

**THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ  
A CRITICAL EXPOSITION**

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***THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
TO  
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY.  
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES,  
UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD.***

**HYDERABAD, A. P.**

**SEPTEMBER 1985.**

## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled **The Metaphilosophy of Morris Lazerowitz: A Critical Exposition** submitted by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, to the Department of Philosophy, in the School of Humanities has not been submitted to any other university for this or any other purpose.

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**Certified that the thesis entitled The Metaphilosophy of Morris Lazerowitz : A Critical Exposition submitted by Miss Mercy Helen for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Hyderabad, has been done under my supervision and embodies the result of bona fide research work.**

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## A B S T R A C T

Philosophy has acquired a notoriety for the endless disagreements it exhibits in regard to every problem it deals with. This peculiarity of philosophy appears disturbing to many philosophers, Morris Lazerowitz being perhaps most mentionable among them. His metaphilosophy is specifically designed at instituting a sophisticated and highly stimulating theory to provide an explanation of this disagreement via an investigation of the nature of the utterances in which the philosophical theories are embodied. What this theory stands for and what, according to us, its merits and demerits are, are stated in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively.

Lazerowitz's metaphilosophical theory is continuous with Wittgenstein's views on the nature of philosophical propositions and, in that *sense*, it may be said to have derived its clue from the latter. Accordingly, in Chapter 4 we have given an account of Wittgenstein's views. It is a vital part of the setting without reference to which, the understanding of Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy is bound to remain incomplete.

The other, equally vital components of the setting, are the three theories which respectively are that philosophical propositions are empirical, that they are a Priori and that they are nonsensical. Brief accounts of these theories together with an account of how Lazerowitz reacts to them are given in Chapter 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

Professor B.S. Ramakrishna, our Vice-Chancellor, and Professor S. Nagarajan, our Dean, without whose help and encouragement it would not have been possible for me to go to United States and avail myself of the immense benefit I have obtained from Professors Morris Lazerowitz and Alice Ambrose.

Mr. S.K. Moldgy, who has typed this thesis with great care.

MERCY HELEN

## C O N T E N T S

	Page
Abstract	5
Acknowledgements	7
Introduction	10
CHAPTER	
1 Philosophical Propositions: Are They Empirical?	14
2 Philosophical Propositions: Are They A <u>p</u> riori?	28
3 Logical Positivism: Schlick and Ayer	44
4 Wittgenstein! His Views	55
5 Morris Lazerowitz: On the Nature of Philosophical Theories	90
6 The Critique	130
Notes	176
Bibliography	200

## INTRODUCTION

The central aim of Morris **Lazerowitz's metaphilosophical** investigation is to arrive at an **understanding** of the nature of **philosophy** **Why** such an investigation is necessary appears plainly **in** his treatment of classical philosophical problems - problems which occur **in** every field of philosophy and which have been raised again and again in the course of a long **history**. Traditionally, philosophers have conceived their work as a search for **truth**, and their goal as knowledge of reality as against mere **appearance**. Yet the body of propositions which constitute philosophy presents us with an enigma, **It** is unlike other disciplines in that not a single one of **its** theses **is non-controversial**. A philosopher advances his theory with the assured air of asserting an **incontrovertible** truth, yet every **theory** **is** surrounded by **disputation**. Some philosophers have been **aware** of this situation, and openly deplored **it** For **example, Kant**. He **wrote**:

There is no single book to which you can point as you do to **Euclid**, and says This is **metaphysics**; here you may find the noblest objects of this **science**, ... proved from principles of

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

pure **reason**.\*• in all **ages** one meta-  
**physics** has contradicted **another**,  
 either in its assertions or their  
**proofs**, and thus has itself destroy-  
 ed its own **claim** to lasting **assent**.<sup>2</sup>

Descartes made a similar observations

I shall not say anything about **phi-**  
**losophy**, but that it has been culti-  
 vated for many centuries by the best  
 minds that have ever **lived**, and that  
 nevertheless no single thing is to be  
 found **in** it which is not subject to  
 dispute\* **and** in consequence which **is**  
 not **dubious**...

and more recently **G.E. Moore**\* **writes** t

Philosophy is a terrible **subject**:  
 the longer X go on with **it**, the  
 more difficult **it** is to say any-  
 thing at all about it which is  
 both true and worth **saying**. You  
 can never feel that you've fini-  
 shed with any philosophical ques-  
 tion **whatever**: got it finally  
 right\* so that you can pass on to  
 something **else**...

**Justification** for these complaints is found on **every**

## INTRODUCTION

**side.** For **example,** note the continuing disagreement about the existence of abstract **entities,** which goes back to **Plato.** Again consider the uncertainty about the validity of Descartes' **"cogito".** Does **it** beg the question? - Does Descartes put into his premise what he claims to deduce from it in the conclusion? To take still another example, consider the dispute about **causation,** Kant says **"every** event has a cause" is an **a priori** truth, **A.J.** Ayer raises the question whether an event must have a cause and maintains that it need not.

Disputation is rife not only among classical philosophers but among present day philosophers as well. And there is hardly a problem among **contem-**poraries but **has** its source in **antiquity.** This would suggest that something **in** the nature of philosophical position and the arguments for it is not understood. The existence of interminable debate **is** the most **com-**pelling reason for **Lazerowitz's** kind of **investigation.**

The extensive treatment in his writings on logically **necessary,** as **contrasted** with contingent or (**em-****pirical**) propositions is an indication of the importance to be attached to a study of their **features.** The

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

central question of Lazerowitz, 'How is a philosophical proposition to be **understood?**' has been answered **in** the history of **philosophy** in diverse ways - some philosophers appear to claim that their views are **a priori**, while yet other philosophers take them to be **empirical generalisations**. Thus the preliminary task in the **attempt** to understand their nature is to achieve clarity on the **nature** of **a priori** and empirical **propositions**. Once we are clear on their features we shall be in a position to determine whether philosophical theories have such **features**.

## CHAPTER 1

### PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY EMPIRICAL ?

This chapter will aim at outlining the **philosophical** setting of Morris **Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy**.

Philosophers **from** the beginning have held different views on the nature of philosophical **propositions**. These propositions appear to be a priori **in nature**, and at the same time they present the appearance of being empirical generalisations **with** a high degree of **probability**. It will be useful to examine these two diverse accounts of their **nature**, as it will enable us to find the causes for the upsurge of **interest in** the **metaphilosophical** question posed by Morris **Lazerowitz**: What is the nature of a philosophical statement - whether it occurs in **metaphysics, epistemology, ethics or aesthetics**?

In light of the fact that philosophical statements are expressed in an idiom which makes them appear to be **empirical**, while also appearing to be necessary (since no fact **is** used either to support or refute **them**), let us examine first of all whether a necessary proposition can at the same time assert a fact about **things**. It **is** requisite to set out clearly at least some essential features of necessary propositions **before** proceeding to treat this **question**.

### THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

A logically necessary **proposition**, one which has its **truth-value** by inner necessity (**Kant's** phrase) is such that its actual truth-value is its only **theoretically possible truth-value**. The negation of such a proposition results **in** a proposition which is logically **impossible**. when people talk about the nature of necessary **propositions**, there is a tendency to say that these propositions describe necessary features of the **world**. I **intend** to maintain the view that necessary propositions are not about **things**, or about the **world**.

Let us consider **zeno's** claim that motion does not **exist**, which is supported by a **non-empirical demonstration**: a moving body must go half of a **distance** before it can traverse the whole **distance**, and the same for each half of half the distance ad **infinitum** hence, since **it is** impossible to complete traversing an infinite number of **distances**, however small they become, motion **is** impossible. Now, what is interesting **is** that the disputes over such claims **as 'motion is impossible'** are not empirically resolvable, that **is**, by observation or **experimentation**. **If it** were, then Diogenes<sup>0</sup> standing up and walking across the lecture **hall**, as reportedly **occurred**, would have refuted **zeno's claim**. But

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY EMPIRICAL?

**zeno was** aware of the appearance of **motion** presented by **Diogeness** he saw what the **audience say**. That motion appears to **take** place does not show that it really takes place, **zeno's** argument remained untouched/ no flaw in **it** was **shown**, and what is equally **important**, nothing would be accepted as refuting the thesis that motion is **impossible-neither** flying birds nor **galloping horses**. This is an **important** feature of any **necessary proposition**, that no fact will upset **it**. That is\* its **truth-value** remains truth, no matter how much the world changes or even though the world goes out of **existence**. To quote **C.I. Lewis**, "That only can be a priori which **is** true no matter what."

Further\* **it** can be seen that an a priori claim cannot have **non-a priori** consequences\* that is\* it cannot by implication be about the **world**. To hold that it can\* **e.g.**, that motion is impossible implies that motion in fact does not **occur**. This I shall maintain\* involves us **in a contradiction**. To show this\* consider the following **argument**.

Suppose\* as **G.H. von\_wright** (by implication) held\* that  $\sim \diamond \sim p$  implies  $p$  is true as a matter of **fact**,<sup>2</sup>  
 $\sim \Delta p$  implies  $p$  is false as a matter of **fact**.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LA ZERO WIT Z

If  $p$  is true (or false) as a matter of fact, then it is in principle possible for  $p$  to have the opposite truth-value to the one it possesses} if  $p$  is true, this fact does not eliminate the possibility of its being false; and if  $p$  is false this fact does not eliminate the possibility of it being true. Now if  $\neg\Diamond\neg p$  implies that  $p$  is true, then it implies that  $p$  could be false, i.e.,  $\neg\Diamond\neg p$  implies  $\Diamond\neg p$  and  $\neg\Diamond\neg p$  also implies  $\neg\Diamond\neg p$ . The absurd consequence is,  $p$  is necessarily true, and at the same time, possibly false.

Since philosophical views appear to many philosophers to be a priori, the nature of a priori proposition needs a thorough investigations Three main questions arise.<sup>4</sup>

1. Can an a priori proposition entail an empirical proposition? That is\* can a proposition which has only one possible truth-value entail a proposition which has two possible truth-values?
2. Can an a priori proposition be entailed by\* or be deducible from, an empirical proposition ? That is, can a proposition which has

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS<sup>t</sup> ARE THEY EMPIRICAL?

**two possible truth-values entail a proposition which has only one possible truth-value?**

3. **Can a proposition which has only one theoretically possible truth-value present a claim about things?**

On question 1, I have already argued against the special cases  $\neg \diamond \neg p \rightarrow p$ . Hume made the general claim that nothing contingent can follow from what is necessary. The following brief argument supports Hume's point.

Suppose  $p \rightarrow q$ , where  $\neg \diamond \neg p$  and  $p \rightarrow q$  is replaceable by:  $\neg \diamond (p \wedge \neg q)$  since the impossibility of the conjunction cannot be due to  $p$ , which is necessary, it must be due to  $\neg q$  i.e.,  $\neg q$  is impossible or  $\neg \diamond (\neg q)$  That is,  $q$  is necessary. There will be no circumstance under which  $q$  could be false, which contradicts the assumption that  $\neg \diamond \neg$

Since Hume's claim is of great importance to philosophy,

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

an additional argument by Morris Lazerowitz, may be **useful:**

Given  $p \rightarrow q, \neg p$

may be replaced by:

$(p \cdot \neg p) \vee (p \cdot q) \vee (p \cdot \neg p)$

since  $\neg p$  the last two **dis-**  
**junctions** are eliminated, and

**q**) remains, from which  
**follows.**

Let us examine question 2, Can an a priori proposition be deduced from an empirical proposition? In order for a proposition **p** to imply another proposition **q** (such that **q** is deducible from **p**) there must be an inconsistency between **p** and  $\neg q$  (where the **inconsistency** is not merely repeated in  $\neg q$ ). If the **antecedent** is **empirical**, the only **inconsistency** that will occur will **lie in** the negated **consequent**. Then the claimed **implication** between a contingent proposition and an a priori proposition **will fail** to meet the **condition** that **there** be an **inconsistency** between **p** and the negated **consequent**.

To illustrate, take Lewis' claim that a tautology is **implied** by every proposition:  $q \leftarrow (p \vee \neg p)$ .

## PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY EMPIRICAL?

The inconsistency here does not lie between the **antecedent** and the negated **consequent**, but lies in the negated consequent **itself**, viz\*, in  $(p \vee \neg p)$  which **is self-inconsistent**. **Again**, there **is** a useful point to discuss **in** connection with the **cosmological argument**. The latter seems to violate the principle that an a priori truth cannot have non-a priori consequences.

To give a corrected version of the **Cosmological arguments** Every contingent thing must have a cause; if this cause is itself **contingent**, it must have a **cause**. Now there cannot be a consummated infinity of causes going back in **time**. This implies there must be a first cause, which is not **itself contingent, i.e., is** a being which necessarily **exists**. The propositions that contingent thing exist, will have to be **contingent**, such that it could in principle be **false**. Now to say a contingent thing **is** brought **into** existence **implies** that it is caused by the first cause, which itself has necessary **existence**. **The** proposition that a first cause necessarily exists will be a priori and simply restated in propositional terms a **claim** apparently made about the relationship between a necessary existent thing to contingently **existing thing**.

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

As to question 3, whether a proposition having only one theoretically possible truth-value can make a claim about things, consider the notion Kant brought to philosophy the notion of a synthetic a priori proposition. Kant regarded synthetic a priori propositions as a very important class of a priori propositions. Their distinguishing feature is that their predicates are neither identical with nor conjunctive part of their subject terms. Unlike analytical propositions, their negations are not self-contradictory, although they have in common with analytic propositions the feature that no other truth-value than the one it possesses is possible for it. Kant held that these synthetic a priori propositions are about things. For since the predicate of a synthetic a priori proposition is not wholly contained in its subject, it gives new information about what is referred to by its subject term. To take an illustration from Kant, "Every occurrence has a cause" was held to be synthetic a priori. To quote:

Let us take the proposition, 'Everything which happens has its cause'.

## PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS t ARE THEY EMPIRICAL?

In the concept of **'something which happens'** I do indeed think an **existence** which is preceded by a **time**, etc\*\* and from this concept analytic judgements may be **obtained**. But the concept of a **'cause'** lies entirely outside the other **concept**, and signifies something different from **'that which happens'**\* and is not therefore in anyway contained **in this latter representation...** the concept of **'cause'**, though not contained in **it** (the concept of something which **happens**), yet **belongs, to it... (the principle that everything that happens has a cause)** is completely a priori and on the basis of mere **concepts**.

Let us examine the **proposition** considered in this quotations **'All occurrences have causes'**. If the claim that all occurrences have causes is logically necessary then it has only one theoretically possible truth-value\* and this implies that no conceivable change **in** the world could change the **truth-value** of the **claim**. If the **proposition** is not determined by what the world is **like**. It can tell us nothing about the relationship between occurrences and **causes**. For the proposition **'All occurrences must have causes'** would reduce to a **tautology**.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

This we can see **from the following:**

All occurrences must have causes

means

All occurrences are caused occurrences

(by logical necessity)•

If this were the case **"caused"** would not have a use to distinguish between **occurrences**. **"Caused occurrences"** would then shrink **into "occurrences"**; the denotation of **"causal occurrences"** would necessarily coincide with **"occurrences"**. Thus the word **"caused"** becomes **descriptive!// functionless**. As a **result**, we have

**'All occurrences are occurrences'**, which **is** a empty **tautology**. As a further **example**, **consider** Berkeley's statement\*

**'Everything is a perceived thing'**\*

or

It **is inconceivable** or logically **impossible\*** for there to be an **unperceived thing**.

Therefore\* **'unperceived thing'** has no descriptive function\* Just as **"round square"** does not **serve** to describe

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY EMPIRICAL?

a **figure**. According to **Wittgenstein**, if one of a pair of antithetical terms is stripped of its use in the language, the other also loses its use. When a philosopher says '**sense-experience is vague**' or '**everything is in flux**'.

we are using the words '**flux**' and '**vagueness**' wrongly in a typically metaphysical way, namely\* without an **antithesis**, whereas in their correct and everyday use, vagueness is opposed to clearness\* flux to stability\* **inaccuracy** to accuracy\* and problem to **solution**.

Just as "**every occurrence is a caused occurrence**", reduces to "**Every occurrence is an occurrence**", so '**everything is perceived thing**' conveys no more information than '**everything is a thing**'. The word '**perceived**' loses **its** function since **Berkeley's** claim **implies** that **its** antithesis\* "**unperceived**" has no correct use.

The proposition\* Everything **is** a thing obviously gives no **information** about **things**. It says nothing about what a thing is like\* not even whether **it** exists. In this respect **it** is like the **truth-table**

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

tautology " $p \vee \sim p$ ". Of the **special** case of  $p \vee \sim p$ , namely, "It is raining or not raining" Wittgenstein commented in the Tractatus that it gives no information about the weather. It is "unconditionally true".<sup>7</sup>; "a tautology" he said "has no truth-conditions". It should be noted that Wittgenstein was of two minds on this point. The truth-table he constructed for  $p \vee \sim p$ ,

<b>p</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>v</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>p</b>
<b>T</b>		<b>T</b>		
<b>F</b>		<b>T</b>		

suggests that  $p \vee \sim p$  has truth-conditions listed on the left in the table, and that each of these makes it true. But it is clear that "it is either raining or not raining" is true no matter what the state of the weather is, no matter which truth-condition obtains. What happens in the world is not a condition for its being true. This, then, is my answer to the question whether logically necessary propositions are about things, or events, or states of affairs.

It has been claimed, however, that they must be about something. Conventionalists have held that necessary propositions are "really verbal"; they are about the actual use of terminology. As A.J. Ayer put it,

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY EMPIRICAL?

"they call attention to the implications of a certain  
 g  
 linguistic **usage**". The source of a priori necessity is  
 said to be **language**. This position needs careful exa-  
**mination**.

What conventionalists have seen **is** an important  
 similarity between sentences expressing necessary pro-  
 positions and sentences about the use of **words**. **Whether**  
 this similarity supports the conventionalist position  
 that a necessary proposition is verbal must now be **ex-**  
**a mined**. Consider the sentence (a) "**a cat is an animal**",  
 which in English expresses the necessary proposition

g  
 (b) that a cat is an animal/ The fact that (a) does  
 express this necessary proposition is an empirical fact  
 about English **usage**. That **it** does so is equivalent to  
 the following (empirical) fact; that "animal" **in** point  
 of usage applies to everything "**cat**" applies **to**. (Note  
 that the latter fact **is** not about cats, but about the  
words "**cat**" and "animal") we can then write

A cat is an animal expresses a neces-  
 sary **proposition**.  $\equiv$  "The sentence, 'ani-  
 mal' applies to whatever 'cat' applies  
 to" **expresses** a fact about **usage**.

But this does not allow us to write

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

A cat is an animal is a necessary proposition.  $\equiv$  The word 'animal' applies to everything "cat" applies to.

The fact that a proposition is necessary is not to be equated with any verbal fact, since a proposition about the actual use of terminology could be false. This is to say **it** is empirical. **Clearly**, an **empirical** proposition about words cannot be **equated** with an a priori proposition which makes no mention of **words**.

**Nevertheless**, an a priori statement in an oblique way conveys information about the use of nomenclature **in the language**. This **is** plain when one considers how one would justify the **claim** that a cat is an animal is a necessary proposition one would **not** turn to observation of cats but would cite the **fact** that the proposition **is "true by definition"** of the words occurring in **its expression**. The proposition is not equivalent to any statement about usage, but the **only information it conveys** is **verbal**.

In understanding a sentence which expresses an a priori proposition, what we know, and all that we **know**, is a fact about the use of terminology in the language, although that fact **is** not expressed by the **sentence**.

## CHAPTER 2

### PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY A PRIORI?

The term 'metaphilosophy' was coined by Morris Lazerowitz in 1940 to refer unambiguously to a special kind of investigation which Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations had described as one of the "heirs" of philosophy. To put it in his own words x

It is the investigation of the nature of philosophy with the central aim of arriving at a satisfactory explanation of the absence of uncontested philosophical claims and arguments.

