugation" as it constructs not only criminals but also doctors, psychologists, students, patients, teachers, factory workers, soldiers, and so on. Whereas the classical notion of power was concerned with interdiction, coupled with instruction to regulate and restrict the behaviour of subjects, the new form of disciplinary power classifies, measures and trains individuals with a specific kind of desires and behaviour as subjects in the modern institutions such as educational, factory, family, and so on. Since all subjects are "inside" the power relations and the subject does not exercise power in the traditional form of "A exercise power *over* B", Foucault makes three radical claims: (1) power should be seen as politics of the day to day life affairs the ensemble of social relations embedded in the various social practices; (2) since neither power nor subjectivities are ahistorical and ontological, they should be historically understood and socially analyzed;(3) since power constructs subjects, there is no essential subject or human nature but only socio-historically "constructed subjects". The modern form of power, strictly speaking, therefore, is a complex strategic field, which no longer functions in terms of the law, authority and legitimacy designated as rightful sovereignty over others, but it operates through the new modes of normalization. As power in the modern society exercises through the ideological level in the least observable form in normalizing and constructing individuals, Foucault claims, in its function, the power to punish is not fundamentally different from that of curing, rehabilitating, supervising, training and educating.

Since disciplinary power constructs subjectivities by training, supervising and measuring individuals through various institutions, bodies of knowledge, and social practices, *power, Foucault claims, is not essentially repressive as it could be productive.* According to Foucault, power is productive as it produces subjectivities and knowledge and increases the utility of the institutions. Since power/knowledge nexus enhanced various bodies of knowledge such as psychiatry, medicine, criminology in constituting the modern subjectivity of criminal, Foucault claims, power should be seen as productive. Similarly, since power constructed numerous subjectivities such as psychologists, doctors, wardens, and so on to regulate these human sciences or knowledge, power should be considered as productive. Furthermore, since power is diffused through various institutions, and it operates on the "actions" of individuals, politically speaking, it enhances massive control over subjects without any active, sovereign agent's supervision and execution as conceived in the pre-modern power regime. Also, since power works subtle ways by

normalizing individuals, it is not only rapid and effective, but it also arouses only a little resistance from the people. For these reasons, Foucault claims, disciplinary power is productive as it not only increases the utility of the institutions but also enhances the docility of individuals by training, supervising and regulating their subjectivities. Therefore, by giving the historical explanations of various punishment practices in the pre-modern and modern power regime, Foucault concludes that power, knowledge and subjectivities are inextricably connected.

3.3.2 Questioning the Subject: The History of Sexuality

Following the main arguments proposed in the *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault, in the *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, specifically substantiates two claims: power is not essentially suppressive as it can be productive; power is the ensemble of complex strategical function as it is coextensive with the social body. By examining the genealogy of sexuality, Foucault argues that sexuality is not a biological referent inscribed in human nature, but is socially forged and historically constituted through power relations. In formulating these arguments in an ordered plausible way, this section is also concerned with how power and knowledge reciprocally function in the various discourses of sexuality in constructing numerous sexual identities. To illustrate these claims plausibly, Foucault elaborates the extended form of disciplinary power in the domain of sexuality, namely, Bio-power. Therefore, this section deals with three subsections, namely, arguments for the repressive hypothesis, Foucault's arguments against the repressive hypothesis, and the emergence of Bio-power. In the first subsection, the main claims of the repressive hypothesis, which is the fundamental assumption of the conventional theories of power, are recapitulated. The second subsection discusses how Foucault criticizes the repressive hypothesis. The third subjection, however, illustrates not only the characteristic features of Bio-power but also how Bio-power and knowledge are related in constituting various sexual subjectivities. Let's evaluate each of the subsection as follows:

3.3.2.1 Arguments for Repressive Hypothesis

In the domain of sexuality, the repressive hypothesis argues that power has repressed sex for the last three hundred years since the rise of the bourgeoisie. It postulates that in the capitalist socio-historical power structure, sex has been condemned as a meaningless activity. According to this view, in the capitalist social order, there was strict confinement of spending human energies

solely on work or production by controlling the sexual discourse enforced by the capitalist's vested interest. For increasing production, capitalists enforced people to spend their energies in their physical works and condemned other pleasurable activities such as sex. For this reason, according to the repressive hypothesis, any expenditure of energy on pleasurable activities is considered as against the "work ethics" of bourgeoisie's social order. Similarly, controlling sexual practices as private, practical affairs confined strictly to marriage is seen as essentially a means of controlling power. By controlling human energies, especially sexual energies strictly to marital affairs, the bourgeoisie forced individuals to spend their whole energies on work and gained production primarily through exploiting their physical labour.

Regulating the discourse of sexuality and the truth about sex in this manner, the proponents of the repressive hypothesis state that capitalist materialized their vested interests through exercising their power by repressing individual's desires and pleasures. For this reason, to increase economic production, the capitalist power mechanisms manipulated social order in three ways: firstly, they made an awareness that sexual enjoyment as a pleasurable activity is useless; secondly, they made a moral code stating spending energies for pleasurable activities is incompatible with work ethics; thirdly, to achieve that objective, they confined, restricted and thereby, repressed sexual activities. For this reason, sexuality in the capitalist social order has reduced into marital heterosexual monogamy and reproductive aspects beset by imperative decency on sexual practices and mandatory reticence in speaking sex, and so forth. It is not just sexuality alone that is suppressed in the Victorian age, but repression is considered as the general form of power under capitalism. On these grounds, holders of repressive hypothesis articulate that sex, power and subjectivity are interrelated as repressive with the rise of capitalism.

However, according to the holders of the repressive hypothesis, the political revolution in the domain of sexuality should be seen as the attack on power's domination and repressive mechanisms. The political acts, therefore, oriented towards making people free by talking openly about sex and enjoying bodily pleasures without any restrictions. This political orientation serves two political tasks: sexual liberation from power structures and the overthrowing of capitalism. For this reason, by this same argument, openly speaking sex is viewed as discarding the established power relations (*BSH*, 129). The proponents of repressive hypothesis, therefore, states that since capitalist's social order repressed sex in terms of "prohibition and imperative of decency" as the

function of power, sex must be discussed publically as the political resistance against capitalist's vested interest and power. This very political resistance is not only meant to be breaking taboos of sexuality and overthrowing capitalism, but also defeating the mechanism of power and achieving sexual liberation.

3.3.2.2 Foucault's Arguments against Repressive Hypothesis

Foucault's aim is not exactly rejecting the repressive hypothesis, but to provide a "genealogy of how repressive hypothesis came to be and what function it has played in our society" (*BSH*, 131). Though Foucault agrees tighter controls were imposed on the discourse of sexuality in the 18th century even at the level of speech, gestures, behaviours, and so forth, *he argues that the very effort to control sex, however, intensified the discourse of sex in the capitalist social order rather than repressing*. According to Foucault, sexuality in capitalist society should be seen as one of the essential aspects of life, rather than useless, worthless activity as claimed by the proponents of the repressive hypothesis. Sexuality in the capitalist society, argues Foucault, is concerned with preserving health and lineage both for the present and future generations. Controlling sex, for the bourgeoisie, claims Foucault, is primarily intended to secure their health and longevity; whereas, sexual perversions, according to them, is the deviance of hereditary and a hindrance to the survival of their class. For this reason, sexual repression, during this period, should be seen neither the effect of economic subjugation nor the result of any form of asceticism. In the capitalist social order, controlling sex, on the contrary, claims Foucault, should be viewed as economically useful and politically conservative.

In contrast to the repressive hypothesis, Foucault argues, during the 18th century, sexuality has increased and intensified non-reproductive sexual practices with the multiplication of different kinds of non-conjugal and non-monogamous sexualities. The implantation of manifold sexualities cannot be described in terms of repressive aspects alone, but it should be seen, Foucault claims, as an instrumental effect of power manifested by isolation, intensification, and consolidations of sexuality. Since sexual subjectivities multiplied and measured by the power, the 18th century witnessed an explosion of unorthodox sexualities manifested and solidified. It is not the general barriers on sexuality that gave rise to "perverse outbreak and pathology of the sexual instinct" in the 18th century, but the disciplinary power displayed on the body and sex with its inciting and multiplying mechanism. Scattered sexualities, for this reason, rigidified and proliferated by the

optimization of power, which has subsequently been classified in terms of age, a place, a type of practice, institutional relationships and so on. Foucault provides four operations of such kinds, which are quite different from the simple prohibition of power as suggested by the repressive hypothesis. They are the sexuality of children, incorporation of perversions, medicalization of sexuality, sexuality in family affairs, and sexuality in the religious confessions. Let's evaluate each domain of sexuality as follows:

Firstly, since the 18th century, states Foucault, the scrutiny of children's sexuality has become one of the significant aspects in the discourse of sexuality. It has altered parents, teachers, doctors and respective authorities keeping children away from the realm of sexuality. For this reason, the sexuality of children has become a problem to be confronted and managed in hospitals, and family, schools which consequently proliferated knowledge of sexualities in terms of expert's observations, medical cases, public opinions, educational practices, legal cases, and so on. Educators and doctors, for this reason, have combated taking care of children's sexuality as they have counselled educational programs and procedures not only giving the necessary directions to families but also submitting the guidance projects to authorities. The optimization of power, for this reason, has exhibited "*lines of penetrations*" around the sexuality of children, which multiplied its effects, expanded its targets, subdivided its scope, and above all, branched out its functionalities. For this reason, the sexuality of children has become the nexus of power operations among parents, doctors, teachers, and so on which instead of repressing and silencing the feasibility of children's sexuality, it has brought sexuality into the public and discussed endlessly.

Secondly, aberrant sexualities in the 18th century, states Foucault, have entailed a new *specification of individual*s. The *incorporation of perversions*, for example, the modern concept of homosexuality, has been arisen as a fundamental aspect of who one is. Rather than suppressing, Foucault argues, the 18th century has provided "sexually perverted" permanent visibility and reality in the public domain through the disciplinary mechanism of power. For instance, sodomy[83], which is seen as forbidden sexual acts in the traditional canonical codes and social life, has been considered the manifestation of homosexuality as a form of life and a personage. Sexuality,

[83]"Sodomy is anal sexual intercourse". (*Collins Online Dictionary | Definitions, Thesaurus and Translations* "Sodomy Definition and Meaning | Collins English Dictionary," accessed March 31, 2018, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/sodomy).

particularly homosexuality, has become associated with a person's identity as the key to interpreting one's personality and modes of conduct. The aberrant sexualities have developed with the specification and the regional solidification through the principle of classification and intelligibility of power a "natural order of disorder" in the society (*HS*, 44). The optimization of power in the 18th century, with its strategic dissemination and incorporation, rather than eliminating non-heterosexual acts as social exclusion, it has expanded sexuality as a constitutive of forming subjectivities such as lesbian, gay and bisexual and so on.

Thirdly, in examining various forms of sexual behaviours, the "medicalization of sexuality", Foucault claims, has increased insistent examination because the diagnosis of sexual matters relied on the domain of health and pathology (*HS*, 44). Since sexuality was a medical object, setting contact of bodies and detecting symptoms, it has established a deep medicalized physical proximity and peculiar power relation between the doctor and patients. Under the medical observation, whereas patients confessed "sexual problems", doctors monitored various forms of sexual behaviours with an attentive examination and persistent observation. The medical monitoring, the psychiatric investigation, and the pedagogical descriptions, therefore, have established "sexually perverted people" as "sick" and "demented" as separate categories of subjectivities by giving them permanent visibility and reality in the "medicalization of sexuality". Fourthly, apart from the reproductive aspect of sexuality, the family has been viewed as one significant aspect of "sexual discourse" under the "surveillance of power" in the 18th century. Even the smallest dimensions of the family such as the relative segregation created between boys and girls, instructions given to nursing infants (maternal breast-feeding and hygiene), infantile sexuality, children's masturbation and puberty, polarity established by constructing separate rooms for parents and children, and so on, have become the scrutiny of power and sexuality (*HS*, 46).

Fifthly, 18th century onwards, in religious practices, confessing sexual misconduct has been viewed as one of the essential aspects of sexual discourse. Through confession, constant awareness of sexuality has been made among people that the slightest inclination towards sex should be revealed. The Christian pastoral imperatives in the form of confession, for this reason, managed and inserted sexuality into systems of utility rather than condemning sex. Various forms of sexuality, therefore, has become beyond a matter of mere "moral judgment", and is viewed as "a thing to be administered" (*HS*, 24). The discourse of sexuality, for this reason, has been regulated

under the "management procedures" and "police matter"[84] as sexuality has become a constant theme of the public interest. The constant optimization and the increasing valorization of sexuality, therefore, eventually has become a political, economic, and technical stimulation to talk about sex. On these grounds, Foucault concludes that in the 18th-century capitalist social order, sexuality has multiplied, intensified and solidified in various ways with maximum permeation in determining sexual affairs rather than subjugated as a hidden treasure as suggested by the repressive hypothesis.

3.3.2.3 The Emergence of Bio-power

In the political domain, however, especially in the administration of the modern nation, sexuality is viewed as the function of "Bio-power". According to Foucault, the concept of "Bio-power" is an extended form of disciplinary power as it is concerned with the disciplinary mechanisms by which "the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy".[85] It deals with how the practices of modern nation-states regulate its subjects through the numerous techniques and strategies, for achieving the subjugations and management of human life processes. However, according to Foucault, the Bio-power should be seen as the shift from the pre-modern regime of power to modern disciplinary power. In the pre-modern time, the sovereign power had "the right of life and death over its subjects"[86] as its general functionality consists of taking things away from subjects such as life, taxes, property, privileges, and so on. However, unlike the pre-modern regime, in the modern world, the function of power is concerned with securing, developing, maintaining and improving life itself as a "life-administration" of subjects. It primarily has two functions: disciplining the subjects as *productive* and the regulation of population administratively. The former does its mechanism by reinforcing, controlling, monitoring, optimizing, and organizing subjects through various institutions such as the military, schools, workplace, family, and so on, whereas the latter by demography, wealth analysis, and so on.

According to Foucault, managing and administrating the lives of people by analysing "population" as an economic and political issue is the significant characteristic feature applicable

---

[84] The term "police", used here by Foucault is not in the sense of the modern idea of the police force. It means the set of laws and customs, rules and tactics that regulate behavior (*MC*, 46; cf. *TS*, 148-154).
[85] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*, ed. Michel Senellart. trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Springer, 2007), 1.
[86] It does not mean that power was exercised in the pre-modern regime in an absolute and unconditional way. But, it was the "general mechanism of power" that prevailed in the pre-modern time. (*HS*, 131).

only in the modern world. However, though wealth and labour capacity are directly linked to population, according to Foucault, the basis of this economic and political problem was the increased discourse of sex (*HS*, 25). For this reason, the sex lives of citizens have become an object to be studied rationally and classified statistically. The statistics of sexual matters such as "birth-rate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions" (*HS*, 25-26) have become accumulated knowledge to be analyzed. Since sex has become an issue between the state and the individual, it has led appearing systematic campaigns combining economic and political behaviours, which are seen beyond traditional moral values and religious convictions. Therefore, under the political economy of population, sex has not only become "an object of analysis and a target of intervention" but also a whole grid of observations.

Since the new technology of Bio-power has brought life and its mechanism of the population for systematic study, demographics have turned out to be the means of regulating the population. It has triggered the modern social sciences to systematically study the "empirical investigation of historical, geographic, and demographic conditions". As a result, for the first time, scientific categories such as species and classification applied to study the human population with an object of political and administrative means. This mechanism of Bio-power over the "vitality of life" and administrative application for "transforming the individual's political existence", therefore, has constituted various *subjectivities* within the sexual discourse. As a result, it has categorized, measured, consolidated and studied various sexual subjectivities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and eventually provided them permanent sexual identity. The discourse of sex, for this reason, has associated with other discourses such as medicine, psychiatry, criminal justice, and so on. The very association with other discourses has enriched analyzing sexuality in terms of technical languages and expertise, which has made sexuality a matter of public scrutiny.

By analyzing Bio-power, two significant historical changes noticed by Foucault are relevant: saturation of manifold sexual identities and the increased knowledge about sex. The modern discourse of sexuality, therefore, has triggered both the individuals and populations as "regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse" (*HS*, 34) and "the key to individual health, pathology and identity" (*BSH*, 168). For these reasons, the individual self-examination and collective control of sexuality, Foucault argues, have increased the domain of sexuality by

discussing, writing and thinking about sex, unlike the pre-modern discourse of sex. The modern discourse of sexuality, therefore, for Foucault, is *productive* as it has produced various subjectivities and knowledge through the optimization of power. On these grounds, Foucault makes five conclusions: power and knowledge are mutually constitutive; power (i.e., bio-power) is not essentially repressive as it can be productive; power is not the capacity and possession as the exertion of will exclusively as it should be seen as the ensemble of complex strategical function in the society; power is not a centralized force, it is, on the contrary, diffused throughout the social body; sexual identity is not a biological referent inscribed in human nature, but it is historically constituted and socially forged through power relations.

3.4 Subject as Constituting Themselves

3.4.1 Introduction

In the last two sections, by elaborating the genealogy of medical discourse, madness, the penal system and sexuality, we have seen how power embedded in the social practices and knowledge has constructed subjects. However, it has raised a significant issue in Foucault's account: *if power constructs subjects, then subjects seem to be a "reductive product" as a mere effect of power.* Answering this question, Foucault claims subjects should not be seen as simply *subjected* to power. Subjects are not *a mere effect* of power as they are not *reduced and determined* by socio-historical conditions as such. Therefore, Foucault claims subjects can *constitute* themselves in the given power relations. In principle, though all subjects are constructed by power, Foucault claims, they are not merely subjected to it. Therefore, Foucault makes two central arguments: (1) power constructs subject, (2) subjects can constitute themselves in the given power relations. Let's evaluate how Foucault has arrived to claim these two arguments. The first argument is based on the following suggestions:

- If the subject exercises power, then power seems to be a possession, essentially repressive and the capacity of (sovereign) subject exclusively.
- If the subject exercises power, then the sovereign (the one who exercises power) seems to be "free" from power relations.
- If power is the exercise of sovereign subject, not only he/she can determine the socio-historical conditions but also power relations seem to be "static" excluding any possibility of resistance and freedom.

- If the subject exercises power, then he/she seems to be a transcendental subject who is ahistorical and free from social conditions.
- For these reasons, subjects should be seen as the construction of power as they are historically constituted and socially forged.

The second argument follows from this:

- If the subjects are historically constructed and socially forged, they cannot be foundational and transcendental.
- If the subjects are historically constructed and socially forged, they seem to be "reductive product" of power.
- Since the subjects are not *reduced and determined* by socio-historical conditions, subjects should not be seen as the "reductive product" of power.
- If subjects are not a "reductive product" of power, then subjects can *constitute* themselves within the socio-historical conditions.

Though Foucault has advocated subjects are socially forged and historically constituted, he has investigated the formation of subject in two ways: firstly, how power *constructs* subjects through external socio-historical conditions (for example, how the discourse of madness has constructed normal and abnormal); secondly, how subjects *constitute* oneself in the given power relations (for example, how human beings came to see or perceive themselves as desiring individuals in the discourse of sexuality). Foucault's earlier genealogical investigations inquired how *power constructs subjectivities*, whereas, in the later works, he has investigated how *subjects constitute themselves in the power relations*. In the later historical investigation, therefore, he has inquired; *how a subject perceives one's own subjectivity in the given power relations?*

3.4.2 The General Framework of the Problem

Before analysing the research objective mentioned above, few methodological clarifications need to be elucidated. The primary target of Foucault, as I mentioned before, is to eradicate the "philosophy of subject" through excavating the "genealogy of subject". However, by "studying the constitution of the subject across history", he has headed explaining not only how subjects are constructed by external social conditions but also how one constitute oneself in the socio-historical practices. It suggests that Foucault's genealogy has two theoretical technologies studying the *relation* between power and subject: "technologies of domination" and "technologies

of the self" (*TS*, 18-19). The former defined power in terms of imposition and submission with certain ends or objectives which determine the nature of one's subjectivity in the given power relations, whereas the latter deals techniques by which individuals transform or modify themselves to constitute certain subjectivity in the given power relations. The former emphasises how individuals are driven by others or external factors, but the later stresses the way in which individuals conduct oneself.

For these reasons, Foucault uses the word "subject" primarily in two senses, namely, "mode of subjection" and "mode of subjectification".[87] The former indicates that through various social conditions, individuals constitute one's subjectivity or identity by which they are made subject to "power relations". It signifies the "influence of normalising power on individuals, which in turn "produce" or "fabricate" subjects".[88] In other words, it denotes "the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject".[89] Foucault calls it "technology of domination" by which power constructs the behaviour of individuals by capitulating them to certain ends as subject (*TS*, 18). Foucault's earlier works such as medicine, madness and the punitive system are studied through "technology of domination" by which he investigated how patients, madmen, and criminals are constructed as subjects. The later specifies, however, a "forms of elaboration" by which the subjection to the social conditions should be seen as the self-conscious following of rules of practices given in the power relations.[90] Foucault calls it "technology of the self" by which individuals constitute themselves with specific effects by their own means on bodies, conduct and way of life in the given power relations (*TS*, 18). Put it bluntly, it studies the process by which how one acquires the constitution of the subject by "acting upon oneself" to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge who one is. Genealogy, therefore, takes these two accounts (techniques) inseparably into consideration and studies their complex interrelations. Though Foucault admits his earlier works directed excessively on "technology of domination" and

[87] Mark G. Kelly, *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault* (London: Routledge, 2010), 87; Judith Butler, "Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions," *Journal of Philosophy* 86, no. 11 (1989): 601-7, doi:10.5840/jphil198986117.
[88] Sebastian Harrer, "The Theme of Subjectivity in Foucault's Lecture Series L'Herméneutique du Sujet," *Foucault Studies* 2 (May 2005): 79, doi:10.22439/fs.v0i2.861.
[89] Kelly, *Political Philosophy of Foucault*, 88.
[90]Gary Gutting, *Foucault: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 101-102.

later works focused on "technologies of the self", he claims that the interconnections between them were very much present in each work.[91]

Whereas the "technology of domination" is concerned with "how subjects are constructed", which is described in the previous sections, this section, however, investigates the "technology of the self" examining "*how subject constitutes oneself*" in the given power relations. For this reason, this section explains Foucault's later works such as *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure* and *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3*: *The Care of the Self*, which deals primarily with the question of how one relates to oneself as a sexual subject in the given power relations. The aim of this section, therefore, is concerned with how individuals understand themselves in the power relations by examining the technology of the self in the domain of sexuality. This section, therefore, proceeds with three subsections: practices of self in the Greco-Roman culture, Christian practices of the self, and the technology of the self as constituting oneself. In the first subsection, the characteristics features of Greco-Roman practices of the self are described. The second subsection, however, explains not only the features of Christian practices of self but also how they are different from the ancient's. The last subsection, nevertheless, explains how the technology of the self as constituting oneself is related and relevant in the modern discourse of sexuality. In this genealogical investigation, Foucault, therefore, makes the following claims:

1. Sexuality is not a biological essence and an archaic drive, which is based on foundational subject or essential human nature.
2. Sexuality is socially forged and historically constituted through the ensemble of power relations.
3. Power should not be seen as "determining" subjects because subjects can constitute themselves.
4. The self-constitution not only reveals the truth about oneself but also shows that freedom and resistance are not outside the power relations.

[91] It is true that the analysis of "self-problem" is not strictly another project which Foucault wishes to do. What he claims is that there is a conceptual continuity rather than a break between his earlier and later works as it is the same project, but only the theoretical emphasis has changed. As he states: "[w]hat are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, labouring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal? What were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals? It seemed to me that by framing the question in this way, and by attempting to develop it for a period that was rather far from the horizons with which I was familiar, I would be going more closely into the inquiry that I have long been committed to"(*US*,7).

To evaluate these claims, let's examine each subsection as follows:

3.4.3 Practices of the Self in the Greco-Roman Culture

Foucault begins with unearthing the characteristic features of the "ethical practices" in the Greek cities. He inquires how subjects constituted and conducted meaningful life in the late antiquity as an ethical subject in the domain of sexuality. The ethical practices were constituted, as he puts it, by a concept called "cultivation of self"[92] or "care of the self" which was, for the Greeks, the central principle of cities and the primary rule for cultivating a composed life. To analyze this practice, in the *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure* and the *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self,* Foucault has examined how classical Greco-Roman culture dealt with the "problematization" of sexuality in the ethical domain.[93] Greek has considered, Foucault claims, ethics as practice with a spiritual orientation as a way of life by which individuals constitute themselves as sexual subjects. The significant characteristics of Greek morality of sexuality based on two aspects; (1) how human beings constitute oneself as sexual subject 2) how problematization of sexuality constituted as a moral domain. Though Foucault has elaborately explained various practices of "care of the self", our aim is not to explain matters of facts in detail, but describing the "type of approach" he has pursued.

For Greek, according to Foucault, cultivation of self is the technology of self which deals with how a subject perceives oneself or "how an individual acts upon oneself" (*TS*, 19). However, in the technology of self or the cultivation of self, subjectivity is not a "state" that individuals occupy but rather an "activity" which takes place within an environment of rules and regulations

---

[92] The ancient ethical technology, however, is fundamentally a preconception of two ancient injunctions, care for oneself and to know oneself, which are formerly represented by Socrates. Importantly, Foucault thinks, "the care for oneself" serves the fundamental justification for the prescriptions to "to know oneself" in the ancient world. In other words, to know oneself, the means through which one cared for oneself is necessary for the ancient thinkers. For example, according to Socrates, "truth" requires self-disciplined attention to one's character making. To gain truth, for Socrates, care for oneself as an ethical subject is essential as knowledge requires the right conduct. (Darryl M. De Marzio, "The Care of the Self: Alcibiades I, Socratic Teaching and Ethics Education," *Journal of Education* 187, no. 3 (2007): 103-127,doi:10.1177/002205740718700308).

[93]Foucault traces examples explaining the notion of "taking care of the self" from Plato's *Alcibiades I* primarily. However, he claims, in the Socratic dialogues, in Xenophon, Hippocrates, and the Neoplatonist tradition from Albinus on, the concept of care of self was prevalent. Furthermore, the first Epicurean text to serve as a manual of morals was the *Letter to Menoeceus* (Diogenes Laertius IO. 122-38) and Alexandrian text, 011 *the Contemplative Life*, by Philo of Alexandria also give similar account for "care for self" (*TS*, 22-23). The "practices of the self", however, includes cultivation of the self, truth-telling (parrhesia), and self-writing, which are elaborately explained by Foucault. This chapter, however, is not devoted to examining all of them in detail. Instead, I will explain the "cultivation of the self" in the domain of sexuality briefly.

(power relations).[94] In the practices of the "technology of the self", however, the "subjects constitute themselves in an active fashion" (*EST*, 291). It is not to say that the "technologies of the self" are invented themselves by the individuals in a purely "self-creating" manner. Instead, they are the models, proposed, suggested, or imposed on individuals founded in culture and society (*EST*, 291). However, subjects constitute themselves through the technology of self in the domain of sexuality, according to Foucault, is an "ethical subject". Since experiencing sex should be conducted appropriately, according to Greek, one has to be an ethical subject by "cultivation of oneself". Ethics, therefore, for Foucault is "understood as the elaboration of a form of relation to self that enables an individual to fashion himself into a subject of ethical conduct" (*UP*, 251).