At another place he says:

... (it) is the investigation of philosophical utterances, with the special aim of reaching a satisfactory understanding of what in their nature permits the intractable disagreements which invariably attach to them.

Its intended use is not to refer to a philosophical system or systems as "metaphysics" does; here one has to understand that metaphilosophy should not be treated as another branch of philosophy. It is about philosophy — about the statements which comprise it. To anticipate what will be discussed in detail, he characterizes a

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

philosophical theory as a

••• gerrymandered (i.e., re-edited) piece of language, which because it is presented in the ontological idiom, is capable of creating the intellectual illusion that a theory about things is being stated and also of giving expression to a cluster of unconscious ideas.<sup>3</sup>

As this description suggests, the theories and arguments in philosophy are mis-conceived. It is obvious without elaboration of this bald account that the task of roetaphilosophy is not to adjudicate between rival views. Strangely enough, philosophers are not made curious about the nature of their activity, nor are they sufficiently disturbed to look into the baffling permanence of their disagreements. This situation has no parallel in mathematics or in natural sciences. The fact that there are unresolved problems in these disciplines in no way presents anything comparable to the disputes that everywhere pervade technical philosophy. Once a dispute occurs in philosophy it remains in philosophy. A further point of difference between philosophy and other disciplines is that they have a body

**PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY A PRIORI?**

of established results which can be counted as finished **business**. Philosophy has nothing comparable to **show**.

Philosophers **may realise**, at least **dimly**, that understanding these disputes might require a reassessment of the accepted **ideas** about the nature of their **work**. The impression that is gaining strength **is** that philosophers have a skeleton in their closet which they do not wish to be seen. Wittgenstein has **expressed** the wish that philosophy should disappear and it **may** well be that philosophers fear that philosophy will evaporate if **it is given** sufficient **scrutiny**. Gilbert Ryle seems to have sensed this when he coined the **expression "meta-evaporate"**. As already mentioned in the **preceding chapter**, disputes in philosophy have existed for an astonishingly long **time**, and the **irresolvability** of these disputes **is** something which **demand**s **investigation**. A further **thing**, these disputes have the curious feature of being carried on in the presence of all facts **necessary** to resolve them, if they indeed are about the **facts**. To **illustrate**, with regard to such elementary statements as  $2 + 2 = 4^*$  and a cat is an animal\* the **truth-values** of which are not **in** dispute; rival views have clustered around the question as to what they are **about**. Some

THE **METAPHILOSOPHY** OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

philosophers have declared that the **arithmetical** proposition **is** about the terms "2" and "**4**"; others maintained that it is about abstract entities denoted by these **terms**, and still others stated that **it** is an inductive generalisation based on examination **of instances**. In the case of each **theory**, simple inspection of the proposition should yield the fact the philosophers **seek**, - no further fact is required in order to settle the **disagreements**. Disputes of this kind pervade philosophy.

To turn to another surprising feature, philosophers who have maintained a particular view have changed their minds and adopted an opposing **view**. For example, Aristotle's view that a **universal** cannot exist without its particular, came to the fore again **in** our own **time** in the work of Rudolf **Carnap**. For many years Carnap denied (**cf.** his Logical Syntax of Language) that there are abstract entities denoted by general **words**. Later he accepted the Aristotelian **view**. Bertrand Russell is another example of a philosopher **shifting from** one view to an opposing **view**. In **his** early days he held that he was acquainted with abstract entities whenever he **understood** a general word, and later he **was** reduced to the tentative admission "**I** conclude ... though with **hesitation**, that there are **universals...**" This kind of

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY A PRIORI?

change of mind **is understandable** in religion and politics, but not **in a** reasoned **discipline**.

What explanation can be offered for such vacillation? The answer must lie **in** a correct account of the nature of a philosophical **theory**. **Hence**, the task ahead is to **determine**, if we can, what feature or features the **theory has**. Our preceding chapter elaborates **distinctions** between propositions which will serve as a starting point for the characterization of philosophical theories, (1) as being empirical (2) as being **a priori**.

One theory which is represented as if **it** were empirical, **i.e.**, as making a claim to which observation **is** relevant to determining its truth-value, is to be found **in Hume**. He urges observation as a means of deciding its truth or **falsity**. In **his** treatment of causation, he appears to have expected careful scrutiny to show whether there be "**a tie**" between cause and **effect**. To quote **him**:

**What is** the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning (the) relation of (cause and effect)? It may be replied in one word, **experience**.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

## Commenting on Hume, Russell says:

Hume's real argument **is** that, while we sometimes perceive relations of time and **place**, we never perceive causal **re-relations**, which must therefore **if admitted**, be **inferred** from relations that can be **perceived**. The **controversy** is thus reduced to one of empirical **fact**. Do we or do we not sometimes perceive a relation which can be called **causal**.

To take another example **from** Hume, his account of the self seems to have rested on an empirical process of introspection. He reported that the notion of self **as a** 'simple and continued spiritual **substance**' was not to be **found**. **When** he supposed **himself** to be making an empirical examination of **himself**, he reported:

But self or person **is** not any one impression, but that to which our several **impressions** and ideas are supposed to have a **reference**. If any impression gives rise to the **idea of self**, that **impression** must **continue** invariably the **same**, thro'

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY A PRIORI?

the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist **after** that **manner**. But there is no impression constant and **invariable**. Pain and **pleasure**; grief and **joy**, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same **time**. It cannot **therefore**, be from **any** of these impressions or from any **other**, that the **idea** of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea ... After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with **it**? For my **part**, when I enter most intimately into what I call **myself**, I always stumble on some **particular perception** or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or **pleasure**. I never can **catch** myself at **any-time** without a perception, and never can observe<sup>7</sup> anything but the **perception**.

It **is** evident that Hume's procedure is permitted with an empirical **air**. He seems to be observing introspectively the contents of his experience in a search for a continuous **self**. The conclusion he comes to is that there **is** no such **entity**. Now these described procedures

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

look to be similar to those which the scientist engages in. Nevertheless, in science and in everyday life, when we look for something we have an idea of what it is that we are looking for. The astronomer who discovered the planet Pluto, in a general way knew that he was looking for prior to his discovery. He was looking for the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Neptune. Any divergence of opinion about the causes of the deviations in the expected orbit of Neptune would have come to an end, as in fact it did.

In the case of Hume, the peculiar fact is that his claim that there was no impression of causation and hence no idea of it, implies that he could not have known what it was that he was looking for. His philosophical observation would seem only to imitate the genuine empirical searches in science and in ordinary life. A further point might be added. The claim that there is no impression of causation implies that the words "impression of causation" have no use to describe anything whatever, and that the word "cause" has no correct use in the English language. In general one cannot say what it is that one does not have. Wittgenstein observed that you cannot hang a thief who doesn't exist, to which we

**PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS ARE THEY A PRIORI?**

might add that you cannot think of the meaning of a **term** which is **meaningless**.

**Hume's attempt** to discover causation, as well as to find a **self** to which his impressions "have reference", are **entirely** different from those in **science**. Hume is unable to say what **it is** he **is** trying to discover since he according to his own declaration has no **idea** of **it**. He **says**,

Unluckily all these positive **asser-**  
**tions** [by philosophers who **claim**  
 that 'we are every moment intima-  
 tely conscious of what we call **self**'],  
 are contrary to that very **experience**,  
 which is pleaded for them, nor have  
 we any **idea** of self, **after** the man-  
 ner it is here **explained**.

He appears to tell us what it is that he can't find, by **introspection** or some other form of **investigation**, and at the same time tells us that we cannot even **in-**  
**stitute** a **search**.

Now **if** Hume's denial of the existence of a causal **"tie"** or a continuous self were empirical, he and his opponents **could** in principle have settled their **dispute**. They would have an **idea** of what terminating the dispute

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

would seem to be like. The question is, how is the continuing, disputation to be explained? There seems to be no escaping the conclusion that Hume's investigation was not an empirical search regardless of how it may appear.

Wittgenstein stated clearly\* though without elaboration, that philosophical problems ... are, of course, not empirical.<sup>12</sup> His remark makes it natural to suppose that he thought them to be a priori. And in lectures, 1934-5 he says\* "philosophy is a priori".<sup>3</sup> Having discussed at length in the preceding chapter the nature of a, priori propositions\* we are now in a position to investigate whether philosophical propositions are a priori.

We take as an illustration an argument and a thesis which have all the earmarks of being a priori: St. Anselm's Ontological argument for the existence of God. The Leibniz-Cartesian form of it is as follows:

God is the greatest or (as Descartes says) the most perfect of beings\* or rather a being of supreme grandeur and perfection\* including all degrees thereof. That is the notion of God.

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS <sup>t</sup> ARE THEY A PRIORI?

See now how **existence follows from this notion**. TO exist is **something more than not to exist**, or rather existence adds a degree to grandeur and perfection, and as Descartes states **it**, existence is **itself a perfection**, or rather this perfection which consists in **existence**, is in this supreme **all-great, all-perfect being**; for otherwise some degree would be wanting to it contrary to **this definition**. Consequently this supreme being **exists**.<sup>14</sup>

The Anselmic argument is intended to show that existence is a necessary property of a perfect **being**. According to philosophical theologians existence **is** a perfection of a thing, such that to have it is to be more perfect than to lack **it**. To say an absolutely perfect being does not exist **is** to imply that a perfect being lacks a possible perfection and is therefore less than perfect. That existence is classed with such properties **as** all-powerful, **is** exhibited clearly in the following version of the Anselmic proof. An absolutely perfect being than which a more perfect is **inconceivable** is such that all **its possible** properties are actual properties of **it**. Now such a being could exist, **i.e.** could have the property of **existing**. It's existence

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

**is not incompatible with any other of its properties. Hence it exists.**

Against **this**, Kant posed the objection that existence is not a characterizing property of a being. He says:

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing - even if we completely determine it - we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing **is**. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that **exists**, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say, that the exact object of our concept **exists**.<sup>16</sup>

Hume maintains a similar view when he talks about the existence of God. He says that the **idea** of existence is nothing different from the **idea** of any object. To quote him:

Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the **idea** of such a being, as he **is** represented to us; nor **is** the existence, which

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS <sup>t</sup> ARE THEY A PRIORI?

we attribute to **him**, conceived **by** a particular idea, which we **join** to the idea of his other **qualities**, and can again separate and distinguish **from** them. But I go **farther**, and not content with asserting, that the conception of the existence of an/ object **is** no addition to the simple conception of it...<sup>17</sup>

If the existence of God is deduced from the nature of God, then God exists is an a priori **proposition**. But if God exists were a priori, then it would tell us nothing about the existence of an/ thing or being. As we saw **in** the preceding chapter, an a priori **proposition** is not about things, and the only **information** it provides, in an oblique way, **is** about the use of terminology in the language. **In** the present case what it conveys is information about the use of the word "exist".

Counted as a predicate which characterizes the nature of a thing, it **is** possible without loss of literal sense to deny that a given thing has it. Thus the term "**octagonal**", which has a **characterizing** use, is such that to **deny** that a given thing **is octagonal** has no unwelcome consequences.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

Similarly, if existence is a characterizing attribute, then to deny that the thing in question exists should likewise have no unacceptable consequences. The difference between the uses of "octagonal" and "existence" can be seen by comparing "This exists", and "This is octagonal". The denial of "This exists", i.e., "This does not exist", makes no literal sense, unlike the denial of "This is octagonal". To bring out the point somewhat differently, consider the statement "I have 13 pence in my hand, one of which does not exist". This makes no literal sense, although it should, if "exists" has a characterizing use.

There are countless additional ways of bringing out the difference we all sense between existence and a descriptive property such as all-wise. Some of these are enlightening. I cite two further considerations that called my attention by Lazerowitz:

1. There exists an all-perfect being =  
There exists an all-wise, all-good,  
all-powerful being. If existence  
is listed among the perfections,  
this equivalence becomes:-

PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS: ARE THEY A PRIORI?

There exists an **all-perfect** being =  
 There exists an **all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, existent being**. Thus one of the **implications** of There exists an all-perfect being is There exists an existent being. And **this** tautology adds nothing to the implication of There exists an all-perfect being.

2. Given that existence is a feature of a perfect being, it becomes absorbed in the subject term. Thereupon the **statement** that a perfect being exists involves us in an infinite **regress**. For attributing the property of existence to a thing yields a **statement** about its nature (about what it is, rather than that it is). Once absorbed **into** the subject **term**, the existence of that subject has yet to be demonstrated and **if, again,**

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

existence becomes part of the nature of the **subject**, then the statement that the subject exists requires a demonstration ad inf 1-nitum.

These various considerations all show that arguments for God's existence which involve taking existence to be a characterizing **attribute**, go against the fact that to **say** something exists is to say that it is, not what it is. This fact shows that a perfect being exists is not an a priori proposition. Existence **is** not part of God's nature.

## CHAPTER 3

### LOGICAL POSITIVISM t SCHLICK AND AYER

From what we have already seen in the preceding **chapter**, philosophical propositions are neither empirical nor a priori. If this is the **case**, then the only remaining alternative would seem to be that they are **non-sensical**. The notion comes directly to us from the logical **positivists**.

In the 1930's logical **positivists**, amongst them, **Schlick**, Carnap and other members of the **so-called** Vienna circle enunciated the thesis that the meaning of a statement is the method of its **verification**. It "can be given only by giving the rules of its verification in experience"<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact, the requirement of **verifiability** was first stated by Wittgenstein according to Carnap. He says, in "**Testability and Meaning**":

... among empiricists there seems to be full agreement that **at** least some more or less close relation exists between the meaning of a sentence and the way in which we come to a verification or at least a confirmation of **it**. The requirement of verification was first stated by Wittgenstein, and its **meaning** and consequences were **exhibited** in the earlier publications of

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

our Vienna circle...

Now this principle, which is known as the principle of **verifiability**, functioned as a criterion of **literal meaningfulness**. It was used to determine whether an utterance has **literal sense** or **not**. **Schlick's** formulation is **inadequate** because it does not **distinguish** between kinds of **verification**. The modifying phrase, "**in sense experience**", was eliminated by **Schlick** because "**no other kind of verification has been defined**", the implication being that there **is** no other kind of verification. Now the suppression of the phrase "**in sense experience**" as unnecessary might be contested by a "**scientifically minded angel**", which hypothesis, however inane, is **theoretically possible**. **Schlick** leaves himself open to the objection that his verification criterion **is** an empty **tautology**. If verification in sense-experience **is** the only theoretically possible kind of **non-a priori** verification, then the term "**in sense-experience**" has no use to distinguish between kinds of **non-a priori** verification. And the statement "**all non-a priori verification is sense verification**" turns **into** the **uninformative** tautology "**all non-a priori verification is non-a priori verification**."

## LOGICAL POSITIVISMS SCHLICK AND AYER

A better known formulation of the criterion which is A.J. Ayer's is not subject to this objection since it includes a reference to **sense-experience**. It is as follows:

... a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express, that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the propositions as being true or reject it as being false.

In summary,

a simple way to formulate the principle would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.

The logical positivists considered metaphysical statements which refer to a supposed reality lying beyond the bounds of **sense-experience** to be nonsensical (neither a priori nor **verifiable** in sense-experience, therefore nonsensical).

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

Though the criterion of literal **meaningfulness**, as first stated by **Wittgenstein**, was used by **positivists** to attempt to eliminate metaphysical **statements** from **sensible discourse**, Wittgenstein never clearly distinguished between philosophical statements **in general** and the special class of metaphysical **statements**. In the Tractatus he **said**:

most of the propositions and questions to be found **in** philosophical works are not false but **non-sensical**.

In his liter writings he appears to use "**metaphysics**" and "philosophy" **interchangeably**. If this identification **is** correct, then the principle of **verifiability** would eliminate not only metaphysical statements, but all philosophical statements/ not only statements **referring** to what transcends **sense-experience**, but **statements** which refer to everyday phenomena, e.g., '**Motion is impossible**', '**Time is unreal**', '**Space cannot exist**', and such **like**.

Before embarking on a discussion whether all philosophical sentences are **nonsensical**, we should reformulate the principle of **verifiability** so as to avoid inadequacies of **Ayer's** first formulation, viz., a

LOGICAL POSITIVISM; SCHLICK AND AYER

sentence has literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expresses ... This is open to the objection that if the sentence already expresses a proposition it must have literal **significance: a proposition** ~~is~~ the **meaning of an indicative sentence**. The sentence thus ~~cannot~~ be cast out by the application of this version of the **verifiability criterion**. we cannot say that a sentence expressing a proposition is **meaningless** because it expresses an **unverifiable proposition**. For, **if** it expresses an unverifiable proposition, **it** expresses a proposition and therefore **has** literal **meaning**. The difficulty can be got round by a simple formulation: A sentence has literal meaning **if** and only if **it** expresses a proposition verifiable in **sense-experience**.

But this **reformulation** does not escape the obvious objection that it is **seemingly** tailored with an eye to what **positivists** wish to **eliminate**. By semantic  **fiat**, **i.e.**, arbitrarily, **it** eliminates metaphysical utterances. ~~we~~ might characterize it as a **semantic petitio principii**. For the principle of **verifiability** ~~was~~ patently intended to rule out metaphysics by **its formulation**. A metaphysician could defend himself by arguing against the criterion **in** the following way, "**non-a priori** sentences which refer

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

to a transcendental **reality** are those which are open to **super-sensible verification.**" Thus Kant has said in his **Preface,**

••• when all progress in the field of the supersensible has thus been denied to speculative **reason,** it is still open to us to **enquire** whether ••• data may not be found sufficient to ••• enable us, in accordance with the wish of **metaphysics** ••• to pass beyond the limits of all possi-

8

**ble [sense] experience.**

Again in the Phaedrus the platonic **immortals come** to the outside of **heaven,** and the revolution of the spheres carried them **round,** and they behold the things **beyond.** But of the heaven which is **above the heavens,** what earthly poet did or ever will sing worthily? It is such as Z will **describe,** ••• There abides the very being with which the true knowledge is concerned/ the colourless, formless\* intangible essence\* visible only to the mind\* the pilot of the **soul.** The divine intelligence being nurtured upon **mind** and pure knowledge\* and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving food proper to it\* rejoices at beholding **reality,** and once **more** gazing upon truth\* **is** replenished and made **glad...**

## LOGICAL POSITIVISM: SCHLICK AND AYER

**"Reality" here is plainly supersensible.**

An important defect of the verification criterion which has not so far been noted is that it violates a principle about the way in which antithetical terms are linked to each other. Wittgenstein made use of this principle although he did not explicitly formulate it. He did however, in several instances, cite examples of its violation. He writes

... in stating our puzzles about the general vagueness of sense-experience, and about the flux of all phenomena, we are using the words "flux" and "vagueness" wrongly, in a typically metaphysical way\* namely, without an antithesis; whereas in their correct and everyday use vagueness is opposed to clearness, flux to stability\* inaccuracy to accuracy...

This shows the way to a general formulation of the principle of antithetical terms: if one of a pair of antithetical terms is deprived of its function in the language, the other\* even though artificially retained in the language\* has no descriptive function.

The following are examples of violations of this principle.

1. Hobbes' view that all desires are selfish. Here

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

the term **"selfish"** would not have a use to distinguish between desires. Therefore **"selfish desire"** would contract into **"desire"**. By being deprived of its antithesis, **"unselfish"**, the word **"selfish"** loses its function to characterize desires. As a result, Hobbes' view reduces to the contentless tautology, **"All desires are desires"**.

2. Berkeley's view that **"it is impossible for there to be an unperceived thing<sup>\*1\*</sup>** About the existence of **"sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind"**, he says **"to me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all."** They no more describe a sensible object than the phrase **"round square"** describes a geometrical figure. **"Unperceived thing"** has no descriptive function in the language. But by eliminating **"unperceived"** from use, **"perceived"**, even though retained in the language, loses its ordinary use. As in the example from Hobbes, depriving a term of its antithesis reduces the view to a tautology. **"Everything is a perceived thing"** becomes **"Everything is a thing<sup>\*</sup>"**

3. Mill's view that all propositions are empirical, **2+2=4**, alike with **all cows are herbivorous**. According to Mill, the difference between them lies merely in their degree of certainty. But again, if all propositions

LOGICAL POSITIVISM: SCHLICK AND AYER

are empirical, then "empirical" does not serve to distinguish between propositions and loses its use.