The word, ethics, however, for Greek, is not related to "right" or "good" corresponding specific rules and principles but is rather a "*character*" representing a "dimension of ourselves" effectively.[95] Foucault, therefore, distinguishes the conceptual difference between morality and ethics clearly. To understand morality, Foucault makes a distinction between morality as a moral code and the morality of behaviours. The moral codes refer to recommended sets of values and rules of actions, which are "a coherent doctrine and explicit teaching", operated through various agencies such as the family, educational institutions, churches, and so forth (*UP*, 25). The behaviour of individuals, for this reason, is constructed according to the recommended rules and values by which they could either obey the values and prescriptions or resist interdictions embedded in them. Whereas "moral code" refers to having a rule of conduct, "morality of behaviour" designates having conduct according to the rule.

For Foucault, "morality" should be seen as acting according to the "moral rules", whereas "ethics refers to the manner in which one forms oneself as a subject of morality".[96] He does not reject moral codes as inadequate principles, but what he proposes is that moral codes and actions should be understood as the function of "relation to oneself". It is not "moral code" first made that "moral conduct" is achieved, but, on the contrary, "constituting oneself" as an ethical subject made first that one functions according to the appropriate moral codes. Ethics, according to Foucault, therefore, "determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of

[94]Dianna Taylor, "Practices of the Self," in *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts*, ed. Dianna Taylor (London: Routledge, 2014), 173.
[95]Mark G E. Kelly, "Foucault, Subjectivity, and Technologies of the Self," in *A Companion to Foucault*, ed. Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 517.
[96] Johanna Oksala, *Foucault on Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 158.

his own actions" (*EST*, 263; cf. *UP*, 26). It is in this sense that ethical self-constitution is directly related to power relations in the domain of sexuality. In the given socio-historical conditions, ethics, therefore, for Foucault, refers to how an individual ought to conduct oneself as a sexual subject acting according to the moral code. Therefore, ethics designates the modes by which individuals problematize their moral activities and conduct appropriate ways of "use of pleasure" by cultivating oneself. Since the technology of self is the way to construct subjectivity, which may vary according to the persons and rules and regulations, there can be different forms of "self" possible. As Foucault rightly pointed out: "[a]s there are different forms of care, there are different forms of self" (*TS*, 22). Therefore, Foucault suggests two significant claims: firstly, the very subjectivity of an individual is not a *mere effect* of power as the culturally determined and historically reduced product; secondly, there is no *essential subjectivity* but only socio-historically "self-constituted" *subjectivities*.

The significant characteristics of Greek morality of sexuality based on two aspects; (1) they did not consider the bodily pleasure in itself evil, (2) they have emphasised the appropriate cultivation of sexual activity and health (*UP*, 97). For ancient, the ethical practices oriented towards "cultivation of self" as a way of appropriate "use of pleasure" consist of cultivating or correcting one's action, thought and speech constituting ethical subject in the domain of sexual moral valuations and choices. The main objective of "care of the self" not only deals the relationship between health, life and sex but also defines "use of pleasures", its favourable conditions, recommended practices, necessary rarefaction empowering certain way of caring oneself (*UP*,97). For this reason, the Greek ethics, strictly speaking, neither related to religious preoccupation nor oriented to socio, legal and institutional systems as such, but it was concerned with constituting a *relation* to oneself through the practice of "cultivating oneself". Besides, Greek morality was not a system of rules and regulations, aiming a code of conduct, but it was a "subject's mode of being" as an ethical practice relating to oneself and others. Ethics, for them, was a set of practices concerning "cultivation of self" as a form of self-activity considered as both duty and technique as a central obligation to be worked with oneself. In that sense, it is a technology of existence, and "mode of subjectivation" acting upon oneself to improve and transform oneself.

Foucault claims ancient Greek had a unique way of understanding life's activities especially "sexual morality" in which four aspects concerning the relation to oneself were very

crucial: "determination of ethical substance, mode of subjection, moral work and moral goal" (*UP*, 26). In Greek knowledge, the ethical substance is "morally problematic aspects of self" which represents the object of one's ethical reflection and transformation of one's conduct. It denotes "material things" of one's moral conduct, which deals with the specific aspects of people's lives that need to be ethically conducted. It is concerned with "the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct" (*UP*, 26). It deals primarily "the acts, gestures, and contact that produce a certain form of pleasure" (*UP*, 40). For Greek, therefore, dealing with bodily appetites, particularly sexual behaviour, is not related to the nature of activities, but how it is to be conducted. For example, in the practice of conjugal fidelity, partners can not only work of procreation but also practice mastering one's desire through conducting proper use of sexual pleasure.

The mode subjection, however, is concerned with "the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice" (*UP*, 27). It deals primarily the way people recognise their moral obligations in terms of "the conditions and modalities of the "use of pleasure" (*UP*, 53). It is concerned with what principles one could "moderate, limit, regulate" in the sexual activity. It represents the manner in which an individual manages sexual activity, the regimen allowed to oneself, and the conditions accomplished in such sexual acts (*UP*, 53). One could, for example, practice conjugal fidelity because one accepts oneself to be a follower of the group that practices it, or wants to offer oneself as an example for others to follow (*UP*, 27). The third ethical aspect of Greek's practices is "ethical work" which denotes various self-transforming ethical activities. It represents the actual means by which one takes efforts to transform oneself to become an ethical subject. It may include the renunciation of pleasures, self-interrogations, meditations, memorization of scriptures, and so on. The fourth ethical aspect is the moral goal which denotes the ethical subject one is aspiring to become. It represents "a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject" (*UP*, 28). This characteristic mode of the ethical subject takes not only a moral action in its own execution but also moral conduct that obligates an individual to a definite mode of conforming to values and rules (*UP*, 28). One's ultimate aim, therefore, may be self-mastery, purity, happiness and freedom.[97] In the Greco-Roman culture, therefore, the intentional and voluntary action that set for rules of conduct and

[97] Oksala, *Foucault on Freedom*, 159.

transforming oneself by "cultivation of oneself" or "taking care of the self" is called "art of existence" or in Foucault's terminology, "technology of the self".

3.4.4 Christian Practices of Self

Though "taking care of oneself" is not only an "ethical principle" but also "a constant practice" in antiquity (Greek-Roman culture), later on, it has changed its forms from being primarily "a public activity to personal activity" (*EST,* 260). With the emergence of Christianity, however, the very practices of cultivation of the self were subjugated, and given much significance to another principle called "to know oneself". The Christian spirituality and monastic principles[98] have subdued gradually taking care of oneself as morally wrong treating these practices are "self-indulgence" and "self-obsession". Unlike the Greek-Roman culture, in Christian practices of the self, "self-renunciation" and "salvation" have become the primordial moral codes. For this reason, Christianity consequently transformed concern for oneself into "attention for salvation" and "self-renunciation" in the moral domain in terms of external ethical codes (commandments) written in the religious texts. Salvation in Christianity, however, is considered to be attained through self-negation as they make "self-renunciation is the condition for salvation" (*TS*, 22). The active abnegation of self in Christian morality eventually disavowed "the care of the self" as meaningless, sometimes "morally evil". With the emergence of Christianity, the very practice of "taking care of oneself" has been derided because Christian moral imperatives such as "mortifying self" and "being selfless" have become fundamental ethical practices for Christian Practices of Self.

According to Christianity, claims Foucault, salvation is the fundamental goal, which is the ultimate spiritual attainment achieved through a set of conditions and rules of conduct, by and large imposed, to transform oneself. However, Foucault claims that Christianity is not just a religion of salvation alone but is a religion of "confession" as well (*TS*, 40). Unlike any other pagan religion, Christianity followed strict obligation of truth, duty to accept the responsibility, authority of both institutions and religious text, and so on. The moral and spiritual values of Christianity, Foucault claims, consist of "strict abstinence, lifelong chastity, and virginity" (*UP,* 14). Apart from

[98]Foucault notices certain difficulties to study Christian practices regarding self. First of all, Christian practices are not well known, and there are seldom textual pieces of evidence. Though only the history of beliefs available than the history of practices, the technology of self has been convoluted with theological concepts such as soul-concupiscence, sin and the fall from grace etc. Moreover, it is very difficult to segregate practice related to self as it has been spread through different channels and associated with different other practices in the West (*TS*, 17).

that, Christianity also instructed both spiritually and morally, a duty to know oneself. An obligation to "confess" is one of the primary practices of Christianity in which one has to disclose, either to God or priest, one's desires, temptations, faults, sins, and so on. This constant search for "what is happening inside" made people follow the principle of "know oneself" aiming to have "self-knowledge". Moreover, to recognise oneself as a sinner and penitent with the ensemble of truth obligations, the Christian has postulated "purity of soul", which consequently subjugated "care of the self" and gave significance to "know oneself". On these grounds, "to know oneself" has become the fundamental principle of Christianity, which has two intersected essential functions: avoiding sin and attaining salvation.

According to Foucault, Christian morality postulates strict moral code to experience sexual pleasure confined to marriage, whereas, Greek was not concerned with whom one should have sex but how it has to be conducted properly. Whereas Christianity practised sexual activities according to specific laws both religious and spiritual, which are meant to restrict "bodily pleasures" through abstaining, Greek, on the other hand, considered "bodily desire" is natural and necessary to be conducted appropriately. The Greek is concerned the experience of sexual activities should be depended on one's "cultivation of self" rather than any external moral code imposed, unlike the Christian morality. Christianity emphasised sexuality in terms of "heterosexuality", which is, on the one hand, strictly confined to marital relations, whereas, on the other hand, subjugated other forms of sexual experiences as moral evils, for example, homosexuality. Greeks, on the contrary, did not restrict sexual activities to the domain of "heterosexuality", but they allowed same-sex sexual activities as well. The fundamental difference between Christianity and Greek, claims Foucault, lies in the fact that the former is concerned with external moral codes, which is directly related to the power structure of the Christian community, whereas, the latter treated sexual activity is a matter of one's choice as part of the cultivation of the self to be practiced within the power relations embedded in the social practices.

3.4.5 The Technology of the Self as Constituting Oneself

In both cultures, according to Foucault, subjects to constitute themselves have acted certain ethical codes which should be seen as the ensemble of power relations embedded in the various social practices and institutions. However, it is to be noted that Foucault does not suggest "cultivation of the self" practiced by Greek culture is the fundamental solution for "constitution of

self". What he suggests is that there is always a possibility that subjects can constitute oneself in the given power relations, what he calls as "technology of the self". In other words, individuals can constitute themselves in deciding what moral codes one needs to obey and follow in the socio-historical conditions because subjects are not the mere effect of power. In the given power relations, there is always a possibility of constituting oneself or technology of oneself, which, however, differs according to the individual and the socio-historical conditions. According to Sebastian Harrer, what Foucault has suggested is that there are different possible ways to conduct oneself concerning a moral law one abides. Two instances of a given type of action abided to a particular moral code may be identical, but the *relation to self* that is involved in each of the two instances, Harrer claims, may be significantly different. Harrer provides Foucault's example to substantiate his claim. As evidenced by Foucault, Harrer illustrates, King Nicocles followed the moral code of the commitment to marital faithfulness, which is given in the divine commandment. However, he constituted himself by it in two ways: being faithful to his wife and striving for self-mastery.[99]Therefore, the technology of the self should be seen as *the way by which* individuals relate to oneself as a subject.

Given the genealogy of sexuality traced from Greco-Roman philosophy to Christian spirituality and monastic principles, Christianity has emphasised "external codes" as the primary ethical principle to be followed, whereas Greek stressed external code of morality should be followed consciously and willingly by the subject. According to Greek culture, cultivation of self signifies "the constitution of oneself in an active fashion", whereas, in the Christianity, self should be denied to attain salvation by practicing the moral codes suggested in the religious texts. It does not mean to say subjects in the Christian periods are passive subjects subjected to power relations embedded in the moral practices since they follow external moral code. Similarly, one cannot say that in Greek culture, all the subjects had the freedom to constitute oneself consciously to follow the plausible moral codes. For this reason, in the given genealogical description of Christianity and Greek culture, one should not, therefore, conclude Foucault's close reading of "discourse of sexuality" in favour of one against others exclusively. However, by comparing both cultures, Greek culture tends to be closer to the technology of self as constituting oneself in the given socio-historical practices than Christian practices. Therefore, Foucault's historical investigations should be seen as exposing the "cultural emphasis of practices of the self" and "possibility of the

[99] Harrer, "The Theme of Subjectivity," 79.

technology of the self" in the "problematization of sexuality" practised by both cultures: how they conducted their sexuality and on what ethical concerns.

Since in the modern discourse of sexuality, Christian moral codes have significant influence, Foucault suggests, individuals should know what moral codes they must follow by cultivating one's subjectivity. As various sexual identities have emerged in the modern disciplinary society, constituting oneself or "technology of the self" seems to have primordial significance. Foucault sees sexuality in the modern world not only constituted in the given power relations, but it also reveals "what you are" exhibiting one's truth about sexuality. As far as "sexuality" concerns, though everybody has desires, one's "sexual identity" such as gay, bisexual and heterosexual, however, is a "relationship with oneself" to be constituted through the "technology of the self". For this reason, according to Foucault, in the domain of sexuality, there is no *"the*" technology of self or *the way* to constituting oneself, but there are numerous ways for constituting oneself. Since there are many ways to have technologies of the self, there could be numerous subjectivities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and so on. Therefore, Foucault claims, the subject is not only socially and historically *constructed* but also they are socio-historically *constituted*. Since the subject is constituted in the given power relations of socio-historical conditions, Foucault claims, there is no transcendental or ontological or foundational subject as such. Therefore, Foucault discards the claim that sex is a biological essence and an archaic drive, which is proposed by the foundational subject or essential human nature, and states that sexuality is a socio-historical construction.

However, Foucault has neither mentioned how the technology of self should be practiced nor made the claim that the Greek's cultivation of the self as the political solution for present identity problems in the discourse of sexuality. There are plausible reasons why he has not mentioned *what* the technology of self is or how it should be practiced. First of all, since subjects are socially forged and historically constituted, there is no "the technology of the self" to be applied to all subjects. Secondly, since the technology of self depends on the formation of discourse, the power relations that regulate its practices, forms and modalities associated with institutional rules and regulations, it is historically variable and socially contingent. For these reasons, there is no "*the technology of the self*" but only "*technologies of the self"*. Foucault's theoretical excavation of technology of the self, therefore, should be seen as the possibility of constituting oneself in the

given power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions. Therefore, politically speaking, Foucault argues that in the present dominant heterosexual discourse, subjectivities such as gay, lesbian, bisexual and so on should be seen as "self-constitution" or *the technology of the self* not only as the freedom to constitute oneself but also as the resistance against the dominant heterosexual ideology. On this ground, Foucault argues that power cannot be said as repressive and constraining always as subjects can constitute themselves in the given power relations. Therefore, Foucault concludes, though power constructs subject, individuals can constitute and recognize oneself as *qua* subject in the given power relations.

3.5 Conclusion

Unlike the previous chapters, which have outlined only the conceptual framework of power and subject, in this chapter, how Foucault has investigated to evaluate the relation between power and subject through historical documents and examples is discussed. Considering the earlier and later works of Foucault, it is evident that he has studied the relation between power and subject in two significant ways: technology of domination and technology of the self. For this reason, these two types of approach he has pursued to understand the relation between power and subject are specifically outlined in this chapter. In the first two sections, we have examined how Foucault has studied the genealogy of medicine, madness, penal system and sexuality by excavating the technology of domination. These genealogies, therefore, have exposed not only how criminals, mad people, patients, and various sexual subjects are constructed but also how other subjects such as normal, doctor, heterosexuals *indirectly* constructed themselves in the discourses of medicine, madness, psychiatry, punishment and sexuality. On this ground, Foucault claims that subjectivities are not foundational and substantial as given by nature but are historically constituted and socially forged.

However, in the later works, in the genealogy of sexuality, he has demonstrated how subjects constitute themselves by studying the "technology of the self". In this historical excavation, Foucault has illustrated subjects can act upon oneself or constitute oneself in the given power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions. Considering these two types of approaches, in the earlier works, Foucault has demonstrated how power *constructs* subjects, whereas, in the later works, he has illustrated how subjects *constitute* in the power relations. Therefore, he has studied the relation between power and subject in two ways: in the earlier works,

from the viewpoint of power (technology of domination) and the later works, from the viewpoint of the subject (technology of self). Since Foucault has proceeded with these two types of approaches to study the relation between power and subject, they enabled him to hold two substantial claims: (1) the subject is not *reduced and determined* socio-historical conditions, (2) the subject is not a "*reductive product*" *as a mere effect* of power. For these reasons, these two types of approaches, on the one hand, have rejected the "foundational subject"; on the other hand, have provided the ground rationale for his main claim that *the subject is socially forged and culturally constituted.*

Therefore, by tracing three modes of subjective formations, Foucault draws the following conclusions regarding the relation between power and subject.

1. Subjects are socially forged and historically constituted by the power relations embodied in them.
2. Subjects do not exercise power, but they are, on the contrary, constructed by power.
3. Subjects are not "reduced" and "determined" by power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions because they are capable of constituting themselves.
4. Knowledge, practices and power are not only related but also mutually constitutive in the formations of subjects.
5. Power is not essentially repressive and constraining but can be productive in constituting subjectivities.
6. Since all subjects are "inside" the power relations, power is not only a complex strategic social relation but also co-extensive with society.
7. Since power and subjectivities are socio-historically constituted, they should be historically understood and socially analyzed.

Chapter 4: A Critical Analysis of Foucault's Perspective

4.1 Introduction

Since Foucault's views are widely influential in various disciplines apart from philosophy, "readings *on* Foucault" itself is an intellectual endeavour not only applying his ideas plausibly but also scrutinizing various present philosophical issues. This chapter, therefore, attempts one of such *readings*, which deals with how Foucault's ideas can be understood with a "critical analysis". Though this chapter is intended to be a critical study, it does not venture to have a detailed analysis of theoretical changes and imprecision found in Foucault's account. Strictly speaking, this chapter is restricted to critically examine Foucault's account on two grounds primarily: critical engagement of disciplinary power and analyses of anti-subjective hypothesis. This critical analysis, therefore, aims to criticize how Foucault has conceived the relation between subjects and power from the two perspectives: firstly, it shows inadequateness and scope of the radical conception of power; secondly, it inquires the drawbacks and advantages of anti-subjective hypothesis.

This chapter, therefore, consists of two sections: power and normative grounds; autonomy and agency in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. The first section of this chapter, however, deals with the problem of power on normative grounds. It primarily tries to explain normative confusions on three grounds: in the genealogical method, in the power/ knowledge nexus, and in the account of power itself. Therefore, the first section inquires "is Foucault's account theoretically adequate and politically useful". The second section, however, deals with the status of agency and autonomy in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. It is primarily an analysis to find out on what ground agency and autonomy can be placed in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. Though these two sections critically evaluate two distinctive issues, the central problem they are intended to examine is the relation between power and subject. Whereas the first section critically examines the relation between power and subject from the perspective of studying power relations, the second section, however, investigates the same problem from the viewpoint of the subject in the power relations. Let's examine each section as follows:

4.2 Power and Normative Grounds

4.2.0 Introduction

Foucault's insights though paved new ways explaining fundamental philosophical problems, they are also, like any other conceptualization, not free from criticism. The general criticism against Foucault, interestingly, associated with his obscure and imprecise approach in explaining concepts. There are two accusations against Foucault that seems to be significant: conceptual imprecision[100] and unreliable historical documentation.[101] The former alleged Foucault's tendency to be inconsistent in taking philosophical positions, whereas, the latter, questioned his inclination towards concluding "hasty generalization" from the acquired historical documentation. His conceptual complications are often criticised as theoretical inaccuracy, which, on the one hand, lacks theoretical continuity, on the other, underscores contradictory explanations. Similarly, Foucault has been criticised for his imprecise collection of historical documents as he has been alleged to committing the fallacy of "selecting" historical examples only relevant to his hypothesis.

However, in this section, I don't deal with analysing the imprecision of the historical documentation Foucault has selected. This section, nevertheless, is intended to critically examine the inadequacy found in his theoretical conceptualizations. The fundamental problem in Foucault's conceptualizations primarily is to evaluate the relation between power, knowledge and practices in constituting subjectivities. It is the problems of subjectivity and its relation to power, practices and knowledge that Foucault's theoretical focus is grounded. For this reason, Foucault claims that power relations, social practices and knowledge formations are intrinsically linked in constituting subjectivities. According to Foucault, in the process of subject constitution, power/knowledge nexus constructs specific rationalities which enable and limit in forging subjectivities. For this reason, Foucault's problematization is based on two conceptual implications: It, on the one hand, describes the discursive formations of social practices and knowledge production; whereas, it, on the other hand, examines how subjects are constituted or governed through power relations. However, Foucault's empirical studies, strictly speaking, do not necessarily aim at assessing legitimate or illegitimate social practices and normative validity of knowledge but are concerned

[100] See, for example, Richard Rorty, "Foucault and Epistemology," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David C. Hoy (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), 28-41.
[101] See, for example, Jose G. Merquior, *Foucault* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1987).

with the material conditions of their occurrence and the power relations in constituting subjectivities. In these construals, Foucault not only historicizes the subject but also power; therefore, for Foucault, *power is historically understood, and the subject is historically constituted and socially forged.* It has made Foucault provide power not as a theory but as a tool without presupposing *the* subject and normative frameworks.

However, critics ask the following question: is Foucault's account *theoretically adequate* and *politically useful?* However, on what grounds whether "Foucault's account is *adequate and useful*" discussed in this section needs further clarifications. The criticism we discuss in this section is primarily based on the "normative confusions" found in Foucault's account. On this ground, whether Foucault's account is useful for political engagement is raised. These two criticisms, nevertheless, are not only interlinked but also imply each other in making their arguments. Though this section discusses the normative confusions in Foucault's account, the primary debate examined here aims to evaluate the main research objective of the thesis, namely, the relation between power and subject. Therefore, our critical questions are formulated as follows:

1. Is Foucault's account *adequate* without "normative contents"?
2. Is Foucault's account *useful* for political engagement since it is "normatively neutral"?

Put it bluntly, the critical claims proposed in this section, therefore, are two: (1) since Foucault's account is normatively neutral, his explanations given to the genealogical method, power/knowledge and the relation between power and subjectivity are unsatisfactory (2) Since Foucault's account suffers from normative confusions, it is inappropriate for political engagement. It is in these critical conceptual frameworks that this section inquires: is Foucault's account *adequate* and *useful*. However, on what ground normative confusions in Foucault's account is evaluated requires further clarifications. Importantly, in three ways inadequacy of Foucault's account is formulated in this section: in the genealogical method, in the power/ knowledge nexus, and in the account of power itself. However, though the main question is to evaluate the normative confusions in Foucault's account, this section proposes four significant related questions as well. Though they are independently posited, they are interlinked, complementary, and compatible with each other. Not only does "each question" address specific issues at the outset, but it also provides "rational ground" for each other refining their arguments. The related questions are as follows:

1. Is Foucault's method, particularly genealogy, adequate to study power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions and the formation of subjects?
2. Is the explanation given to power/knowledge nexus in constituting subjectivity satisfactory?
3. Is Foucault's conceptualization of power appropriate and useful?
4. Does Foucault's account of power appropriate in abandoning the foundational subject? Or is Foucault's explanation plausible to claim that the subject is socio-historically constituted?

Since in three ways the conceptual frameworks of arguments are formulated according to the particular issue at hand, this section proceeds with analyzing the main arguments of three major critics, namely, Jurgen Habermas, Peter Dews, and Nancy Fraser. Firstly, I will proceed with Habermas's main arguments against Foucault's genealogical method on normative grounds. He criticizes not only the methodological problem of genealogy but also makes the account of the power and the position of the subject in the power relations in question. By elaborating his main argument further, the first section also discusses how the genealogy as a *critic* is implausible not only for evaluating the complex mechanism of power but also for political engagement. Following Habermas, Dews elaborates the normative confusions found in Foucault's radical formulation of power/knowledge nexus. His criticism, nevertheless, mainly focused on evaluating the normative ambiguities in the epistemic justification of Foucault's power/knowledge nexus. Since Foucault is reluctant to provide normative ground for both power and knowledge formulations, he argues Foucault's account is not only theoretically inadequate but also politically unengaged.

Following the arguments of both Habermas and Dews, Fraser evaluates the normative ambiguity in the Foucault's account of power itself. She argues that the fundamental problem of Foucault's account, which is found in the method of Genealogy, power/knowledge nexus, is the ambiguity of normative contents in the very conceptualization of power itself. She argues that these two criticisms proposed by Habermas and Dews are based on the normative confusions found in Foucault's conceptualization of power in principle. By critiquing Foucault's genealogical method, firstly, Habermas demonstrates this point, whereas critiquing the power/knowledge nexus from the viewpoint of epistemic justification of knowledge, Dews does the same. Taking their arguments as a background justification, this section, therefore, evaluates Fraser's arguments by questioning Foucault's account of power itself. On these construals, since Foucault's concept of

power is normatively neutral, Fraser argues, Foucault's account of power is not only theoretically implausible but also politically suspect. Let's analyze the arguments of each critic as follows:

4.2.1. Habermas on Questioning the Genealogical Method

Firstly, let's evaluate the main arguments of Habermas, which are as follows:

1. Since discourse and power are autonomous for Foucault, Habermas asks, how the "practices of critique" can be located in his account.[102]
2. As there is no power free discourse, Habermas argues that "practices of critiques seem to be one of the many practices tied to power".[103]
3. Since genealogy is a practice of critique for Foucault, either it takes a *transcendental role* or it undermines the truth of its critique.[104]
4. Foucault's account, for these reasons, seems to refer back to the concepts it claims to have overcome such as (foundational) subject and normativity.[105]

Let's elaborate his arguments in detail. According to Foucault, the genealogical method studies "actual ways in which power operates"[106] in social practices. That is to say, the genealogy is concerned with the processes, procedures, techniques and strategies of social practices as the function of power by which subjectivity is constituted. The genealogy, however, does not take practices with normative contents; it does not assume whether practices are right or wrong, good or bad, and above all, legitimate or illegitimate. On the contrary, genealogy studies "practices in themselves", its processes, directions, strategies, and functionalities. For this reason, according to Foucault, history consists of a "plurality of practices" and its corresponded "forms of rationalities".[107] Since neither any rationality nor practice does not have any determinant content or normative value as such, there are *only* diversity of practices and forms of rationalities in socio-historical conditions which are not only competing but also intersecting with each other.[108]

---

[102] Michael Kelly, "Introduction," in *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 2.
[103] Kelly, "Foucault/Habermas Debate," 2.
[104] Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 272-274.
[105] Kelly, "Foucault/Habermas Debate," 2.
[106] Nancy Fraser, "Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," 273.
[107] Peter Dews, "The Return of the Subject in late Foucault," *Radical Philosophy* 1, no. 51 (1989): 37, https://www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/author/peter-dews/.
[108] Dews, "The Return of the Subject," 37.

The genealogical method, therefore, studies the system of power that regulates these "ever-shifting plurality of reasons and practices" as a plurality of discourses with its field of struggles, specific technologies and open strategies. It is in this sense that Foucault claims modern disciplinary power functions at the capillary level, at the least observable form via the plurality of everyday practices in constituting subjectivities. The genealogy, therefore, excavates power in terms of formation and functioning of "incommensurable networks of social practices"[109] as the "regime of practices" in constituting subjectivities. For this reason, genealogy studies power relations embedded in the social practices as normatively neutral, which are historically instituted and socially forged in constituting subjectivities. Put it bluntly, according to Foucault, genealogy, therefore, should be seen as the historical method for studying social practices, without laying down to any "normative frameworks".