It may turn out, however surprising, that the verifiability criterion also violates the principle of antithetical terms. The criterion is formulated in such a way to eliminate the theoretical possibility of verification in non-sensory experience (i.e., experience which transcends the bounds of sense). This comes down to saying that the phrase "domain beyond the bounds of sense" has no use to refer to a domain. The term "domain of sensible objects" therefore has no antithesis and itself can have no actual use in the language. The suppression of "domain of supersensible experience" carries with it the suppression of "verifiable in supersensible experience". The antithesis of the latter, "verifiable in sense-experience", would remain in the language only artificially where it delusively appears to have its use. Only by re-instating "verifiable in super-sensible experience" does the term "verifiable in sense-experience" regain its use. Wittgenstein said "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."<sup>12</sup> This is the way of restoring their lost function. Wittgenstein compared the semantic separation of antithetical terms

METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

with removing the tiller from the rudder, thereby making the rudder useless. If all literally significant non-a priori statements are verifiable in sense-experience, such that the phrase "verifiable in non-sensory experience" is ruled out from having a use, then "verifiable in sense-experience would not distinguish between verifiable propositions. The criterion then would say nothing more than "All verifiable propositions are verifiable propositions". We are perhaps justified in thinking that the verification criterion has been semantically tailored with an eye to what it eliminates. Violating the principle of antithetical terms prevents it from doing the task the positivist wishes to assign to it.

With this failure to eliminate from philosophy what Hume characterised as its "most contentious" part, we are left with the same disputes which have survived unresolved for centuries. Ayer has taken the position that these disputes are unwarranted. He writes:

••• the questions with which philosophy is concerned are purely logical questions; and although people do in fact dispute about logical questions, such disputes are always unwarranted. For they involve either the denial of a proposition

## LOGICAL POSITIVISM: SCHLICK AND AYER

which is necessarily true, or the assertion of a proposition which is necessarily **false**. In all such cases\* **there fore** \* we may be sure that one party to the dispute has been guilty of a miscalculation which a **suffici-**ently close scrutiny of the reasoning will enable us to **detect**. So that if the dispute **is not immediately resolved, if is** because the logical error of which one party is guilty **is** too subtle to be easily **detected**, and not because the question at issue is irresolvable on the available **evidence**.

Even if we allow that the verification principle eliminates certain philosophical propositions\* it **fails** to explain the **interminability** of debates that cluster around every philosophical **theory**. **E.g.**, that motion is **impossible**. The latter **makes** a claim that is not eliminated by the verification **criterion**. Dispute about **it** continues although **it is** practically **as** old as philosophy **itself**. Therefore **it** would seem that the **positivists** have **added** a dispute to the collection of philosophical disputes - the dispute over the **verification** principle **itself**.

## CHAPTER 4

### WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS

Wittgenstein had deep insights **into** the subterranean workings of philosophy which he did not **elaborate**. (He was like the Delphic oracle **"who** neither utters nor conceals his meaning but shows **it** by a **sign"** •) Philosophy presented **itself** in different ways to him, some of which were inconsistent with each **other**. The inconsistencies are of no great **importance, however**, since Wittgenstein did not develop a system/ unlike F.H. Bradley, he did not attempt to set out a metaphysical system **in** which the inconsistencies would be bound to **reappear**. (Crucial to **Bradley's** system was the claim that time is **unreal**, "a contradictory **appearance"** • It should have prevented **his** remarking **that: "I will, in the next chapter, reinforce and repeat this conclusion..."** ) Wittgenstein's early views on the nature of philosophy appear also to be inconsistent with the remarks he makes in his later works such as the Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigations. But all embody perceptions which make it useful to examine separately each of his views as they are expressed **in** the course of his philosophical **odyssey**.

**To begin with, his** views **in** the Tractatus which as we see, differ **from** each other and taken together are

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

**inconsistent**

(a) Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but **nonsensical**. Consequently, we cannot give any answer to question of this kind, but can only establish that they are **nonsensical**... And **it is** not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all. (T.4.003)

(b) Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an **activity**. A philosophical work consists essentially of **elucidations**. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but **rather** in clarification of **propositions**. (T.4112)

(c) The totality of true propositions **is** the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural science\*) (T.411)

Philosophy is not one of **the natural sciences**. The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside **them**. (T.4.111)

(d) All philosophy **is** a critique of **language**... (T4.0031)

These remarks may be **summed** up in the following way to bring out the **inconsistencies** between **them**.

(1). Philosophical sentences are **nonsensical**.

(2). There are no "philosophical propositions".

## WITTGENSTEIN | HIS VIEWS

**(3). Philosophical propositions are not truths.**

**(4). Some philosophical propositions are true\*  
others false.**

**we shall comment on these in turn.**

View (1) is not **surprising**, for Wittgenstein was the founder of **post-Humean positivism**. As is well-known, **positivists** considered metaphysical utterances to be simply **nonsensical**, devoid of literal **significance**, and therefore should be clearly **recognized** as such. We have already given a critique of the principle of **verifiability** as formulated by the **positivists**, but this should not prevent us **from** recognizing their **merit**. In the Preface to Logical Positivism (ed. by A.J. Ayer)\* **Ayer says:**

- •the originality of the logical **positivist** lay in their making the **impossibility** of **metaphysics** depend not upon the nature of what could be known but upon the nature of what could be **said**. Their charge against the metaphysician was that he breaks the rules which any utterance must satisfy **if it is** to be literally **significant**.

**The influence** of positivism in turning attention of

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

philosophers to language, is to be found not only in the Tractatus, but also in later work. Here we see that Wittgenstein had not freed himself from the shortcomings of logical positivism. He says, "the results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense..." and also, "my aim 1st to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense."

The remarks he makes in (b), in part to the effect that the task of philosophy is elucidation, lead to view (2) namely, that there are no philosophical propositions. The history of philosophy presents the appearance of a parade of theories supported or refuted by arguments. What Wittgenstein wants to hold about this is indicated by the final clause, in "Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity"<sup>1</sup> The following sentence characterizes the activity, as he sees it, namely, as elucidation or clarification. What are taken to be "philosophical propositions" are really pieces of analysis. This Wittgensteinian position will be more fully discussed later. The question which forces itself upon us here 1st how could Wittgenstein take both positions (1) and (2) namely, 'philosophical propositions are nonsensical' and 'there are no philosophical propositions'?

**WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS**

He makes another striking remark about philosophical propositions in (c) that the body of truth coincides with the propositions of natural science. We see that the view (3) that philosophical propositions are not truths, follows from (c)\* and (c) is a glaring untruth; for a non-scientific statement such as "I am reading" would have to be counted as false. To elaborate for a moment according to this thesis any non-scientific proposition would not only have to be false, but necessarily false. For it could never under any circumstances, find its way into the body of truths. (Nor is this thesis a scientific proposition\*)

There is yet another view (4)\* that some philosophical propositions are true, others false, which is clearly inconsistent with (1)\* (2) and (3). If a philosophical proposition is true or false\* that means it has a truth-value. But if a sentence occurring in a philosophical work is nonsensical, then it expresses nothing and hence nothing that has a truth-value. Still another important view to be found in the Tractatus is:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way/ anyone who understands them eventually recognises them as nonsensical. when he has used them — as steps to climb up beyond them. (He must so to speak, throw away the

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

ladder after he has climbed it\*\*) He **must** transcend these **propositions**, and then he will see the world **aright**.

The paradoxical consequence of this **claim**, is conjunction with (1)\* **is** that nonsensical elucidations are a means of seeing the world **aright**. How could **philosophical propositions**, if the/ were **nonsensical**, be the means to seeing the world aright? **F.P. Ramsey**, in commenting on Wittgenstein in his The Foundations of Mathematics, says:

the chief proposition of philosophy **is** that philosophy **is nonsense**. And we must then take seriously that **it is nonsense**, and not pretend\* as Wittgenstein does\* that it is **important nonsense**.

In a way\* **it seems** to us that Wittgenstein wanted to retain views which are inconsistent with each **other**.

II

**We** now come to an important observation which Wittgenstein held steadfastly from the Blue Book period on **through** his later **works**. This **is** that "philosophical problems are of course not **empirical**." His attack on philosopher's treatment of their problems is **unequivocal**. The following are examples of the recurrent theme that

**WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS**

what philosophers advance as a theory does **not** concern a matter of facts "Philosophic **problems**", he said, "are attacked as scientific problems are, and are **treated** perfectly **hopelessly**, as **if** we had to **find** something new. The problems do not appear to concern questions about language but rather questions of facts of which we do not yet know **enough**"<sup>8</sup> • Also, "the essence of philoso-  
g  
phy **is** not to depend on **experience**" • "The characteristic of a metaphysical question is that we express an **unclarity** about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific **question**." The first rule of procedure **is** to "to destroy the outward similarity between a **metaphysical** proposition and an exponential one."

Actually the view that philosophical propositions are not empirical, **is** plainly incompatible with the view (4), that some philosophical propositions are **true**, others false, **as** we have seen **in** section (I). The point Wittgenstein seems to **be** stressing **is** that, philosophers have made pronouncements which give the appearance of resulting **from** empirical **procedures**, because they take as a guide the methods of **science**. He himself **says**:

philosophers constantly **see** the method of science before their **eyes**, and are

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

**irresistibly** tempted to ask and **answer** questions in the way science **does**. This tendency is the real source of **metaphysics**, and leads the **philosophers** into **complete darkness**"

Again, to be **more specific**, he says: "There is no **com-**  
**mon-sense** answer to a philosophical **problem**." <sup>14</sup> This  
comment **was** directed against **Moore**, who took certain  
philosophical thesis, **e.g.**, "**Time** is **unreal**", as **im-**  
plying the falsity of factual, **common-sense** statements,<sup>15</sup>  
such **as** "I read my notes before going to the class\*"
And Moore used an apparently empirical procedure to  
prove, for instance, that two **human hands** **exist**. **How?**  
**By** holding up my two **hands**, and saying as I make a cer-  
tain gesture with my right **hand**. "**Here** is one **hand**"  
and adding as **I** make a **gesture** with the left "and here  
**is** another\*• Moore's "proof of an external world"  
appears to proceed **in** the same way the man in the  
street would proceed **in** proving that he had coins in  
his **purse**: by exhibiting an object of the kind in **ques-**  
**tion**. Another example this time taken **from** classical  
**philosophy**, will **illustrate** **Wittgenstein's** claim that  
philosophical statements **often** pantomime statements  
of **fact**. **Heraclitus** maintained that everything **cons-**  
tantly flows or **changes**, that nothing remains the

## WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS

**same.** Here Heraclitus seems to **make** a false empirical **claim.** To anticipate **what** we shall argue for **later,** his words create an illusion that they express a theory about **things.** We see Wittgenstein attacking those **philosophers** who (he thinks) wrongly treat philosophical **questions** like **scientific** ones and whose answers appear to be supported by the use of empirical methods such as

17

**observation, and experimentation.** Besides this, a philosophical proposition and an experiential proposition are often expressed in the same words thus strengthening the impression that philosophical propositions are **empirical.** For example, the words **"I alone exist"** when uttered by the lone survivor of a **holocaust,** and by a **solipsist,** and the words **"I can't know how he feels"** uttered by a sceptic and by a person who is baffled by an enigmatic **person.**

## III

**From** Wittgenstein's emphatic denial that philosophical statements are **empirical,** it is natural to **infer** that he takes the alternative **position** that philosophical propositions are **a priori.** In fact he **says:**

**... it is the essence of philosophy**

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZAROWITZ

not to depend on **experience** and this is what is meant by saying that philosophy is a priori.<sup>18</sup>

Further,

every philosophical problem typically contains one particular word or its equivalent, the word "must" or "cannot"<sup>19</sup> and the "must" and "cannot" are the "must" and "cannot" of logic.<sup>20</sup>

E.g., the philosopher who says "there must be a mental act when one understands a word", indicates by the use of "must" that he is citing an **entailment** of the concept understands. As has already been seen, an important fact about a priori propositions is that empirical evidence cannot either refute them or support them. Moreover, as we have seen in section I, the method of concept analysis, which Wittgenstein calls 'elucidations' or 'clarifications', employed to obtain a necessary truth. E.g., the correct analysis of the concept brother yields a necessary truth. Such a "logical clarification of thoughts"<sup>21</sup> is unlike the chemical analysis of a piece of matter, done in a laboratory. The work of the chemist might be called **discovery-analysis**, in which the notion of a substance lacking the reported constituents is

## WITTGENSTEIN t HIS

**non-contradictory. By contrast, concept analysis comes down to anal/sis of the meaning of an expression. It has been carried on in antiquity and continued into the work of present day philosophers - from Parmenides and zeno to Russell, Moore and more recent philosophers.**

It will be useful to **examine briefly some** samples of **'concept analysis'** as practiced throughout the history of philosophy.

Leibniz seems to have had the **idea** that what might be called decomposition analysis could show that apparently extended objects consist of **non-extended** ultimate **constituents**. He maintained that things are really a collection of non-extended sentient **entities** b/ performing an analysis on the concept of matter or extended **body**. Consider his argument for holding that the **structure** of matter is **monadic**.

Suppose that a bit of **matter**  $\alpha$  occupies a **space**. Space is divisible **into** sub **spaces**, which are external to each **other**. Consequently anything which occupies space will consist of parts each of which occupies a **component space**.  $\bigoplus$  There are three possibilities with regard to the divisibility of a bit of **matter** ( $\alpha$ )\*

- (1)  $\alpha$  is extended and further **divisible**.  
or (2)  $\alpha$  is extended but not further **divisible**.

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

or (3)  $\mathcal{C}$  is not **extended**.

(1) **must** be rejected on the grounds that we have not reached an ultimate part of  $\mathcal{C}$  \*

(2). This alternative also must be rejected because it implies a contradiction: the space  $\mathcal{C}$  occupied will consist of individual **sub-spaces**. And this implies that the part of matter occupying space will consist of parts external to each **other**, each occupying a sub-space. Each of these parts will in turn have parts which occupy a **sub-space**. We thus arrive at the contradiction of the hypothesis that  $\mathcal{C}$  is extended but not further **divisible**.<sup>22</sup> Leibniz meant by "not further **divisible**", not in principle further **divisible**.

(3). Only the third alternative that does not have **extension**, is acceptable to Leibniz if no extended **particle**, however **small**, is to count as an ultimate component of **matter**. From this it follows that the **ultimate atoms are immaterial**, what F.H. Bradley would call a "psychic center".

To make his **discovery**, it must be pointed out that Leibniz never left the domain of **concepts**. Here the **concept** to be analysed was the concept of a

WITTGENSTEIN; HIS VIEWS

material substance. The important thing to note is that Leibniz's "clarification" was more than just clarification. It led to the discovery of the ultimate constituents of matter.

It was G.E. Moore who in our time brought philosophers to focus on the technique of analysis. Like the famous character in Moliere's drama who discovered he was speaking prose, philosophers over the centuries may not have been aware that the method they employed in dealing with a problem was analysis.

Moore set the example and made explicit the procedures by which philosophers should deal with a question. He criticized philosophers for attempting to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which [they] desire to answer. Clarification of the question means working out what it entails. Moore's example of concept analysis, a brother is a male sibling, became the paradigm for the school of analysts. The concept brother entails being male and being a sibling. Its analysis does not include properties which things answering to the concept may have\* such as loyalty. Subject and predicate are connected by logical necessity. The denial of a

THIS METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

correct analysis **is** a logical impossibility. Although **in** the course of the argument from Leibniz for the monadic constitution of matter, instances of concept analysis occur, yet his conclusion might be described as a discovery, and the argument "discovery-analysis". For being material and not being constituted of spiritual atoms is not a logical impossibility.

Wittgenstein's later work strongly supports the view that concept analysis cannot yield what the analytic thinkers hoped for. 'Analysis' was no longer the main philosophical method for him, though he admitted that difficulties are sometimes removed by it.<sup>24</sup>

IV

It seems that Wittgenstein's great concern in both the early and later periods has been the "master problem", what are the nature, task and methods of philosophy? How are its problems to be understood? His examination of language was his means of understanding philosophy, therefore he says "philosophy is a 'critique of language'". As early as the Tractatus, he says:

**this** book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems

**WITTGENSTEIN : HIS VIEWS**

are posed **is** that the logic **of** our  
27  
**language is misunderstood.**

"Understanding the logic of our **language**"; **this is** a phrase which we **must** be clear about **if** we are to appreciate the attention Wittgenstein **gives**, especially **in** his post-Tractatus writings, to the contrast between the use of language by a philosopher and by the **man in the street.**

**Sometimes** what Wittgenstein says **in** a few sentences refers to such diverse **tasks** that one **is** uncertain of the direction his work came to **take**. For **example**, he said in his Philosophical Investigations:

Philosophy (as he does **it**) may **in** no way interfere with the actual use of language/ it can **in** the end only describe **it...It** leaves everything as it **is**.<sup>28</sup>

The first sentence makes the point which he elaborates **in** another **place**, that the examination **of** actual usage is not **intended** to reform **it**. But that his **work** "can **in** the end only describe (actual usage)"? **This** latter assertion cannot put forward **a** central **aim**, for as **he himself** points **out**, his task and that of a linguist are utterly **different**. He **said**:

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher. One obvious difference is that the linguist is concerned with history, and with literary qualities, neither of which is of concern to us. Moreover we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not interested in, e.g., puzzles arising from the expression, "Time flows". Our object is to get rid of puzzles. The grammarian has no interest in these, his aims and the philosopher's are different.

It is when he says that philosophy as he does it "leaves everything as it is" that we have a hint at the aim which governs so much of his later works "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage".

As we have seen already the conventionalist equates a necessary proposition with a factual proposition about the use of words. That is, a necessary proposition is verbal - and not necessary!; likewise Wittgenstein, in using the words 'rule of grammar' to characterize an a priori proposition, implies that an

## WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS

a priori proposition is verbal. This comes out clearly in his assertion that "the statement that there must be a cause [where the 'must' is a logical must ] shows that we have got a rule of language." His own peculiar use of the phrase "grammar of a statement" and "grammar of a term" connects up with his characterizing necessary propositions as grammatical, and also, more generally, with his investigation of any expression which figures in philosophical puzzles. For example, one way of determining the "grammar of a statement" is by ascertaining what type of verification is relevant to it. He says:

the differing grammars of \*Z have tooth ache' and 'He has tooth ache' show up in the fact that the statements have different verifications and also in the fact that it is sensible to ask, in the latter case, 'How do I know this?' but not in the former. †

As for "the grammar of term", it is clear that when he urges us to examine the "grammar of such words as 'God', 'soul', 'mind', 'concrete', 'abstract'" he is asking us to investigate the use of these words with the aim of circumventing a philosophic puzzle. He says:

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

**we** might feel that a **complete** logical analysis **would give** the **complete gram-**mar of a **word**. But **there is no such** thing as a completed **grammar... Logi-**cal analysis **is an antidote**. *Its importance is* to stop the muddle **some-**one makes on reflecting on words.

Wittgenstein **as we see here, is** using the word **"grammar"** in an unusual **way**. This causes considerable **mystifica-**tion, which is removed in part by replacing "rule of **grammar"** by "rule of **usage"**. This in no way modifies his **conventionalism**. He allows that "we shall have to justify calling our comments on such a sentence [**as 'time flows'**] **grammar."**<sup>3</sup> This ha leaves **undone**. He contents himself with pointing out the

difference in the **aims** for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the **philosopher... More-**over, we construct **languages** of our own<sup>38</sup> so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is **not** interested **in... we** have indicated a **way** of explaining the **word... we** have left the **realm** of what is generally called **grammar**. Our object is to get rid of certain **puzzles**. The **gram-**marian has no interest in these/ his **aims** and **philosopher's** are **different**.<sup>39</sup>

## WITTGENSTEIN! HIS VIEWS

Wittgenstein's explanation of the difference between **his** and the grammarian's use of the word "**grammar**" does not justify **his** use of **it** rather than **some** other word. He **admits** that **he is** using **it** in an **uncustomary** way, but continues to use **it**.