Habermas claims, according to Foucault, genealogy refers to two substantial aspects: on the one hand, it examines "the constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, and so on, without having to make reference to a subject" (*PK,* 117); on the other hand, it studies constituting of the subject as the "discursive subject" by analyzing social practices and the ensemble of power relations. On these grounds, according to Habermas, Foucault seems to have taken genealogy in two senses: on the one hand, a historical description of how the subject is constructed through the myriad of social practices; on the other hand, genealogy as a critique without referring to any subject as such. Apart from that, genealogy, for Foucault, is not a mere description of social practices describing the "actual operation of power", but is a "critique practice" used for political engagement.[110] Given these two assumptions, however, it implies that Foucault's genealogy as a critique should be seen as "politically engaged but normatively neutral".[111] On this ground, it appears Foucault seems to be made a stronger claim that normative notions are not needed to guide political engagements.[112]

Evaluating the above-described claims, according to Habermas, genealogy is inadequate mainly from the two perspectives: genealogy as a practice of critique and genealogy as a method without referring to the subject. Firstly, genealogy as the practice of critique, argues Habermas, cannot be adequately located in Foucault's account. Since Foucault has taken practices without

[109] Fraser, "Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," 275.
[110] Ibid, 272-276.
[111] Ibid, 275.
[112] Ibid.

normative content, genealogy as a practice of critique cannot qualify as a *critique* in the first place. Unless one differentiate practices of critique with a normative content, either the practices are good or bad, or legitimate or illegitimate, in what sense genealogy as critique stands for is an ambiguity in Foucault's account. Similarly, since discourse and power are autonomous and normatively neutral for Foucault, genealogy as a critique seems to be "one of the many practices tied to power."[113]It implies two difficulties in Foucault's account: firstly, Foucault's theoretical explanation is insufficient to explain how genealogy as a *critique of practice* is different from other practices; secondly, Foucault desperately needs normative criteria not only to distinguish various practices but also to claim his method of genealogy is the practice of critique. On these ground, Foucault's account of power, according to Habermas, either undermines the practices of critique (i.e. genealogy) both its rational basis and practical efficacy[114] or takes the truth of genealogy as self-evident and indirectly claims "normative superiority". Genealogy as a method without normative criteria, for this reason, either undercuts the truth of its critical stands or it cannot be a critique in the first place. Following these two arguments, to qualify genealogy as method and practice of critique, Foucault paradoxically needs to admit two assumptions: firstly, discourse and power are not autonomous; secondly, discourse and power are not normatively neutral. In all three cases, Foucault seems to be, on the one hand, implausibly bracketing normative criteria in the genealogical method; on the other hand, he appears to be inviting "normative superiority" paradoxically to substantiate his method as a critique.

Similarly, since Foucault takes genealogy without referring to the subject as such, Habermas queries how it can be a critique for analysing "constructed subject" in the first place. To put it bluntly, Habermas argues how a subject (the inquirer) studies an inquiry towards "constituted subject" when the inquirer himself is a "constituted subject".[115] If genealogy is considered as a critique, then the genealogist seems to have taken either a *transcendental role* (at least, speaker's benefit) or subjugated subject in analysing the "constituted subject". If Foucault as the genealogist has taken a *transcendental role*, then he seems to be either pre-supposes foundational subject or undermines the claim that power is autonomous and normatively neutral. If Foucault (the genealogist) is considered as the subjugated subject, then he seems to be either an improper critic

[113]Kelly, "Foucault/Habermas Debate," 2.
[114] Ibid.
[115]Strozier, *Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity*, 9.

in the first place or uncertain about the truth of subjective formation. Habermas also argues, the inquiry towards "constructed subjects", how genealogy without normative criteria qualifies a method since the genealogist himself is a "constituted subject". An inquiry to a "constructed subject", Habermas argues, the inquirer needs to be situated at least a normatively theoretical position to evaluate the various formations of subjects. To say genealogy is a qualified method, either it has to take "normative stands" or it has to pre-suppose the foundational subject. In either case, Foucault's account, for these reasons, seems to refer back to some of the primary categories and concepts it claims to have overcome such as (foundational) subject and normativity.[116] Therefore, Habermas concludes that from the perspective of analysing subjective construction and studying social practices adequately, genealogy without normative criteria seems to be neither a proper critique nor a qualified method.

According to Habermas, the suspension of normative content, however, not only makes Foucault's method of genealogy theoretically ambiguous but also politically dubious. To politically engage, Habermas argues, one needs to distinguish the proper or improper practices and legitimate or illegitimate power because a method of critique can't qualify itself as a political critique and gains a political status without any normative content. It is questionable whether Foucault's critical political rhetoric qualifies to distinguishing "better from worse regimes of social practices" and "identifying various forms of domination" without normative frameworks.[117] Similarly, Foucault's socio-political criticism investigated by genealogy might well be judged implausible without any normative content as it is unsatisfactory to explain not only distinguishing various forms of resistance to domination but also suggesting "what sort of political change is desirable".[118] If genealogy could be a political critique, then it has to either presuppose both (foundational) subject and normative criteria or it has to dismiss normative distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power as a critique. For this reason, Habermas claims, genealogy as normatively neutral cannot be qualified as a desirable critical approach as its intended scope is dubious and unsatisfactory. Strictly speaking, according to Habermas, Foucault's genealogy as an alternative critical method and as a political tool seems to be "tentative and fleeting" and remains

[116]Nancy Fraser, "Michel Foucault: A "Young Conservative"?," in *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 185.
[117] Fraser, "Young Conservative," 195.
[118]Ibid.

only an “elusive suggestion”. For this reason, Habermas argues Foucault’s account is not only “theoretically paradoxical” but also “politically suspect”.

4.2.2 Peter Dews on Questioning the Power/knowledge Nexus

Let’s evaluate the main arguments of Peter Dews, which are as follows:

1. Since Foucault does not describe power/knowledge nexus in terms of normative stands, his account seems to be inadequate to make the epistemic justification of knowledge and legitimate/illegitimate features of power.
2. As knowledge is normatively neutral, then not only critique of knowledge but also the subject constructed by it seems to be deficient to take a critical stand.
3. As the disciplinary procedure of power is normatively neutral, then not only the critique of power relations but also the subject constructed by it seems to be flawed to take a critical view.
4. Since power and knowledge are normatively neutral, Foucault’s project as a critique seems to be not only theoretically paradoxical but also politically undesirable.

Let’s develop these arguments further. Dews argues that a significant theoretical gap can be seen in Foucault’s project in conceptualising power/knowledge interrelations. Foucault claims that power and knowledge are intrinsically related, which primarily deals with the “institutional preconditions” for the production of a particular kind of knowledge systems. It is for this reason that Foucault explains emergence and arrangements opened up by the asylum, the hospital and the prison have led to the development of the various human sciences. Problem with Foucault, as Dews presents, rests in equating various disciplinary procedures with the diversity of social practices and its rationalities in constituting knowledge and subjectivity. Since Foucault does not assign rationalities and practices with any determinant content or normative value as such, he rejects the claims that history is inherently progressive and knowledge has objective truth. However, if it is the case that knowledge and power are normatively neutral to constitute each other in constituting subjectivities, Dews argues, Foucault’s position deprives in defining the general connection between power and knowledge.

According to Dews, Foucault’s account contradicts the claim that “power/knowledge” is intrinsically related, for the following reasons. Foucault’s account is inadequate and ineffective,

claims Dews, on two grounds: problematic epistemic justification of knowledge and the normative neutrality of disciplinary power. He argues that Foucault does not explain how the discipline and normalisation, which is the result of the change in the power relations from pre-modern to modern, are "enhanced" by the applications of human sciences. Similarly, Foucault, neither makes any epistemic justification for human sciences nor explained how the emergence of modern disciplinary power enhanced them. These two aspects, namely problematic of epistemic justification and the normative confusions of disciplinary procedure in Foucault's account, according to Dews, are derived from the normative neutral account of power/knowledge nexus. Therefore, studying the mechanism of power and emergence of human sciences in this way seems to acknowledge the relation between power and knowledge as non-intrinsic and theoretically inexplicable. For this reason, Foucault is unable to make the claim whether the disciplinary procedure is illegitimate or legitimate and human science is progressive or retrogressive.

According to Dews, Foucault is unable to describe power/knowledge connection appropriately because he has to admit the "historical progress" at least one dimension of its rationality, the "cognitive-instrumental dimension"[119] by abandoning his relative stands. Similarly, if the rationality of human science is valid, Foucault position would be dispossessed in explaining the regulation of power and its domination, and the relation between them in the institutional procedures. Since Foucault refuses to describe power/knowledge nexus in terms of normative stands, Dews claims, Foucault is obliged to reject any distinction between "facticity and validity" of knowledge. It has made Foucault neither to denouncing "the human sciences as forms of distortion or misrepresentations"[120]nor accepting its validity. Similarly, since the disciplinary procedures, which have invested on human bodies, acts and forms of behaviour, are normatively neutral, Foucault's explanations seem to be unsatisfactory in explaining legitimacy, and justification of techniques, strategies, and rationalities of disciplinary power. For this reason, Foucault's account of power is unsatisfactory as it might have overlooked some, subjugated others, misjudged or misrecognized different forms of power.

Since power/knowledge nexus is normatively neutral, which takes "the formation of power and formation of knowledge compose an indissoluble unity,"[121] Dews argues, it leads to difficulties

[119] Dews, "Return of the Subject," 37.
[120] Ibid.
[121]Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 272.

for Foucault when he wishes to take a critical stand. The absence of normative stands analysing both technologies of power and formations of knowledge (human sciences) in constituting subjectivities is not only theoretically paradox but also politically questionable. For instance, to criticise disciplinary power, Foucault has to take the alternative conception of the body or subject, which he is unable to propose as the alternative would be another "power relations", and it cannot be normatively neutral. Similarly, to criticise the human sciences, Foucault has to make the epistemic justification of the validity of knowledge, which he is unable to propose as it leads to pre-suppose power relations in terms of normative ground. Since the subject is constructed by power/knowledge nexus, and the knowledge and power are normatively neutral, then, Dews argues, Foucault's account deprives of explaining not only how the construction of the subject is justified but also the scope of the fabricated subject's critical stand. It seems "subjection" of subjects in the power/knowledge nexus, which is constituted through knowledge and institutional practices, deprives effective agency or sense of authority.[122]

Either to accept the efficacy of knowledge and legitimacy of power or to criticise the inadequacy of knowledge or illegitimacy of power, Foucault has to take normative stands. Put it briefly, Foucault's project is subject to dilemma as he, on the one hand, proposes a critical perspective by offering power/knowledge nexus, whereas, on the other hand, he is tempted to abandon "emancipator stand" by being reluctant to suggest any solutions as such. For example, taking a normative neutral stand in the constructing of madmen by the modern mental asylum, which is the cultural product of various knowledge and disciplinary power, the critical and the emancipatory stand Foucault has taken seems to be only the evasive approach and politically inconvenient. It is an evasive approach because Foucault is unable to explain whether the construction of madman and validity of human sciences through the various disciplinary procedures in the modern mental asylum is legitimate. Similarly, since Foucault takes power/knowledge nexus is normatively neutral, his account seems to be uncertain about whether it could be another form of social control in criticising the modern modes of knowledge and power that he has described. Since Foucault's account suffers from normative confusions, his social criticism seems to be laudable only in mere principle. Therefore, Dews concludes, Foucault's

[122] Linda Alcoff, "Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits to a Collaboration," in *Crises in Continental Philosophy*, ed. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), 69-86.

account of power/knowledge nexus is not only theoretically contradictory but also politically unengaged.

4.2.3 Nancy Fraser on Questioning the Account of Power

Let's illustrate Fraser's claims as follows:

1. By bracketing the normative contents, Foucault's account seems to be an essential theory instead of a historical account.
2. By suspending the normative criteria, Foucault's account is unsatisfactory in explaining freedom, resistance and repressive and productive aspects of power.
3. By excluding the normative frameworks, Foucault's description of power simplifies and generalizes the specificities of power relations.
4. Without the normative justifications, Foucault's description of the formation of subjects and self-constitution of subjects are implausibly explained.
5. Since Foucault's account is normatively confused, it is politically suspected.

Before delving into these critical claims, let's outline the conceptual route derived from the arguments given by Habermas and Dews in criticizing Foucault's account of power. We have seen how Foucault's account is theoretically inadequate and politically suspect from the two perspectives given by Habermas and Dews: inadequacy of genealogical method and implausibility of power/knowledge nexus. Habermas has argued genealogy is inadequate in studying the social practices and power relations since Foucault takes power as normatively neutral. He has also pointed out that to qualify genealogy as a critique, Foucault needs to presuppose normative content and the subject. Above all, since genealogy can't be a proper critique without taking any normative content, he has shown how Foucault's account is politically suspect. Similarly, Dews has illustrated the epistemic problem with knowledge in Foucault's power/knowledge nexus, and how it theoretically contradicts Foucault's analysis of modern disciplinary power. He has also shown how disciplinary power without normative content suffers analysing both the validity of knowledge and the function of disciplinary procedures. Dews has demonstrated, therefore, the power/knowledge nexus, from a critical perspective, is the politically evasive approach and embarrassingly pessimistic.

Importantly, these two accounts, strictly speaking, have shown the account of power Foucault has suggested is inadequate from two perspectives: explaining the inadequacy of genealogy and examining the problem with the power/knowledge nexus. It implies that the primary problem with Foucault's account is the normative content in the power relations itself, which he has suspended in his genealogical method, knowledge production, and above all, in the constitution of subjectivities. For these reasons, according to Fraser, it is essential to explain the normative confusions in Foucault's account of power in the first place. Several significant questions arise Foucault's bracketing of the normative content in his account of power. The problematic normative framework is susceptible to a variety of construals, which primarily asks whether such justification is possible, and if so, what it consists of.[123] Since Foucault takes practices are value-laden and knowledge without epistemic normativity, then the obvious question one might ask is what exactly the intended scope of Foucault's bracketing of normative content is. Similarly, one may question if the problematic of normative justification in the account of power is politically desirable, what is its gain. Since these questions have enormous importance, it is necessary to look more closely at the actual concert use Foucault makes of his account of power. Therefore, this section proceeds with three subsections asking the following questions: how Foucault's account without normative content tends to be an essential account; suspending the normative contents, how the explanation of freedom, resistance and repressive and productive aspects of power is satisfactory; since Foucault's account of power is normatively neutral, how is it politically suspect? Let's evaluate each of these questions as follows:

4.2.3.1 How Foucault's account without normative content tends to be an essential account?

Let's begin with analysing Foucault's conceptual frameworks of power itself. According to Foucault, power should be understood as "how it works" rather than "what it is". The very suggestion "how" suggests not only power as such does not exist[124] but also the theory of power as such is not possible. The very dismissal of proposing a theory of power shows that power should be seen as *historically understood and socially analysed*. Foucault rightly claims that the socio-historical conditions, which are the primary aim of the power studies, are not only embedded in the various practices and norms but also imbued in the processes of constructing subjectivities.

[123] Fraser, "Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," 275.
[124]Flynn, "Foucault's Mapping of History," 34.

Since socio-historical conditions are subject to change, Foucault has not suggested a theory of power as such, and by the same token, rejected the normative content in the power relations as well. For this reason, power in Foucault's work is defined not only as a "theoretical tool" but also an "empirical role" which attempts to understand how social practices work in the formations of subjects without laying down any normative grounds.

However, Fraser asks how rejecting a theory of power can justify the bracketing of normative content. According to her, without any normative content, Foucault's conceptualization of power appears to be a heuristic principle on two grounds: firstly, Foucault's account without normative frameworks seems to presuppose "universal claims of power", which he claims to have surpassed; secondly, the value-neutral account of power seems to have a prior objectification of "essential theory" with an ongoing conceptualization. On the one hand, Foucault never pronounces in favour of a theory of power to evaluate social practices and power relations not only for political engagement but also for "dialectical socio-political criticism". However, on the other hand, his theoretical explanation and historical investigations abound with "rhetorical devices" that tend to convey universal claims and features of essential theories. Importantly, according to Fraser, Foucault's value-neutral account of power not only seems to be presupposing universal claims as an essential theory but also appears to be claiming, with an outright contradiction, socio-political criticism is possible without presupposing normative contents.

Firstly, Fraser criticises Foucault's conceptualization of power on two grounds: inadequacy in understanding the nature of social practices and inappropriateness in distinguishing various forms of power mechanisms. She argues that, though studying "practices themselves" one could *identify* various power relations, it is highly implausible that taking "practices themselves" as value-neutral to *analyse* the actual operation of power. According to Fraser, Foucault is negligent to the fact that practices are once applied and operated, they do have consequences and thereby, normative contents. She argues social practices themselves do not exist without any empirical effects as they have meaning only when they are operated over various individual's actions. Practices are not value-neutral as their modus operandi does have various implications at particular instances with their own normative contents. Studying "practices in themselves" without any normative content does not provide a plausible explanation for how power operates through its mechanisms, apparatus, institutional procedures, and so on. Similarly, by evaluating practices

themselves without normative criteria, Fraser claims, it is highly problematic to evaluate how power relations can be studied in the formations of subjects in the first place. Since practices can't be value-neutral, the same ambiguity can be applied to studying not only the power relations embedded in them but also the process of subjective formations. For this reason, in the various formations of subjects, not only analysing social practices but also examining the power relations, Fraser suggests, Foucault's account desperately required normative contents. She, therefore, argues that by bracketing complex empirical considerations that neither can have nor require normative justification, Foucault's theoretical explanations seem to be not only an oversight but also a mere generalization by neglecting complexities of power relations and social practices as value-neutral.

However, by elaborating the main claims described above, Fraser argues that the absence of normative contents has conceded three substantial ambiguities in Foucault's account regarding power and social practices. From the perspective of analysing social practices, Fraser makes three arguments. Firstly, addressing various constraints in social practices can't be regarded as value-neutral as suggested by Foucault. Secondly, it is highly implausible and problematic that explaining how practices can be distinguishable according to their modus operandi without pre-supposing any normative content. Thirdly, without any normative content, not only evaluating how practices work but also how critically addressing them seems to be implausible and impractical. Since Foucault treats power as a complex strategic system with shifting fields of relations, he has claimed power-free social practices are in principle impossible. For this reason, from the perspective of analysing power relations, Fraser also makes three arguments. Firstly, addressing various constraints and compulsions in the power relations, value-neutral approach as suggested by Foucault is highly problematic. Secondly, in distinguishing various forms of power whether it is legitimate or not, one needs to assign normative criteria. Thirdly, not only evaluating various forms of subjugations and dominations but also critically addressing them, a normative justification is necessary for studying power relations.

Similarly, according to Fraser, Foucault has neglected the complex empirical considerations in his account on two grounds by bracketing the normative contents: firstly, he has bracketed *particular instance* of power relations and social practices in his account; secondly, he has *simplified or generalised* the complexity of power relations by claiming power and social

practices are normatively neutral or normatively same. It is for this reason that Foucault has claimed though power relations embedded in the practices are simultaneously constraining and enabling, one should not take these constraints as "for or against'" while evaluating particular practices and power relations. Apart from that, for claiming power is normatively neutral, Fraser argues, Foucault has also made several significant claims as well. She points out them as follows: there can be "no social practices without power relations"[125]; power is a complex strategy and "there is no "escaping" it" (*HS*, 95); and "power is everywhere in society" (*HS*, 93). On these grounds, Fraser contends that by bracketing the particular instances of practices and power relations and simplifying their complexities, Foucault tends to be proposing universal claims, which he has claimed to be rejected in his account. These universal claims imply that Foucault's account seems to be ahistorical as it conceptually tends to be a "theory of power" with a prior objectification. Therefore, Fraser claims that Foucault's account is normatively ambiguous because Foucault is unclear or paradoxically takes either power as value-neutral or power is normatively the same for all its instances.

4.2.3.2 Suspending the normative contents, how the explanation of freedom, resistance, repressive features and productive aspects of power is satisfactory?

Since Foucault simplifies particular instances of power and social practices, his account seems to be making universal claims and features of essential theory on four grounds as well, namely, freedom, resistance, repressive features and productive aspects. Foucault's normative neutral account of power gets more "grave difficulties" when one critically analyses the notion of freedom, resistance, productive and repressive aspects in his account. To substantiate the claim, let's begin by noting Foucault's writings abound with phrases that are tended to be universal claims and features of the essential theory. There are four significant claims to be noted: "power is exercised only over free subjects" (*BSH*, 221); "where there is power, there is resistance" (*HS*, 95); "one is always 'inside' power, there is no 'escaping' it" (*HS*, 95); and "power plays a "directly productive role" (*BSH*, 185). These four claims, according to Fraser, are *ontologically pre-supposed* for *all* power relations in Foucault's account of power. These claims not only make Foucault propose universal claims and features of essential accounts but also tend to be an ahistorical account of power. On these grounds, according to Fraser, Foucault has assumed not

[125]Fraser, "Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," 286.

only all forms of power relations are normatively neutral or normatively same but also all social practices are neither "good nor bad" nor "illegitimate or legitimate" in themselves. For this reason, Nancy Fraser argues that Foucault's account is not only ambiguous but also contradictory in understanding the function of power and analysing the social practices accurately.

Let's evaluate the four aspects mentioned above, namely freedom, resistance, repression and productivity one by one. By assuming power works on *free* subjects, Foucault's account seems to either simplify the differences among the subjects or it is unsatisfactory in explaining the agency and autonomy of subjects. For the same reason, Foucault seems to neglect the privileged subjective positions of subjects in society. Similarly, by presupposing resistance to all power relations, Foucault's account simplifies various forms of domination and subjugation of power relations in identifying their diverse forms and mechanisms. For the same reason, Foucault oversights that all subjects do have more or less the same possibility of resistance without considering the social situation in which they belong. Similarly, treating productivity as a conceptual feature of *all* power relations, on what grounds Foucault distinguishes identifying various forms of dominations and subjugations in social practices and power relations is a vexed issue. Foucault's account seems to be unsatisfactory in explaining whether productive "docile body" is forged willingly by subjects or it is a passive subject submitted to given power relations. For the same reason, Foucault's account seems to neglect various forms of repression by giving improper explanations for the resistance of subjects and the normative neutral account for various kinds of social compulsions and dominations. On these grounds, without considering normative contents in explaining freedom, resistance, productivity and repression in the given power relations, Fraser argues that Foucault's account seems to be made "generalization of their specificities" or "sweeping assumptions" of the various mechanisms and procedures of power bracketing its particular instances. By bracketing particular instances and normative contents, Foucault makes a mere generalization of power, which tends to be not only universal claims but also features of essential theories. For this reason, Nancy Fraser argues that Foucault's account of power is unsatisfactory as he seems to be failed to explain how in disciplinary society or "panopticized" society, the formation of subjects and the different forms of power can be distinguished.

4.2.3.3 Since Foucault's account of power is normatively neutral, how is it politically suspect?

Foucault's normative confusions, however, not only based on bracketing particular instances and simplification of power relations by generalizing modern disciplinary power as centerless, diffused and productive, but it also opens various detours and difficulties when asking political questions. The central political questions are manly five: (1) how the legitimacy of modern disciplinary power can be described,[126] (2) how one can explain the legitimacy of modern power/knowledge regime,[127] (3) "if power is "nominalized" in the modern world, in what ways is it explanatory" (*BSH*, 207) (4) if power is productive and normalised, "[W]hy should we oppose a fully panopticzed, autonomous society?"[128] (5) In what ways one ought to either accept or oppose the disciplinary procedure. These questions are argued on two levels: on the one hand, to evaluate the conceptual ambiguity in the conceptualization of power: and, on the other hand, to examine how the conceptualization of power is politically suspicious. These two evaluations, nevertheless, substantiate that the central problem with Foucault's account is its normative confusions.

To evaluate normative confusion in Foucault's account politically, Fraser has provided two notable examples: Foucault's political rhetoric on Bio-power and his socio-political criticism against the humanistic reformation regarding the penal system. Let's evaluate firstly the first example. According to Foucault, the modern world is described as the age of Bio-power and disciplinary society, which takes power as "capillary" dispersed throughout the entire social body because it does not have any particular identifiable centre of power as such. For this reason, according to Foucault, power exercises through manifold dominations and subjugations as all subjects are subjected to power. In the earlier works, Foucault claims, the disciplinary institutions like prison have emerged for fabrication and subjugation of *particular* subjects as the object of knowledge and subject of power. However, the same mechanisms and procedures, according to Foucault, in explaining Bio-power, are considered as the global strategies of domination aimed at the total administration of *all* subjects. Foucault, therefore, assumes power in the modern world is deeply *normalised* and *omnipresent* as it works in the least observable ways in administrating *all subjects*. It implies two grave difficulties in Foucault's account in explaining the relation between

[126]Fraser, "Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions," 282.
[127]Ibid, 283.
[128]Fraser, "Young Conservative," 208.

power and subject. Firstly, it shows that in the modern "panopticized" society, hierarchy and domination seem to be superfluous as individuals are forged by internalising disciplinary norms. Secondly, by pre-supposing all are the subject of modern normalised "panopticized" society, Foucault seems to be discredited various subjective (privileges) positions in the social world. It raises grave difficulties in explaining how one can explain power appropriately and on what ground one can oppose such normalisation politically. On these grounds, Foucault's explanation of forging subjectivity and self-constitution of subjects seem to be unsatisfactory, and it, therefore, desperately needs normative criteria to distinguish various forms of power.

By taking the second example mentioned above, Fraser argues that Foucault's normatively neutral account of power is politically unfeasible to criticise humanism. The central argument Foucault makes in the *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* is that humanistic reformation never materialised, but it is transformed into a new mode of social control called disciplinary power. In the emergence of the modern penal system, humanism, which is the political emancipation and scientific praxis that is oriented to human progress, rights and values, according to Foucault, is the product or outcome of new forms of disciplinary power. In contrast to humanism, which is the political and philosophical account oriented towards the object "man" or "human", Foucault argues, man or human is the historically constrained product of power/knowledge nexus in the modern disciplinary society. Human is not only the construction of human sciences as the "epistemic object" but also the subject of "the target and instrument" of a new disciplinary power. For this reason, Foucault claims, the man *only* came into being in the late eighteenth century with the rise of a new power/knowledge regime. Humanistic emancipation, therefore, according to Foucault, should be seen as the result of the replacement of pre-modern domination with the new forms of disciplinary power. The modern concern for justice and other human values, thus, should be seen as the extended scope of social control with the emergence of the state, mental asylum, jail, and so on. Humanism, for this reason, according to Foucault, should be seen as new forms of domination and ways of constructing subjectivities.

As suggested above, humanistic fundamentals such as autonomy, human progress, political emancipation, essential human nature, rationality, and self-determination, Foucault claims, are historically contingent and socially forged. Humanism, as Foucault suggests, therefore, should be understood by analyzing power relations embedded in the social norms and historical practices.

Since humanism is socially forged and historically constituted, Foucault claims that humanism as political rhetoric came into being only in the late seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century with the development of human sciences and new disciplinary power. Since the critical stand of Foucault's political rhetoric brackets normative criteria in explaining modern disciplinary power in rejecting humanistic reformation, Foucault, on the one hand, historicized all humanistic idioms, whereas on the other hand, claimed humanistic values are forged through cultural norms and institutional practices.

However, Fraser argues that Foucault's criticism does not qualify to reject humanistic emancipation as such by claiming humanism is intrinsically undesirable as it is domination tout court. Foucault's political stand without normative content is unsatisfactory to criticise humanistic normative ideals such as emancipation and human progress. Utilitarian humanist, for instance, definitely can argue that though modern disciplinary society described by Foucault has some problems, it is better than the dictatorship of pre-modern regime's public torture. Similarly, to disprove humanistic ideals as irrelevant, Foucault as the anti-humanist needs to provide a plausible explanation for how in the complex empirical features of normalised "panopticized society", individuals enable to constitute themselves. Though individuals are capable of self-constitution by internalising disciplinary norms, Foucault's account is inadequate to explain whether they are willingly constituted themselves. One need not conclude with Foucault that humanistic ideals are unrealizable in the disciplinary institution because Foucault needs to show how social subjugations or dominations in the modern world discard them. Foucault's criticism, for this reason, seems to be inadequate, and it seems humanistic ideals share critical and emancipatory punch at least in the embryo. Similarly, since Foucault does not provide an accurate explanation for social subjugations or repression of the modern disciplinary world, he seems to be criticized neither humanist's emancipation nor the subjective construction of marginalized or excluded subjects such as madmen and criminals as such. On these grounds, Fraser concludes that by bracketing the normative criteria of power/knowledge regime, Foucault, on the contrary, paradoxically, seems to be *justified* the validity of human sciences and legitimacy of the disciplinary procedure by claiming *all* are subject to modern power.

On the one hand, Foucault's conceptual account assumes the concept of disciplinary power as normatively neutral, which allows him no condemnation of any legitimate /illegitimate

objectionable features of modern disciplinary society. However, at the same time, on the other hand, his political rhetoric betrays the conviction that disciplinary society is without redeeming characteristics as he has paradoxically claimed that "power is everywhere" (*HS*,93), and there is no "escaping" it (*HS*,95). Since Foucault's account is deficient in discrediting humanistic ideals without assuming normative justifications, by evaluating his dialectical socio-political criticisms, one may infer that it has provided prerequisites involving modes of discourse productions in the working of disciplinary institutions. Foucault's account, therefore, should be seen as *only* the historical descriptions of the transition in the structural features of power from the pre-modern to modern forms. For this reason, according to Fraser, Foucault's arguments may be seen as *only a conceptual explanation* of how modern power is different from the hierarchical, symmetrical and sovereign model of the power structure prevailed in the pre-modern period. One should understand, therefore, that Foucault's historical description is the *explanandum* for discursive preconditions of the working of disciplinary institutions rather than the critique of humanism simpliciter. Therefore, Foucault's claim that modern penal systems are the new form of domination in the disciplinary institutions, according to Nancy Fraser, need not be seen as discrediting proper humanism.

Similarly, without criticizing knowledge, social practices and disciplinary procedure on the normative ground, Fraser claims that Foucault's account seems to be politically conservative and theoretically enigmatic. Foucault may be successful in giving various sorts of rationalities, strategic grounds, and subtle forms of power's exercises in conceptualising historical changes of crime and punishments. However, does his account without assuming any normative contents qualify or able to identify various forms of domination and subjugation in the instrumental changes of power relations is a vexed issue. Foucault's conceptualisation of power without normative justification not only insufficient in detecting legitimate or illegitimate forms of power but also implausible to suggest the desirable political critique because his account is deficient in normatively validating social practices, institutional norms, knowledge justifications he has described. It clearly shows that Foucault's account without normative content is politically suspected as its explanations regarding knowledge productions, disciplinary procedure, subject construction, and self-constitution are theoretically unsatisfactory as a critique. On these grounds, Fraser concludes that to explain the relation between power and subject appropriately, distinguishing various forms of power relations, and evaluating the constitution of oneself as

subjects, Foucault desperately needs normative criteria. Therefore, Fraser claims that Foucault's account without normative content is theoretically *inadequate* and politically *unfeasible.*

4.3 Autonomy and Agency in Foucault's Anti-Subjective Hypothesis

4.3.1 Introduction

The questions concerning agency and autonomy are very much discussed by critics in Foucault's project. It carried out a very crucial critical analysis by which Foucault's earlier and later works are taken into specific consideration. The very distinction between earlier and later works designate that, as critics and supporters claim, Foucault has undertaken a project of "genealogy of subject" with definite theoretical emphasis. Critics, however, argue that it is a theoretical break in which Foucault contradicts the very argument that "subject is constructed". However, on the contrary, Foucault's supporters argue that it is a theoretical continuity but a different emphasis in approach. The issues evolved around here, however, are based primarily on two grounds: subject's construction and self-constitution. The earlier works focused on the subject's construction within the knowledge through practices and discourses where they deal with the subject's constitution from external factors such as socio-cultural-political-historical conditions. It is in this conceptual ground that Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis, which rejects the "philosophy of subject or essential human nature", is primarily grounded. However, the later works focused on ethics and sexuality in which Foucault argues that subjects can constitute themselves.

Many have argued that it directly brings back the question of autonomy and agency by claiming that Foucault has fallen back to "the return of the subject" instead of "get rid of the subject". Strictly speaking, Foucault is alleged in giving the improper explanation to concepts such as autonomy, agency, freedom and creativity which are not only commonly instantiated to the notion of subjectivity, but also considered generally the requirement for social critique and change. Though the primary target of Foucault is to eradicate the "philosophy of subject" through excavating the "genealogy of subject" by "studying the constitution of the subject across history which has led us up to the modern concept of self,"[129] it is important to note that, as Amy Allen

[129]Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982*, trans. Graham Burchell (United States: Palgrave Macmilla, 2005), 223-224.

claims, Foucault does not suggest eradicating "philosophy of the subject" as such, nor does he state the subject is fiction. Instead, he has questioned "the philosophy of the subject" as a foundational and constitutive role for knowledge as well as any human activities. The subject, according to Foucault, therefore, situated in the social conditions and the specific historical juncture as subjectivity is constituted by power relations embodied in them.

The "genealogy of the subject", therefore, consists of a historical investigation in which it studies how the subject has been constituted. For that reason, genealogy should be seen as a critical philosophy as it seeks the conditions and possibilities of constituting subjectivity. Foucault, therefore, is interested to study "the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse" (*AK*, 200). In the earlier works, Foucault has studied how power constructs subjects, whereas, in the later works, he has examined how subjects constitute themselves in the given power relations. Though subjects are historically constituted and socially forged, according to Foucault, they are not *reduced and determined* by them. Foucault, therefore, does not reject the "subject's existence" as such, but rather *only* "bracketed it as a consideration" "in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it" (*AK*, 96). It directly brings the question of agency and autonomy on the table and asks how Foucault has dealt with these concepts in his anti-subjective hypothesis. The debate, therefore, in this section, is based on the issue of autonomy and agency by asking whether Foucault's explanation of these two concepts in his ant-subjective hypothesis is satisfactory.

This debate, therefore, consists of the main arguments of five thinkers, namely, Thomas McCarthy, Amy Allen, Peter Digeser, Mark Bevir and James Wong. I shall begin with analysing McCarthy's main criticism against Foucault regarding the subjective construction in the power relations. He argues Foucault not only contradicts his main assumptions in the earlier and later works but also provides unsatisfactory analysis for explaining the relation between power and subject. However, by criticizing McCarthy's claim, Allen proposes that Foucault's self-constitution and the account of power are compatible if one is aware of the contextual assumptions. Whereas Allen offers a positive interpretation of Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis, Digeser argues that Foucault's account is inadequate to explain the status of autonomy and agency in power relations. Bevir, on the other hand, though follows the main criticism of Digeser, he has focused on explaining the characteristic elision between agency and autonomy rather than rejecting them

as criticised by Digester. However, Wong rejects the views of both Digeser and Bevir by claiming they have misinterpreted Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. By evaluating all these five thinker's arguments, an attempt is made to draw certain concluding remarks to locate autonomy and agency in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. Therefore, throughout the conceptual debate, the primary objective of the analysis is to evaluate the relation between power and subject. Let's evaluate the main argument of each thinker as follows:

4.3.2 Autonomy and Agency: the Conceptual Debate and the Theoretical Connections

Allen claims that the possibility of autonomy can be found in Foucault's account, at least two senses of that term: capable of taking up a critical perspective and capacity for deliberate self-transformation. It deals, on the one hand, how one resists the technology of domination and, on the other hand, how, thereby, one constitutes or transforms oneself. It maintains the concept of autonomy in terms of freedom and resistance as the ability to be critical and transforming oneself. However, McCarthy argues that this account of autonomy poses problems not only in Foucault's description of social practices but also in the very genealogical approach. His objection is simple and straightforward; if the "self-reflective subject", who has the critical stand and the ability to transform oneself, is constituted by power, how does that "subject" understand that his/her reflections are real? In other words "how are we to understand the reflection that takes the form of genealogy?"[130] He pushes this point further and argues that if subjects are fabricated or subjection is the effect of the power relation, then not only autonomy of self-reflective subject but also the genealogy itself is not possible. For this reason, Foucault's account, according to McCarthy, seems to be incompatible. He claims Foucault can't say that subjects have a capacity of critical reflection as autonomous subjects and genealogy as critique at the same because genealogy and subjective constructions are not free or constituted in the power relations. Similarly, he argues, if Foucault's later works suggest the possibility of autonomy by introducing "self-constitution", then he seems to be committing two theoretical errors. Firstly, he contradicts his earlier analysis of power and subjects in analysing autonomy and applying genealogy. Secondly, it again raises intractable

[130]Thomas McCarthy, *Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 59.

dilemmas in defining autonomy and genealogy in understanding "self-constitution" and thereby having a conceptual break with his previous assumption.[131]

However, Allen argues that McCarthy's criticism of Foucault sounds an inaccurate reading as he misinterpreted that the "subject is *merely or nothing more* than the effect of power".[132] This severe objection, Allen argues, seems to be an implausible and inadequate explanation of Foucault's theoretical analysis of power and subjects. According to Allen, Foucault does not take subject is a mere product of power and is socially and historically "determined". The term "autonomy", therefore, has to be taken into account with specific contextual consideration. She contends that in Foucault's project, he neither takes any "metaphysical" perception of autonomy nor attempts to evaluate the process of "subjection" in that sense. Allen, therefore, claims, it is in this "non-metaphysical" sense, i.e. "capacity for critical reflection and deliberate self-transformation", that Foucault's project has been developed. McCarthy's criticism, therefore, Allen claims, is an oversight as he has taken autonomy in the absolute metaphysical sense, which should be seen as the misinterpretation of what Foucault has proposed in his hypothesis. She claims the conception of autonomy in the non-metaphysical sense as the "capacity for critical reflection" and "deliberate self-transformation", therefore, should not be seen as incompatible with Foucault's analysis of power and subjection. In other words, the subject's experience and the exercise of autonomy independent of all social contexts are implausible if one takes the metaphysical sense of the term as suggested by McCarthy. Therefore, Allen concludes, if we take Foucault's understanding of autonomy in the non-metaphysical sense, then it sounds that the subject's reasoning and experiences as an autonomous agent can reach or be evaluated in the existing socio-historical conditions as suggested in the anti-subjective hypothesis.

However, she does not declare that Foucault's concept of autonomy and the analysis of power and subject are completely satisfactory. Foucault's position, Allen claims, is deprived to qualify as an accurate explanation of "process of subjection" and thereby, the question of "autonomy" in the given power relations, and it, therefore, should be seen as a vexed issue. However, for the misinterpretation of Foucault's account of power and subject, according to Allen, one should not blame readers or commentators solely. It is undoubtedly true that Foucault does

[131]McCarthy, *Ideals and Illusions*, 59.
[132] Ibid.

not give a precise and consistent explanation to domination, violence and other related issues of power. For instance, Allen notes that in a late interview, Foucault had admitted his detours and oversights happened in his earlier works in conceptualising power and subject. She substantiates her claim by citing Foucault's words as follows: "all these concepts are ill-defined so that one hardly knows what one is talking about. I am not even sure if I made myself clear, or used the right words when I first became interested in the problem of power" (*EST*, 299). Similarly, she also notices that in the Dartmouth lectures, Foucault has used power and domination interchangeably. Similarly, one of his late interviews, Allen cites, Foucault has explained, on the one hand, power as "unstable, reversible, micro force relations";[133] on the other hand, he has defined domination as "broader, systematic, macro-level asymmetries of power".[134]Allen, therefore, concludes it is this inconsistent theoretical connotation that the "theoretical possibility of reciprocity" between power and subject is underdeveloped in Foucault's account.[135] For this reason, Foucault's concept of autonomy in the analysis of power and subject is incomplete and unsatisfactory.

However, in contrast to Allen, Digeser makes the argument that the distinction between autonomy and agency blurs up in Foucault's definition of subjects. Considering the main arguments, Digeser's primary question seeks to explain what the "forged subject" denotes in the power relations. It is a vexed issue in Foucault's account that whether forged subjects refers to "effect of power upon the *quality* of autonomy (formations of our dispositions, desires, intentions and interests) or it applies to the generation of the agency (*capacity* to have them)".[136] As this distinction is an enigma in the anti-subjective hypothesis, what power exactly does in forging subjects is a significant issue to be analysed in his anti-subjective hypothesis. According to Digeser, if the operation of power calls into question autonomy alone, then, our autonomous formation cannot be our own in a deep, critical sense.[137] If we admit, on the contrary, that autonomy presupposes specific capacities which individualize who we are, then forging subjects refer to the status of the agency. It points out that Foucault makes a strong claim that the operation of power calls into question the enabling and disabling of agency alone rather than autonomy.

---

[133] Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 48.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Peter Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," 980.
[137] Ibid.

However, if power is deeply associated with the formation of agency, according to Digeser, "its operation questions whether we have become something less than agents, or if we truly understand the costs of becoming agents".[138] In either case, Foucault neither explained adequately what kind of subject is being produced by power nor given satisfactory analysis in examining autonomy and agency independently.

Similarly, in contrast to Allen, but following Digeser, Bevir argues many of the complexities of Foucault's works have stemmed up from the characteristic "elision" of the distinction between autonomy and agency. According to Bevir, Foucault at times appears to reject autonomy, for example, when he talks about "ubiquity of power", but at other times, he appears to reject agency, for example, when he describes "confession as self-regulation"[139] in the power relations. However, such complexities can be explained by distinguishing "excitable Foucault" and "composed Foucault". The excitable Foucault, who sees the subject is merely constructed by social conditions and power, is a familiar explanation given by Foucault. However, on the contrary, the composed Foucault, who sees the subject is capable of constituting oneself, believes in the implementation of the agency. The former, however, profoundly declares the subject is dead and maintains subject or self is a construction of socio-historical conditions, whereas, the latter, highlights the "self-reflective" subject who is a creative agent[140]. In short, Bevier also admits the distinction between earlier Foucault and later one where excitable Foucault is presented in the earlier works, whereas the composed one in the later.[141] It clearly shows Foucault's account might

[138] Digeser, "Fourth Face of Power," 980.

[139] According to Foucault, in the modern disciplinary society, confession as a technology of power has been spread in many domains apart from the religious discourse, namely, medicine, education, legal field, family, and so on. These social fields have ensured various confessions such as one's crimes, sins, thoughts, desires, illnesses, troubles, and so forth in these discourses. It has caused the subject to learn to effect changes on himself to know himself and constitute oneself in the given power relations (*HS*, 59).

[140] By creativity, we generally mean that one's capacity for creation, the ability for inventing by oneself, forming concepts, theories, or scientific facts, and so on. For example, when we speak of scientific creativity, we generally state, accurately, for instance, the achievements of Einstein. In this context, we are not attributing to the concept of creativity and its value to this general sense exclusively. The term creativity, particularly in this context, also refers to a little bit idiosyncratic as a normal human act. For example, an individual is able to describe, react, tell and think when he is able to come to grip with a new situation. However, Foucault does not take creativity as inherent in every single individual. According to him, creativity must be understood with an ensemble of socio-historical relations as acquired through socialization.

[141] Mark Bevir, "Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency against Autonomy," *Political Theory* 27, no. 1 (1999): 65-84, doi:10.1177/0090591799027001004).

well be judged deficient because it invites the assumption that one requires a further plausible explanation for autonomy and agency in his anti-subjective hypothesis.

Though Foucault's account appears to provide an ambivalent conception of "autonomy" and "agency" and provides an inadequate explanation for their relation, Bevir claims one significant conceptual assumption can be made in the anti-subjective hypothesis. According to Bevir, Foucault has vehemently rejected "autonomy", but maintained "agency" throughout in his anti-subjective hypothesis. According to him, Foucault has rejected autonomy in his anti-subjective hypothesis but maintained the concept of agency as an essential feature in understanding the formation of subjects constructed in the power relations. He pushes his point further and claims that "a rejection of autonomy need not entail rejection of agency".[142] Importantly, what Bevir holds is that the validity of the anti-subjective hypothesis can be understood by distinguishing agency and autonomy. According to him, "[A]utonomous subjects would be, at least in principle, to have experiences, to reason, to adopt beliefs, and to act, outside all social contexts".[143] They could rule themselves uninfluenced by others or external factors and therefore, capable of free from any norms and techniques in the power relations. This autonomous subject, who stands outside of social conditions and historical contingencies, is what, according to Bevir, Foucault has rejected in his anti-subjective hypothesis. If we take Foucault's criticism of the subject to be a "critique of autonomy", Bevir argues, it completely agrees with the rejection of "sovereign, founding subject" and seems to be a reasonable interpretation.

Agency, on the other hand, Bevir claims, is not only different from autonomy but also opposite to it. However, in contrast to "autonomous subject", agents are creative beings who are situated in specific social contexts and act accordingly. Although they exist in the power relations embedded in the social conditions, mechanisms of power do not *determine* them. They can adapt their beliefs and perform the actions within the social context as their creativity based on their agency which should not be seen as incompatible with socio-historical conditions. Though socio-historical conditions influence them, their creativity enables them to exercise reason and are capable of having different experiences. As individuals have different beliefs and the ability to perform their actions, we cannot refer to "individual beliefs and actions" as determined or reduced

[142] Bevir, "Foucault and Critique," 68.
[143] Ibid, 67.

to the social context exclusively. The subjects could be "creative agents" within the social-historical conditions where they could decide what kind of belief and actions one must hold. Though the subjects are situated in the social context and acting within the institutional and other social practices, they are not wholly determined by them because social conditions and creative agents should not be seen as incompatible. In that sense, the subjects have agency and creative ability to decide themselves as they should not be seen as a "mere product" of power in the socio-historical conditions. Subjects should be seen as a creative agent because otherwise, one cannot be qualified as capable of setting against the manipulative force in various social conditions. In other words, if subjects are not creative beings with the agency, then, Bevir argues, they are not qualified to claim as the political being because they are not only incapable of resisting social conditions but also inefficient to modify those contexts. Therefore, Bevir argues, if we take Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis to be a "critique of agency", it sounds highly implausible.

However, Wong argues that claims of Digeser and Bevir are extravagant because Foucault did not reject autonomy in favour of the agency. Central to their account is the claim that Foucault is committed to deploying either agency against autonomy or they are independent concepts. On their construals, deploying agency opposite to autonomy, which serves individuals to implicate exercising freedom thereby constituting oneself, is puzzling. However, according to Wong, to evaluate the formation of the subject or creative agent, who has considerable freedom in the power relations, agency and autonomy should be seen as conceptually related. He pushes this point further and claims not only agency and autonomy conceptually related but also the regulation of agency requires an account of autonomy. Similarly, to evaluate creative subjects in power relations, one need not necessarily reject autonomy to maintain agency. Intuitively,[144] autonomy and agency are related not only to describe, react and think creatively but also taking critical stands against social compulsions. In the account of Bevir and Digester, Wong argues, autonomy entails that "subject is self-sufficient unto itself; the subject can create and maintain itself *ex nihilo*".[145] It

[144] Wong takes this notion of intuition from Harry Frankfurt's structural account of identification. What leads an individual to perform an action is the desire and beliefs associated with one's own volitions because, according to Wong, individuals identify an action with which they perform. Thus, what motivates someone to be an agent or creative is, therefore, based on autonomy. If anyone exercises and follows their own activities with which they identify, it is autonomy by which an individual is able to act despite the compulsions. In that sense, the agency needs autonomy, and thereby, they are intuitively connected. (James Wong, "Foucault and Autonomy," *Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy* 96, no. 3 (n.d.), 278)

[145] Wong, "Foucault and Autonomy," 278.

implies that they have considered autonomy by pre-supposing foundational subject or "genuine, pre-social human nature"[146] which Foucault has claimed to have rejected in his account. By doing so, they are not only deploying agency against autonomy but also consider them as mutually exclusive or independent concepts.

The central argument of Wong explains that in the account of Digester and Bevir, agency and autonomy are incompatible and independent concepts with their distinguishing features. It implies that the relation and issues concerning agency and autonomy are not as easily as evaded by Bevir and Digester. Though the agency is taken for granted as the base of voluntary action, according to Wong, their account has failed to explain the nature of the agent's action whether it is the agent's own or not. To illustrate, the motive and volitions which lead to individual deeds with which how the agent identifies them are barely explained in their account. This suggests that they have failed to explain various kinds of compulsions (the self-distorting external factors) which possibly could influence an individual's actions. Their very claim, i.e., "autonomous action" which does not influence by external factors, seems, therefore, an account of "autonomous agency". Strictly speaking, their account of agency cannot be explained without considering the concept of autonomy. Since desires, passions, beliefs, which all have a significant impact on an individual's actions, Bevir and Digester are unaware of the fact that an agent is motivated by autonomy. In this view, the agency without autonomy points out that agents are alike as it does not take into consideration of individual's various possible reactions against social structures. Autonomy is, thus, a trait that individuals can exhibit and act related to any aspects of social-historical circumstances and practices. This clearly shows that views of Bevir and Digester contradict with their very claim that agents are creative without autonomy or they are mutually exclusive. Explained above, it can be concluded that, as Wong states, the concept of agency in the account of Bevir and Digester pre-supposes autonomy though they try to deploy agency against autonomy.

Provided that, Wong illustrates that Foucault's usage of autonomy can be rightly understood by making a distinction between two senses of that term: "self-sufficiency" and "self-rule". The best examples for understanding self–sufficiency are Aristotle and Immanuel Kant. According to Aristotle, self-sufficiency is the key for an individual to maintain a proper happy life. The self-sufficiency, therefore, denotes the ability to procure oneself what one needs by making

[146]Wong, "Foucault and Autonomy," 278.

life choice-worthy to lead a happy life. Similarly, as Wong claims, self-sufficiency describes a significant role in Kant as well, especially regarding moral choices. Incompatible with external factors and influences, for Kant, moral values are bound up with "will" alone. According to these two views, autonomy is defined as the ability to decide or determine oneself to pursue a course of action independently as it indicates the independence and authenticity of an individual's ability to self-governing without any external constraints. Ethically speaking, it indicates the capacity to impose moral law upon oneself, regardless of any external compulsions. Politically speaking, autonomy ascribes to having one's own political decisions and action irrespective of any imposition from social structures and political institutions.[147] Therefore, autonomy as self-sufficiency postulates "self-governing" which states reasons, volitions and motives that impact one's action are "one's own" irrespective of any manipulative or misconstruing external forces.[148]

However, autonomy as self-sufficiency sounds a problematic model because it is hard to accept that individual life can be self-governed irrespective of society and history both morally and politically. Thinking autonomy as an irrefutable value as opposed to any socio-cultural-political-historical conditions for a self-governing individual is highly implausible not only politically but also ethically. Autonomy as the foundation for moral principles, actions, and the legitimacy of the political subject, however, inevitably sparks conceptual disputes. Considering the complex socio-historical conditions in the constitution of various subjectivities, whether all individuals can be qualified as an autonomous subject in the self-sufficient sense is a vexed issue. Without analysing the socio-historical conditions, the autonomous subject as self-sufficient seems to be non-autonomous. For example, subjective construction of potentially vulnerable people in various power relations such as women, peasants, children, and so on, for this reason, seems that they are socially excluded as non-autonomous subjects.

Nevertheless, as an alternative, Wong claims that autonomy as a "self-rule" provides an accurate explanation for Foucault's use of that term. According to Wong, in the process of subjective constitution, self-rule suggests that one's actions are self-controlled. It implies that the motives (belief, desire and value commitments) which lead to voluntary deeds are "self-authorized" to achieve "self-governance". Nevertheless, as opposed to self-sufficiency, self-rule

[147] Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2018 Edition)."
[148]Wong, "Foucault and Autonomy," 278.

does not exclude external circumstances as it is compatible with understanding subjective construction in socio-historical conditions. It emphasises the compatibility of the social aspects and the ability to govern oneself, arguing that there need not necessarily be antagonism between autonomy and social-historical conditions. Whereas the concept of self-sufficient takes autonomy as a universal ideal for essential human nature, the self-rule claims autonomy should not be seen as substantial and absolute. Self-rule, therefore, suggests there could be many self-constitution as it is forged within the socio-historical conditions. Since Foucault rejects universal human nature, autonomy as self-sufficient should be deemed as inadequate. Considering both conceptions, therefore, Wong claims, Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis is best understood by self-rule than self-sufficiency.

4.3.3 Locating Autonomy and Agency in Anti-Subjective Hypothesis

Though the terms agency and autonomy have complex relations with each other, given the theoretical explanations as suggested above by Thomas McCarthy, Amy Allen, Peter Digeser, Mark Bevir and Wong, certain conclusions can be drawn. Since each of the thinkers has plausible theoretical arguments, they are treated as the *specific* reference points in our debate. However, by evaluating their arguments, one should be noted not only plausible conceptualizations of agency and autonomy but also their interrelations. It is indisputable that Foucault's project in any sense is not an essential account per se as it, on the one hand, rejects any metaphysical assumptions, whereas, on the other hand, claims subjectivity is historically constituted. As subjectivity is socially and historically constituted, the associated concepts such as agency, and autonomy, therefore, should be understood in the same fashion. For this very reason, one can say that Foucault does not accept "autonomy" and "agency" in the metaphysical or transcendental sense following the essential account. On these grounds, one can claim that thinking agency and autonomy in the metaphysical and absolute sense, which asserts subjects can stand exclusively irrespective of social conditions, is not only an oversight but also a misreading of anti-subjective hypothesis in understanding the relation between power and subjective formations.

However, the question, how Foucault's discussion of autonomy and agency is to be conceived appropriately needs further explanations. The adequate explanation of autonomy,

however, can be characterized as "regulative autonomy".[149] If one accepts the essential account exclusively, then regulative autonomy does not make sense. Similarly, once one makes the distinction between autonomy and non-autonomy absolutely, logically speaking, we cannot talk about "regulative" sense either. Since subjects, according to Foucault, are socially forged and historically constituted, autonomy also should be understood as socially ingrained and historically embedded. Regulative autonomy, therefore, denotes subjects are not only responsible for one's own action, but they also do have independence (not in the absolute sense) within the socio-historical conditions. It, however, claims neither autonomous individual is completely free from oppressive and constricting conditions nor the subject is absolutely authentic. The condition of being "regulative", therefore, represents the ability to understand the socio-historical conditions because "self-constitution" should be seen as the capacity to be reflexive about the social world and make choices by shaping one's own norms, tastes, desires, and so on. Regulative autonomy, therefore, comprises socially ingrained dispositions, intentions, interest, and so on as subjects perceive the social world around them and react to it. On this ground, regulative autonomy could refer to different or multiple ways of self-constitution within the socio-historical contingencies as suggested by Foucault. The regulative autonomy, therefore, indicates subjects have the possibility to constitute themselves or govern oneself because subjects are not the reductive product of power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions.