Wittgenstein's conventionalism carries over to philosophical **statements** since these are presented as though they are necessary **truths**. Accordingly, Wittgenstein charges philosophers who advance **paradoxical "theories"** as making mistakes about **usage**. His own **task is** clear

Our **investigation is** therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of **words, caused, among** other **things, by** certain analogies between the form of expression **in** different regions of **language.**<sup>4</sup>

"[The philosopher's]" questions he **says, "refers to words: so I have to talk about words"**. The questions arise because philosophers are caught **in** verbal tangles or knots **from** which one can **escape** by the semantic **therapy** of "bringing words back **from** their metaphysical

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

to their everyday usage<sup>42</sup> or as he says in a different place\* "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."

The misunderstandings that he has in mind are of two different kinds. One is the mistake he thinks philosophers make of supposing the import of their statements as factual - factual in the way scientific statements are factual. The other is a factual mistake about usage, a verbal mistake. At one period in Wittgenstein's development, he appeared to think that philosophical controversies could be settled by recourse to usage, in other words, untying verbal knots will settle a philosophical argument. "What we are destroying", he said, "is nothing but houses of cards, and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." It is here that Wittgenstein draws our attention to how words are actually used in the language. He explains however, that:

we are interested in language only insofar as it gives us trouble. I only describe the actual use of a word if this is necessary to remove some trouble we want to get rid of. Sometimes I describe its use if you have forgotten it.

One thing which has to be noted is that Wittgenstein's

## WITTGENSTEIN\* HIS VIEWS

**intention was** not to reform language, or in some way change actual usage, as might appear to be the case. He **said:**

This may make it look as if **we** saw it as our task to reform language. Such a reform for particular practical **purposes**, an improvement in our terminology designed to **pre-**vent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.

The cases we have to do with are those resulting from verbal **tangles**.

Two examples to which Wittgenstein gave a great deal of attention were (1) the problem of universals and (2) the problem of our knowledge of **other minds**. (1) The Platonic doctrine of **universals**, that the **mean-**ings of general words are abstract **objects**. **This doc-**trine contrasts the objects grasped by the mind **in** understanding general words with the changing and passing phenomena perceived by our **senses**. In addition to such things **as** tables, and white sheets of paper, it **is** held that there **are** the utterly **different** objects, **tableness** and **whiteness**. To quote **Russell:**

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

If we believe that there is such a universal as [whiteness], we shall say that things are white because they have the quality of whiteness ... If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose some particular patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then, the resemblance required will have to be a universal. since there are many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things; and this is the characteristic of a universal.

Russell, at one time maintained that not only are there universals but also that we have acquaintance with them. He says t

In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we call universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood and so on.

The idea that the meanings of general words are *common*

## WITTGENSTEIN; HIS VIEWS

properties is one which seems to account for the difference between e.g., 'John' and 'man'. In the case of proper names, knowing the bearer of the name does not enable us to go on to further applications. The word applies to one object, whereas knowing a general term enables one to go on to new applications. Russell states clearly the Platonic view as follows:

Let us consider, say\* such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves what justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that and the other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common. They roust all, in some sense, partake of a common nature\* which will be found in whatever is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in virtue of which they are all just\* will be justice itself\* the pure essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the multiplicity of just acts. Similarly with any other word which may be applicable to common facts\* such as "whiteness" for example. The word will be applicable to a number of particular things because they all participate in a common nature or essence\*<sup>49</sup>

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

It **is** at this point that Wittgenstein uses his **therapy** in dealing at length with what he **considers** to be the puzzlement of the **philosophers**. He says\*

••• you think of the meaning as a thing of the **same** kind as the **word**, though also different **from** the **word**. Here the **word**, there the meaning.

One important source of puzzlement **is** our feeling that we ought to be able to point to something that **is** the meaning of a **word**. He **remarks**:

The questions, "**what** is length?", "**what** is meaning?", "**what** is the number one?" etc., produce in us a mental **cramp**. we feel that we can't point to anything **in** reply to them and yet ought to point to **something**. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderments a substantive **makes** us look for a thing that corresponds to **it**).

Perhaps the most **salient** feature of the Platonic position about the meaning of a **general** word **is** that the word applies to **particular** things **in** virtue of their possessing a property in **common**. In Plato's behalf **it** can be argued that the existence of **similar** things **implies** the existence of a point of **similarity**, a common **property**.

**WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS**

It can also be argued that the possible existence of dinosaurs **implies** the actual existence of the property of being a **dinosaur**. Further, when we say 4 is an even **number**, this implies that there is an even number and this in turn implies that there **is a number** - a number being an abstract entity referred to by a **numeral**, where each numeral names one and only one **object**. Since a numeral does not name concrete, particular **entities**, it must name something **abstract**.

To continue with reasons which a **Platonist** philosopher might give for the view that in addition to words and their denotations, i.e. their concrete **applications** to things, there are entities of a different kind, **and** these exist whether or not they are given **names**: by an apprehending **mind**. Consider the fact that a million years ago it **was** true to say that no language **exists**. This obviously **implies** that a million years ago there **was** a proposition not expressed in **words**. A **similar** argument shows us that the meaning of **abstract** words **exists independently** of the words that stand for them, since **it** makes perfectly good sense to say that a million years ago there were white **ivory tusks**, and hence that whiteness existed prior to being **given** a name. **This is** offered as proof that

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

Platonic Universals exist unnamed, since a non-verbal proposition consists of Platonic entities.

Another argument in support of the view that Universals can exist unnamed is the following: At any given time there is a finite number of symbols (numerals) but an infinite number of numbers. So the numbers outstrip the numerals. This is to say they exist unnamed. Euclid's proof that there is an infinity of primes proves that there is an infinity of numbers that have no names.

As is well known, there are philosophers who deny both the existence of unnamed universals and the existence of any abstract entities in addition to general names. Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, seems to argue that it is false that general words stand for a common property possessed by the individuals to which the word applies. He states that one has only to examine these individuals to see that there is often nothing which they all have in common; in other words they do not share in a common essence. He makes the point in the following way:

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-

## WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS

games, card-games, ball-games\*  
 Olympic-games, and so on. What  
 is common to them all? - Don't  
 say: "There must be something  
 common, or they would not be  
 called 'games' .. - but look and  
see whether there is anything  
 common to all. - For if you  
 look at them you will not see  
 something that is common to all,  
 but similarities, relationships,  
 and a whole series of them at  
 that,<sup>53</sup>

Locke also seems to be attacking the Platonic  
 claim (Republic X, Sec.596) that "wherever a number  
 of individuals have a common name\* we may assume them  
 also to have a corresponding idea or form." Alice  
 Ambrose\* in her essay Sic et Non, has raised the ques-  
 tion whether Witt ~~enstein~~ was "holding the Platonic theory  
 to be false" or that he was holding that the Platonist's  
 words do not express anything either true or false.

That we sometimes call general words "general names"  
 is a way of minimizing the difference between general  
 words and proper names. There are analogies without  
doubt, but there are dissimilarities\* or disanalogies\*  
 as well. To remark on one difference\* in connection  
 with a proper name it is correct usage to say "Here the

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

name, there the object named." But with a general name this is not possible. Not only naming the meaning of a general word through Platonic spectacles as being abstract entities, there is no way of pointing to an entity which would permit us to say "Here the word, there the meaning". As Wittgenstein clearly remarks

... we are more inclined to say that these things looking different are really the same than to say that these things though looking the same are really different.

A case in point is the two phrases, "understanding words" and "imagining something". These look alike and if we compare them with "writing words" and "lifting something", we should say that both denote mental states. But if we are asked to describe the mental state accompanying grasping the meaning of a word, we often can cite nothing which would be called "mental". This shows according to Wittgenstein, that the presence of a mental process is not a necessary condition of understanding words, i.e., is not part of the definition of "understanding", and thus is not a criterion for the application of that word. By contrast, a condition for understanding a word which suggests no idea of an accompanying mental process is being able to

## WITTGENSTEIN'S HIS VIEWS

use the **word**. And **this is** very different from the conscious process of **imagining something**.

The question '**what is the meaning of a word?**' has prompted very different **answers**. **Platonists** asserted that **in** addition to the things general words **apply** to, there are abstract entities named by **them**, and that there are their **meanings**. **J.S. Mill** distinguished between the connotation of a word and **its denotation**. Its connotation **is its** meaning; **its** denotation **is** the thing to which **it applies**. Parenthetically, **it** should be pointed out that nominalists deny that anything more than words and their application exists. There are no **abstract** entities which are connotations of **words**. So to **speak**, they use Occam's razor, the **maxim** that entities should not be multiplied **unnecessarily**, **in this** case to **eliminate** abstract **entities**.

Wittgenstein suggests putting a question which **will** shed light on '**What is the meaning of a word?**', namely '**what is an explanation of the meaning of a word?**' **what-**ever the explanation explains **will** be the **meaning**. Asking **this** question **will** cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call '**the meaning?**' For **what** the explanation does **is** to **give**

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZERWITZ

the use of the word. And the noun phrase "use of a word", unlike the phrase "meaning of a word", does not tempt one to expect an ostensive definition of it. He gives as a general directive, "Don't ask for the meaning of a word/ ask for its use". One might call this directive "avoidance therapy" - avoidance of the trap which Platonists fall into because of "prejudices in favour of a certain form of expression". Noun and noun phrases, unlike "perhaps" and "not", appear to have similar roles in language, namely, to refer. "The number 2", for example, is taken by Platonists to refer to an ideal object. This claim, Wittgenstein says:

... is evidently supposed to assert something about the meaning\* and so about the use\* of ["2"]. And it means, of course\* that this use is in a certain respect similar to that of a sign that has an object\* and that it does not stand for any object.

we turn now to another problem with which Wittgenstein concerned himself. This problem is posed *tit* the sceptic's claim (2) that we can have no knowledge of other minds. About this claim Wittgenstein in the Blue Book remarks\* "There is a temptation for me to say that

**WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS**

only my own experience is **real**: 'I know that I see, hear, feel **pains**, etc., but not that anyone else does. I can't know **this**, because I am I, and they are they.'<sup>59</sup> As F. H. Bradley put **it**. "since all ray faculties are totally confined to my **garden**, I cannot tell if the roses next door are in flower." Alice Ambrose on behalf of the sceptic **argues**:

I can never know that you mean by "pain" what I mean by it. When you say you are in pain I can only infer **from** your behaviour that you attach the **same** meaning to your words as I do. **To** know what I mean I would need to enter into your mind and experience your ... [seeing of the color data and your] feeling of **pain**. This **I** could do only by being you... If I were identical with you, there would be no **me** to **wonder** about your thoughts. Two **minds** cannot be one and still be two.<sup>61</sup>

Again, to quote waiter **T. Staces**

I cannot **experience** anything **ex-**cept my own experience. I can see ay **red**, but I can never see

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

**yours**. I can feel my emotion, but not **yours**. Even if your anger infects me, so that I feel it **in** sympathy with **you**, **it** is yet, in so far as I feel it, my anger, not **yours**."<sup>62</sup>

The above quoted **arguments** lead to a consequence which ends in solipsism. That **is**, the **sceptic's claim** that "I can't really know what is going on in another's mind" or "I cannot know whether he is in **pain**" leads finally to the claim that "**only** my pain is real".

This can be easily seen from the following argument. "I **can't** really know that another has **pain**" **im-**plies the **impossibility** of believing that another **per-**son has a pain. "**Believing** that another person has a pain" **implies** the theoretical possibility of knowing **it**. **If** there is no theoretical possibility of knowing it, then there is no theoretical possibility of believ-  
ing it." Wittgenstein might put it in **th's** ways "We do not know what **it is** like to be absolutely certain that someone else is **in** pain" **implies** "we have no **idea** of what it would be like to believe that someone else **is in** pain." And this in turn **implies** that we have only idea of our own **sensations**, (**present**, past or future) but we are limited to the knowledge of our own

## WITTGENSTEIN'S HIS VIEWS

pain, and the same applies to other people's thoughts. And this implies that we have no idea of what it would be like for there to be another person. So "I alone am real" is what might be called a priori solipsism. Not only can I not have your pain, I don't have any idea of someone else's pain and hence I don't have any idea of there being anyone else, I can't look in someone's garden because of a physical wall, but here I can't look into someone else's mind because of a logical wall.

What Wittgenstein wants to point out is that a philosopher imagines himself to be expressing matter of fact, that is, to be stating what really is the case. He seems to himself and other philosophers to be stating the actual limits of our knowledge. His mistake lies in the construction he places on what he is doing, not in his undertaking of the actual use of terminology. He is mistaken about what he does with conventions of usage. But the "theory" he presents has the appearance of stating a matter of fact at the same time. And this is an important feature in the development of Wittgenstein's views on the nature of philosopher's statements. He holds that these statements are

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

not the result of a **mis** take about ordinary usage. **In-**stead, they conceal his dissatisfaction with it. Parallel comments apply to the solipsist's contention that only his own experience **is** real. He **says**:

The man who **says** "**only** my pain is **real**", doesn't mean to say that he has found out by the **common** criteria - the **cri-**teria, **i.e.**, which give our words their **common** meaning - that the others who said they had pains were cheating. But what he rebels against is the use of this expression in connection with these criteria. That is, he objects to **using** this word **in** the **particular** way in which it is commonly used. On the other hand, he is **not** aware that he is objecting to a convention. He **sees** a way of dividing the country different from the one used on the ordinary **map**. He feels tempted, say, to use the **name** "**Devonshire**" not for the county with **its** conventional **boundary**, but for a region differently bounded. He could express this by **saying**: "Isn't it absurd to **make** this a **county**, to **draw** the **boundaries** here?" But what he **says** is: "**The** real **Devon-**shire **is** this". We could answer: "What you want is only a new notation, and by a new notation no **facts** of geography are changed". It **is** true, however, that **we**

## WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS

may be **irresistibly** attracted or **repelled** by a **notation**. (we **easily** forget how **much** a **notation**, a form of **expression** may mean to us, and that changing it **isn't** always as easy as it often is in **mathematics** or in the **sciences**. A change of clothes or of names may mean very little and it may mean a great deal.)<sup>63</sup>

The above remarks **indicate** an emerging view about a philosopher (**solipsist/sceptic**) who says, 'I cannot **know** whether he has pain' or '**only** my pain is real'. He is objecting to the conventional use of 'has a pain\*', Not only **this**, he is (1) not aware that he is objecting to a **convention**. (2) The notation he wishes is one which stresses a difference more **strongly**, **makes it** more obvious\* than ordinary language does\* or one which **in** a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression **than** our ordinary **language**. (3) But this does not have as a consequence\* a reform of ordinary **usage**. (4) The **consequences** are wholly "**academic**". The phrase 'knows that another has **pain**' is deleted only in pretence as part of a language **game**\* without **expectation** of any practical **result**.

## CHAPTER 5

### MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

**This chapter will attempt to present Morris Lazerowitz's views on the nature of philosophy.**

**The previous chapter showed clearly Wittgenstein's great penetration into the hidden workings of philosophy. The following section will aim at highlighting the similarities and dissimilarities in Wittgenstein's and Morris Lazerowitz's positions.**

## Z

**It is to be noted that from the beginning of our exposition there has had one aim, viz., to bring out Lazerowitz's main thesis regarding the explanation of the mystifying irresolvability of philosophical disagreements. This explanation has some of its roots in Wittgenstein's remark that "philosophical propositions are of course not empirical." Here we have a metaphilosophical claim about the nature of philosophical utterances. Our understanding of the endless disagreements in philosophy is improved once we take note of the difference between a scientific and a philosophical statement. A scientific disagreement in principle comes to an end when all the facts necessary for its resolution are arrived at, whereas a philosophical dispute continues to exist in the presence of all facts necessary to settle the question,**

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

were the philosophical disputes **empirical, i.e., about the facts of the case.**

In **addition**, Wittgenstein held the **meta philosophical** view that they are not about **facts** even though they **are a priori**. His **point**, that **a priori** propositions are not about the **world**, has been **already** discussed and an attempt made to support **it**. **Nevertheless**, it might be useful to connect this thesis with the claim that the **statement "Every occurrence has a cause"** is a synthetic but **logically necessary claim**, which gives **information** about the structure of the **world**. Kant disagreed with Leibniz over whether an analytic proposition, the predicate term of which is a conjunctive component of the subject **term**, could yield information about **things**. According to **Kant**, the predicate of such an analytic proposition as\* **"Every effect has a cause"** adds nothing to the **subject**. This proposition which **is** equivalent to "Every **caused** event has a cause", **is** of the forms **a. b is a.** Kant's reason **is** that the predicate of this statement **says** nothing new about the subject **in** which **it** is **already contained**. By contrast\* a synthetic proposition the **predicate** of which **says something new** about the subject term\* does so even when the connection **between the** subject and the **predicate term is** logically **necessary**. Kant maintained **that** the

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

statement "Every occurrence has a cause" is logically necessary, but conveys information about the world because it is a synthetic a priori proposition. A former criticism of the statement that a proposition can be both necessary and about things remains good: this is that a proposition, the truth-value of which is not determined by what the world is like gives no information about what it is like. This holds not only against the idea that analytic propositions yield information about things (as Leibniz held) but also against the Kantian claim. What prevents a statement from being about things is that it is logically necessary.

Recently the philosophical claim has been made that there can be a proposition that is both a priori true and also contingent. This is reminiscent of the von Wright's view that  $\neg \diamond \neg p \rightarrow p$ . The same criticism applies to the contingent a priori as to the synthetic a priori being contingent, its actual truth-value is not its only theoretically possible truth-value, while being a priori, its possible truth-value coincides with its actual truth-value.

On this point\* Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz are in agreement that a philosophical proposition is not empirical and also is not about things. The difference

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

between the two philosophers **lies in** the fact that **Wittgenstein** never offered any explanation of the **irresolvability** of philosophical **disputes**, nor did he **seem** to be **concerned about it**.

To see what Wittgenstein was **interested in**, it is **important** to notice his two main **aims**: (1) To determine the nature of philosophical **statements**. (This as we know is a **metaphilosophical investigation**). (2) To find the sources of philosophical **puzzlement**. As regards (1), we see that this became the central **aim** of **Lazerowitz**. The second aim of Wittgenstein sheds light on the nature of the **"theories"** which traditional philosophers **advanced**. According to him, these **"theories"** which do not arise because they rest on matters of fact about which we do not know **enough**. **Unlike scientific problems**, philosophical problems are not solved by the discovery of new **facts**. It only compounds the problem to treat it as if it is a **scientific problem**. A little reflection should make philosophers **aware** that in philosophy, **"experiments are not made**, because they would be utterly **useless."** If **experimentation was** useful, philosophy, the oldest of the intellectual **disciplines**, would have laboratories by **now**. Nevertheless, it **must** not be forgotten that some philosophers continue to hold, as did **N.V. Quine**, that

**MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES**

philosophy "... is continuous with science. It is a wing of science..." Wittgenstein's aim of seeking the sources of the puzzlement leads him to say that the problems "appear ... to concern questions of fact of which we do yet not know enough." And also, "philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness."