The regulative autonomy, therefore, denotes the *possibility* of self-governance within the specific socio-historical fields in which the subject is situated. It does not exclude external circumstances; rather, it affirms the ability of the subject to assess them in deciding the individual's actions and thereby self-constitution. The individuals, therefore, can identify themselves with their subjectivity within various social fields despite external compulsions and influences. Thus, instead of essential universal subjectivity, individuals have multiple subject formations depending on the socio-historical circumstances and contingencies. Since subjectivities are seen as socially forged and historically constituted, and they are subject to reproduction or transformation through socio-historical changes, the subjective position should be seen as contingent, provisional, and constituted rather than given and absolute. As subjectivities are neither given by nature nor fixed, Foucault's usage of the term autonomy must be interpreted not only as a non-metaphysical concept

[149]I am indebted to Dr. Laxminarayan Lenka, Associate Professor, Department Of Philosophy, University Of Hyderabad, for suggesting this point.

but also a non-essential account. On these grounds, one can say that self-constitution is achieved not by absolute autonomy but with a regulative autonomy. Therefore, it is the regulative autonomy that provides a compatible understanding of Foucault's analysis of power and subjects in understanding subjective construction or self-constitution.

Similarly, the agency also must be understood in the regulative sense as the capacity to act and the ability to take a critical stand against social compulsion. Agency, therefore, in the anti-subjective hypothesis should be seen as the exercise or manifestation of capacities in a given environment engaging with the social structure.[150] Notably, particularly in this context, the agency should be understood as the ability because an agent should be seen as possessing the capacity to recognize compulsions of "socialization" and modify their place in the given power relations embodies in the socio-political structure. It also refers to the ability to decide the choice to act freely and the self-reflexively instigating an action. It does not mean that one will always have a numerous range of choices, though agency refers to the ability of individuals to act independently and make free choices. Agency must be understood with one's own capacity in regulating choices within the opportunities one has in the given socio-historical circumstances. For this reason, we should not take the social structures and agents are mutually exclusive. Our options or choices to act are compatible with the socio-historical conditions in which we belong. This compatibility, however, should not be misunderstood as internalising external constraints as the permanent structural features of human activity. The agent and socio-historical relations are mutually constitutive realities by which social arrangements and historical aspects are both the medium and outcome of actions and reactions of individuals. By agency, then, we also mean that the social values, norms and structures can always be explicitly questioned and altered. Foucault's concept of agency, thus, entails the claim that an agent makes decisions and enacts them in the world, which is self-directed, intentional, however, operating in, and being affected by, interacting social relations.

Furthermore, agency and autonomy are not mutually exclusive but are interrelated. Agency and autonomy not only conceptually related but also the regulation or exercise of the agency requires autonomy. To exercise the agency as the ability to act, one needs to have the formations of dispositions, desires, intentions and interests as the quality of autonomy. In Foucault's account,

[150] Schlosser, "Agency (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2018 Edition)."

autonomy as the conditions for self-constitution takes desires, reasons, and values are one's own, whereas, the agency represents the capacity to accelerate them. It does not mean to say that autonomy and agency are inscribed in human nature; they should be seen, on the contrary, constituted and achieved through socialization. Since subjectivities are constituted through socialization, agency and autonomy should be seen as both the medium and outcome of actions and reactions by which subjectivities are constituted. However, how we identify, understand, and employ these concepts, requires two more basic concepts: freedom and resistance.

Freedom and resistance can be understood in the anti-subjective hypothesis as follows. It is possible to conceive that social and cultural forces may shape individuals and their ways of social relations and individual actions. Similarly, an individual could internalise the external constraints either by ideological apparatus or other socially suppressive mechanisms. However, the possibility of altering and resisting such domination and suppression occurs only when individuals become aware of their normalisation as *free subjects*. Only free subjects can exercise their choice in shaping the conditions of their subject formations. By free subject, Foucault means that an agent has the *capacity to resist* social pressure or institutional incentives. It does not mean that the subject's sense of freedom is absolute irrespective of social conditions. Driven by a commitment to this regulative sense of freedom and capacity to resist, the subjects can act by agency and autonomy in a regulative manner. The terms, agency and autonomy, therefore, have to be understood with this possibility as the ability to take a critical perspective and deliberate self-transformation with the regulative sense of freedom and resistance.

On these grounds, one can conclude that subjective construction or self-constitution, which are suggested in the earlier and later works of Foucault, should not be seen as a mere product of power relation as the determined subject of socio-historical conditions. For this reason, the main argument of McCarthy, which suggests since subjects as the mere effect of power, Foucault's account of subjective construction is inadequate, should be rejected. However, Bevir's claim, which infers Foucault has rejected the absolute sense of autonomy in understanding the formation of subjects in the given power relations, is acceptable and adequate. Similarly, Allen's view, which proposes Foucault has stated autonomy as the non-metaphysical concept in understanding the relation between power and subjective formations, is also plausible and satisfactory. Furthermore,

the claim that the agency, which makes individuals capable of acting within the external compulsions, plays a significant role in self-constitution, as suggested by Bevir, is also plausible.

However, it is erroneous to claim that agency is opposite to autonomy and they are mutually exclusive or independent concepts as suggested by Digeser and Bevir. One can agree that autonomy and agency are "non-absolute" as they should not be seen as a universal ideal inscribed in human nature. Since subjectivity and socio-historical relations are mutually constitutive realities, agency and autonomy should be seen as both the medium and outcome of their interrelations. As autonomy and agency are related in this way, they are not only regulative but also the latter requires the former for its regulative exercise. For this reason, unlike the claims of Digeser and Bevir, it is a plausible explanation that agency and autonomy are interrelated to govern oneself in a regulative sense as suggested by Wong. Therefore, agency and autonomy are not inherent in every single individual as they must be understood as the ability to exercise one's freedom and resistance with the ensemble of power relations embedded in the socio-historical conditions.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen how the relation between power and subject is criticized in Foucault's account on two grounds: normative confusions in the account of power and the conceptual problem of agency and autonomy in the anti-subjective hypothesis. In the first conceptual debate, Habermas argues Foucault's historical method is inadequate to qualify a "critique" because Foucault has to paradoxically accept either normative superiority or the foundational subject, which he has claimed to have rejected in his account. Peter Dews, however, argues that Foucault's account is inadequate as it is normatively neutral in conceptualizing power/knowledge axes. As bracketed normative criteria in power/knowledge nexus, he claims, Foucault is unable to claim neither disciplinary power is bad or legitimate, nor human sciences are plausible or inadequate. Following these arguments, however, Nancy Fraser argues that Foucault's account of power without normative criteria, on the one hand, pre-supposes essential account; whereas, on the other hand, provides an implausible explanation for subjective constructions. For this reason, she has shown Foucault's critique of humanism and political emancipation is questionable. Therefore, to explain the relation between power and subject appropriately, Foucault

desperately needs normative criteria. On these grounds, this chapter concludes that Foucault's account without normative content is theoretically *inadequate* and politically *unfeasible.*

The second section, however, is debated on how agency and autonomy can be located in the anti-subjective hypothesis. In this conceptual debate, Thomas McCarthy has argued that Foucault's subjective construction and the genealogical method are inadequate *as they are the effect of power*. Amy Allen, in contrast to McCarthy's claim, has argued that Foucault's self-constitution and the account of power are compatible as *one should not take subjects as the mere product of power*. Peter Digeser, however, argues that Foucault's account is inadequate to explain the status of "forged subject" as it is a dilemma that whether it refers to the *quality of autonomy* or *the generation of the agency* in the power relations. Mark Bevir, nevertheless, claims that Foucault's account should be seen as a "critique of autonomy" rather than "critique of agency" because autonomy not only is presupposed essential human nature but also opposite to agency. However, according to James Wong, arguments of Bevir and Digeser are inadequate because not only agency and autonomy are related but also to evaluate the formation of subjects, one need not reject autonomy to maintain agency. The second section, therefore, concludes that since autonomy and agency are neither inscribed in human nature nor determined by power relations, they should be conceived as "regulative" because subjectivity and socio-historical conditions are mutually constitutive realities.

Chapter 5: Caste and Political Issues

5.1 Introduction

It is indisputable that Foucault's insights have propelled debate of power and subject on the nuanced ground yet another twist. Having said that, how his ideas are useful to study political problems is another issue to be worth discussing. Many critics have alleged skeptical claims regarding Foucault's thoughts to explaining and solving political problems. Not only are they dubious on Foucault's hesitancy to take consistent philosophical positions, but they have also questioned his tendency to engage in mere conceptual analysis. For example, one of the most prominent figures among them is Charles Taylor, who has argued though Foucault offers a better critique of history and social practices, he dashes out any solution or "way out" as a result of analysis he has given to us.[151] However, despite this claim, taking Foucault's these theoretical tools, an attempt is made here to address caste issues which, I hope, can shed light upon the current discussion on caste. In this engagement, two interconnected questions are relevant: (1) Can we use Foucault's concept of power and subject in the debate on caste issues which have predominantly occupied an intellectual exercise in the current socio-political debate? (2) Can we more plausibly understand Foucault's meaning of power and subject, which claims to be both "descriptive and critical" of the social practices and subjective formations, by placing them in the ongoing caste discussions? By taking this juxtaposition, particularly in the political debate of Indian context, this section deals with how one can understand caste and its political significance by applying Foucault's radical theoretical explanation of power and subject.

To evaluate the "power relations in the caste system," this chapter has been divided into two main sections. The first section of this chapter, therefore, proceeds with analysing a comparative debate between Marxism and Dalit discourse on two grounds: conceptual dispute in analysing power and subject; and disagreement in their political orientations. One might ask why such comparative discussion is necessary in the first place. There are three substantial reasons for such beginning: firstly, the political orientation of both rhetoric aim at the upliftment and

[151] Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David C. Hoy (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), 69.

emancipation of subaltern people; secondly, the Marxist discourse, however, subjugated Dalit discourse both politically and conceptually; thirdly, by comparing caste and class as the theoretical categories, power relations in the caste system can be evaluated adequately. In this debate, therefore, four significant questions are discussed such as: why caste is a more prominent issue than class in India; do caste and class mutually exclusive theoretical categories; is it possible to have reconciliation between them; what the differences between class and caste are. By asking these questions, how the power relations between class and caste are different and how subjectivities constructed in them are discussed. In this analysis, I would argue that "class relations" is not an appropriate approach to study Indian society, but on the contrary, it is the "caste relations" which is the significant feature to examine Indian socio-political-historical circumstances. Therefore, it is argued here that the very natures of power relations in these categories are quite different and specific kinds; and thereby, the subjects forged by them too. By contrasting and comparing class and caste, what I want to discuss here is, on the one hand, to critically engage with Marxism, on the other hand, to show Indian social structure is primarily based on caste rather than class.

The second section of this chapter, however, deals with how power relations and the subject formation in the caste system can be evaluated. Such an attempt is proposed because it is derived primarily from Foucault's radical departure in the explanation of the two concepts: power and subject. In this analysis, an attempt is made to study the mechanism of caste by the "methodological precautions of power" Foucault has suggested. In this conceptual examination, six basic assumptions are proposed: (1) power works more effectively when it is least observable (2) power construct subjectivities, (3) power studies should not be concentrated on "repressive aspect" alone, (4) power should be evaluated as "relation" rather than capacity, possession, and commodity, (5) caste identity is socially forged and historically constituted (6) caste is not discrimination alone; it represents the accumulation of capitals in determining the status of the subject in society. This engagement, however, brings out specific implications in which I would try to study how Foucault's ideas have a better understanding of studying the mechanisms of caste. With this caveat in mind, how caste practices forge subjects and why annihilation of caste ought to be the primary political problem are the main issues discussed here. It deals primarily with three questions: how to study caste, how subjects are constructed in the caste system; what is the current social status of the caste. In this endeavour, by applying Foucault's understanding of power, how

subjectivity in the caste system is constructed is the main issue analysed here. Let's evaluate each section as follows:

5.2 Marxism and Dalit Discourse: Political and Conceptual Disagreements

Dalits argue against Marxists and others that caste has been an indispensable issue in India, not because it is a misunderstood institution, but we hardly know its mechanism. Everybody knows and recognizes what caste is, but what all are unaware of is how caste works in our life. It is only when Dalit discourse has taken charge recently that the Marxists have started thinking their drawbacks and began to address caste issues, at least in their principle. It is the reason why "what is the status of caste in the present Indian society?" has become a central debate in the current socio-political atmosphere. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Dalit discourse has caused, at least indirectly, to bring out such debate between class and caste in the front. In this regard, "who can theorize caste"[152] has become a significant issue in the current socio-political debate. For this reason, Dalit discourse has emerged as "identity politics" against class politics as they claim class approach is not adequate to address identity issues such as caste. On that score, without bearing this context in mind, we cannot proceed with our above mentioned theoretical questions adequately. Let me begin by analyzing each question mentioned above as follows:

5.2.1 Why Caste is a Prominent Issue in India than Class

Firstly, let's evaluate how Marxists have failed to understand the mechanism of caste in their political as well as theoretical orientations. To answer this question, one has to reply to Indian Marxist's dilemma that "does Indian society have serious fundamental caste issues?" If so, how adequately Marxists have addressed such issues? If not, is it true that Indian society is based on class rather than caste? From Marxists, there are two main possible answers or positions which are essential in this context. The general position they have taken is that Indian society, like Western, is fundamentally structured and divided in terms of class. It follows that the class conflict is an inherent structure to Indian society and therefore, it is inevitable to have a political revolution which is achieved through "proletarian dictatorship".[153] The second possible position of Marxists have stressed is that caste may be one of the issues, but it is not the crucial one in the Indian social

[152] Gopal Guru, "How Egalitarian are the Social Sciences in India?," in *The Problem of Caste*, ed. Satish Deshpande (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2014), 107.
[153] Sunny M. Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Ghar Vapasi (Home Coming of the Homeless)," *YouTube*, August 19, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdvKso0HU-s.

reality. It is a moderate position, in which they emphasize, though caste is an issue, it has to be addressed within the class issue.[154] For that very reason, the fundamental problem Marxists want to solve is economic inequality and exploitation, which is directly related to class conflict.

Though Marxists were aware of caste's existence and its issues in the past, they did not theorize it adequately. They have admitted caste is one of the issues, but not the most important one. As a result, they have neglected caste as a significant socio-political issue as such; some have connived cautiously, while others have dodged it in the very beginning. The earlier Marxists, without any doubt, have asserted that there are no "caste issues" as an essential social problem. To illustrate my meaning: while claiming class is the central issue, the Marxists didn't pay enough attention to the caste problem in the past. For example, according to Sunny M Kapicadu, Marxist party in Kerala reduced studying caste issues into economic relations of class when it began to organize during 1940. Though in the renaissance period of Kerala (started at the end of 19th century), which has questioned caste discrimination at the core level forming several communities to address caste issues, later on with the emergence of the communist party, caste issues are subjugated from the public discourse. The renaissance period has remarked various community-organization formed by joining various sub-caste such as Sadhu Jana Paripalana Sangham (SJPS), Sree Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP) and Nair service society (NSS), and so on. It was the time when Kerala began to move into modernity by rejecting the caste values and social hierarchy, in which such communities had an important role to play. However, when the communist party had emerged, according to Kapicadu, they reduced complex caste issues to mere economic or labour problems. The peasant revolts conducted by the Marxist party in that period were very prominent. It has led them to think equating community as caste, and therefore, caste and community are pre-modern issues. It eventually directed Marxists to suppress caste issues to discuss in the public discourse.[155]

Suppressing caste issues is not the single unified subjugation associated with Marxist discourse alone, but it was also the general political atmosphere even in the freedom struggle period. Ambedkar, in the *Annihilation of Caste,* illustrates that during the freedom struggle period, two parties had existed, namely political reformist and social reformist for addressing socio-

[154] Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Home Coming of the Homeless."
[155] Sunny M. Kapicadu and Dalit Camera, "A Critique of Kerala Modernity by Sunny M Kapicadu," *YouTube*, March 22, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDlkXyto_Ps.

political issues. The former was obstinately concerned to get freedom from the British authority, whereas the latter, social reformation of the Indian social issues. When the freedom struggle went to its peak, under the leadership of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the social reformist party was abolished. The primary reason behind such a venture was, as political reformists had claimed, social reformation in India is unnecessary. According to them, the only main issue in India is to get freedom from Britain because they firmly believed that any social problems would be solved after gaining independence. Though the very idea of social reformation had vanished, their "social reform" was not exactly "annihilating caste" but removing the Hindu upper-caste family issues such as child marriages and widowhood. In short, even during the freedom struggle, none of the political leaders has stood for the reformation of Indian society because they were not interested in addressing caste issues.

In contrast to the Marxian explanation of society, which is based on economic structure alone, Dalits claim, studying caste structure is essential to understand Indian society rather than class. They claim, more than economic structure and class conflict, social stratification, i.e. castes in India is the main determining factor not only in social life but also in economic relations. It indicates that one has to evaluate Indian society and its power structures in terms of caste rather than class. According to Dalit thinkers, the reason why Marxists in India failed to address the socio-political issue satisfactorily because they have fumbled to understand the nature of power relations in Indian society. The methodological tool they have used to study Indian socio-historical circumstances is "class relations of power", which is not significantly related to Indian social reality. More than economic inequality, Indian society is deprived of social disparity at great length, which is a different kind of power relations altogether. Even the economic conditions such as modes of economic productions and relations of production are strongly related to or even based on caste (social inequality) rather than class (economic disparity). For example, it is often asked how agriculture in Kerala has reduced its production after the independence of India. It is because, as Kapicadu argues, the untouchable caste educationally got uplifted (in the renaissance period of Kerala, all OBC, ST/SC belonged to untouchables) and are not ready to do their traditional caste job. Agriculture in Kerala has direct caste relations as it was the job assigned to untouchables, particularly the castes such as Ezhava, Parayan, Pulayan, and so on.[156] It indicates that Indian

[156]Sunny M. Kapicadu and Manorama News, "I Learned about Caste very early on; Sunny M Kapicadu," *YouTube*, December 2, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yrt6q_aGklY.

society is not structured primarily in terms of "economic relation of class" exclusively. Therefore, it is indispensable to analyse caste because, in India, economic relations such as owning the property, accumulation and distribution of productions are determined by "social relations", i.e. the caste stratification.

Similarly, Anand Teltumbde claims the main factor of subjugation of the caste issue subordinated to the class analysis has happened because Marxists have given an over-emphasis on base and the superstructure metaphor.[157] The so-called Marxist have exceedingly popularised the notion of the basic structure, at times even vulgarised, and by doing so, they have neglected the aspects of the superstructure at primary concern. Theoretically, for the so-called Marxist, caste belongs to the superstructure, which is perceived as "determined" by the economic base structure alone. As a result, this mechanical interpretation of the base-superstructure metaphor made them not to address the caste issues appropriately. He also points out that one of the significant reasons why they have not addressed caste issues is the fact that the early communists in India typically were educated middle class and upper caste. Though they have started their activities with trade unions, they were obsessed with the base-superstructure metaphor in the working of party politics. As a result, along with the fear of organizational breakup, their confrontation with caste was limited. He adds further; it is only after the eruption of the Naxalite movement, which has roots in caste issues, the caste questions in the Marxist discourse have been discussed seriously.[158] On these grounds, it is clear that Marxists discourse, by and large, not only inadequately addressed caste issues but also subjugated them in the mainstream intellectual discussions both politically and theoretically.

5.2.2 Do Caste and Class as the Theoretical Categories Mutually Exclusive?

No words have had a significant political consequence as caste and class have in India. Though the class political movement was predominant in India than caste, the caste political activities have become an overwhelming "discourse" now. In this light, the current working-class movement can be broadly divided into two camps: Ambedkarites and Marxists. The debate around them mainly has arisen in terms of whether caste and class are mutually exclusive, opposite to

[157] Anand Teltumbde, "Dichotomisation of Caste and Class," *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 47 (November 2016): 36, https://www.epw.in/.
[158] Teltumbde, "Class and Caste," 36.

each other, complementary, reducible to each other or compatible with each other. What underlines in these endeavours most of the time, strictly speaking, at least by a significant number of people, is an effort to make their work appear incompatible, if not contradictory. Gopal guru argues that there always has been an attempt from Marxist to treat the class as a superior social category over others such as caste, gender and so on. Either divergence of caste, that is considering class and caste are mutually exclusive, or reducing caste to class, has been a political practice of the mainstream left.[159]According to Guru, Dalit Mukti March (Dalit liberation front) and the left-led anti-untouchability forum would be some of the examples for such attempt.

However, it is to be noted that there are attempts made in the current political debate treating caste and class are theoretically mutually exclusive. Though these two camps often have conceptual conflicts, their extreme versions are, nevertheless, obsessed with their ideological stands by claiming caste and class are completely independent social realities. Currently, some of the Dalit thinkers are attempting such task rigorously as did Marxists in the past by portraying caste and class are characteristically different in studying socio-political issues. They also, like earlier Marxists, who have held class struggle as the only reality in India, have considered Marx and Ambedkar are opposite to each other. According to them, Marxists have reduced examining Indian society merely into class relation and have been backed by their ideological delusion. They argue, for Marxists, caste remains the domain of the "unexplained", not because its complex intricacies have "misunderstood" but they have failed to understand its mechanism. The earlier Marxists didn't address caste issues independently as they were on the belief that caste has to be discussed within the class domain. Guru argues Marxists have believed class as a theoretically privileged category over other categories such as caste, gender and so on because they erroneously thought that class has an "internal coherence" to comprise every other category.[160] For this reason, Marxists have failed to realize that caste as a separate essential social reality like class. In the Foucauldian terminology, it can be claimed that Dalit issues were "excluded" by the dominant discourse of Marxism.[161] In that sense, the upcoming Dalit discourse can be termed what Foucault says "subjugated knowledge".

---

[159] Gopal Guru, "Shifting Categories on Discourse on Caste and Class," *Economic and Political Weekly, 51*, no. 47 (November 2016): 24, https://www.epw.in/.
[160] Guru, "Caste and Class,"24.
[161] Kapicadu and Dalit Camera, "A Critique of Kerala Modernity."

As a social aspect, caste for Marxist was theoretically belonged to superstructure alone and was not a vital social factor as such. They adamantly believed that when "basic economic structure" changes, then superstructure (here, caste) will also change. That is the reason why the caste issue has received only lopsided attention from different quarters of Marxists discourse. Though Marxists have not blacked out the caste issues completely, it is evident that the elicited academic interest of Marxist discourse has not addressed its significant reference points. For this reason, it is the debate such as reducing caste issues into class and approaching them as mutually exclusive that our discussion is grounded. That being said, any attempt either of synthesizing Marxism and Ambedkarism or treating them mutually exclusive on a theoretical level would be trivial. Similarly, any effort of comparing and differentiating their views by an attempt of reduction would be a prejudice of subordinating one over another. What is essential is, neither an attempt to place them mutually exclusive nor synthesising, but building a conceptual ground to have an appropriate conversation between them. In this light, Marxian perception of class and class struggle may be unacceptable, but the concept of "class" should not be abandoned. That class should not be rejected because caste can be understood better by its comparison with caste. It is not to claim that class and caste are the same, but they are indeed comparable. For that very reason, an attempt is made here to understand caste stratification by comparing class division by applying the Foucauldian theory of power and subject. It is in this debate between Marxism and Ambedkarism based on class and caste that our research question is grounded.

5.2.3. Is it Possible to have a Reconciliation between Class and Caste as the Theoretical Categories?

It is the usual proposal suggested by matured Marxist[162], who has realized the existing Marxian tool is not enough to study Indian society. This approach is not necessarily intended to have a conclusive end to reconcile caste and class, but searching for, on what grounds their possibility of interconnections is plausible. For example, according to Sunil P Ilayidam, the earliest, perhaps the prominent evidence of such interpretation is found in Ambedkar's notable writing *Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development*.[163] In this essay, he argues,

[162] The matured Marxist is someone who understood the significance of other aspects of social reality along with the class.

[163] Ilayidam, Sunil P., and Yuvasamithi KSSP. "Ambedkar and Democratic Thoughts." *YouTube*. November 13, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJl1Pqq3hS4.

Ambedkar claims that the theory of "class conflict may be an exaggeration", but classes in a society are a fact though their basis differs. He adds further that not only does the class that first made itself into a caste, but caste is also an "enclosed class" and even early Indian society could not have been an exemption to this.[164] This points out that the theory of class is still an applicable theoretical tool to study Indian society even though it is not the same "class" Marx has talked about. Similarly, he argues that Ambedkar didn't reject "class approach" as such. Though explicitly didn't speak for it, Ambedkar's usage of "depressed classes" at Ratnagiri Khoti strike, observation of "enclosed class" in defining caste and naming his party as "Indian labour party" can be considered that, at least implicitly, he had proclaimed that class politics is inevitable in our society.[165]

Ilayidam also argues that the "obsession with class analysis", for which Marxists have been criticized, is not exactly true because there are pieces of evidence to substantiate that Marx has studied other socially relevant aspects apart from class. According to Ilayidam, Marx has studied other socially relevant aspects after 1870, which can be seen as Marx's self-reflective attempt to re-examine his own thoughts. Evidence for such a claim can be found in the late published work *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx* which consists of Marxian observation of American civil war, the Irish civil war and along with the social formations of Russia and India. Marx's view regarding American labour was notably significant in which he stated that in America, labour was conjoined with racism. For America, therefore, Marx says, their revolution is also, as a matter of fact, debunking racism along with capitalism. Since this work was later published, Ilayidam argues, Marxists all over the world, by the time, had exaggerated "base-superstructure" metaphor mechanically. This could be a reason why Marxism has been "mechanically" interpreted as "materialistic determinism" coupled with class conflict theory. This indicates that like Ambedkar, who has observed the social aspects of the class, Marx also, however, with a different emphasis, considered the significance of other social aspects in understanding social reality along with the class.[166] In this light, it is highly implausible to say that caste and class as the theoretical categories are mutually exclusive in their mechanisms. However, it is also noted that we should not treat them as the obverse and the reverse side of the same coin, either. With this in view, any theoretical

---

[164] B.R. Ambedkar, *Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development* (Bombay: Ssoft Group, India, 2016), 15.
[165] Sunil P. Ilayidam and Navamalayali Online Magazine, "Sunil P Ilayidam on Ambedkar and Marx: Possibilities of Debate and Synchronicity," *YouTube*, February 13, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xp_jsdJsqTk.
[166] Ibid.

attempts to examine Indian social issues, by portraying caste and class are opposite or mutually exclusive, would be trivial; so would any political orientation of such basis.[167]

5.2.4 What is the Difference between Class and Caste?

Though caste and class have enough commonality to build up a conceptual scheme, their "general" distinguishing characteristics can be certainly pointed out. According to Ilayidam, the significant difference between caste and class is that caste is a "social category", whereas class is an "analytical category". To analyse society, we, theorists, use "class" as a methodological tool or theoretical entity to examine social reality, but caste is a definite experiential social actuality which has material existence. It does not mean that class as social reality does not have any empirical content. Nevertheless, the class should be seen as "theoretical content" compared to caste because it is not easy to point out its features empirically. Further, to define what class is, there is a significant theoretical gap between defining it (theory) and experiencing it (practice). In that sense, the class has abstract aspects in its theoretical nature in which its features are, in principle, mainly conceptually thought about, whereas "caste" is a concrete reality which is, strictly speaking, empirically recognizable. To put it bluntly, there is a considerable breach between defining a class theoretically and understanding its mechanism empirically, whereas, once a particular caste is differentiated, it is, theoretically speaking, constituted ostensibly with an empirical consideration.