By implication what Wittgenstein declares is that philosophical statements are not empirical, and not about things. Further, one of his stated aims of investigating the nature and source of philosophical theories is to make the theories disappear. For he says:

... the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question\*

Here the **difference** between Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

has to be noted. Lazerowitz's intention would be to understand what makes it possible for a philosophical problem to disappear. Wittgenstein's main intention is to say that philosophers are misled by language into putting forward what looks like a scientific position. Sometimes Wittgenstein talks as though language misleads the philosopher into false positions, and sometimes that it misleads a philosopher into supposing that he is advancing a truth-valued claim, i.e., a statement that is either true or false. To be misled into supposing that a form of words expresses a theory is the kind of claim made over and over again by philosophers who attempt to refute an opponent's view. To charge a philosopher with not expressing a theory at all is a much more radical attack. Both accounts of how philosophers are misled find illustration in Wittgenstein's writings. But Lazerowitz, who holds that philosophical claims have no truth-value cannot be said to picture philosophers as being misled into a false view.

Here it is interesting to note that both philosophers attach importance to investigating the language philosophers use, though their goals are different. For Lazerowitz we can say this: to understand a philosophical problem is to understand what is in the nature of the problem that makes it possible to disappear. what is the

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

**semantic** magic which could bring this about? No philosopher can tell what **it** would be like for a philosophical dispute to be permanently **resolved**, since the enigma of the continuance of a philosophical dispute **is** that it goes on in the presence of all facts necessary to resolve **it if it is** about the facts of the case. Both Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz devote themselves to questions **about** the nature of philosophical propositions which **scarcely** are to be found among philosophers, classical or contemporary. Wittgenstein was aware of this and even raised the question as to wh/ what he does should be called "**philosophy**". He **says**:

The use of expression\* constructed on analogical patterns **stresses** analogies between **cases** often far apart ...[howing this] may be **extremely useful**. It **is**, in most cases [howeve r\*] impossible to **s how** an exact point **where** an analogy begins to mislead us ... *It\$ e.g.*, we call our investigations "**philosophy**" this **title**, on the one hand, **seems** appropriate, on the other hand it **certainly** has misled people.

Wittgenstein **remark**s that "one **might** say that the subject we are **dealing** with **is** one of the heirs of the subject that used to be called '**philosophy**'." For convenience Lazerowitz

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

has given the name "metaphilosophy" to this "heir" of philosophy. It should be pointed out, however, that only part of what Wittgenstein does can be classified as an "heir". What Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz have in common is their attention to language, Wittgenstein in order to make a philosophical "theory" disappear, Lazerowitz to explain the continuing debate over their assumed truth or falsity.

II

Let us consider the metaphilosophical thesis common to Wittgenstein and Lazerowitz:

1. Philosophical propositions are not empirical. we have already discussed this metaphilosophical view in the preceding section, and with it the claim that philosophical propositions have no factual content. we have seen that some philosophers hold that philosophical propositions could have factual content in virtue of being synthetic a priori. This is the second metaphilosophical view which needs to be considered.

2. Philosophical propositions are a priori. Wittgenstein asserted that "it is the essence of philosophy not to depend on experience and this is what is meant by

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

saying that philosophy is a priori<sup>1</sup>. The "cannot" and "must" occurring in philosophical statements **is**, he says, the "cannot" and "must" of logic. Here Lazerowitz **dis-**  
**agrees**, and gives **as** a reason for holding that a philosophical proposition is not as Wittgenstein **claimed** - a priori: he denies that the "cannot" and "must" of philosophical statement **is** the logical "cannot" and "must", **even** though these statements purport to be a priori.

A point of special **interest** here is that Wittgenstein's **metaphilosophical** view that philosophical statements are a priori rests on a philosophical **view** about all necessary **propositions**: **namely, conventionalism**: necessary propositions are **verbal**. John Wisdom has said that necessary statements are "purely verbal", that, "they are purely about the use of the **expressions** they connect\*" **The** conventionalist view **is** that if philosophical statements are a priori, **it follows** that they are verbal. Lazerowitz and Wittgenstein differ on this **point**. **If** philosophical statements are a priori, **Lazerowitz's** fundamental question would not be **answered**. For **presumably** a **claim** about the application of words **as** dictated **in** the language would be fairly readily **tested**. A consequence of this philosophical view would be that philosophers **make mistakes**, when they put forward a philosophical proposition\* To see why

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

Lazerowitz does not adopt this position, we shall consider briefly his account of logical necessity.

III

According to Lazerowitz, if the conventionalist takes necessary proposition to be verbal, he is committed to the consequence that there are no necessary proposi-

12

tions» The implication of conventionalism is that necessary propositions are empirical since it equates a necessary proposition with an empirical proposition about the use of words in a language. This means that "necessary" would not have any use in the language to characterize propositions. This in turn would make "empirical propositions" lose its function of distinguishing among propositions. So "all propositions are empirical" will contract into the empty tautology that all propositions are propositions. That is, "empirical" would be absorbed into the word "proposition", so that "empirical proposition" would mean the same as "proposition".

The difference between Lazerowitz and Wittgenstein becomes clear from examination of the following three sentences:

- (a) "A rhinoceros is an animal".

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

(b) "The word 'animal' correctly applies to whatever the word 'rhinoceros' correctly applies to".

(c) "A rhinoceros is a comical beast".

We shall see how these differ from each other by asking in each case what it is about. (C) is obviously about what the subject-term refers to (a kind of creature). (b)'s subject-term clearly refers to a word. As for (a) we are presented with a problem. If it is about the use of the word, it would be open to the objection already made against conventionalism: a necessary proposition is not necessary. Wittgenstein's conventionalism would require him to say that (a) is replaceable by (b) - that (a) and (b) are translatable into each other.

As for sentence (a), if its subject-term refers to an animal the implication is "essentialism", according to which some properties are essential to its subject, without which it could not exist, as against so called accidental properties, without which it could exist. It is to be noticed that an accidental property is not, in the ordinary way of speaking, accidental (happening by chance). To say that being an animal is an essential property of a rhinoceros is a mystifying way of stating the entailment claim: being a rhinoceros entails being

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS

an animal. The **essentialist philosopher reformulates the entailment claim** as a claim about the **manner** in which a thing possesses a certain **attribute**.

On **Wittgenstein's** account of necessary propositions as **"rules of grammar"** an **entailment statement** is about the linguistic connection between the application of expressions **in the language**. To this account the former objections remain, i.e., objections against **conventionalism**. It would seem that the only conclusion regarding the questions **as what (a) is about, is that it is not about anything**, inasmuch as it is not about either things or words. **However, it is not, as it would perhaps be natural to infer, without sense**.

The question we now face **is: "What is sentence (a) about?"** can properly be asked. The analogies between sentences (a), (b) and (c) easily lead one to suppose that the same question can be asked about each. But the **conclusion** that (a) **is not about anything** and **at the same time is not nonsensical**, suggests that **"What is (a) about?"** is not like **"What is (b) about?"** and **"What is (c) about?"**, both of which have straightforward non-philosophical answers. Philosophers have found it **natural, regarding (a), to use the same interrogative fora of speech used regarding**

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

(b) and (c)\* and to answer with a controversial philosophical "theory". Conventionalists argue that it is about words, Platonists that it is about abstract entities. Here we have a good illustration of how a philosophical theory can arise through what Wittgenstein described as an obsession with language, here with the phrase "is about".

what is needed here is an account of the nature of necessary propositions which does not commit one to a philosophical view. This is what Lazerowitz attempts to do. He will not expect an answer to "what is the sentence (a) about?". However, he will try to elucidate the nature of an a priori proposition by showing its connection with words used in its expression. It is natural to say, as did C.I. Lewis, that a necessary proposition is "true by definition", i.e., by definition of the words occurring in the sentence expressing it. That is, it is natural to justify a claim that a proposition p is necessary, not by turning to things, but by turning to language. The proposition, a cat is an animal, is true in virtue of the conventional use of the words "cat" and "animal". How is Lazerowitz to give an account of necessity without being caught in the tolls of conventionalism? In an early account

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

Lazerowitz said "what it is for a sentence to express a logically necessary proposition will now be clear: it will express a logically necessary proposition if it converts (not translates) into a sentence which expresses a true proposition about usage. A logically necessary proposition is the meaning of a sentence S in the ontological idiom, where S converts into a sentence about the use of expressions\*\* What Lazerowitz means by "convert" is unexplained. Apparently he uses it as synonymous with "translate" - which brings him back to the conventionalist view, with all its shortcomings. Lazerowitz was aware of this. In his book, The Language of Philosophy, he gives an account of necessary propositions, which avoids conventionalism. This means not equating the necessary propositions with a proposition about the use of words. To cite an extended quote from Lazerowitz should be useful here:

The idea that an indicative sentence might have a literal meaning but nevertheless, have no subject matter, and make no statement about anything\* apparently produces discomfort in the minds of philosophers. Like an oyster which tries to remove an irritant by manufacturing a pearl, a philosopher tries to make up for what language

MORRIS LAZAROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

denies him by manu factur ing a subject of discourse for it. The result is a thicket of theories. Philosophers of the a priori rid themselves of a linguistic discomfort but in doing so produce a typical philosophical symptom, an irreducible number of views. Anyone who prefers fact to semantically induced fantasy will experience little trouble reconciling himself to the idea that a sentence whose meaning is an a priori proposition has no subject about which it makes a statement. He will have little trouble seeing that, although it says nothing about words, in knowing what it says we know only facts of usage. This fact about sentences for a priori propositions is, perhaps, shown most simply and clearly by writing out the following equivalences:

- (1) the fact that the sentence 'It is impossible to grow a tulip which is not a flower' expresses an a priori proposition is equivalent to
- the fact that the sentence  
"grows a tulip which is not  
a flower" is a phrase that has  
no descriptive function\* expresses

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

a true **verbal proposition**.

- (2) the fact that the sentence 'A **tulip is** a flower' expresses a logically necessary proposition

**is** equivalent to

the fact that the sentence "**flower**" applies by reason of usage in the **language** to whatever "**tulip**" applies to **'expresses** a true verbal **proposition**.

To hold that (1) and (2) are equivalent **is** not to **imply** that the proposition expressed by 'The phrase, "grows a tulip which is not a flower" has no use' **is** the same as the **proposition** expressed by 'It is **impossible** to grow a tulip which is not a **flower**'. Neither **is it** to imply that the proposition expressed by 'Usage dictates the application of the term "**flower**" to whatever "tulip" applies to\*' is the **same as** the **proposition** expressed by 'A tulip is **necessarily** a **flower**', or by '**Being** a tulip entails being a **flower**'. The fact about usage expressed by the first sentence of each of the two **pairs** of sentences is what we know in understanding the second **sentences**, and we know nothing **in** addition to these **facts** in knowing the propositions

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

expressed by the second sentences.  
The facts which we know are nevertheless not the subject-matter of the sentences and cannot be identified with the propositions they express. Mathematics, which may be truly described as the systematic science of the a priori, has been a source of wonder and mystification to many people. G.H. Hardy represented the mathematician as gazing into an intricate system of objects less gross than those encountered in sense-experience, and recording what he sees. The view we have arrived at here about the nature of the a priori de-Platonizes mathematics, without reinstating Hilbert's form of conventionalism. To make an observation on part of what a mathematician's work consists in, it is the explication of rules of usage presented in a form of speech in which no terms are mentioned, i.e., in the ontological idiom. <sup>18</sup>

It is to be noted from this excerpt that at no place is an equivalence between a necessary proposition and a proposition about words asserted. It thus does not advance or support a conventionalist view, neither

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

does **it** suggest a Platonist **view**. **What** then **is** the conventionalist doing when he maintains his view in the face of facts to which\* attention has been explicitly directed by Norman Malcolm and others? According to Lazerowitz he is manufacturing a subject of discourse for necessary **propositions**: they are about **words**. A game is being played\* to use **Wittgenstein's** words\* with the term "**verbal**". "A necessary proposition is verbal" stretches the word "**verbal**" to cover what **is** indirectly and obliquely

19

referred to by an **a priori sentence**. The sentence "A rhinoceros is an animal" makes no mention of words\* yet what we know in knowing that **it** expresses a necessary proposition is a fact of **usage**. The **conventionalist** who supposes himself to be announcing a theory about the nature of necessity\* **is stressing** this similarity between **a priori sentences** and sentences about word **usage**. These are alike in respect of the **information** they convey\* the one **explicitly**, the other **obliquely**. Wittgenstein notes that our language **sometimes** stresses a difference\* or a similarity\* and sometimes hushes **it up**. A notation can stress or **it** can **minimize**.

According to **Lazerowitz**, "**necessary** propositions are verbal"\* while purporting to announce a **feature** of **a priori** propositions\* **is in fact** introducing a stretched

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

use of the word "verbal". If the conventionalist was making a mistake about the nature of a priori propositions, the mistaken claim that the word "verbal" applies to them, then he can be disabused of his error. Thereupon debate over his claim would come to an end, through citing such simple facts as that "verbal" applies only when the use of words is mentioned, Lazerowitz maintains that, in general, a philosopher who advances a "theory" is not making a mistake. Instead he is introducing a re-edited piece of terminology. He does this in a form of speech in which words are not mentioned i.e., - in the ontological idiom. This explains why "a debate ... can go on, without prospect of future resolution". It is because no fact is in question. When Berkeley said that chairs and tables are mind-dependent, he was using his argument that variability in our perceptions implies the subjectivity of their object to extend the use of "mind dependent". Of course Berkeley, like other philosophers, does not present his view as either implying anything about the actual use of terminology or as suggesting a reform of terminology. Philosophy would lose its appeal if to use Hume's expressions, it were taken "to turn upon words". Rival philosophers suppose themselves to be disputing

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

over nonverbal facts. This brings us to our exposition of Lazerowitz's account of philosophical theories.

IV

What follows in this section would be an exposition of Morris Lazerowitz's metaphilosophical view on the nature of philosophy. Keeping in mind that no explanation on the nature of philosophy will be satisfactory unless it is also an explanation of the continuing irresolvability of philosophical disputes, we proceed to examine his exposition of a philosophical theory.

According to him, a philosophical theory may be viewed as a structure consisting of three related interacting parts, one of which is visible and the other two hidden from our awareness. This distinction between the three layers connects up with one of Freud's topographical maps of the structure of the mind. The one which is relevant to the purpose at hand describes the mind as consisting of three components, the conscious, the pre-conscious, and lastly, the unconscious, which is the repository of repressed ideas.

To quote Lazerowitz:

Z propose to illustrate the hypothesis

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

that a philosophical view is a three-layer structure composed of the illusion of science (the illusion that a factual claim about the existence or nature of phenomena is being made), an unconscious group of ideas, and an altered piece of language which creates the first and gives expression to the second...<sup>22</sup>

The illusion is created by the form of speech in which language is used to describe things. It is the form of speech in which the scientist and the mathematician present their findings. Parenthetically, this may be one of the reasons which led Quine to say philosophy is continuous with science. Lazerowitz's view is that this is an illusion. In his opinion, Wittgenstein is correct, when he said that the philosophy "of a given subject is an idleness in the subject". The philosopher, according to him,

... uses language to bring about simultaneously a double dramatic effect, the convincing semblance of deep science and the expression of a cluster of inner fantasies. <sup>4</sup>

One thing that creates the semblance of science is, as

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

Wittgenstein **pointed** out, the fact that often the words of the metaphysician **"can** also be used to state a fact of **experience."** Philosophical theories **are** frequently **paradoxical,** apparently flouting both **commonsense** and science, but their **similarity** at least **in appearance,** to scientific **claim is** undeniable. One has **merely** to turn **one's** attention to any branch of philosophy to find **illustration** of claims which have the **appearance** of being advanced and supported as though they were statements about the nature and existence of **things.** It is worthwhile reminding ourselves of this feature of philosophical theories by **citing** a few **examples.** The following is an example **from** the Blue Book.

• • • We have been told by popular scientists that the floor on which we stand **is** not solid, as **it appears** to common **sense,** as it **has** been **discovered** that the wood consists of particles filling space so thinly **that it** can almost be called **empty.** This **is liable** to perplex us\* for in a way of course **we know** that the floor **is solid,** or th t, **if it isn't solid,** this **may** be **due** to the wood being rotten but not to **its** being composed of **electrons.** To say\* on this **l tter** ground\* that the floor

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

**is not solid is to misuse language.**  
For even **if** the particles were as  
**big** as grains of **sand**, and as close  
together as they are **in** a **sandheap**,  
the **floor would** not be solid **if it**  
were composed of them in the sense  
**in** which a **sand** heap is composed of  
**grains**. Our perplexity was based  
on a **misunderstanding**; the picture  
of the thinly filled space had  
been wrongly applied. For this  
picture of the structure of matter  
was meant to explain the very phe-  
nomenon of **solidity**.

Wittgenstein somewhere **characterizes** a philosopher  
as making the mistake of substituting the explanation of  
a phenomena for the **phenomena**. In the above quotation he  
**claims** the **mistake** rests on a misuse of language. **Laz-**  
**erowitz** would not say that philosophers **make mistakes**.  
According to **him**, language has been **re-edited** so as to  
delete the word '**solid**' but doing this **in** a way that  
creates the **impression** that a disconcerting fact about  
**things is** being **announced**. **In** the present **example**,  
this **is** done by exercising one of \* pair of **antitheti-**  
**cal terms**, not **mistakenly**, but for the effect it **pro-**  
**duces**. The **term** "solid" **is** deprived of **its application**

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

to **states of things**. But since the word **"solid"** is **retained**, even though **artificially**, the fact that the terra **"solid"** no longer has application tends to be **hidden** from our **awareness**. The **gain from bringing back** an exorcised word **into usage** is that **its antithetical partner** regains **its usage**. However, **something is lost in the process: a philosophical theory!** Bringing terms back

27

**"from their metaphysical to their everyday use"** **reinstates** the actual use of the **artificially** retained word but does **this at a cost**. The philosophical problem is **made to disappear**. It will be recalled that one of Wittgenstein's basic **aims was to make "philosophical problems completely disappear."**<sup>28</sup>

To turn now to a further example of a philosophical theory which creates the **illusion** of conveying a fact about the **world**. As in the preceding example, the **illusion is generated** by a hidden **re-editing of terminology**, formulated in the fact **stating** form of **speech**. This is the nature of **Zeno's claim** that space does not **exist**. His argument was **that the existence of space involved the existence of an infinite number of spaces**, which he declared to be **impossible**.<sup>29</sup> Since **Georg Cantor**, however, the **idea** of the completed or extended **infinite**

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE MATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

cannot be rejected in this easy way. For Zeno's thesis, Lazerowitz has given the following additional argument:

If space exists, it exists as a whole and every space must be a part of the whole of space. Let  $\underline{S}$  = the whole of space. Then there must be a space,  $\underline{S}'$  which contains it, as every space is enclosed in a greater space. But  $\underline{S}' - \underline{S}$  will itself be a space, which cannot be part of the whole of space, and thus contradicts the hypothesis that every space must be part of the whole of space.

without going into the matter, the idea of space underlying this argument is that it is a cosmic container, as C.D. Broad puts it, a box without sides. Behind this idea is a re-edited piece of language, the point of which can be brought out quickly by noting that a box is something from which one can exit, whereas there is no exit from space. To put it in Wittgenstein's way, "space" is a substantive for which we tend to look for a corresponding substance. Parenthetically, to say that time is a river, is to do a similar thing, viz\*, to treat "time" as name denoting a fluid substance. In certain respects the use of the word "space" resembles the use of the word "box". In order to heighten the similarity, the philosopher

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

re-edits the word "space" into the name of a container. Just as the imagery brought out by the words "time is a cosmic river" is that of something which flows so the imagery generated by the word "space" is that of a vast container.

Consider now another example of a philosophical theory which appears to make a factual claim. This is H.A. Prichard's view that it is impossible to perceive things. He says:

No one doubts that in certain cases we have or are under an illusion [of seeing a body] and all I have been doing is to contend that all so-called seeing involves an illusion. Just as much as that so-called seeing which everyone admits to involve an illusion.

Prichard is saying that there is no intrinsic difference between cases of what is ordinarily called seeing a body, and cases where we are under the illusion of seeing a body. Given that there is no difference between the two, if one is not a case of seeing a body, neither is the other.