Another distinguishable feature, Ilayidam illustrates, is that, in the caste system, one becomes a member through hereditarily, whereas in the class system, a person belongs to a class by the acquisition of education, wealth, and so on. Caste can be said to be the stable, static and considerably well-defined social structure in which social mobility probably is, in general, not possible. Class, on the other hand, is dynamic, and it allows social mobility to improve social status. Since hereditary determines the lifetime status in the caste system, the identity of an individual is well constructed. Theoretically speaking, it defines what one *is* by determining what one *ought to be* both socially and morally. It not only determines what one is but also segregates individuals in a graded inequality as either low, lower, and lowest or high, higher and highest by

[167] Here, class is not taken in the Marxian sense. In the Marxian perspective, the class is derived from the modes and relations of productions. But, what I have mentioned here as the class is not the economic sense alone. On the contrary, it also denotes its other basis as well such as social, intellectual, symbolic, and so on.

putting them into fixed social stratifications.[168] Individuals in the class, however, can have mobility in the social status as the class structure is not permanently constituted and predestined. The caste system is supported on religious grounds followed by certain customs and rituals. But, social classes have no religious inclinations as such and do not have any prescribed practices and rituals, which the members ought to follow. Importantly, the class system is based on, especially the Marxian concept, means and modes of productions, whereas, caste is grounded on the very hereditary biological reproductive relation and its perpetuations.

The significant distinguishing factor between class and caste, which I have already mentioned above, is the "kind" of subjects they produce. The very subjectivity construction in these two social stratifications is an essential contention in our discussion because the very comparison not only shows the nature of subjectivities but also the kind of power relations. As far as the subject's formation is concerned, in the caste system, it is deeply constructed as a normalized reality through deep ideological construction, unlike in the class. For this reason, the operations of power relations in these social systems are not only empirically different but also conceptually distinctive. More than a degree of exercise, power operates differently in these two social stratifications, in which they are distinguished not by the "degree" but by the "kind". Since these two stratifications produce distinctive subjectivities, class and caste should be seen as different kinds of power relations rather than its degree of exercises. In other words, as they are different kinds of power relations, the subjectivity in the caste system is stable and structured than class. The fundamental difference between caste and class lies in the fact that power works in the caste system at its maximum than the class system in constructing fixed subjectivities. Therefore, theoretically speaking, caste is an *identity*, whereas class is not. Put it bluntly, it is the construction of the subjectivities that class and caste should be seen as different, which are, however, constituted by the *kind* of power relations embedded in both social stratifications.

5.3 Studying the Mechanism of Caste by Using Foucault's Tools

Though caste and class are significant to understand Indian society, the question of caste has to be addressed with a primary concern than class. I have already described how Marxist have avoided it in their theoretical analysis and sometimes been expelled by their ideological obsession.

[168] Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Homecoming of the Homeless."

However, by using Foucault's insights of power and subject, particularly using his methodological precautions of power, in this section, an attempt is made to study the mechanism of caste. There are three questions crucial to such analysis: (1) How to study caste? (2) How are subjects constructed in caste? (3) What is the status of caste in the present Indian society? Though these three questions are independently posited, they are interconnected and should be treated inseparably. The first questions emphasize to analyze under what mechanisms caste as a social institution has established as a social reality. It also deals with how we study caste or power, not necessarily what it is, but how it *works* in social life. The second question attempts to explain the nature of caste identity and how it is constituted. It not only analyses how subjects are constructed in caste but also how it should be evaluated by studying the mechanism of power. However, the third question aims at evaluating the existing understanding of caste, which deals with how caste works in the modern social world. It focuses on how by studying power relations suggested by Foucault, one could understand not only the mechanism of the present caste issues but also its contemporary relevance and scope. It is these prominent questions that Dalit discourse has evoked new avenues and perspectives of caste issues with a rigorous academic interest in the current political scenario. It is in this spirit that Dalits thinkers argue the existing social theories, which have not taken caste as a central issue, are inadequate to study Indian society. Let's evaluate each question as follows:

5.3.1 How to Study Caste?

According to Foucault, power needs to be historically understood within the complex social conditions. The same also applies to one who undertakes to analyze the complex intricacies of the caste problem. Castes are historically constituted and therefore the subjectivity forged by them too. Since caste is a system of power relations, it should be seen as a historically constituted and socially forged institution. The primordial aspect of studying the stratification of caste, therefore, lies in analyzing it as historical and social instead of seeing it as "essential attribution" of human beings. It is argued by Ambedkar in his notable writing *Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development* that "abler pens" in his time failed to understand caste mechanisms because they did not take caste as historical. Those subtler mind's mistakes lie in trying to explain caste

complexities as a "closed system".[169] They attempted to explain caste *essentially* by asking "ontological" questions. They tried to describe caste ontologically by proposing an "essential account" referring to specific features of it.

To illustrate, Mr Senet defined caste issues in terms of "idea of pollution", but Ambedkar rejected it by saying such ideas originated as part of priestly ceremonialism that came into existence historically. Similarly, Mr Nesfield and Mr H. Risley, who defined caste in terms of limiting social intercourse and practicing positive prohibition, according to Ambedkar, deserve no special attention because caste institution as a "self-enclosed unit" naturally does it so. However, Dr Ketkar defines the "*prohibition of intermarriage and membership by autogeny*"[170] as two characteristics of caste, which, Ambedkar argues, elucidated nothing new but two sides of the same coin. According to Ambedkar, when one understands the custom of endogamy as historically constituted and how it is maintained, then the genesis and the mechanism of caste proves rightly understood. As stated by Ambedkar: "*Thus the superposition of endogamy on exogamy means the creation of caste.*"[171] Where others tried to explain what caste is, Ambedkar studied how caste practices historically came into existence. In other words, while others tried to define caste essentially (what is caste), Ambedkar studied it historically (i.e. how caste works). It is in this sense that Ambedkar states that since caste is historically constructed, it is possible to conceive the annihilation of caste historically.

Another significant aspect of the caste system is, as Ambedkar noted down, its cultural foundation. Indian culture has not been an "amalgamation" of people but a cultural unity. Ethnically all people are heterogeneous as to their physique, even with the skin colour, from south to north, as does the east to west. The clothes people wear, the food they eat, the language they use, all of them would differ ethnically. However, the Hindu society is not a "mere federation of the mutually exclusive unit"[172], but it has a homogeneous cultural unity. As Ambedkar claims; "it is the unity of the culture that is the basis of homogeneity"[173]. Since India has profound and fundamental cultural unity, it has homogeneous unity, which not only does embrace geographical

[169] Sunil P. Ilayidam and Yuvasamithi KSSP, "Ambedkar and Democratic Thoughts," *YouTube*, November 13, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJl1Pqq3hS4.
[170] Ambedkar, *Castes in India*, 8.
[171] Ibid, 9.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid, 6.

differences, but it does also connect people too. It is in this foundation that the mechanism of caste has to be understood. As Ambedkar says; "caste is a parcelling of an already homogeneous unit, and the explanation of the genesis of Caste is the explanation of this process of parcelling".[174] It bears out the central point of the caste mechanism that "caste is not an isolated unit by itself"[175]. Castes have to be understood as a "whole" with "definite relations" and they are "complementary" to each other. As Ambedkar points out; "[t]here is no such thing as a caste: [t]here are always castes"[176]. Though caste's existence is identified through its relation to other castes, each caste is "conscious of its existence and survival" by distinguishing itself from other castes. "Its survival is the be-all and end-all of its existence".[177] By endeavouring to segregate each caste from others, the Hindu has only the "consciousness of caste" than a society. For this reason, Ambedkar argues "Hindu society as such does not exist".[178] That is to say, Hindu society is nothing but the collection of these self-enclosed units, which precariously lacks what sociologists call "consciousness of kind".[179]

As described above, caste should be analyzed as a "relation" rather than a thing. Since Power, according to Foucault, exercises in our "relation" to others, the same can be applied to the caste system too. Ambedkar's view on caste is significant here: "[c]aste is not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line of barbed wire which prevents the Hindus from co-mingling and which has, therefore, to be pulled down".[180] It follows that one can identify "power relations" only the social relations by which individuals are constructed as subjects because society is not mere individuals but is an ensemble of individual's social interrelations. Since caste is a "power system", we can think of caste's validity only with its relation to other "castes". It is in the social relation between individuals that caste works and identified. For this reason, Ambedkar's observation is worth thinking that "*caste in the singular number is an unreality. Castes exist only in the plural*

[174] Ambedkar, *Castes in India*, 6.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid, 20.
[177] B. R. Ambedkar and Arundhati Roy, *Annihilation of Caste: The Annotated Critical Edition*, ed. S. Anand (New Delhi: Navayana, 2014), 242.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ambedkar has taken this term from American sociologist Franklin Henry Giddings, who has studied underlying law that defines a society. According to Giddings, the consciousness of a kind is "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself." (Franklin H. Giddings, *The Principles Of Sociology* (New Delhi: Cosmo, 2004), 17).
[180] Ambedkar and Roy, *Annihilation of Caste*, 46.

number."[181] Similarly, caste relation has to be taken into consideration as a whole rather than a single unified entity because Foucault argues, "power is everywhere" (*HS,* 93*)* in society. For this reason, caste has to be understood as a "net-like institution" which always circulates or functions in the "form of a chain". In that sense, power is everywhere in the caste system; not because it "determines" everything; but it can be wielded from all sides in any direction.

Similarly, studying caste should not be concerned with power at the "level of conscious intention" by any particular individual, but at what level it has been invested in its "real and effective practices". Caste is an empirical reality, a social institution in which all subjects share its values though all of them do not have the same status in it. Everyone is part of the caste system and shares its social practices and beliefs, though some of them stand on the top whereas some others in the bottom. It does not mean that power in the caste system is a capacity of particular individuals possessed over others. Theoretically speaking, as Foucault argues, all are subject to power, and power is not "possessed" by any individuals. Some individuals unquestionably do have upper hand in the caste system, but it does not qualify to say that they are free from the caste system and thereby free from power relations. Power or caste has to be studied with its multiple forms of exercises implemented through various social practices and beliefs rather than perceiving the mere capacity of particular individuals. What is necessary for studying caste or power relation is how subjects are gradually constituted through a multiplicity of practices where power installs and produces itself. To put it briefly, it is necessary for a "power or caste study" that its focus must not be particular individuals (assuming they possess power) but multiple ways of its exercises at the micro-level. For this reason, political rhetoric against caste is not the issues of the Dalit alone; it should be seen as the issue of the society as a whole.

As described above, in the caste system, caste works independently of any particular individual's will. "Caste identity" is, therefore, constituted not necessarily from one's choice. It does not mean that an individual is entirely determined by caste, but to say "individual's will" alone can alter it willingly is not possible. Though individuals should be seen as the conscious, rational agent in the caste stratification, who is capable of revolting and reproducing its mechanism, caste as a social stratification is not determined by personal decisions exclusively. If a person alone can determine and choose caste identity, caste would have been demolished a long

[181] Ambedkar and Roy, *Annihilation of Caste*, 9.

time before. Caste combines the social and individual because though the experience of one's social life may be unique in their specificity, they are, in essence, moulded by caste structure. In the essay, *Caste in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development,* Ambedkar argues that the origin and development of caste cannot be attributed to any particular individuals (for example, law-giver Manu) or any particular group (Brahmins). Caste cannot be imposed upon either by propagating any set of conspiracy theory or implementing through any Shastras. Neither Manu nor Brahmin are the *founder* of caste because caste is a historically constituted institution which can have different historical origins, discontinuities and rupture. As an established institution, to perpetuate its mechanism, upper castes do have their role, but to say, they are the founder would be pointless. In short, caste is an institution developed through various social conditions and historical aspects as it is historically constituted independently of the individual agency and individual will.

As described above, in studying caste, individuals should not be seen as exercising power and constitute one's subjectivity independently, but they should be seen as inculcated in social relations as members of a particular caste or caste identities. For this reason, the caste atrocities are considered as a hate crime[182] than an individual one because members of the same caste by definition share structurally similar positions and social conditions that engender the structurally comparable experience of social relations, practices and social process. Caste, therefore, should be seen as an ensemble of social relations in which all its members have *their own* social positions and relationships. For this reason, it is erroneous to say that caste is an issue of Dalit alone. Dalit may be the victim of its serious atrocities, but they are not the only vehicle of perpetuating its mechanism. Individual or particular caste people alone cannot carry caste because it is perpetuated and circulated through all its members as all of them are its wheels. Power in the caste works outside of the individual will, where all castes are correlated with each other though subjects or individuals are "different" individually.

Since individuals are the structurally unique social configuration in the caste system, power in the caste stratification is not individually held by any particular person or caste. According to

[182] It is a crime motivated because of the membership of certain social groups such as race, nationality, gender and religion etc. In such cases, though the individuals are a victim of crime, it occurs not because of individual offence but the hate constructed over the group in a society in which they belong. (Sunny M. Kapicadu and Biju Mohan, "Dalit Politics at a Time when Fascism was Destroying India," *YouTube*, September 8, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_NWLSx_CBM).

Foucault, it is not individuals who exercise power, but they are constructed by power. For this reason, in the caste system, all of its members should be seen as the "constructed subjectivities" whether it is a Brahmin or untouchable. Individuals are the prime effects of power through the various set of practices which constitute particular "caste identity". Power in the caste system, never localized in anybody's hand but circulates connecting individuals between its threats. The individual is not an "elementary nucleus" on which power works, but "[i]ndividuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (*PK*, 98). One must conduct, therefore, analysis of power, starting with its "infinitesimal mechanisms" which have its techniques and strategies invested, displaced and extended in various social practices individuals perform. On this ground, to understand the subject constitution in the caste system, we need to examine how power exercises at the micro-level where its procedures are manifested.

As power, according to Foucault, is "intentional but non-subjective", the same also can be applied to studying the mechanism of the caste system. This claim seems to be paradoxical as one might ask how an action is intentional without presupposing subjects. From Foucault's point of view, though individuals should be seen as acting with a set of intentions with some interest and desires in the given power relations, *caste as a power system* does not have any essential objective interests and explicit aims as such. The caste system as a whole with its conflicting forces and functions, institutionalized entitlements and individual's intentions, should not be seen as having specific objective aims as such. It does not mean that no one is responsible for caste atrocities and thereby the domination as well as the suppression. It is essential to situate individuals in the caste system as conscious acting subjects who constitute, reproduce and modify the social relations characterized by caste. All caste practices or actions certainly are intentional though caste is an unintended consequence of intentional actions of individuals. However, it does not mean that it has resulted from individual decisions and intentions exclusively. Empirically, at the practical level, individuals or particular caste are certainly responsible for atrocities if it is happened by them because they are certainly *intended*. However, in principle, *caste as a system* does not have any exact conscious intention as such because it is not constituted by individual decisions or intentions as such. Caste as a system of power relations should be seen as non-subjective because power is not a possession or capacity of particular individuals. At the individual level, caste certainly has intentions; however, as a system of power relations, it does not have an overarching

plan with an explicit intention as such. Therefore, caste should be seen as "intentional but non-subjective".

Since power relations in the caste system are intentional but non-subjective, not only everyone is subjected to caste through multiple ways such as through rituals, marriage, occupations and so on, but also none of its members or particular caste is free from the power relations embedded in the caste system. All its members are subjected to power relations embedded in the caste practices in various ways. It is for this reason that the social revolution of caste brings changes not only for Dalits but also for all other caste's members. For example, according to Kapicadu, Kerala renaissance, in general, is considered as a subaltern movement as it was the fight against the caste system particularly started with the subaltern revolutionaries such as Narayana Guru, Ayyankali and so on. Nevertheless, it has brought a radical change in Kerala society not only for Dalits but also for Brahmin and other upper castes as well. Sambandham, Smartha Vicharam and other evil practices in the Brahmin caste along with untouchability got vanished by Kerala renaissance. In that sense caste issues are the problem of all; so is the case with revolutionary benefits.[183]

Similarly, since caste is intentional but non-subjective, power relations in the caste system is not a possession and capacity of particular individuals as such. For this reason, it is not only for Dalits caste is undesirable power relations but also upper castes as well. For example, though Brahmin said to have "upper hand" having institutionalized entitlements reserved in the caste system, they are the one indeed deeply constructed inhumanly. Sundar Sarukkai in his essay, "Phenomenology of Untouchability," argues that the most untouchable person in the caste system is Brahmin.[184] The very practice of untouchability made Brahmin morally degraded and

[183] Sunny M. Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Annihilation of Caste: Modernity, Gandhi and Ambedkar," *YouTube*, May 31, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GTXyBvbhKc.

[184]Sundar Sarukkai, in his essay, "Phenomenology of Untouchability," argues that untouchability is not only a judgement of '*other'*, but also it is a practice of making oneself not *touchable*. Though untouchability is an essential marker of Brahminhood, by internalising such practices, Brahmin essentially constitutes oneself an untouchable. Brahmin maintains such practices rigorously as part of their religious dharma (It is also noted that each caste also practices untouchability to those who have below status to them, but here I am taking Brahmin and Dalit as example because they are the extreme contrast in the caste system) which not only made them untouchable at the core but also constructed their subjectivity deeply. Dalit, however, becomes untouchable by external imposition without having any choice, but for Brahmins, untouchability is self-constituted by being religious. Untouchability, for a Brahmin, is not only an action but also a moral judgement, which decides with whom they should have *contact*. However, untouchability for a Dalit is an activity of 'being judged' which decides with whom they should *not* have contact. On the one hand, the very practice of untouchability suppressed Dalit and destroyed their dignity, whereas, on the other hand, such practices made Brahmin self-tortured subjects by slaughtering their dignity themselves. Untouchability

forced them to treat themselves to be not *touchable*. Kapicadu argues that the practice of untouchability constructed Brahmin communities incapable of possessing human virtues such as equality, brotherhood and sense of freedom. He adds further, untouchability is dehumanising not only for Dalits but also Brahmins though such practices function in them differently.[185] On this ground, it is clear that the caste issues are not exactly the problem of Dalit alone, but it also refers to the predicament of all its members. Caste makes humans unequal, undemocratic and after all, dehumanising. Therefore, the annihilation of caste as a socio-political agenda is essential to reforming and developing Indian society.

Another aspect of studying power relations in the caste system is based on analyzing how the repressive aspects and domination should be evaluated. Studying the power relations in the caste system, one should not be concentrated on repressive aspects and hierarchical domination alone. The caste system is a power relation not necessarily because it is essentially hierarchical, but it "constructs subjects". There is no doubt that caste is a "graded inequality"; however, how power constructs caste identity is the essential question in studying caste rather than analyzing in terms of the old formula "power over". It does not mean that one should reject the hierarchical aspects; but, one should take hierarchy as one of the features of power, not *the* essential one. It implies that one should significantly highlight the complexity of the subject's formations in analyzing the mechanism of caste rather than examining its hierarchical aspect exclusively. It is through the subject constructions in multiple ways that hierarchy in the caste system is maintained. If hierarchical order is the *only* "fundamental aspect", how "power relations" between people in the same caste is conceivable would be a vexed issue. Therefore, it is through examining how subjects are constructed in the caste system that hierarchy can be understood, and not vice versa.

One might ask, however, how the power relations in the caste system should be seen, if not through hierarchical aspects. Answering this question, one should understand that not only does

made Brahmin inhuman whereas Dalit victim of its brutalities. It indicates that immediate reformation morally as well as socially is needed not for the so-called untouchables (Dalits), but the so-called religious, pious Brahmin. In other words, the political agenda of the annihilation of caste denotes not only upliftment of Dalit from suppression but also reforming Brahmin as '*Human'*. Therefore, caste stratification is not the issue of Dalit alone, but it is a disease got contagious to all its members. (Sundar Sarukkai, "Phenomenology of Untouchability," in *The Problem of Caste*, ed. Satish Deshpande (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2014), 98-106; Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Home Coming of the Homeless").

[185] Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Home Coming of the Homeless."

caste have a vertical aspect (i.e. hierarchy), but it does also have a horizontal character.[186] This "horizontal aspect" characterizes a caste as an identity by which its members identify each other and form a sense of belongingness. It gives a sense of security and makes the members believe the same caste people as their own and others are different (or not equal). For this reason, when people migrate, get married and even think about others well-being, a "caste preference" is favoured. Maintaining all sorts of caste privileges, whether cultural, political, economic and symbolic, have to be understood with this horizontal aspect along with the vertical feature. However, power in the caste system exercises not with these two dimensions alone, but in multiple forms. For instance, as far as women are concerned, caste is not merely "Brahminical", but it is "Brahmanical patriarchy". Similarly, the subject constitution of Dalit women is not as same as upper-caste women. It is in this sense that, as Foucault says, power is everywhere and it has multiple functions in constituting subjectivities.

Hierarchy is based on the "repressive hypothesis" which is, of course, the significant aspect, but it is not enough to explain power's complexities. Identifying power with only oppression aspects is to assume that power is exercised from one source and rejects its different relations in the entire caste system. It can give us only the repressive, dominative and therefore, "pathological" perspective of power. If caste issues are attributed to the repressive aspect alone, we tend to think its mechanisms only relating to its pathological features (for example, untouchability). It is one of the reasons why many people doubt do castes exist in urban areas where its pathological grievances seem to be absent. Ajith Kumar, for instance, shares a similar argument on how caste plays a significant role in both "popular" as well as "art" cinema, particularly in Malayalam. He says Dalit issues always portrayed in films in terms of severe atrocities such as rape and untouchability, and by doing so, it has made a belief that caste is fundamentally untouchability. Kumar, therefore, claims it has led to several difficulties in representing other subtle issues of caste and thereby, understanding "Malayali subjectivities".[187] Caste is not untouchability alone as it has various interrelations with our social domains such as land, language, art, food habits and the very production of knowledge, and so on. The questions related to its function and processes are many and at the same time highly complicated. Thus, to

[186] Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Modernity, Gandhi and Ambedkar."

[187] Ajith Kumar and Dalit Camera, "Ajith Kumar (Part-I) Caste in Cinema," *YouTube*, April 30, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_srujpVMuk.

begin with, it is pertinent to inquire what kind of subjectivity caste constructed than beginning with the "hierarchical model" and repressive hypothesis. That is to say, in speaking of subject formation and operation of power, we have to address in what ways power is effectively embodied in the caste institution where its subjects subjugated in different ways.

One might ask what if one analyses caste in terms of Foucault's positive interpretation of power. Since, for Foucault, power can be constraining and producing, can we say caste is productive? It brings the old defenders of the caste who claim it is a system meant for transmitting skills and developing one's potential, and not necessarily intended to be discriminatory. The philosophical justification for them to defend such a claim is the theory of "*Chaturvarna*". The defenders of *Chaturvarna* say that "Varna'' and "caste" are not the same since Varna is based on "guna" (quality) and "karma" (action), unlike caste which is strictly based on birth. Their concern lies in the argument that "*Chaturvarna'' is* seriously misunderstood. It may sound plausible, but there is nothing more sterile than admitting it. For example, according to Kapicadu, the prominent figure who has stated such a claim was Gandhi. Gandhi has considered, claims Kapicadu, *Chaturvarna* is the great model for the entire world because it can provide freedom to every individual in achieving one's potential. Caste atrocities, however, for him was the moral degradation that happened to Indian society, particularly upper caste people as the spiritual truth of '*Chaturvarna'* is wholly misunderstood by them. According to him, it is an outcome of the lack of spiritual growth in understanding the divine order called *Chaturvarna* that moral degradation in treating human beings came into existence in the caste system. Once upper caste people grow spiritually and correct their misconception, Gandhi has thought, caste issues can be solved. In other words, according to Gandhi, solving caste atrocities lies in the spiritual growth of upper caste people when they become "spiritually altruistic beings". For Gandhi, therefore, solving caste atrocity is the issue not necessarily related to the "right" of the discriminated people but is the moral debasement that happened to those, who do discriminations. Gandhi was, therefore, interested in solving caste atrocities such as untouchability only as part of social reformations but was not in favour of abolishing caste.[188]

Though the defenders of caste proclaim varna and caste are different, the fundamental problem with Gandhi and other defenders rests in the fact that they are not all successful in

[188] Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Modernity, Gandhi and Ambedkar."

distinguishing Varna and caste not only theoretically but also empirically. It follows that though they claim the notion of karma is precisely founded on Guna, which is given by birth, they paradoxically presuppose it is from essential human nature that subjectivity is constituted. *Chaturvarna* is based on essential human nature which does not accept socio-historical conditions in constituting human "subjectivities". From Foucault's perspective, for this reason, not only "*Chaturvarna"* is a baseless theory, but also deserves nothing significant to study society. The theory of *Chaturvarna* without any doubt should be seen as the means of ideological construction of caste. Foucault's account unquestionably would reject such theories as groundless because he rejects universal human nature in understanding subjectivity as subjects, according to him, are socio-historically constructed. On this ground, Foucault's account of power would unquestionably reject caste is "productive" claim if argued in connection with the theory of "*Chaturvarna*".

However, caste in the productive sense is objectionable not only with this line of argument alone, but it is also unacceptable as it does not qualify to call even a power relation in the productive sense. Power is productive for Foucault only when it is operated on the free subject who has resistance in power relations. One of the arguments of the defenders of the caste often raises the claim that caste is productive because basically, it is a division of labour. Since it is the division of labour, they claim it is not necessarily a discriminatory system but is a productive social stratification. However, the caste system cannot be productive with this classification of jobs as it primarily discriminates labourers along with the labour. As Ambedkar rightly pointed out: "The caste system is not merely a division of labour. It is also a division of labourers".[189] Occupational status of caste is unnatural as labour and labourers are graded one above other by placing them into "watertight compartments". Labour in the caste system is not based on either natural aptitude or one's choice. Moreover, it is an institution which does not allow any individual to choose an occupation when social conditions change. Lacking readjustment in occupation and predestination in choice are the basic features of labour in the caste system. Therefore, the claim that caste is productive is futile if argued with the division of labour. Therefore, caste cannot be called a power system in the productive sense as it is not only "graded inequality" but also reluctant to allow any

[189] Ambedkar and Roy, *Annihilation of Caste*, 115.

free subjects. The caste system is not at all desirable because not only it limits the choice of the individuals, but it is also a social system of violence and pathology.

5.3.2 How are Subjects Constructed in Caste?

Power constructs subjects, thereby the caste system too. Power produces a particular type of behaviour and social life which regulates people's everyday activity. As caste conditions the behaviour of its members, it is crucial to know the micro-structural process of power by which caste is embodied. For that matter, the pivotal factor underlying the salience of the caste system is its mechanism of constructing subjects. The question may be asked, "if caste constructs subjects, does it constitute subjectivity equally?" However, caste constructs *subjectivities, not subjectivity.* In other words, in the caste system, all its members have specific identities which are constituted not in the same manner. For instance, women do not have the same identity as men do. Similarly, a Brahmin does have different subjective formation comparing to Dalit. However, members of the same caste do share similar subjective constructions, but "complexity" of power relations in the caste system should not be evaluated by analyzing only its visible features. Within the same caste status, the subjective formation does share similar identity construction, but with its specificities, it certainly differs, for instance, among men and women. Studying the subjective constructions in the caste system, therefore, one should evaluate power relations in its multiple functions and various levels.

Power relations in the caste system lie in constituting reality by constructing the subjectivities. It is the ideological construction of power exercised through various socio-political practices, which makes us believe "social reality" natural, that subjects are constituted through internalizing various operations of power. Caste has its "own life" and "existence" irrespective of an individual's will to construct, influence and shape the social, moral and political life of its members. We have to consider caste is a social reality as it has *material existence*. It is neither an abstract idea nor merely an issue of "one's attitude", but it refers to individuals' multiple functions of subjective formations in society. The caste system, without any doubt, can be seen as a power system because it shapes our beliefs, thoughts and perceptions and thereby normalizes reality by which subjectivities are constructed. For that very reason, by what means and at what levels, power is at work is the central emphasis in studying the subject formation in the caste system. To begin

such research, it is essential in the first place to understand that everyone has caste identity whether one asserts or is aware of it or not.

Unlike other social abominations, caste has a distinct peculiarity which lies in the fact that it has a "knowledge discourse" to justify it. Apart from the other social evils in the world, caste discriminations are justified by philosophical texts, moral codes and religious belief which are embodied in our day to day life. Its discourse is remarkably vast as it is not only theoretically postulated in various religious texts but also deeply embodied in the cultural practices because it is always associated with the *moral life* of the people. It is directly associated with all aspect of a human being; one's birth, death, sex, job, food, place, home, and so on. In all occasions of one's life, caste has its peculiar aspect and function to perform such as birth rituals, naming ceremony, marriage customs, pregnancy and menstruation rituals, job functions, spiritual practice, death rites, and so forth. From the perspective of power, members of the caste system don't behave, communicate and relate to others from "their own" moral notions, but they act and practice *only* the rules and regulations embedded in the caste stratification. For this reason, the caste system is deeply constructed through observable behavioural patterns along with ideological beliefs. Though such behavioural attributes do not have continuous homogeneity and they are subject to historical discontinuity and breaks, caste is a success in constructing "docile bodies" with an observable behaviour is a fact.

The caste system is the ensemble of moral codes which are deeply embodied in various social relations and practices. The worst aspect of such moral beliefs is the dogma that the people who suppress and being suppressed think it is our moral right to subjugate and being subjugated. For this reason, one should see the function of the caste is also the *life* of an individual according to the particular caste he/she belongs to. Strictly speaking, the subjectivity of an individual in caste is fixed and determined as it is based on prescribed morality described by religious knowledge and various practices. In that sense, to protect the caste mechanism becomes the moral duty of an individual. Since duty lies in one's individuality, it is deeply embodied in constructing one's subjectivity. In this way, simultaneously, on the one hand, it constitutes the *self* and on the other hand, the *other*; it defines the very social *relations*. Caste continuously reminds who you are, with whom you should have social relationships and what would be the social status of such relations. It is the reason why caste secured its "journey" long period and manages to continue today as

well. The construction of subjectivity in the caste system, therefore, is directly related to moral codes in the religious knowledge discourse and social practices because the relation between them should be seen as the function of power. For this reason, to analyze the power relations in the caste system, one needs to critically engage with knowledge discourse and social practices associated with it as suggested by Foucault's conceptualization of power.

However, the question may be asked how one identifies the subjective *status* in the caste system accurately. The answer to such a question is rightly understood if its relation with capital is examined.[190] It is also one of the reasons why comparing caste and class with capital is worth thinking particularly in the analysis of power. Since capitals serve to navigate the social world, which alters one's opportunity to gain subjective status in society, they accentuate the power relations between individuals. For this reason, it is peculiar to India that possession of different capitals such as cultural, political, economic and symbolic,[191] which indeed have a far-reaching impact in constituting subjects, is directly related to caste. As we are concerned not only the repressive aspects of caste stratification alone, its subtle features and functions can be exposed by excavating its relation with capital. Class is always associated with resources such as economic, social and intellectual, and so on, but in caste, capital functions not in the way class do. In India, capitals, in its all forms, are tightly conjunct and reduced by the caste stratification as caste as the system of power should be seen as an "*enclosed capital*", in its three main functions, namely, accumulation, transmission and conversion of capitals. For this very reason, generally, for some people, particularly upper caste people, caste is a positive capital, whereas Dalits, negative. It is for this reason that emancipation and upliftment of the status of the Dalit people have become very difficult in the caste system.

In general, a class is understood as describing different capitals, and how they have impacts on individuals in identifying the status of subjects in society. However, unlike in the class

[190] Kapicadu and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf, "Home Coming of the Homeless."

[191] The economic capital denotes economic resources such as money, assets, property; whereas, social capital refers to the network of institutionalized relationships associated with actual and potential resources; cultural capital, however, denotes one's education including the socialized acquisition of knowledge and intellectual skills; the symbolic capital, nevertheless, associated with resources available to an individual based on honor, prestige or recognition in a society. These four capitals, which are interlinked in its accumulation, exchange, and conversion, serve to navigate the social world by altering an individual's experience and opportunity in gaining status in a society. (Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 241-258).

system, a considerable reductionism of capital resources to upper caste is seen in the caste system. The very distribution and accessibility of the capital resource, either cultural or economic and so on, is at a large extent *restricted* in the caste system, unlike in the class. The statistical account given by Arundhati Roy in the introduction of the *Annihilation of Caste* would substantiate my claim. Roy explains how in the modern democratic world capital is restricted for Dalits and preordained for upper caste. By giving statistical data of various resources of capitals, she has explained how caste functions in the Indian society in constituting subjectivities. The data underlines the fact that seven out of the top ten are Vaishyas who hold most of the resources of productions of business such as oilfields, mines, fresh food outlets etc. in India. Vaishyas also hold most of the small trade in cities and traditional rural money landing across the country. However, while Vaishyas control the majority of the business and industrial sectors in the country, Brahmins sovereignty mainly dominates the educational sector as well as Indian bureaucracy. She cites the study conducted by CSDS to explain the scenario. She also touches upon the areas of the media and judiciary sector which are predominantly monopolized by Brahmins. The only government sector that represents the majority of Dalit is menial jobs such as cleaning streets, sweeping etc. Inequality in the caste system, Roy argues, may be flawed, but are unlikely to be drastically flawed. Therefore, she claims democracy has not eradicated caste, but it has entrenched and modernized it.[192]

In class, the status subjectivity of an individual may be changed considerably as per the capital one gains. However, changing the status of the subjectivity of an individual in the caste institution is not as easy as it does in the class system. It is also possible to happen in the caste system that, though economically elevated, one may be treated as lower status if he belongs to a lower caste. How the institution of marriage works in India is the best example of such findings. An individual's effort or skill is generally respected in a class system, but caste comparatively predestined such natural aptitudes tightly to one's caste order. In other words, to develop one's efficiency or competence and elevate the status of individuals, capital resources are required which is, however, in the caste system restricted at large to one's caste circumstances. It is for this reason that Dalits, in general, do not have substantial capital compared to the upper caste in elevating their status in society. Furthermore, it is a known fact that the social efficiency of a progressive society

[192] Ambedkar and Roy, *Annihilation of Caste*, 37.

depends on the steady functioning of accessibility, distribution and the production of the capital. Similarly, since social conditions are never static and undergo “rapid and abrupt” changes, “an individual must be free” to change his circumstances. However, the caste system is “positively pernicious” to any such development as it subordinates man’s competence by forcing individuals to prefer the exigencies of caste rules. Therefore, the analysis of caste involves not only severe atrocities such as untouchability but also how it is related to capitals in constituting the status of subjectivities.

5.3.3 What is the Status of Caste in the Present Indian Society?

In seeking to explain the current status of caste mechanism, Guru argues, it is essential to consider what radical changes have happened in our social life in the time of globalization. Guru, in his article “Shifting Categories in the Discourse on Caste and Class,” explains how caste and class changed its existence and essence in the current socio-political life. He notices the working class is now described as the working mass and similarly, caste has modified into a broader category such as “ethnicity”. It is also a significant fact to notice that, as Guru argues, “humiliation or indignity”, which was the basic gist of caste in the past, has now been replaced by the “experience of exclusion”. Similarly, the shared experience of exploitation among workers now does have intersecting forms and must be analyzed in terms of categories such as agricultural labour, sexual labour, and labouring poor and so on. However, though caste has transformed into “ethnicity” in the recent time, “social exclusion of caste”, on the contrary, has been continuing to persist and even has polarized its issues in a more solid form. For example, the stigmatization and solidification of Dalit colonies as the social exclusion should be seen as the process in which individuals are blocked or denied access to opportunities and resources. Similarly, it should be significantly noted that many Dalits continue to work jobs such as scavenging and rag picking even in the current social circumstances.

However, the radical change that has taken place in the economy and social life after the emergence of globalization has shaped the caste genesis recently in a significant manner. For instance, as the effect of globalization and as part of a new economy, particularly migrations for jobs and education have diluted the “rigid sense of caste identity” at least in its embryo. However, it does not mean to say that caste issues are reduced completely. On the contrary, the domain of caste issues and its various mechanisms have widened or not restricted simply to family status,

marriage, home and job exclusively. However, the visible remarks to identify castes such as the way of dressing, visible marks on bodies, eating habits, and so on have changed unrecognizable manner is a fact. Similarly, as part of globalization, because of the nonlinear modes of accumulation and multiple modes of investments in the economy, shifting changes in employment can be seen both in the caste and class categories. As it has led the working-class mainly to footloose labour, caste identity also has received changes along with it. As Guru argues, it has led the working-class people from the shared sense of exploitation into a form of a "layered sense" of exploitation. The same can be applied to caste identities as distress migration for jobs and education and the force of globalization have made labour, education, and social life vulnerable and shifting change in their lifestyle. It is in this light that the existence of caste in urban and middle-class have become a critical question in the present caste debate.

Though pathological forms of caste such as untouchability do not exist in visible form in urban areas and other such public places, it is essential to note that caste functions in such spaces not in terms of its known vocabulary and forms. People do not talk, act and perpetuate caste in such *a field* with its old *habitus*, but in *other terms*. The function of these "other terms" can be put together, as Foucault claims, the invisible form of power or micro-physics of power. This new habitus or other terms, in general, have three functions; firstly, pretending caste as such does not exist by subjugating its discussion; secondly, avoiding various mechanisms of caste and equating caste means untouchability; thirdly, perpetuating its mechanisms of power relations subtle way so that it becomes unrecognizable. It is the reason why, as Arundhati Roy rightly points out, though other social evils politically and intellectually challenged at the international forums, caste issues managed to escape without serious objections.[193] In the analysis of caste, therefore, one should study the various interrelations of caste in the multiple social domains such as land, language, art, food habits and the very production of knowledge, and so on. Caste issues must be treated a distinctive social reality like other abominations such as racism, sexism, apartheid etc. not because it is "colour-coded" but "not easy to see".[194]

The questions related to caste's function and processes are many and at the same time highly complicated. Some of the significant questions are as follows: How does a specific place

[193] Ambedkar and Roy, *Annihilation of Caste*, 22.
[194] Ibid, 22.

or region impact a Dalit, and what is its cultural significance and political aspects in forging their subjectivity? How have they been denied occupying any land and completely marginalized from society? Similarly, what sort of language they use or how they are represented in language, not necessarily in terms of semantic and syntax features, but its cultural connotations. How Dalits are represented in literature, cinema and other social media? How the dominant ideology (Brahminical Hindutva) is being propagated through such mediums? Furthermore, what are the cultural significance and caste relations do have on, for instance, food habits such as eating beef and other meats? How it is related to Dalit, and by what means those caste practices being are operated? Moreover, what kinds of knowledge are being produced about Dalits? Who can provide them? Under what knowledge system or philosophy, Dalit issues are conceptualized? How these knowledge systems construct Dalit identities? In this fashion, the Dalit domains are many and complex; so do addressing their issues. Therefore, the issues of caste should not be limited and reduced exclusively to the problems such as the debate on the reservation, atrocities related to inter-caste marriage, and problems concerned with jobs and education.

The elaborated explanation given above, it can be drawn that since caste is fused with our day to day life in an unrecognizable manner, how power works in this social stratification is very important to analyze. Therefore, to analyse the power relations in the caste system, it is important to note that caste constructs our belief, desire, behaviour and thereby our "subjectivity", not only in terms of repressive perspectives but also through multiple forms of its subtle operations. The "genealogy of caste" is extremely complicated as the power relation of its practices, operations and processes are imbued so deeply in cultural norms and regulations. It has multiple formulations, distinctive social functions, specific historical features and strong political connotations. In the caste system, the subject formation and power's operation is deeply normalised in which individuals are barely conscious of the process of their "construction". To understand caste's mechanism, therefore, we have to comprehend what kind of power relations exercise between people or castes. Therefore, the appropriate approach to caste analysis lies in displaying invisible mechanisms of power exercised on various caste practices we perform in the day to day life, rather than analysing them uniformly from top to bottom. One these grounds, two concluding marks can be drawn: firstly, studying power relations in the caste system is essential to understand Indian society not only theoretically but also politically; secondly, the annihilation of caste as the political agenda should be seen as the essential political task to reform Indian society.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, an attempt is made to evaluate caste issues by using Foucault's theoretical conception of power and subject. However, having evaluated the debate between caste and class, this chapter, on the one hand, has pointed out how the power relations and subjective formations are different in these social stratifications; on the other hand, how dominant Marxian ideology has subjugated caste issues. Therefore, this chapter argues it is essential to study caste issues as the primordial political issue for two reasons: firstly, Indian society is based on caste stratification rather than class division; secondly, there are seldom attempts to analyze the complexity of power relations in the caste system as the discourse of caste has been subjugated in the public domain. For this reason, by using Foucault's tool, this chapter has pointed out that one should not study caste issues in its repressive aspects such as untouchability exclusively. Instead, rather than purely concentrating hierarchical structure and repressive aspects, how subjectivities are constructed in caste should be the primary concern. Caste, for this reason, should not be seen as the discriminatory process alone because it represents the "status" of subjectivity in society. For this reason, how caste is related to the formation of capitals in constituting the status of the subject is a significant aspect to study power relations in the caste system.

Furthermore, since caste is deeply normalized by power relations, subjectivities in the caste system should be seen as historically constituted and socially forged. For this reason, for political resistance against caste, it is essential to have a critical analysis of knowledge discourse and cultural practices because knowledge, practices and power are constitutive in constructing subjectivities. On this ground, not only studies of caste should be extended to analyzing its various mechanisms in numerous social fields but also must be concentrated on the invisible forms of power relations embedded in them. Similarly, the operation of power in the caste system should be seen as "relation" because not only all subjects are inside the power relations of its stratification but also constructed by it. Since all subjects are constructed by power relations in the caste system, caste should be seen as a social evil for all its members. This chapter, therefore, provides two concluding remarks. Firstly, the annihilation of caste as the political agenda is not necessarily mean to be the upliftment of Dalit alone but the reformation of the society as a whole. Secondly, it is essential to study the various power relations embedded in the caste system to understand not only subjective formation but also the characteristic features of Indian society.

6. Concluding Remarks

As the title of the thesis signifies, the central research objective we have discussed throughout the thesis is to evaluate *the relation between power and subject*. Though the thesis has recapitulated the central tenets of Foucault's account with a consistent theoretical elaboration, the fundamental issue discussed here is how power and subject *problematised*. For this very reason, the thesis has examined *by criticising the foundational subject, how Foucault has claimed the subject is historically constituted and socially forged through power relations.* To evaluate these theoretical problems, in the first chapter, the central discussion aims to examine the question of power which, on the one hand, has focused on evaluating *the status of the subject in the power relations*; whereas, on the other hand, has inquired the *relation between power and subject*. By critically arguing against three models of power, Foucault's account claims that it is not the subject who exercises power as suggested by modern thinkers, but they should be seen as constructed by power relations. Since all are constructed as subjects in the power relations, Foucault, on the one hand, rejects sovereign subject or foundational subject, whereas, on the other hand, claims power should not be seen as a possession, capacity, commodity and repression of sovereign subjects exercised *over* others. On these grounds, the first chapter makes three substantial claims: firstly, power as such does not exist "ontologically" because it should be historically understood and socially analyzed; secondly, since power constructs subjectivities, it should be seen as not only ensembles of social "relations" but also the complex strategic social process; thirdly, power studies should not be limited in the political domain such as state, class, and so on exclusively as power is everywhere in the society as the day to day life affairs in constructing subjectivities. The first chapter, therefore, concludes that *subjects are not pre-given and pre-supposed in the power relations, but, on the contrary, they should be seen as constructed by power relations.*

In the second chapter, the discussion is oriented towards *explaining the role of power in analyzing the problem of the subject*. Following the main arguments of the social constructivist account (by rejecting the essential account), Foucault in his anti-subjective hypothesis, on the one hand, rejects absolute creativity and autonomous subjectivity; whereas, on the other hand, the sovereignty of the subject and essential human nature. On these grounds, Foucault postulates two claims: firstly, knowledge and power are interrelated in constituting subjectivities; secondly, subjects are historically constituted and socially forged through power relations. By describing the conceptual framework of discourse analysis, Foucault, therefore, not only explained how subjects

are socially forged but also claimed knowledge and subjects are discursively constituted. Similarly, by explaining the conceptual frameworks of his historical methods, Foucault not only elucidated how subjects are historically constituted but also rejected objectivity of knowledge. By claiming knowledge and subjectivities are historically constituted and socially forged, Foucault, therefore, on the one hand, rejected essential subjectivity; whereas, on the other hand, he claimed power, knowledge, and subjectivities are directly related. *Therefore, the second chapter concludes that* "*power studies*" *are indispensable to understand the formations of subjectivities.*

Since the first two chapters have elucidated only how the relation between power and subject should be *approached*, it has raised a significant question: how Foucault has substantiated the relation between power and subject by historical documents and examples. To illustrate on what ground Foucault has substantiated the question of the relation between power and subject, the third chapter, therefore, has examined three modes of inquiries, namely, subjects as the object of knowledge, subjects as the construction of practices, and subjects who constitute oneself. In the first mode of inquiry, *to evaluate subjective construction as the object of knowledge*, Foucault has excavated genealogy of medical knowledge and discourse of madness. In these historical investigations, by discussing power relations operated in the institutionalization of clinics and emergence of confinement houses, Foucault has made two central claims: knowledge and power are mutually constitutive; knowledge production is not inscribed in essential human nature as suggested by essential accounts. Since knowledge is constituted by power relations, Foucault, on the other hand, rejects absolute creativity and substantial autonomy of subject, whereas, on the other hand, argues knowledge and subjects should be historically understood and socially analyzed. On these grounds, Foucault claims knowledge does not liberate as suggested by essential accounts, but it constitutes subjectivities. *Since subjects could be constituted as the object of knowledge, and power and knowledge are mutually constitutive, the first mode of inquiry, therefore, concludes power constructs subjectivities.*

In the second mode of inquiry, Foucault has developed most of his conceptualization of power, which he has initially postulated in his previous works. In this historical excavation, Foucault has traced two discourses, namely, punishment and the history of sexuality. By evaluating the power relations embedded in the emergence of the modern penal system and various sexual domains of modern industrial society, *Foucault has examined how subjects are constructed by*

power relations embedded in social practices. In these historical excavations, Foucault makes four concluding remarks by rejecting conventional views of power. Firstly, Foucault claims that power is not a capacity, possession, property and repression operating with a single, unified, homogeneous exertion as suggested by conventional views because, in the modern world, power is diffused throughout the social body; secondly, subjectivities are not naturally given in the power relations, they are, on the contrary, socially forged and historically constituted; thirdly, knowledge does not liberate as suggested by humanists because knowledge and power are mutually constitutive; fourthly, power is not essentially suppressive as it could be productive. *Since subjects are constructed by social practices as the operation of power, the second mode of inquiry, therefore, concludes power constructs subjectivities.*

Unlike the previous modes of inquiries, which has studied how power has constructed subjectivities, the third mode of inquiry, however, examines *how subjects can constitute themselves in the power relations*. Though subjects are historically constituted and socially forged, Foucault argues that subjects should not be seen as socio-historically "determined". By tracing "technology of the self" in the history of sexuality from antiquity to Christian practices, Foucault argues that subjects can constitute themselves in the given power relations as individuals should not be seen as reduced to socio-historical conditions. According to Foucault, subjects can constitute themselves in the given power relations as they have not only agency and autonomy in a regulative sense but also freedom and resistance. The technology of the self as self-constitution in the given power relations, therefore, on the one hand, indicates freedom to constitute oneself, on the other hand, denotes resistance against external social compulsions. By introducing the technology of the self, Foucault, therefore, on the one side, argues subjects are not only constructed but also can constitute themselves in the power relations; whereas, on the other side, claims since there are many ways to constitute oneself, an individual could have many subjectivities in the given power relations. *Therefore, in the third mode of inquiry, by demonstrating subjects are not reduced and determined by socio-historical conditions as the mere effect of power, Foucault has substantiated that subjects can constitute themselves in the power relations.*

In discussing the critical analysis of Foucault's perspective, the first section of the fourth chapter has evaluated the normative confusions in Foucault's account. In this conceptual discussion, Habermas has argued that without normative criteria, Foucault's genealogical method,

on the one hand, either undermine its truth or takes its truth as self-evident; on the other hand, presupposes normative criteria or normative superiority and the genealogist as the foundational subject. On these grounds, Habermas concludes that genealogy as critique is not only theoretically paradoxical but also politically suspect. Similarly, since bracketing normative criteria in the power/knowledge nexus, according to Dews, Foucault's account commits two conceptual errors: firstly, it is inadequate to explain legitimate or illegitimate power; secondly, it is inappropriate to examine validity or invalidity of human sciences. For this reason, Foucault's power/knowledge nexus is unable to explain how disciplinary power has enhanced the development of the human sciences and vice versa, and also faces conceptual ambiguity explaining the subjective formations in the power/knowledge nexus. Following the main arguments of Habermas and Dews, Nancy Fraser, however, argues Foucault's account without normative criteria tends to be an essential account by generalizing the *specificities* of power relations. For this reason, Foucault, on the one hand, paradoxically, has neglected the historicity of power; whereas, on the other hand, he has invited, at the same time, normative confusion. On these grounds, she claims Foucault's account is not only implausibly explained the subjective construction and self-constitution but also unsatisfactory in explaining freedom, resistance, repressive features and productive aspects of power. Therefore, Fraser concludes that since Foucault's account of power is normatively confused, it is not only theoretically inaccurate but also politically suspect.

The second section of the fourth chapter has evaluated the problem of agency and autonomy in Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis. In this conceptual debate, McCarthy has argued Foucault's account is implausible to explain the subjective construction and self-constitution because Foucault has explained them as the mere effect of power. However, by rejecting the claim of McCarthy, Allen argues that Foucault's self-constitution and the account of power are compatible as subjects are neither "determined" to socio-historical conditions nor the mere effect of power. According to Allen, McCarthy has misinterpreted Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis by thinking "the subject is merely an effect of power." However, Digeser argues Foucault's account is inadequate to explain the nature of "forged subjects" in the given power relations as it is unclear not only how autonomous subjects are constructed but also on what costs one becomes an agent. Nevertheless, according to Bevir. Foucault's account should be read as a critique of autonomy rather than a critique of the agency because autonomy stands for essential subjectivity; whereas, the agency stands for self-constitution as it denotes freedom and resistance

in the given power relations. However, according to Wong, the criticisms proposed by Bevir and Digeser are implausible because they have treated the concepts of autonomy and agency as opposed to each other or independent concepts. Wong, contrary to claims of Bevir and Digeser, argues that autonomy and agency are not only conceptually related but also to regulate agency, one needs autonomy. Therefore, two concluding remarks can be drawn from this conceptual debate. Firstly, since individuals are *already* positioned in the socio-historical conditions, agency and autonomy should be seen as the medium and outcome of the ensemble of power relations by which individuals constantly interact. Secondly, since autonomy and agency are not naturally given as they are achieved or acquired through socialization or interacting with the social world, they should be seen as "regulative" as the expression of freedom and resistance in the given power relations. The second section, therefore, concludes that the "regulative sense of autonomy and agency" is the compatible explanation for Foucault's anti-subjective hypothesis.

The fifth chapter, however, has discussed how power relations and the formation of subjectivities can be studied in the caste system by applying Foucault's theoretical tools. Provided the debate between caste and class, this chapter has pointed out that since Indian society is based on caste stratification rather than class division, it is essential to study caste issues as the primordial political issue. Since caste constructs subjectivity of an individual, this chapter has argued power relations in the caste system should be studied as an ensemble of social relations embodied in various institutions, cultural practices and knowledge discourse. In this light, limiting caste studies only to repressive aspects exclusively, such as the analysis of untouchability, is inadequate as the complexity of caste issues are embedded in many social fields. Therefore, the operations of power relations in the caste system are least observable as it is deeply embodied in the cultural practices and moral codes in constructing one's identity. For this reason, resistance against caste atrocities, it is essential to have a critical stand against moral codes of caste and knowledge discourse associated with it. Similarly, power in the caste system should be seen as "relation" rather than a possession, capacity, and commodity because the mechanism of power in the caste system is embodied in our day to day social life affairs. On this ground, the annihilation of caste is not the issues of Dalit alone but is the political issue of all subjects in the caste system because all of them do have caste identity whether one aware of it or not. Caste, therefore, is not discrimination alone; it represents the accumulation of capitals in determining the status of the subject in society. Therefore, this chapter concludes that it is essential to address caste issues to reform Indian society.

Limitations of the Study

1. Since the analysis of the relation between power and subject is based on historical conditions and social practices, the conceptual investigation of the thesis (i.e. three modes of inquires) is limited to Western culture and society as regional studies.
2. The conceptualization of power and its role in understanding the various formations of subjects are not built upon the detailed analysis in this thesis as it is restricted on the three modes of inquiries exclusively, namely, subject as the object of knowledge, subjects as constructed through practices, and subjects as self-constituted.
3. As the conceptualization of power and subject is historically understood and socially analyzed, it appears to face some problems that are common to any socio-historical studies such as selections of historical documents and choosing appropriate research social fields. Therefore, the analysis of the thesis is limited as it is based on the selected discourses such as medical knowledge, madness, punishment, and sexuality.

Plausible Further Studies

1. Since "power studies" are multidisciplinary, the applicability of Foucault's theoretical insights could be accounted to other domains, especially in the fields of identity politics such as gender studies, racism, and so on.
2. As the notions of historicity and social conditions have emerged as inevitable conceptual categories in the current intellectual debates, it seems they have relevant roles in various knowledge productions. If this is correct, then Foucault's discourse analysis and the three historical methods might be useful for conceptual studies in various disciplines.
3. The applicability of Foucault's power/knowledge nexus could be accounted for other than the social sciences, especially the conceptual reorientations in natural sciences. Since the historicity of physical sciences and values in sciences are emerging theoretical confrontations, Foucault's power/knowledge account might be useful for explaining the formation of knowledge and the theory changes in the natural sciences.

Bibliography

Alcoff, Linda. “Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits to a Collaboration.” In *Crises in Continental Philosophy*, edited by Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott, 69-86. New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.

Allen, Amy. “Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault.” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10, no. 2 (2002), 131-149. doi:10.1080/09672550210121432.

Allen, Amy. “Discourse, Power, and Subjectivation: The Foucault/Habermas Debate Reconsidered.” *The Philosophical Forum* 40, no. 1 (2009), 1-28. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9191.2008.00314.x.

Allen, Amy. “The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the Death of the Subject.” *The Philosophical Forum* 31, no. 2 (2000), 113-130. doi:10.1111/0031-806x.00031.