According to Norman Malcolm:

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

When Prichard's view is drawn out in the only direction it can go, it turns out to be the claim that it is an a priori truth that we cannot see bodies. He is holding that the very notion of seeing a body is absurd.<sup>33</sup>

Prichard does not say what it would be like to see a thing, as against seeing an appearance of a thing. He therefore rules himself out from being able to distinguish between them by any means whatever. His theory provides no test for determining whether we are seeing a thing or not. In doing this, he severs the connection between what appears to be a claim about the inaccessibility of things and tests for determining whether and what they are. As George Paul has pointed out, in the ordinary course of things we know how to test for the difference between a fruit in a basket and a wax imitation.

It becomes clear that Prichard's view does not make an empirical claim about the inaccessibility of things to perception. He apparently imagines himself to be making an empirical claim, and does not realize that his claim, if a priori, cannot be about things. Prichard's view seems as to be a dressed up version of Locke's substratum theory, that a thing can present appearances but cannot itself be

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

one amongst them. **Substratum is something that is beyond the bounds of sense, so that not even God can perceive what intrinsically is not open to perception.**

**As is known, Locke held that a thing consists of a substratum in which experienceable attributes inhere and Prichard appears to adopt a variation of this philosophical view. A thing presents appearances to our senses but the thing itself is never presented to the senses, the idea presumably being that if the thing were presented to the sense it would be one of its appearances/ and a thing is more than just an appearance. To suppose that it is one of the appearances it presents, is to imply that it is not a thing; it is no more than an appearance. If one refuses to accept the Berkeleyian idea that a thing is a system of mind-dependent ideas, then the notion of something distinct from the ideas would itself not be subject to perception. What Prichard has done is to highlight a distinction between a subject and the experienceable predicates (or appearances) of a thing. He does this by a semantic manoeuvre in which "is perceived" no longer applies to "subject" of appearances. It applies only to the appearances.**

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

explanation of why controversies between philosophers of opposing views are interminable. Like aesthetic disputes they can go on endlessly without resolution. The disputes, according to him are conducted in the presence of all facts necessary to resolve them, because these 'opposing views' are expressions of semantic preferences, i.e., preferences of one terminology over another. And to argue for the preference is not to argue for or against the truth of a statement. As Hume says 'tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy.'

Secondly, his meta-theory explains why there is no common-sense answer to a philosophical question, because the problem does not concern a fact of the world. It is neither an empirical problem about what the facts are, nor a problem about "the essential features" of things (therefore not the problem of finding an a priori truth about things). Nor will a common-sense answer show that a philosopher has made the mistake of misusing the language. Lazerowitz's view is that such a "mistake" would eventually be rectified and the problem would be settled. But this is not the case\* as the disputes remain unresolved indefinitely.

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

It will be useful here to look at various **attempts** to give a **common** sense answer to a philosophical **question** **sa mu** el Johnson's **well known attempt** to refute **Berkeley's** view that physical objects are sets of **ideas** cooes to **mind**. **Johnson's** kicking a stone is **not** a refutation of the theory since Berkeley **claims** not to **have** denied the existence of stones and the **like**. His theory concerns their **nature**, not their **existence**. He says that he calls "**real things**" simply "**those ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature**". He grants that

•• it sounds very harsh to say that we eat and drink **ideas**, and are **clo-**thed with **ideas** ••• the word **idea** not being used in **common** discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which **are** called **things**; ••• I **annot** for disputing about the **propriety**, but the truth of the **expression**. If **there-**fore **you** agree **with** me that **we** eat and drink and are clad with **the immediate** objects of **sense**, which cannot exist **unperceived** or **with-**out the **mind**\* I **shall** readily **grant** it is more proper or conformable *to* custom that they should **be** called **things**, rather than **ideas**.<sup>39</sup>

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

These words show that Berkeley **is almost aware** that his "view" is a revision of accepted **terminology**. He is not using the term "idea" **mistakenly**. Instead he **is stretching** the term so as to apply to atones\* **chairs, tables and the like**.

In our own day perhaps the best **example** of an attempt to give a **common sense** answer to a **philosophical** question is the work of the **common sense analyst, G.E. Moore**. In his **Philosophical Studies**, and in his famous "**Defence of Common Sense**", Moore tried to answer **Bradley's** claim that **time** is unreal and that the external world of physical objects does not **exist**. By "translating into the **concrete**" **i.e.**, by drawing out **its consequences**, Moore tried to refute **Bradley's claims**. He **said**:

... if you try to translate the **pro-**  
position [that **time is unreal**] into  
the concrete\* and to ask what it **im-**  
**ples**, there **is**, I think\* very **lit-**  
**tle** doubt as to the sort of thing  
**it implies**. The moment you try to  
do this\* and think **what it** really  
comes to, you at once **begin think-**  
ing of a **number of different kinds**  
of propositions\* all of which plain-  
ly must be untrue\* **if time is unreal**.

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now.

Moore then puts an argument in Bradley's south by which he supposed that Bradley might defend himself, and charges him with committing a fallacy, which Moore admits may be thought "too gross for it to be possible that Mr Bradley should have been guilty of it."

Lazerowitz maintains that Bradley did not commit a fallacy in the course of supporting his view, or that he is mistaken about usage. He agrees with Wittgenstein who said:

A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn't see what everybody sees; nor on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

is not founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for the source of his puzzle ment. And we find that there is puzzlement and mental discomfort ... when a notation dissatisfies ... Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary

42

language\*"

If a philosophical view arises because of dissatisfaction with language, and by use of the fact-stating idiom conceals the revision of language which would be satisfactory, it is clear that citing facts accepted by common sense will not impinge on the view. The facts are irrelevant: a nonverbal empirical fact can upset only a nonverbal factual claim, not a terminological claim\* because a nonverbal fact does not, contain its name as part of its nature.

The linguistic concomitant of Bradley's view that time is unreal is that temporal words such as "past", "present\*\*" "before" and "after" are by implication

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

**self-contradictory.** Bradley's arguments are to the effect that the concepts "time", "physical objects"\* etc. are self-contradictory. If Bradley's views are taken to express a priori claims\* then (as has already been shown) empirical facts will neither support nor go against the truth-value claimed for them. For a priori propositions are not about things. Nor will nonverbal empirical fact upset or support a language innovation.

Lazerowitz has given an interpretation of Moore's translations into the concrete\* and of his other so-called attempts to defend common sense\* say by citing "truisms" which imply the existence of a world of things. It therefore is something of a mystery that Moore thought it necessary to "prove" the existence of an external world. Moore certainly considered himself to be showing Bradley's views to be false. By citing such common place facts\* as that he was born at a certain time in the past\* and that there is a human body which is his body\* he expected to refute Bradley's claims to truth. Bradley expresses himself in the ontological mode of speech\* He speaks of space\* time\* material body being **self-contradictory** rather than the terms "space"\* "time"\* and "physical objects"

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

are self-contradictory expressions. To say that space is self-contradictory is a nonverbal way of saying that the word "space" is a self-contradictory term. Moore's translations into the concrete taken at face-value are incapable of the work Moore intended for them. They do not show that space-terminology is not self-contradictory, since on Bradley's claim any "space" translation into the concrete would itself be self-contradictory. How, now, are we to understand Moore's claims and his truisms and his translations into the concrete? This no longer presents a difficulty. His truisms give expressions to the wish to retain ordinary terminology, which has worked and continues to do the work assigned to it. Moore has to be understood as denying that space-terminology is self-contradictory, and his denial is to be interpreted as opposing the philosophical suppression of ordinary space nomenclature .

To quote Lazerowitz:

A philosopher who holds a view like 'Time is unreal\*' and resists its translation into 'There are no temporal facts' is not failing to see an obvious implication. His resisting the translation means that his words do not have that translation.

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: CBS TH2 NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

And they do not have that translation because he has\* in the way usual in philosophy, changed language. In the light of this supposition, Moore's translation, which takes the philosopher's words in their everyday sense is to be construed\* not as correcting a mistaken idea about the use of the word 'time', but an counter-ing an academic decision to cast out 'time' with a vote for the status quo. This explanation of what has happened must be conceded to have the merit of making intelligible to us a philosopher's being able to remain obdurate when faced with a translation into the concrete, and indeed it explains how he could even come to hold his view. 6

"Thinking with the learned" comes no more than what Wittgenstein calls a language game - a holiday use of terminology.

Wittgenstein said that philosophers are dissatisfied with everyday language, and this may be the reason for their re-editing language. This is not done for any practical purposes - the philosopher is not \* language

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

reformer. Despite his philosophizing, he continues to "speak with the vulgar". All this is done in the spirit of a semantic game\*. This is why a person who might express some scepticism, say about Zeno's paradoxes against motion can be made to join the philosopher and enter into the game with him. When philosophical reasons are given, the supporting arguments can be looked upon as part of the game.

This brings us back to Lazerowitz's exposition of the third layer of a philosophical theory. It is to be noted here that the first two layers can stand alone without bringing in the third layer. In Lazerowitz's opinion it is the contents of the third layer which hold the philosopher in fascinated bondage to his subject. It might be called the nightmare part of the mind which can be brought to consciousness only by \* special technique devised by Freud. According to Freud, there is a third component of the mind the unconscious, which consists of unacceptable ideas, kept under repression\* According to his findings, these ideas occur in a highly disguised form\* as in dreams and in pathological states. Wittgenstein observed that "our ordinary language holds our mind rigid in one position." we may permit ourselves

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ: ON THE NATURE OF  
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

the conjecture that quite unwittingly he was referring to unconscious ideas as the cause of our rigidity. Lazerowitz brings into his account of the nature of philosophy, 'the unconscious', only to give what he calls the complete picture of how a philosophical theory works. He has been criticized for describing the philosopher as "dreaming with words". The reason for his choice of language is to highlight the ideas that the philosopher's use of language gives hidden, dream-like expression to impermissible ideas. The philosopher uses language in such a way as to create a conscious illusion - at one level of the mind, he re-edits terminology at another level of the mind, and he uses his re-edited language to give hidden expression to ideas in ourselves which we cannot consciously tolerate. We might say that like Oedipus Rex, who blinded himself in punishment for unacceptable wishes, the philosopher blinds himself to what he is doing in order to be able to give expression to ideas that are inadmissible.

To return for a moment to the view of Parmenides and Heraclitus. We can only guess at the unconscious material with which they link up. The Parmenidean view that motion is impossible, or that nothing can move,

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

might, at the unconscious **level**, represent a death **with**: the dead do not **move**! On the other **hand**, **Hera-**  
**clitus** who **maintains** that everything flows, **i.e.**,  
that nothing remains the **same**, may be understood **to**  
be expressing at the unconscious level of his mind  
the idea that everything is **alive**. Freud **somewhere**  
identified motion and change with **life**. As **is** known  
Leibniz in his **Monadology**, developed the view **that**  
there is no such a thing as (dead) **matter**. Nothing  
**can die**, as a monad is incapable of **decomposition**.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

made a stable part of philosophy by Plato and, such as, by a number of modern philosophers, especially, Aristotle, Kant, Hume and others. However, thanks to the acutely self-conscious twentieth century philosophers, it now forms, as everybody knows, a large and significant part of philosophy.

Lazerowitz has no particular objection against using the word 'metaphilosophy' to describe this branch of philosophical enquiry. But in his own actual and philosophical practice, the word 'metaphilosophy' means a narrower sense. It is intended to designate a limited field of philosophical investigation. In The Language of Philosophy, he describes it as a field of

... investigation of philosophical utterances with the special aim of reaching a satisfactory understanding of what in their nature, permits the intractable disagreements which invariably attach to them.

During discussions with me also, he maintains the position when he says, "Metaphilosophy is just the investigation of the philosophical problems with the aim of describing what there is about them that makes them

## THE CRITIQUE

irresolvable."<sup>2</sup>

Thus metaphilosophy as defined by Lazerowitz may well be said to be a characteristic part or variant of the metaphilosophy in the wider sense; and Lazerowitz as we have said, has no particular objection to this description of his own metaphilosophy; even though he prefers to confine the application of the name "metaphilosophy" to his restricted area of enquiry.

We have no serious objection to Lazerowitz's characteristic use of the name 'metaphilosophy'. But we sense one danger in it. The enquiry instituted by Lazerowitz and named 'metaphilosophy' is designed to explain one notorious and apparently disturbing peculiarity of philosophical utterances. But philosophical utterances may have more peculiarities which are equally notorious and have an equal claim to an explanation. Cannot the body of sentences containing such explanation, one may ask, make a claim to the name 'metaphilosophy'? will it not amount to following a double standard to deny the name to it?

Anyway, the question arises: Is metaphilosophy in general and, for that matter, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy which is a characteristic variant of it, a part of

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

philosophy?

we know of philosophers who are inclined to liken philosophy too closely to science, and for that matter, metaphilosophy to metascience. For such philosophers, metaphilosophy will not normally count as a part of philosophy at all, just as metascience does not count as a part of science.

But the position which tends to go so far as to expel metaphilosophy from the domain of philosophy, need not, we think, be taken too seriously. Philosophy may indeed resemble science, even very closely. Yet it would seem to go too far to suppose that the same resemblance holds also between metascience and metaphilosophy, and to argue, on that basis, that since metascience is not science, metaphilosophy, likewise, is not philosophy. For the relation that holds between metaphilosophy and philosophy differs in certain fundamental ways from that which holds between metascience and science. Metascience is not in actuality claimed to be a science, and for that, there is good reason. The reason is primarily that metascientific problems, e.g., 'What is science?' 'What is the method of science?' etc. do not respond to the same method of approach as questions of science, e.g., 'How does mercury react to heat?

### THE CRITIQUE

'What are the effects of carbon monoxide on the human organism?', etc. Our ways of finding answers to the latter are observation, experiment and the like, but these do not apply to the former.

The picture, on the other hand, is totally different when we look at the relation that holds between metaphilosophy and philosophy. Our methods of dealing with problems is the same in both cases. Take for example the philosophical questions, 'What is the nature of ultimate reality?', 'Do Universals exist?' and compare them with the metaphilosophical questions, e.g., 'What is philosophy?', 'What is the method of philosophy?' The way philosophers deal with the latter is not different from the way they deal with the former, and philosophers are not aware of any alternative way which might prove more suitable for metaphilosophical problems.

Interestingly however, one thing may be noted at this point. To his students, Lazerowitz is never known to be one among those philosophers who are prone to liken philosophy to science or even place science and philosophy in the same category.

... philosophy is not a demonstrative

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

science and ... we cannot expect from it what we expect from a demonstrative science.<sup>4</sup>

... the [philosophical] theories, unlike those of the natural sciences and mathematics, are not open to proof or disproof.

Also,

... a moment's reflection will tend to throw doubt on the comfortable idea that philosophy is a kind of science.

Yet, at certain places he sounds like someone subscribing to the position that metaphilosophy is not philosophy, at least not necessarily. He says:

... It seems plainly possible to make statements about philosophy (metaphilosophical statements) which are not themselves philosophical statements.<sup>9</sup>

But on what is this grounded? The only ground, as far as we can see, is obtained introspectively in a Socratic style. It is, in Lazerowitz's own words,

... to speak for myself, I sometimes

## THE CRITIQUE

mention philosophical problems  
without finding philosophical  
thoughts <sup>9</sup> accompanying them.

An introspective or inductive ground has a characteristic weakness of its own, which we need not elaborate. No philosophical proposition, by its very nature, is amenable to factual or inductive corroboration. But this is not our main objection against Lazerowitz on this particular point. What we would especially like to call attention to, is a feeling we have that Lazerowitz in an unguarded moment lost sight of the distinction that exists between mentioning philosophy and talking about philosophy (producing a metaphilosophical statement). The former is not a philosophical activity. And no one perhaps will say that it is. But, talking about philosophy is doing philosophy. It is producing, fundamentally, the same kind of sentences in which philosophy consists. As a matter of fact, this is one recognised singularity which distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines, in that when we talk about science or art we do not necessarily produce science or art,

So we have good reason to look upon metaphilosophy as philosophy. But the question arises: In what precise way is it so? Is it a part of philosophy in the sense

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

in which such branches of philosophy as, **metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc.** are? We seem to have genuine difficulties in thinking of **metaphilosophy** that way. **Metaphilosophy**, even though a part of philosophy, cannot be assigned the same kind of status or position as **metaphysics, epistemology\* etc.** On the other hand, there is a significant difference between them. The difference in fact goes so far as to make them philosophies of a different kind.

Let us illustrate this point.

No two things, say **A** and **B**, can be assigned to the same class, say, **C**, if their logical relations to **c** are different. This follows from the fact that every two members of a particular class stand in the same logical relation to the class as a whole. (For otherwise\* the class-name could not have been applicable to both in the same sense.)<sup>10</sup>

Now, one could have indeed maintained that metaphilosophy is philosophy of a kind with **metaphysics** or **epistemology**, if it were the case that the metaphilosophical problems and the problems of metaphysics\* **epistemology, etc\*\*** could be said to stand in the same relation to the class of philosophical

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

is not philosophy at all. Nor is it correct to think that it is philosophy along with metaphysics, epistemology, etc. But how, then, may we place metaphilosophy or Lazerowitz's characteristic version of it in the map of philosophy? The most appropriate way, according to us, is to conceive it, as a philosophical activity of the second order, as distinguished, from metaphysics, epistemology, and the like, which may well be called philosophical activity of the first order. So in being a kind of metaphilosophy, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy may be called a species of second order philosophy.

In introducing such notions as first order, second order to characterise philosophy, we would appear to be introducing a hierarchy in philosophy which may never end. For, someone who investigates the nature of metaphilosophy will produce a third order philosophy and the process will go on endlessly.

This notion of an endless hierarchy appears repellant to some. But what is there to be frightened of? It follows naturally and inevitably from the nature of man as incurably self-conscious. Besides, it also accords with the nature of knowledge as endless.

## THE CRITIQUE

Lazerowitz however, as far as we know, has not said anything which can be understood as an acceptance of our characterisation of metaphilosophy. But that is because, of the unfortunate fact that the philosopher, so remarkably conscious of the first order philosophy, has not carried forward his self-consciousness a step further to reflect on his own metaphilosophising, that is to say, to be sufficiently inquisitive about what it is that he is doing or how to characterise it. Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy covers a lot; contrarily, his philosophy of metaphilosophy covers little.

## II

In his own preferred sense, metaphilosophy, as we have repeatedly said, is to be conceived as a characteristic preoccupation with the object of finding an explanation of the allegedly irresolvable disagreements among philosophical theories; and in practice also, that is, in the course of working out his unique and sophisticated metaphilosophy, Lazerowitz never loses sight of this stated objective. His metaphilosophy is above all an elaborate and persistent attempt to provide an account of why philosophers disagree endlessly with one another. From this, one thing is obvious. This is that, for Lazerowitz, the

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

thesis to the effect that philosophers disagree, will have to be true. The position is in fact the most basic presupposition of Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy; on its acceptability depends the identity and relevance of the metaphilosophy as he conceives it and as he has practised it. So it is essential that we should examine the position, before we make a claim to have understood Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy.

As we know, from Descartes onwards it has been quite common with philosophers, with an introspective bent of mind, (having in their minds the agreed results obtained in science and mathematics) to speak of the irresolvable disagreement in philosophy and to treat it as a malaise which afflicts philosophy. In this way, the position that philosophers disagree or that disagreement is built into philosophy, has come to assume the standing of an axiom; so that few have ever thought of the need of subjecting it to scrutiny.

The position can be critically approached in a number of ways. E.g., one, assuming that philosophy is always fraught with disagreements, may well ask (as Watkins does), whether these disagreements are necessarily a malaise. We may also ask whether the disagreements

## THE CRITIQUE

attributing to philosophy are peculiar to philosophy and strictly confined to it. But our approach to the position will be different. We are going to question it at a more basic level. That is, we are going to investigate whether there is any sense at all in which philosophical utterances may be said to be in disagreement with one another. Do philosophers really disagree?

Lazerowitz has not investigated this problem in detail. However, he does not deny the importance of the investigation. In a letter, he writes as follows:

... one point you make is too important, however, to delay. This is whether philosophers can be said to disagree. I have remarked on this but in much too cursory a manner. If I may quote one passage: 'with Moore philosophy gains sobriety and the appearance of rigour but loses most of its dramatic appeal ; and it is taste and nothing else which dictates which we choose in philosophy, the extravaganza of metaphysics or the sobriety of common sense with the semblance of science. We may well say with Hume 'tis not solely in poetry and music that we must

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

fellow our taste and sentiment,  
 but likewise in philosophy'. But  
 you are right, of course, I do  
 not state this sufficiently clearly  
 nor do I elaborate it nearly  
 enough. In philosophy there are  
 preferences for opposing semantic  
 innovations...

He says something to the same effect also in his 'Cassandra in Philosophy'<sup>1</sup>

It would seem that the validity of  
 a philosophical argument ... is  
 determined by preference.

Unfortunately, the lines quoted do not make things  
 as clear for us as we would have desired. If we have not  
 grossly misunderstood him, in saying this Lazerowitz  
 appears to understand disagreement in terms of our differences  
 in respect of taste, sentiment and preferences. But in so doing,  
 if one may say so, Lazerowitz is perhaps making a 'holiday use'  
 of the word 'disagreement' to explain the point. Suppose that I  
 prefer coffee to tea, while my friend prefers tea to coffee, or that I  
 admire Gandhi, while my friend does not. Such are not exactly  
 the occasions where I and my friend may be said to disagree  
 with each other; we are said just to differ in

## THE CRITIQUE

**tastes, sentiments and preferences. However, I and my friend may rightly be said to disagree when I assert that drinking coffee is injurious to health', while my friend asserts the opposite, i.e., drinking coffee is not injurious to health. 'Agreement', 'disagreement', and their equivalents, are in fact cognitive words and as such they are explainable only with reference to truth-value, and not with reference to taste, sentiments, etc., A situation which can rightly be called one of disagreement arises only when the same proposition is at the same time called true by one and false by another.**

**So the question whether philosophical utterances can correctly be said to be incompatible with each other hinges ultimately on whether they can rightly be said to have a truth-value, in other words, whether it would make sense to call them true or false. Lazercowitz's position on this point is quite clear. He says,**

**... a philosophical theory is not the kind of theory which has a truth-value**

**and elsewhere**

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

•• metaphysical theories have no truth-values and the controversies about them are not debates over whether they are

17

true or false.

Thus Lazerowitz denies truth-values to philosophical utterances: philosophical utterances according to him can neither be said to be true nor said to be false. But the position, as we can see, tends to spell disaster for Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy itself. Unfortunately, Lazerowitz however, does not appear to be fully aware of this.

First: We have argued that statements over which philosophers can be meaningfully said to agree or disagree, must be such that they can meaningfully be said to be true or to be false. The notions of agreement and disagreement are understandable only in terms of truth or falsity. This means that statements which cannot meaningfully be said to be true or false cannot, for that reason, also be meaningfully said to be compatible or incompatible. Now, if there is nothing basically wrong with this position, then it would follow that in denying truth-values to philosophical propositions, Lazerowitz has unconsciously committed himself to the position that there can never be any disagreement about them. And in that case, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy, essentially an attempt at explaining

## THE CRITIQUE

philosophical disagreements, will have no job to do; it will lose all of its supposed relevance. Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy in this sense turns out to be self-annihilating.

Second: Take the utterances of which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy itself is comprised. What exactly may be the logical value characterising them? Can they make a claim to being true? Taken as philosophical utterances, as we would be inclined to do, in his view they certainly cannot, because philosophical utterances, according to Lazerowitz, are not such as can be said to be true.

But Lazerowitz may escape this consequence by denying philosophical status to his metaphilosophical utterances. And this is perhaps what he is inclined to do. For he seems to look upon his metaphilosophical theory virtually as an empirical hypothesis. Consider the kind of expressions he uses in talking about his theory. "The hypothesis I am going to formulate...",<sup>18</sup> "Regardless of whether ...\* the hypothesis I 'm going to put forward,"<sup>19</sup> and so on. And the hypothesis, according to him, is empirical in the sense that it is backed by factual claims about "the unconscious". "It is now possible",

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

writes Lazerowitz, "to establish them or disestablish them [conjectures about the unconscious significance of philosophical utterances] for there does exist a science of the unconscious. The unconscious no longer is an unknowable, a Ding - an - Sich".

However, taken as an empirical hypothesis, it gives rise to the question: *What tests has Lazerowitz conducted or proposed to ascertain its truth or falsity?* The answer to this is far from encouraging. Thus as Daya points out:

••• one is amazed to find that there is hardly any evidence of empirical methodology being used throughout the whole book. There are no data, either statistical or clinical on which the theory is supposed to be based ••• the hypothesis belongs to the well known field of psycho-analytic theories and, whatever may be the limitations of the verificational methodology in that field, there certainly is a methodology to test the various hypothesis put forward in that field. It is inconceivable that Lazerowitz does not know the fact, yet it is equally strange that a serious thinker should formulate

THE CRITIQUE

an empirical hypothesis and not  
try to test it.

Lazerowitz is not altogether silent about the question of the justification of his hypothesis, that is, his metaphilosophical theory. Asking himself

••• what right do I have to think  
that it is correct,•?

he says,

••• in a answer to this question,  
perhaps the best thing I can say  
is that the position has 'clicked'  
for me, th3t I see that it is cor-  
rect, if not in every detail, then  
23  
at least in subst nce.

and continuing,

The hypothesis I am going to for-  
mulate meets the intellectual need  
of facing and explaining this fact,  
and to put the matter subjectively  
has clicked intellectually for me.<sup>24</sup>

But "clicking" as Dayá rightly points out:

... is not a sufficient condition  
for the establishment of any empiri-  
cal hypothesis, and he would be

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

a strange scientist indeed who is quite satisfied with a hypothesis just because it has "clicked" for him.<sup>25</sup>

In fairness to Lazerowitz, it should be mentioned that his remarking that "the position has clicked for me"<sup>26</sup> and that "the hypothesis ... has 'clicked' Intel-  
27  
lectually for me," are not the only thing he has said in defense of his metaphilosophical hypothesis. He also tries to derive credibility for his hypothesis from an explanatory efficacy it is supposed by him to possess. He thinks that it explains "the chronic condition of philosophical differences of opinion"<sup>28</sup>. As quoted above, he says that it "meets the intellectual need of facing and explaining this fact..."<sup>29</sup>

Explanatory efficacy is indeed one thing which contributes to the credibility of a hypothesis. This is a recognized fact. In his criticism, Daya, however, overlooks this aspect of the defense set up by Lazerowitz in support of his metaphilosophy. Thus his criticism has not been fair. To be fair, we have to examine the explanatory relevance or efficacy Lazerowitz claims for his metaphilosophy.

## THE CRITIQUE

Any claim to such effect as that a particular hypothesis or a theory explains a fact makes sense only when the fact it claims to explain is really there to call for explanation. Talking of explaining a particular fact when no such fact is there, makes no sense. The fact which Lazerowitz's meta-philosophy makes a claim to explain is, as he explicitly states, the endless disagreement in philosophy. But do philosophers really disagree? Is it really a fact that there is anything in philosophy which may count as disagreement in the true sense of the term? We have argued previously that in consciously denying truth-values to philosophical propositions, Lazerowitz has in fact been unconsciously led to deny that there is in fact disagreement. Disagreement presupposes truth-values. And there is no disagreement without them.

## III

The problem that will occupy us now is whether, without leaving Lazerowitz's own framework, we can restore truth-values in some way to philosophical propositions, so that the alleged disagreements among philosophical propositions may turn out not to be a synth

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

and the invaluable philosophising he does in the name of metaphilosophy is not in consequence irrelevant. To put the matter in another way, can we find any ground for saying that philosophical propositions can sensibly be said to be true or false, so that we *may* also have a ground for maintaining that philosophers may sensibly be said to disagree and that, therefore, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy has a genuine fact to explain.

The crucial point for us here to be clear about, we think, is this. What is it that makes Lazerowitz commit himself to the position that philosophical propositions do not have truth-values? The answer is not hard to find. It lies mainly in the third layer of his 'three-layer' analysis of a philosophical theory as expounded in the previous chapter. The position which constitutes the third layer links up philosophical utterances with the non-cognitive functioning of our mind, mostly with wishes (and sometimes also with emotions). It is held by Lazerowitz consistently. To state the position in his own language.

... his [the philosophers'] utterances give expression to unconscious fantasies ... [and] as an unconscious fantasy like a dream functions as the substitutive gratification of wishes.

## THE CRITIQUE

••• joined to these is a third and less accessible layer, a complex of unconscious fantasies. A philosophical theory consists ... lastly, of an unconscious fantasy or cluster of fantasies of importance to our emotional welfare.<sup>32</sup>

The great importance of the utterance to the philosopher makes it safe to compare it with a dream...: like a dream it is fundamentally a wish fulfilment\*<sup>33</sup>

The lines quoted above make it plain that in Lazerowitz's mind philosophical utterances or theories, like dreams, are closely linked up with wishes. This, in turn, makes him feel that the body of utterances that constitute philosophy is a part of our conative discourse as distinguished from the discourse which is cognitive. Once committed to the view that philosophical utterances are a cross-section of conative utterances\* Lazerowitz seems to find it mandatory to hold that they are not amenable to any appraisal in terms of truth or falsity; for truth and falsity belong strictly to cognitive discourse.

However\* the passage from the 'third layer\*\* i.e.\* that philosophical utterances have their roots in our

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

unconscious wishes, to the position that they do not admit a truth-value is not, perhaps as straightforward as it would appear to be at first glance. There is, we feel, some degree of clumsiness about it. Admitted that philosophical utterances are rooted in our unconscious wishes, it does not follow that they are unconditionally conative and, therefore, necessarily devoid of truth-value. Utterances may be linked to wishes in two senses.

First: we may speak of utterances as linked with wishes in the sense that they are straightforward expressions of some wishes in our mind. Examples of such utterances are: 'Had I the wings of the dove!'; 'If I were a multimillionaire!'; and the like. Such utterances constitute conative discourse par excellence. They are essentially immune from characterization in terms of truth-value: no one in fact calls them either true or false.

But, that an utterance is linked with a wish may also mean that it is in some sense caused by the latter. And this, as we understand it, is the sense which Lazerowitz has in mind when he speaks of philosophical utterances as wish fulfilment. That is to say, in calling a philosophical utterance an "unconscious fantasy" or

## THE CRITIQUE

"wish fulfilment", or in comparing them with dreams, all that he has in mind is the idea that philosophical utterances have in some sense, their cause in our unconscious wishes. But for an utterance to be conative in this sense is very different from its being conative in the sense of being a direct expression of wishes. The latter excludes its having a truth-value but the former does not. Being caused by wishes is not incompatible with a statement being true or false. One may well call it true (if it is so), or false (if it is so).

To illustrate the point, let us take what you dreamt last night. You dreamt that you had become the Prime Minister of India, that you had gone to the United States on the invitation of President Reagan, that you held a very crowded press conference which had been telecast all over the world, and that for your performance you were being showered with praises coming from all corners of the earth. Take the sentences the dream is comprised of: (a) 'You have become the Prime Minister of India' (b) 'You went to the United States on the invitation of President Reagan'. (c) 'You held a press conference'. (d) 'Your performance in the press conference was very good.' (e) 'Praises are being showered on you\*.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

As you are not actually the Prime Minister of India, the sentences are all expressions of your unconscious wishes. But that does not stand in the way of their being called false, as they are in fact false.

As a matter of fact, along with every statement that is undeniably truth-valued, may well go some wish in our mind. E.g., when I say to somebody 'I am thirsty' I may well be supposed to be expressing my wishes in order that my hearer will listen to me and that he will give me a glass of water. My statement, though motivated by my wishes, is to be called true if it is really true.

Lazerowitz makes no distinction between an utterance which directly expresses a wish and one which is caused by a wish. He seems to have modelled the latter after the former. And that possibly is one thing which has debarred him from granting truth-values to philosophical utterances and thereby, eventually, made him unwittingly liquid to the very logical basis of the alleged fact of their disagreement, i.e., the very thing which his metaphilosophy centers around.

Thus the psychological information about philosophical utterances contained in Lazerowitz's 'third layer'

## THE CRITIQUE

may well be accepted as true, without it being logically obligatory to say that philosophical utterances have no truth-values. Philosophical utterances may in fact be true or false. So where is no need to *deny* the factual feature of disagreements of philosophical utterances and, for that reason, to deny the relevance of Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy. But are they true or false in the sense in which utterances in science or those in mathematics are said to be true or false? This, however, is a very different issue: which we need not discuss here.

But one may ask\* what about the acceptability of the chird layer itself?

For one thing, the position is emotionally disturbing to philosophers. Hospers in his paper, "Philosophy and Psychoanalysis"<sup>34</sup> refers to the "violence of the reaction" to the position when it was presented by Lazerowitz at a conference in New York University. And the reaction is, in a way, emotionally not unjustified.

The position that philosophical utterances are the fulfilment of unconscious wishes, is apparently an attempt at using psychoanalysts' arsenal to debunk philosophy. And this is unlikely to please philosophers. They see in

THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

it, not only an attempt at undermining the glory of their professional achievements, but also an act of betrayal, that is, a colleague of theirs crossing his professional boundaries and leaguings himself with the psychoanalysts.

It is not that Lazerowitz does not anticipate such a reaction. Referring to this position, he writes in his The Structure of Metaphysics:

... Freud describes three great 'outrages upon its naive self-love' which cultured mankind has had to endure in the last few hundred years. And if the present hypothesis is correct in its general outline, a special group of intellectuals, who have prided themselves on being impersonal seekers after truth, are exposed as the dupes of games they unconsciously play with language.

Theoretically also, the hypothesis of a third layer is perhaps more vulnerable than that of the other two layers in Lazerowitz's three-tier analysis. And that is one

36

reason why critics generally have chosen this as a convenient target of their attack.

The source of our own unhappiness with it, however, as we have already elaborated, is that it tends eventually

## THE CRITIQUE

to liquidate the very reality of philosophical disagreement which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy has to presuppose for the justification of its relevance.

There is another objection which also should not go unmentioned. While fraught with dangerous consequences it dilutes Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy, which is philosophy, with psychoanalysis which is not philosophy.

It may however, be mentioned here that in Lazerowitz's own eyes, this layer, is far less important than the other two layers.

Yet Mr. Lazerowitz maintains that this is not the main point he is interested in making. He has even indicated that he would be willing to drop this part of his theory if it raises too many additional problems.<sup>3</sup>

To me also, in discussions, Lazerowitz and some thing substantially to the same effect.

Despite all this, the position embodied in the third layer is not altogether without sympathisers. It continues to derive support of some kind from the writings of such philosophers as J.J. Wisdom, Alice Ambrose, John Hospers, Margaret Chatterjee, and others.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

## IV

Let us now turn to the consideration of the first and second layers of Lazerowitz's three-layer analysis of philosophical utterances. In Lazerowitz's writings the third layer appears connected with the first two layers. That is true. But the connection is not necessary. This means that the first two layers can stand on their own without the third, in other words, the first two layers are not adversely affected if the third layer is dropped. On the contrary, they gain in respect of philosophical purity, if it is so done. For, the third layer, as we have pointed out, is a suggested excursion into an area outside philosophy, that is to say, into the science of psychoanalysis.

The position upheld in the first layer is, in substance, that philosophical theories, even though they do not convey any information about reality, produce the illusion of doing so. Lazerowitz has put the matter in various ways. To quote just two examples:

••• a philosophical theory ••• creates the intellectual illusion that a theory about the world, either true or false, is being pronounced...

## TH2 CRITIQUE

A metaphysical [philosophical] theory ~~may~~ be described as a two-layer structure, Uppermost is the illusion of a theory about the nature or real existence of a phenomenon, the illusion, that is to say that a metaphysical [philosophical] sentence states a view of some sort about reality.<sup>43</sup>

In talking about the three layers, Lazerowitz as we know, has, among other things, the Freudian picture of the mind as divided into conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious regions. He links up the first layer with the conscious region. On the other hand, the second layer is attributed to the pre-conscious functioning of our mind. It is intended to provide an account of the mechanism of the illusion of reality produced by a philosophical theory, in other words, of how the illusion is created. The illusion is attributed by Lazerowitz to a certain alleged peculiarity of philosophical language. The peculiarity, consists in its being innovative or contrived. Lazerowitz describes it in such words as follows:

(At the pre-conscious level) a piece of altered terminology is introduced. ••whereas what he [the philosopher] is doing is introducing a linguistic innovation.

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

A philosophical theory consists, for one thing, of a statement of an unheralded, concealed alteration of

47

terminology...

... a philosophical theory is an illusion which is created by presenting in the ontological mode of speech, a gerrymandered piece of terminology.

... a revised piece of language which is artfully concealed by the non-verbal

49

idiom in which it is expressed.

We have stated the contents of the first two layers. We may now turn to examine them. To start with the first layer, which says that philosophy produces the illusion of conveying information about the world or reality. This implies that, according to Lazerowitz, philosophy is not justified in presenting claims about reality or the world, in other words, the investigation of reality or the world is not its job inasmuch as the relevance of its methods for securing knowledge of the world is in Question. But must philosophy be viewed as debarred from conducting an investigation of reality and conveying to us the reports of the investigation? Obviously, that depends upon the idea of reality one has in his mind. Needless to say, in

## THE CRITIQUE

using the words 'reality', 'world', etc., Lazerowitz means the world or the reality which is investigated and talked about in science, so that in asking whether a philosopher should, or have a right to, undertake an investigation of this world or reality, amounts to asking whether philosophers should, or have a right to, be concerned with the nature of the scientific world of reality. And on this point we would agree with Lazerowitz. Preoccupation with the problems of the reality which concern science cannot be the job of the philosopher. For the characteristic methods for handling these problems are not the characteristic methods of philosophy. Philosophers qua philosophers are not supposed to know the use of it or to practise it. The method which is appropriate for dealing with the reality of science is irrelevant in philosophy. No philosophical theory, as has been repeatedly pointed out by Lazerowitz himself, has ever been proved or disproved by a method by which a scientific proposition is proved or disproved.

"... the [philosophical] theories", he says, "unlike those of natural science and mathematics, are not open to proof or disproof."

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

••• Philosophy is not a demonstrative science... we cannot expect from it what we expect from a demonstrative science\*"

At this juncture, it may however be asked: How then, does it happen that philosophy and science do in fact have in common many sentences which apparently do not differ in their literal meaning. To mention a few examples: 'Time is infinite', 'Space is endlessly divisible', 'An organism is a material complex'.

The answer which appeals to us is this. The sentences, even though they have the same literal meaning, function very differently in the two contexts, namely those of science and philosophy. While occurring in the body of sentences that constitute science they purport to refer to and describe parts of reality with which science is concerned; on the other hand, when used in philosophy they refer, if we may say so, to themselves, in other words, the kind of reality or world which is constituted by scientific sentences\* To state the matter in another way, in science they perform the role of referring to (or describing) a world which they are not themselves parts of, at least

## THE CRITIQUE

not in the sense in which the objects of science are parts of the world, while in philosophy they perform the role of naming themselves, of referring to a world or reality of which they are themselves constituents.

In saying all this, it is plain that we are introducing an order of reality different from that with which science is concerned, that is, a reality which is constituted of various categories of semantic (logical) entities, e.g., propositions, concepts, etc., which are couched in the sentences of science and in all other such sentences which may be said to describe primary experiences of any kind (religious, moral, artistic and so on). This hypothesis of two-order reality has no doubt many difficulties. For, it gives rise to many disturbing questions. A few examples: Do the alleged constituents of the second-order world have a being in any sense whatever or are they just myths? How is the second-order reality related to the first-order reality of science? Can it be assimilated, in any sense, fully or partly, in the latter? Is there any identity in respect of structure or in any other aspect between the two orders of reality? Can we read in the nature of one the nature of the other? And so on. Dealing with such

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

difficulties is an enormous job by itself, which we cannot afford to undertake here without getting too far afield.