Allen, Amy. *The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Ambedkar, B. R. *Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development*. Bombay: Ssoft Group, India, 2016.

Ambedkar, B. R., and Arundhati Roy. *Annihilation of Caste: The Annotated Critical Edition*. Edited by S. Anand. New Delhi: Navayana, 2014.

Bacchi, Carol, and Jennifer Bonham. “Reclaiming Discursive Practices as an Analytic Focus: Political Implications.” *Foucault Studies*, 2014, 179-192. doi:10.22439/fs.v0i17.4298.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. “Two Faces of Power.” *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (1962), 947-952. doi:10.2307/1952796.

Beauvoir, Simone D. *The Second Sex*. Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.

Bevir, Mark. “Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency against Autonomy.” *Political Theory* 27, no. 1 (1999), 65-84. doi:10.1177/0090591799027001004.

Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Forms of Capital.” In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by John G. Richardson, 241-258. New York: Greenwood, 1986.

Bradshaw, Alan. “A Critique of Steven Lukes’ ‘Power: A Radical View’.” *Sociology* 10, no. 1 (January 1976), 121-127. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42853323.

Brown, Wendy, and Joan W. Scott. “Power.” In *Critical Terms for the Study of Gender*, edited by Catharine R. Stimpson and Gilbert Herdt, 335-357. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.

Brown, Wendy. “Power after Foucault.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, edited by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips, 65-83. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Bruin, Boudewijn D., and C. Zurn. *New Waves in Political Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2008.

Butler, Judith. “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions.” *Foucault and Law*, 2017, 227-234. doi:10.4324/9781315094021-11.

Chomsky, Noam, and Michel Foucault. *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature*. New York: The New Press, 2015.

Christman, John. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2018 Edition).” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed September 18, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/autonomy-moral.

Clegg, Stewart R., and Mark Haugaard, editors. *The Sage Handbook of Power*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009.

Clegg, Stewart. *Frameworks of Power*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1989.

Collins Online Dictionary | Definitions, Thesaurus and Translations. “Sodomy Definition and Meaning | Collins English Dictionary.” n.d. Accessed March 31, 2018. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/sodomy.

Cousins, Mark, and Athar Hussain. *Michel Foucault*. London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 1984.

Critchley, Simon. *Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought*. Brooklyn: Verso, 1999.

Dahl, Robert A. “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model.” *American Political Science Review* 52, no. 2 (1958), 463-469. doi:10.2307/1952327.

Dahl, Robert A. “The Concept of Power.” *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (2007), 201-215. doi:10.1002/bs.3830020303.

Davidson, Arnold I. “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics.” In *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David C. Hoy, 221-234. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

De Marzio, Darryl M. “The Care of the Self: Alcibiades I, Socratic Teaching and Ethics Education.” *Journal of Education* 187, no. 3 (2007), 103-127. doi:10.1177/002205740718700308.

Detel, Wolfgang. *Foucault and Classical Antiquity: Power, Ethics and Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Deveaux, Monique. “Feminism and Empowerment: A Critical Reading of Foucault.” *Feminist Studies* 20, no. 2 (1994), 223. doi:10.2307/3178151.

Dews, Peter. “The Return of the Subject in late Foucault.” *Radical Philosophy* 1, no. 57 (1989), 37-41. https://www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/author/peter-dews/.

Digeser, Peter. “The Fourth Face of Power.” *The Journal of Politics* 54, no. 4 (1992), 977-1007. doi:10.2307/2132105.

Djaballah, Marc. *Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Dryzek, John S., Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Falzon, Christopher, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki, editors. *A Companion to Foucault*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

Flynn, Thomas. “Foucault’s Mapping of History.” In *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, edited by Gary Gutting, 28-46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Foucault, Michel, and François Ewald. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*. London: Macmillan, 2003.

Foucault, Michel. “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self.” *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (1993), 198-227. doi:10.1177/0090591793021002004.

Foucault, Michel. “Politics and Study of Discourse.” In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Foucault, Michel. “Questions of Method.” In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Foucault, Michel. “The Order of Discourse.” In *Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist Reader*, edited by Robert Young, 48-78. London: Routledge, 1981.

Foucault, Michel. *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*. Edited by James Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin UK, 1998.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage/ Random House, 1979.

Foucault, Michel. *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Vintage/ Random House, 1973.

Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge.* Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Harper Colophonn, 1972.

Foucault, Michel. *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1975.

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1990.

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction.* Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1980.

Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1994.

Foucault, Michel. *Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975*. Brooklyn: Verso, 2003.

Foucault, Michel. *About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at Dartmouth College, 1980*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

Foucault, Michel. *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. Translated by Robert Hurley. United States: The New Press, 1997.

Foucault, Michel. *Power*. Edited by James D. Faubion. London: Penguin Books, (UK), 2002.

Foucault, Michel. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke: Springer, 2007.

Foucault, Michel. *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Foucault, Michel. *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984*. Edited by James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 1997.

Foucault, Michel. *The Foucault Reader*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: Vintage Books, 2010.

Foucault, Michel. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982*. Translated by Graham Burchell. United States: Palgrave Macmilla, 2005.

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1988.

Foucault, Michel. *The Politics of Truth*. Edited by Sylvere Lotringer. Translated by Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter. Semiotext (e) / Foreign Agents, 2007.

Fraser, Nancy. “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions.” *Praxis International*, no. 3 (1981), 272-287. https://www.ceeol.com/.

Fraser, Nancy. “Michel Foucault: A “Young Conservative”?” In *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, edited by Michael Kelly, 185-210. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Fred, Rush, editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Freud, Sigmund. “The Unconscious.” In *General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology*, 166-150. New York: Collier Books/Macmillan, 1963.

Gane, Mike. *Towards a Critique of Foucault: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Gibbs, Graham R. “Discourse Analysis Part 2: Foucauldian Approaches.” *YouTube*. May 6, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_ffCsQx2Cg.

Giddings, Franklin H. *The Principles of Sociology*. New Delhi: Cosmo, 2004.

Gordon, Neve. “Foucault’s Subject: An Ontological Reading.” *Polity* 31, no. 3 (1999), 395-414. doi:10.2307/3235247.

Guru, Gopal, and Sundar Sarukkai. *The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Guru, Gopal. “How Egalitarian are the Social Sciences in India?” In *The Problem of Caste*, edited by Satish Deshpande, 107-116. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2014.

Guru, Gopal. “Shifting Categories on Discourse on Caste and Class.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 47 (November 2016), 21-25. https://www.epw.in/.

Gutting, Gary, and Johanna Oksala. “Michel Foucault (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring 2019 Edition).” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/foucault/.

Gutting, Gary, editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Gutting, Gary. *Foucault: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Habermas, Jurgen. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*. Translated by Frederick Lawrence. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2018.

Hall, Stuart. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997.

Harrer, Sebastian. “The Theme of Subjectivity in Foucault’s Lecture Series L’Herméneutique du Sujet.” *Foucault Studies* 2 (May 2005), 75-96. doi:10.22439/fs.v0i2.861.

Heller, Kevin J. “Power, Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault.” *SubStance* 25, no. 1 (1996), 78. doi:10.2307/3685230.

Hook, D. *Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2007.

Hoy, David C., editor. *Foucault: A Critical Reader*. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

Ilayidam, Sunil P., and Navamalayali Online Magazine. “Sunil P Ilayidam on Ambedkar and Marx: Possibilities of Debate and Synchronicity.” *YouTube*. February 13, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xp_jsdJsqTk.

Ilayidam, Sunil P., and Yuvasamithi KSSP. “Ambedkar and Democratic Thoughts.” *YouTube*. November 13, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJl1Pqq3hS4.

Ingram, David. “Foucault and Habermas.” In *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, edited by Gary Gutting, 240-283. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Isenberg, Bo. “Habermas on Foucault Critical Remarks.” *Acta Sociologica* 34, no. 4 (1991), 299-308. doi:10.1177/000169939103400404.

Kapicadu, Sunny M. “Dalit, Identity and Philosophy (Malayalam).” *YouTube*. January 31, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LcL0YdKTOqk.

Kapicadu, Sunny M. “Don’t Say “Caste”, Say “Castes”!” *YouTube*. May 11, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HG9EmVujN2g.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Biju Mohan. “Dalit Politics at a Time when Fascism was Destroying India.” *YouTube*. September 8, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_NWLSx_CBM.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Dalit Camera. “A Critique of Kerala Modernity by Sunny M Kapicadu.” *YouTube*. March 22, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDlkXyto_Ps.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf. “Ambedkarism is Not Casteism.” *YouTube*. June 14, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kge4UpatlXQ.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf. “Annihilation of Caste: Modernity, Gandhi and Ambedkar.” *YouTube*. May 31, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GTXyBvbhKc

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf. “Dr B R Ambedkar: The Architect of Indian Constitution (Malayalam).” *YouTube*. November 26, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lE2urlqOmiM.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf. “Ghar Vapasi (Home Coming of the Homeless).” *YouTube*. August 19, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdvKso0HU-s.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf. “Hinduism is Anti-Democratic.” *YouTube*. February 7, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWOpLTYv-Zc.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Kerala Freethinkers Forum - kftf. “Marginal Body: Body as a Site of Untouchability.” *YouTube*. January 14, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqJDgfpuTzw.

Kapicadu, Sunny M., and Manorama News. “I Learned about Caste very early on; Sunny M Kapicadu.” *YouTube*. December 2, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yrt6q_aGklY.

Keenan, Thomas. “The “Paradox” of Knowledge and Power: Foucault on the Bias.” *Foucault and Law*, 2017, 481-536. doi:10.4324/9781315094021-18.

Kelly, Mark G E. “Foucault, Subjectivity, and Technologies of the Self.” In *A Companion to Foucault*, edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki, 510-525. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

Kelly, Mark G. *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault*. London: Routledge, 2010.

Kelly, Mark G. *Foucault and Politics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

Kelly, Michael, editor. *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Kelly, Michael. “Foucault, Habermas, and Self-Referentiality of Critique.” In *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, edited by Michael Kelly, 365-400. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Kelly, Michael. “Introduction.” In *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, edited by Michael Kelly, 1-16. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Kendall, Gavin, and Gary Wickham. *Using Foucault’s Methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998.

King, Matthew. “Clarifying the Foucault-Habermas debate.” *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 35, no. 3 (2009), 287-314. doi:10.1177/0191453708100232.

Kreps, David. *Gramsci and Foucault: A Reassessment*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Kumar, Ajith, and Dalit Camera. “Ajith Kumar (Part-I) Caste in Cinema.” *YouTube*. April 30, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_srujpVMuk.

Lessa, Lara. “Discursive Struggles within Social Welfare: Restaging Teen Motherhood.” *British Journal of Social Work* 36, no. 2 (2005), 283-298. doi:10.1093/bjsw/bch256.

Long, John C. “Foucault’s Clinic.” *The Journal of Medical Humanities* 13, no. 3 (September 1992), 119-138. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01127371.

Lukes, Steven. *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Lynch, Richard A. *Foucault’s Critical Ethics*. New York City: Fordham University Press, 2016.

Mahon, Michael. *Foucault’s Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject*. Albany: SUNY Press, 1992.

Major-Poetzl, Pamela. *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History*. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2017.

Maniglier, Patrice. “The Order of Things.” In *A Companion to Foucault*, edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

McCarthy, Thomas. “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School.” In *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, edited by Michael Kelly, 243-282. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

McCarthy, Thomas. *Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.

McNay, Lois. *Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

McWhorter, Ladelle. *Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Merquior, Jose G. *Foucault*. Oakland: University of California Press, 1987.

Milchman, Alan, and Alan Rosenberg. *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

Miller, Seumas. “Foucault on Discourse and Power.” *A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 76 (October 1990), 115-125. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41801502.

Mills, Sara. *Discourse*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Mills, Sara. *Michel Foucault*. London: Psychology Press, 2003.

Moore, Mary C. “Ethical Discourse and Foucault’s Conception of Ethics.” *Human Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987), 81-95. doi:10.1007/bf00142987.

Nair, Pramod K., and Vidya-Mitra. “Hegemony and Ideology.” *YouTube*. December 8, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILGUQmUoDps.

Nichols, Robert. *The World of Freedom: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Politics of Historical Ontology*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Nigam, Aditya. “Marxism and Power.” *Social Scientist* 24, no. 4/6 (1996), 3-22. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517788.

Oksala, Johanna. *Foucault on Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

O'Leary, Timothy, and Christopher Falzon, editors. *Foucault and Philosophy*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

Patton, Paul. "Foucault's Subject of Power." *Michel Foucault*, 2017, 145-156. doi:10.4324/9781315249032-10.

Perrin, Robert. ""Barbie Doll" and "G. I. Joe": Exploring Issues of Gender." *The English Journal* 88, no. 3 (1999), 83. doi:10.2307/821584.

Piercy, Marge. "Barbie-doll." *Off Our Backs, Inc* 1, no. 19 (March 1971), 1. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i25771211.

Polsby, Nelson W. *Community Power and Political Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

Poster, Mark. *Foucault, Marxism, and History: Mode of Production Versus Mode of Information*. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1984.

Prozorov, Sergei. *Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Ragesh, A .V. "Foucault's Concept of Power: A Radical Departure from Repression to Productivity." *International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews* 5, no. 3 (July/September 2018), ISSN 2348 -1269, 60-63. http://ijrar.com/.

Ragesh, A. V. "Disciplinary Power in Light of Foucault and Kautilya: A Philosophical Appraisal." *International Journal of Advance and Innovative Research* 5, no. 3 (July/ September 2018), ISSN 2394-7780, 114-119. http://iaraedu.com/about-journal/.

Raghuramaraju, A., and Neeta Khurana. "SLS Expert Lecture Series- Prof. A. Raghuramaraju." *YouTube*. May 12, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=faHGLM4a0jw.

Ransom, John S. *Foucault's Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

Ritzer, George. *Sociological Theory*, 8th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2017.

Rorty, Richard. "Foucault and Epistemology." In *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David C. Hoy, 28-41. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

Rouse, Joseph. "Power/Knowledge." In *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, edited by Gary Gutting, 95-122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Said, Edward W. "Foucault and the Imagination of Power." In *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David C. Hoy. 149-156. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

Sarukkai, Sundar. "Phenomenology of Untouchability." In *The Problem of Caste*, edited by Satish Deshpande, 99-106. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2014.

Sawicki, Jana. “Foucault and Feminism: A Critical Reappraisal.” In *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, edited by Michael Kelly, 347-364. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Schlosser, Markus. “Agency (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2018 Edition).” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed December 21, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/agency/.

Simons, Jon. *Foucault and the Political*. London: Psychology Press, 1995.

Solomon, Robert C. “Subjectivity.” In *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, edited by Ted Honderich. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Stoddart, Mark C. “Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A Critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and Power.” *Social Thought and Research*, 2007. doi:10.17161/str.1808.5226.

Strozier, Robert M. *Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity: Historical Constructions of Subject and Self*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002.

Taylor, Charles. “Foucault on Freedom and Truth.” In *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David C. Hoy, 69-102. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

Taylor, Dianna, editor. *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Taylor, Dianna. “Practices of the Self.” In *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts*, edited by Dianna Taylor, 173-186. London: Routledge, 2014.

Teltumbde, Anand. “Dichotomisation of Caste and Class.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 47 (November 2016), 34-38. https://www.epw.in/.

Wandel, Torbjorn. “The Power of Discourse: Michel Foucault and Critical Theory.” *Cultural Values* 5, no. 3 (2001), 368-382. doi:10.1080/14797580109367237.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Oakland: University of California Press, 1978.

Wilkin, Peter. “Chomsky and Foucault on Human Nature and Politics.” *Social Theory and Practice* 25, no. 2 (1999), 177-210. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract199925217.

Wolf, Simon. *Climate Politics as Investment: From Reducing Emissions to Building Low-Carbon Economies*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

Wong, James. “Foucault and Autonomy.” *Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy* 96, no. 3 (2010), 277-290. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681693.

International Journal of Advance and Innovative Research
Volume 5, Issue 3 (VII): July - September, 2018
ISSN 2394 - 7780

DISCIPLINARY POWER IN LIGHT OF FOUCAULT AND KAUTILYA: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPRAISAL

Ragesh A. V.
Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad

ABSTRACT
In our political life, the concept of 'power' is not a recent debate, but current discussions and arguments call us for a serious discussion to analyse the concept of power as it has become an import concept not only in the academic discussion but also our very day to day social life. In the ancient time, particularly in India, Kautilya discussed the significance of 'power' and how it is important to govern the state systematically. What is power and how it should be operated were the important questions for him. However, the recent debate on power inquires how to characterize power and how we can study it. Though power is often considered as the ability to influence or control the behaviour of people, the recent discussions open up its new dimensions and aspects. To put it another way, much of the recent debate considers power is intertwined with social life as it is inseparable from our political life, especially after Michel Foucault's conceptualization of power. According to him, power can be found anywhere in the society and we must pay attention to its invisible nature. In short, these debates ensure that power has become an important concept in our day to day social life which we must analyse. This paper exhibits a comparative analysis of Michel Foucault's concept of "Panopticon" and Kautalya's concept of 'demonstrating omniscience'. My objectives are, therefore, to handle issues such as the nature of power, its exercises and the relation between power and the subject. Moreover, unlike traditional understanding of power, I will argue power is not essentially repressive but it has productive nature too. To put it plainly, by analysing all these questions, I hope, I can give a better understanding of the 'concept of power'.

Keywords: power, subject, discipline, Panopticon, productive, repressive

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents a comparative analysis of Michel Foucault's concept of 'Panopticon' and Kauṭilya's concept of 'demonstrating omniscience'. In the course of my argument, I shall analysis how power works in its most effective form. Furthermore, I shall try to show, power is more effective when it is less accessible to observation and we need to pay attention to understand it. The view I shall defend or suggest is, power is more effective when it is strategic and tactical rather than compelling forces 'on the physical body'. To put it another way, I shall argue, power should be considered as a technique or strategy which disciplines the human psyche rather than gripping forces 'on the physical body'. Thus, I claim, the operation of power is more effective when disciplining the psyche than coercion on the body, which requires a psychological approach.

This paper handles a number of issues such as the nature of power and its exercises, disciplining the subject[i] etc. Furthermore, I shall suggest that power is an effective tool in order to discipline the subject in a way in which it is not necessarily always negative or suppressive rather, has a productive nature. How power exercise is the task of my paper where I argue that disciplining the psyche or internal coercion without exerting any physical power is the best effective exercise of power. My approach will be to outline and discuss both of the thinkers view not only in terms of nature and exercise of power but also in the way how a subject is disciplined psychologically. In addition, I shall show the main similarities and differences of both views and find out the scope and limits of them. In this conceptual analysis, I will try to examine why power is a major tool in order to govern the state as well as any institution systematically. Moreover, I discuss, by disciplining the subject, how power becomes 'effective operation of power'. In short, how power works in the social life and how these thinker's ideas give a better perspective on the 'concept of power' will be the focus of my paper.

1. Section A: Kautilya's concept of power

In chapter XI of *The Arthashastra*, Kautilya discusses 'Demonstrating Omniscience' which comes under the broad spectrum of psychological warfare where he talks about a method of eliciting obedience from his subjects through a psychological approach. This is a very tactful method where it guarantees the allegiance of subjects in a better way. 'Demonstrating Omniscience', the method, he discusses, is not just eliciting obedience or guarantees the allegiance of his subjects, but it disciplines, trains and supervises subjects. To put it another way, it assures the connection between subjects and king in a more subtle and strong way in which the king's presence is always accessible to the subjects and vice versa. It not only explains the relationship between king and subject but also examines how it helps to govern the state appropriately.

FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF POWER: A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM REPRESSION TO PRODUCTIVITY

RAGESH A V
PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad,
Gachibowli, Hyderabad – 500046, Telangana, India.

Received: June 13, 2018 Accepted: July 27, 2018

ABSTRACT *Power is often conceptualised in terms of capacity to domination and the ability to manipulate, thereby, ultimately repressive and negative. This paper presents, how the French philosopher Michel Foucault conceptualised 'power' and how it is different from the traditional understandings. As the recent debate considers power is a synonymous term of social life as it is inseparable from our lives, it is necessary that power must be analysed. In this paper, I shall suggest or defend that power is not essentially repressive but has productive nature. In order to substantiate my argument, I shall propose a comparative analysis of three-dimensional views of power which includes Liberal conception, Radical conception, and Foucauldian perspectives. The proposed comparative analysis basically inquires the questions such as what power is and how it exercises etc. It brings not only new questions for the analysis of power but also interesting angles on the old debates. However, I shall suggest that we must study power broadly, that is, paying attention to its subtle tactics. Furthermore, the analysis examines the status of the subject in the power relation which, I argue, reveals a radical departure of power's conceptualization from repression to productivity.*

Keywords: *Power, subject, repression, productive, discipline*

1. Introduction

In the course of my argument, I shall basically handle the issues such as what power is and how it exercises. However, the main focus would be to criticise the general definitions of power characterised in terms of domination and repression by analysing the Foucauldian perspective of power. My approach will be to outline three conceptual maps or dimension, which will reveal the distinguishing features of the nature of power. I shall recapitulate the basic assumptions of the three dimensions of power and propose a comparative analysis in which distinguishing features of them are studied. Having analyzed the basic premises of three dimensions, I shall try to show that the third view which is the Foucauldian perspective allows one to give a deeper and more satisfying analysis of power than the other two. To bring these into a set of ordering relationships with each other, a concept of circuits of power has been proposed where what is the status of the subject is studied. In short, my intention is to execute a comparative analysis of the three dimensions which reveal different aspects and angles of the problem of power with regard to the subject.

2. Section A

2.1 The liberal conception of Power

The Liberal conception of power is classified into two dimensions or faces. The First face is often called the pluralistic concept of Power proposed mainly by Dahl, Polsby and Wolfinger. The basic assumption of power is that it is an activity, for example, 'A'[1] significantly affects 'B' to get what 'A' wants to do. To put it another way, Power is considered as the capacity or ability to impact others in a way in which the person or group gets others what they wish to do. Strictly speaking, power is the exercise of affecting or influencing B's values, preferences, interests, beliefs and desires etc seen as the result of B's acceptance of A's interests either by violent or non-violent forms of domination. In his seminal article, Robert Dahl defines Power as '' 'A' has power over 'B' to the extent that he can get 'B' to do something that B would not otherwise do'' (Dahl (1957).p.202-203)

As per this definition, it is evident that in order to exist a power relation, specific subjects (here, in our example, A and B) are presupposed. In other words, power exists or exercises between subjects who have a conflict of interests based on their certain issues. As conflict occurs between subjects, who have the capacities to affect outcomes will be the powerful subject. Therefore, it is conceivable by definition that, if power exercises, then B's interests are harmed by A. This suggests that power is conceptualized as not only A's capacity but also a possession which enables 'A' influencing B, thereby, obtaining the dominance. Moreover, power is conceived to be exercised maximum where A 'gaining control' over B depends on the means, the source used by A. In short, Power is the act of bearing outcomes when there are conflicts of interest between subjects in which the most powerful subject is who wins the majority of the conflicts[2].

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS 5th - 7th Jan. 2018

(Founded in 1925 by Rabindranath Tagore and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan)

Venue : Holistic Science Research Center, VVCRF, Surat (Gujarat)

PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

Prof./Dr./Mr./Ms. Ragesh A V

has participated in the deliberations of the 92nd Session of

Indian Philosophical Congress - 2018.

(Holistic way of Life & Living) He / She has contributed a paper on

Nietzsche's 'Beyond Binaries': A Holistic Approach.

L. D. Patel
Local Secretary

S R Bhatt
Prof. S. R. Bhatt
Chairman

Prof. S. Panneerselvam
General Secretary

Centenary Celebrations of Osmania University

(1917-2017)

Department of Philosophy

University College of Arts & Social Sciences, Osmania University

Certificate

This is to certify that Ragesh. A.V.

has participated / presented paper on Michel Focault and Kautilya -

on Power : A Comparative analysis.

in the National Seminar on Philosophy : The Eternal Awakener of Humanity, held by the Department of Philosophy, Osmania University,

on 28th and 29th March, 2018, at PGRRCDE, O.U., Hyderabad.

Prof. V. Padmavathi

Director of the Seminar,

Head Department of Philosophy, Dean of Arts,

University College of Arts & Social Sciences, Osmania University, Hyderabad,

Telangana, India.

Power and Subject: A Critical Analysis of Foucault's Perspective

by Ragesh A V

Submission date: 03-Nov-2020 10:17AM (UTC+0530)
Submission ID: 1434682623
File name: Thesis_for_Plagiarism_Library_Copy_1.pdf (1.58M)
Word count: 75164
Character count: 427948

Power and Subject: A Critical Analysis of Foucault's Perspective

ORIGINALITY REPORT

1%	1%	1%	0%
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	archive.org Internet Source	<1%
2	discovery.ucl.ac.uk Internet Source	<1%
3	sro.sussex.ac.uk Internet Source	<1%
4	mafiadoc.com Internet Source	<1%
5	docplayer.net Internet Source	<1%
6	preterhuman.net Internet Source	<1%
7	Submitted to Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts Student Paper	<1%
8	documents.mx Internet Source	<1%
9	Critical Perspectives in Happiness Research,	

	2014. Publication	<1%
10	monoskop.org Internet Source	<1%
11	Allen, A.. "Foucault and the politics of our selves", History of the Human Sciences, 2011. Publication	<1%
12	Martin Kusch. "Foucault's Strata and Fields", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 1991 Publication	<1%
13	www.scribd.com Internet Source	<1%
14	drambedkarwritings.gov.in Internet Source	<1%
15	www.coursehero.com Internet Source	<1%
16	www.glitchnyc.com Internet Source	<1%
17	en.wikipedia.org Internet Source	<1%
18	ir.lib.uwo.ca Internet Source	<1%
19	www.earthscience.co	

	Internet Source	<1%
20	Moghtader, Bruce. "Archaeology and Genealogy", Foucault and Educational Ethics, 2016. Publication	<1%
21	Noah Quastel. "Ethical Consumption, Consumer Self-Governance, and the Later Foucault", Dialogue, 2009 Publication	<1%
22	sfbay-anarchists.org Internet Source	<1%
23	www.academia.edu Internet Source	<1%
24	Irene Rafanell, Hugo Gorringe. "Consenting to Domination? Theorising Power, Agency and Embodiment with Reference to Caste", The Sociological Review, 2010 Publication	<1%
25	Peter Digeser. "The Fourth Face of Power", The Journal of Politics, 11/1992 Publication	<1%
26	"Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2010 Publication	<1%

27	link.springer.com Internet Source	<1%
28	windowtophilosophy.blogspot.com Internet Source	<1%
29	"Poverty and the Production of World Politics", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2006 Publication	<1%
30	www.tandfonline.com Internet Source	<1%
31	open.library.ubc.ca Internet Source	<1%
32	wrap.warwick.ac.uk Internet Source	<1%
33	Ideology and Power in the Age of Lenin in Ruins, 1991. Publication	<1%
34	hdl.handle.net Internet Source	<1%
35	scholarworks.wm.edu Internet Source	<1%
36	Peter J. Dwyer. "Foucault, Docile Bodies and Post-Compulsory Education in Australia", British Journal of Sociology of Education, 2006 Publication	<1%

37 Bruce Moghtader. "Foucault and Educational Ethics", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2016 <1%

Publication

Exclude quotes	On	Exclude matches	< 14 words
Exclude bibliography	On		