Anyway, for those who believe that there is sense in talking about the second-order reality, Lazerowitz's position that philosophy is debarred from talking about reality would not hold good unconditionally. It would not be binding on them to accept it. They may well hold a position to the effect, that, even though philosophy is not supposed to be concerned with the first-order reality of science, it cannot be altogether divested of its right to talk about reality as such; it may justly claim, as it actually does, that it is concerned with the second order reality, i.e., sentences and words as looked upon as vehicles of propositions, concepts and such like. The idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis, as critique of language and so on, is very familiar to us all.

But this does not provide any conclusive answer to the problem which takes Lazerowitz to the second layer of his hypothesis. By minor amendments in its formulation, Lazerowitz may well ask: Now then does it come

## THE CRITIQUE

about that philosophical theories, which purport to talk about the second-order reality produce the illusion of providing information about the first-order reality? So the second layer which makes a claim to provide an answer to this question continues to be relevant and important.

Even a cursory look at the language in which the hypothesis embodied in the second layer is formulated by Lazerowitz will make one feel that Lazerowitz has in fact two different answers to this problem, even though he does not appear anywhere to make the difference fully explicit. By one answer he attributes the proneness of philosophical theories to produce the illusion of talking about the first-order reality to what he calls 'linguistic innovations', 'unheralded concealed alteration of terminology', etc., The other answer proceeds to explain the illusion by what he calls the 'ontological mode of speech'. The two are different concepts, which means that Lazerowitz has two different accounts of the illusion producing proneness of philosophical theories. But in that there is little harm. If what matters is, whether the accounts do in fact do their job?

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

We do not understand how linguistic innovation or alteration of terminology can be linked up with the 'illusion' as the source of it. In talking about linguistic innovation, Lazerowitz means using a word to mean something which is different from what it means in its ordinary use, in other words, an innovative language, according to him, is a language in which words of ordinary language have lost their ordinary use.

Now if this is what 'linguistic innovation' means, then we would share with J. J. Wisdom a doubt on two points. Firsts how it becomes peculiar to philosophy; and second: how it becomes a cause of an illusion at all.

In the sense explained, in using any technical word whatever, one may well be said to make a linguistic innovation. so making a linguistic innovation cannot count as anything which only philosophers do. Mathematicians and scientists in using their technical words are also engaged in making linguistic innovations. 'Point', 'straight line' and such other words, as they occur in geometry, lose their ordinary uses. And the same is true of the numerous technical terms (e.g.,

## THE CRITIQUE

'force', 'energy', etc.) used in the various natural sciences. But because of the strictly defined use of technical terms, mathematics and science are not looked down upon as a source of an illusion. As a matter of fact, these technical terms, by ensuring precision and exactitude, ensure the advancement of mathematics and science. What then, may be the basis for saying that philosophy alone, in having recourse to linguistic innovations, i.e., sometimes, but not always, to the use of technical terms, reduces itself to a source of illusion? we do not find anything in Lazerowitz which may count as an answer to this. To quote J. J. Wisdom in this connection

One could justly claim that advances in natural sciences is impossible without linguistic innovation. Indeed those who have not gone carefully into matters of science can scarcely be aware of the enormous extent of linguistic innovation involved.

As a matter of fact, the role of linguistic innovation in philosophy, in our opinion, is the exact opposite of what Lazerowitz says about it. Philosophy, like mathematics and science, is indeed in need of making linguistic innovation: there is nothing wrong in it. On the

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

contrary, we feel that if the linguistic innovation made by philosophers would have satisfied the requirement of it, philosophy would have perhaps been freed, at least partly, of its illusion producing proneness. This point will be made clearer later.

Philosophy is supposed to talk about what we have called second-order reality. However, the way it talks, that is, its use of language, produces the illusion that it talks about what we have identified as first-order reality. All this is true. But the cause of this peculiar malady does not lie in what Lazerowitz calls the 'linguistic innovations' made by philosophers, in other words, in any technical expressions they use. The cause lies elsewhere. And Lazerowitz has very correctly identified it also. It is what he calls the ontological (material) mode of speech used by philosophers in common with the scientists. The nature of speech very naturally meets the requirement of science because of the kind of reality it deals with. It is perfectly appropriate for scientific discourse. But philosophy, in so far as it is concerned with a different order of reality, cannot have recourse to them. It is not so to speak, in tune with the precise requirement of philosophy. Yet, philosophers have to fall back on it because there is no alternative mode of

## THE CRITIQUE

of speech available to them. And this is how the illusion Lazerowitz talks about arises. The illusion is in fact one thing which philosophers, with their present linguistic resources, cannot overcome.

Should we then have to say that philosophy is inseparable from the illusion it produces? Is there no way out of this predicament? The only way that suggests itself strongly to us is what has been mis-identified by Lazerowitz as a source of illusion. This is the creation of linguistic innovations in a form of speech which conceals what is being done with terminology. If philosophers could have contrived a mode of language perfectly appropriate and sufficiently comprehensive to meet the requirements of talking about the characteristic reality they are concerned with, then they could have avoided the material or ontological mode of speech, and with that, also could have freed itself of its proneness to create the illusory impression that they are talking about the first-order reality.

## V

Lazerowitz's retraction philosophy, as an attempted account of disagreements in philosophy, has to presume that philosophers do in fact disagree with one another. As we have

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

stated previously, without this presumption his metaphi-  
 losophy loses its relevance. We have further claimed  
 that by purging philosophical utterances of their truth-  
 values which they are usually supposed to possess and  
 thereby making them in a way parts of our conative dis-  
 course, Lazerowitz made a move towards destroying the  
 very basis of his metaphilosophy. However, by taking  
 necessary precautions against his suicidal move, we  
 have reinstated the fact of disagreement in philosophy,  
 although we have found it difficult to accept his expla-  
 nation of it. What then, we may be asked, is the expla-  
 nation of this notorious disagreement? It behoves us to  
 give an answer, however brief, on this point. The expla-  
 nation, we suppose, need not be confined to a single  
 reason. It may possibly be found in many sources. Let  
 us conclude by pointing out a few such sources.

One probable source, we think, may be a certain  
 basic peculiarity of the questions which occupy philoso-  
 phers. The peculiarity consists in the fact that, as dis-  
 tinguished from scientific and mathematical questions  
 which are answerable by our recognised means, philoso-  
 phical questions are logically unanswerable, in the sense  
 that it is in principle impossible for one to know the

## THE CRITIQUE

answers they have. This idea about the nature of philosophical questions has been held by many, most notably, by Kant and the logical positivists. Kant's belief that philosophy (metaphysics) is impossible, was in fact, based on this particular construction of the nature of philosophical questions. On the other hand, the logical positivists, Moritz Schlick in particular, having equated the notion of being logically unanswerable with that of meaninglessness, came to the conclusion that philosophical questions are meaningless. Whether this equation and the consequent conclusion are correct is a matter to judge separately, what we first want to point out is that being logically unanswerable has been believed by some to be a characteristic feature of philosophical question which, in turn, may provide a possible explanation of why philosophers constantly disagree with one another.

The second peculiarity of philosophy is closely linked up with the first peculiarity that its questions are logically unanswerable. Philosophy, unlike science and mathematics, is not result-oriented. It does not aspire to yield a definite result, so that a multiplicity of results following from philosophical enquiries is inevitable its possibility lies in the

## THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ

very nature of philosophy, which means that disagreement in respect of results is the essence of philosophy. It is only too natural. There is nothing disturbing or worrisome about it. It becomes disturbing only when we overlook its uniqueness, model it after the analogy of science and mathematics and expect it to go the way science and mathematics go.

Another possible source of the disagreement may perhaps be said to lie in a basic peculiarity which distinguishes philosophy from sciences and mathematics. Science and mathematics, as we know, start with a set of beliefs the truth of which is assumed, independently of any proof. The truth of science and mathematics are contingent on the truth of the assumed body of beliefs. But philosophy is different from science in this respect. Within the framework it functions, there is no room for any assumed belief which might provide a starting point for it. The truth of philosophical propositions is in this sense supposed to be unconditional. If science and mathematics were to work within the characteristic framework of philosophy, then perhaps scientists and mathematicians also would have disagreed with one another more or less in the same way as philosophers do.

## THE CRITIQUE

This particular peculiarity which makes the functioning of philosophy vis-a-vis that of mathematics and science is not unknown to Lazerowitz. He recognises it when he says

one difference between philosophy and natural science is evident ... Science conducts its investigation and makes its speculation on a foundation of presuppositions which philosophy undertakes to examine. Thus, science assumes the validity of inductive procedures, which presuppose the uniformity of nature and the existence of a world independent of our perception, whereas philosophy looks into the foundations of induction and the warrants for the belief in an external world. The scientist accepts the commonsense belief that the future will be like the past, whereas philosophers like *some* are concerned with its justification. And the scientist accepts the everyday belief that there is a common objective world, while philosophers, for example, Descartes, investigate its rational justification.

Likewise, he says further:

**THE METAPHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS LAZEROWITZ**

**An important difference between mathematics and philosophy is of course apparent: In mathematics we proceed from explicitly formulated postulates and precise definitions to conclusions rigorously circumscribed by the rules of deduction.**

## INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 2

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Italics mine.

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9

Hume's word was "copy".

10

In this respect Hume may be said to have thought with the learned but to have spoken with the vulgar.

11

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### CHAPTER 3

1

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Language, Truth and Logic, (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London) second edition, 1948), p.133.

CHAPTER 4

1

Appearance and Reality, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1920), seventh impression, p.43.

2

p.11.

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Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.48.

4

Ibid., p.133.

5

6.54.

6

p.263.

7

Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.47.

3

Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, edited by Alice Ambrose, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.99.

9

Ibid., p.97.

10

It should be noted here that Wittgenstein uses "meta-physical" in the Blue Book, when he could just as well have used "philosophical". The statements cited as "metaphysical" do not refer to anything beyond the bounds of sense.

Blue and Brown Books, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1933), p.35.

ibid., p.55.

ibid., p.18.

ibid., pp.58-9.

"The Conception of Reality", Philosophical Studies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1922).

"Proof of an External World", Philosophical Papers, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959), pp.145-6.

ibid., Hume.

Hittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, edited by Alice Ambrose, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.97

ibid.,

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ibid., London, 1961), 4.112.

parenthetically, it may be observed that when the Greeks e.g., Democritus, spoke of an atom as being uncuttable, what that meant was that it was physically uncuttable, not that it was logically uncuttable (decomposable) into smaller parts.

- 23 Principia Ethica, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922), p.VI.
- 24 Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.43.
- 25 Gilbert Ryle.
- 26 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961), 4.0031.
- 27 Preface.
- 28 p.49.
- 29 Ibid., p.51.
- 30 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.31.
- 31 Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.48.
- 32 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.18.
- 33 Ibid., p.16.
- 34 Ibid., p.21.

- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid., p.31.
- 33 The allusion is to "language games", as he sometimes called them.
- 39 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.31.
- 40 Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.43.
- 41 Ibid., p.49.
- 42 Ibid., p.48.
- 43 Ibid., p.103.
- 44 Ibid., p.48.
- 45 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.97.
- 46 Ibid., p.51.
- 47 The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, London, 1976), p.55.

- 48 Ibid., p.28.
- 49 Ibid., P.52.
- 50 Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976)> p.49.
- 51 The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1958)
- 52 Argument from Morris Lazerowitz.
- 53 Philosophical Investigations, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.31.
- 54 Vide Essays in Unknown Wittgenstein, by Morris Lazerowitz and Mice Ambrose, (Prometheus Books, New York, 1984), pp.115-9.
- 55 Philosophische Bemerkungen, Alice Ambrose's translation, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1964), p.152.
- 56 Cf., The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.1.
- 57 Ibid.,
- 58 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, (edited by

G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees and G.E. Anscombe, Macmillan, New York, 1956), p.136.

59

p.46.

60

Appearance and Reality, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1920), seventh impression, p.129.

61

Essays in Unknown Wittgenstein (Prometheus Books, New York, 1984), p.142.

62

The Theory of Knowledge and Existence, (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1932), p.67.

63

The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil & Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.57.

64

Ibid., p.59.

## CHAPTER 5

1

And was held even so recently by H.W.B. Joseph, (An Introduction to Logic, p.13), who said "a=a" is a law of things as well as a law of thought.

2

Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980), pp. 159-60.

3

C.D. Broad, Scientific Thought, (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1927), p.19.

4

Metaphilosophy, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970), vol.1, p.1.

5

Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35 (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.99.

6

The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958) p.18.

7

Philosophical Investigations, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), p.51.

8

The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.28.

9

Ibid.

10

Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.97.

- 11 Vide his "Metaphysics and Verification", Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953)•
- 12 Norman Malcolm in his paper, "Are Necessary Propositions Verbal?" mentions that Ayer is committed to the view that necessary propositions are not really necessary. Mind, Vol.XLIX, N.S., No.194.
- 13 John Austin argues (in a discussion) that since  $2+2=4$  is true, it must be about something.
- 14 The form of speech in which no reference to words is made.
- 15 The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan Paul,Ltd., London, 1955),p.276.
- 16 Hardy writes: "I have myself always thought of a mathematician or in the first instance an observer, a TO n who gazes at a distant range of mountains and sits down his observations", "Mathematical Proof", Mind, Vol.XXXVIII (1929), p.181.
- 17 According to which a necessary proposition about the numbers 2 & 4 is about scratches on paper.
- 18 The Language of Philosophy (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, 1977), pp.189-91.
- 19 Here 'a priori sentence' is used for "sentence which expresses an a priori proposition".

- 20     '  
The Yellow Book (Unpublished)
- 21  
The Language of Philosophy (D. Reidal Publishing Company, Dordrecht Holland/Boston, 1977), p.193.
- 22  
Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964)\* pp.239-40.
- 23  
Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, (edited by G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees and G.E. Anscombe, MacMillan, New York\* 1956)\* p.152.
- 24  
Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul\* New York, 1964)\* p.239.
- 25  
The Blue and Brown Books\* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford\* 1958), p.57.
- 26  
p.45
- 27  
Philosophical Investigations. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976)\* p.48.
- 28  
Ibid.\* p.51.
- 29  
Interestingly enough\* Ayer maintained that it was impossible to know with certainty that a physical thing exists\* on the grounds that such knowledge would require an infinite number of sense observations having been made.

- 30 In discussion.
- 31 The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.1.
- 32 Knowledge and Perception, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1950), p.50.
- 33 Knowledge and Certainty, (Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), p.178.
- 34 The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.57.
- 35 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p.69.
- 36 Philosophical Investigations, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1976), p.19.
- 37 A Treatise of Human Nature, (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge), second edition, Bk I Part III, Sec. VIII.
- 38 The Principles of Human Knowledge. (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1901), Part I, Sec. 33.
- 39 Ibid., Part I, Sec. 38.
- 40 pp.209-10.

- 41  
Philosophical Studies, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1922), pp. 209-10.
- 42  
The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.59.
- 43  
"A Defence of Common Sense", Philosophical Papers, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959), p.33.
- 44  
Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964), p.212.
- 45  
The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.59.

CHAPTER 6

- 1  
p.1; also "Metaphilosophy", Critica, Vol.5, No.5,  
(Mexico, 1971), p.3.
- 2  
Tape recorded by me.
- 3  
Vide his letter to Mr. M. Chakravarty.
- 4  
Philosophy and Illusion, (George Allen and Unwin,  
London, 1968), p.82.
- 5  
The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan  
Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.25.
- 6  
"The Fly Bottle: Wittgenstein and Bowsman", Reports  
on Philosophy, 5, (1981), p.34.
- 7  
Portion within parenthesis ours.
- 8  
"On Talking About Philosophy", Metaphilosophy, Vol.8,  
Nos. 2 & 3, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977), p.253.
- 9  
Ibid., p.254.
- 10  
Chakravarty, M., Metaphilosophical and Moral Philosophical  
Questions, (Centre of Advanced Studies in Phi-  
losophy, Vishwa Bharati, West Bengal, India., 1972),  
pp.11-2.
- 11  
Ibid., see pp.17-20, (For elaboration).

- 12 "Word Magic and The Trivialization of Philosophy",  
Ratio, Vol.7, (1965).
- 13 Vide his letter of March 21, 1934 to Mr. M.  
Chakravarty.
- 14 The Katharine Asher Engel Lectures, Smith College,  
(1983), p.13.
- 15 Cf., Chakravarty, M. "Proofs in Philosophy",  
Proceedings of The Indian Philosophical Congress  
45th Session (Moti Lal Banarasi Das, Delhi, 1971),  
p.170.
- 16 Philosophy and Illusion, (George Allen and Unwin,  
London, 1968), p.83.
- 17 The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan  
Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.25.
- 18 Ibid., p.58. (Italics mine).
- 19 Ibid., (Italics mine).
- 20 Ibid., p.69.
- 21 "Some Considerations on Morris Lazerowitz's The  
Structure of Metaphysics", Mind, LXVII, (No.226,  
1958), p.238.
- 22 The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan  
Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.57.

- 23 Ibid.,
- 24 Ibid., p.58.
- 25 "Some Considerations on Morris Lazerowitz's The Structure of Metaphysics", Mind, LXVII, (No.226, 1958), pp.237-8.
- 26 The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.58.
- 27 Ibid.,
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Philosophy and Illusion (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968), p.109.
- 31 The Language of Philosophy, (D. Reidel Publishing Co, Dordrecht Holland/Boston, 1977), p.174.
- 32 Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964), p.217.
- 33 The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.227.

Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy,  
(New York, University Press, New York, 1959), p.336

P. 226.

Daya in his article "Some Considerations on Morris Lazerowitz's The Structure of Metaphysics, Mind, p.243, J.W.N. Watkins, "Word Magic and Trivialization of Philosophy", Ratio Vol.7, (1965), Brand Blanshard, "Review of Philosophy and Illusion", Metaphilosophy Vol.1, No.2, (1970), p.184, and J.L. Cobitz, "Metaphysics As Wish Fulfilment", The Philosophical Review, LXVII, (1958), p.76.

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"Philosophy and Psychoanalysis", Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy, edited by Sidney Hook, (New York University Press, New York, 1959), pp.336-357.

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 ••Subversion and Inversion", The Language of Philosophy, (Allied Publishers, Ltd., New Delhi, India, 1981), pp.79-96.
- 42  
Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964), p.271.
- 43  
The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1955) p.66.
- 44  
 Vide, The Structure of Metaphysics, p.78, where Lazerowitz says: "the philosophy theory ... is composed of three interrelated, interacting strata; the illusion of a theory about the world, at the conscious level; a non-verbal sentence which embodies an alteration of language, at the preconscious level, and a belief (one or more) which satisfies a wish and counters a fear in the substratum of our minds. (Italics ours).
- 45  
Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964), p.217 (Parenthesis ours).
- 46  
The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.67, (Italics ours).
- 47  
Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964), p.217.
- 43  
The Language of Philosophy, (D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht Holland/Boston, 1977), p.174.(Italics ours).

- 49 Studies in Metaphilosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1964), p.225.
- 50 The Structure of Metaphysics, (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955), p.25.
- 51 Philosophy and Illusion, (George and Allen, London, 1963), p.82.
- 52 "Lazerowitz's Interpretation of Metaphysics", Philosophy and its Place in our Culture, (Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, New York, 1975), p.193.
- 53 Asking "what about those questions for which it is logically impossible to find an answer?" Schlick says, "it would not be a genuine question at all but a mere row of words." And elsewhere, "... a question which is unanswerable in principle can be no question at all; it is nothing but a nonsensical series of words", Meaning and Verification, Readings in Philosophic Analysis, ed. Feigl and Sellars, New York, pp.147-56.
- 54 Philosophical Theories, (Mouton & Co., The Hague, Netherlands, 1976), pp.9-10.
- 55 Idid., p.12.

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