# NATIONALISM: A STUDY IN MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

A Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
Submitted to the University of Hyderabad


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# DECLARATION

**I hereby declare that this thesis entitled** *"Nationalism: A Study in Moral and Political Philosophy,"* **submitted to the** University of Hyderabad **in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the** Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy **is a bona fide record of original research work done by me under the supervision and guidance of** *Professor S. G. Kulkarni* **and the thesis has not been submitted to any other University or Institution for the award of any degree.**

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## CERTIFICATE

**This is to certify that the thesis entitled "***Nationalism: A Study in Moral and Political Philosophy***," submitted to the University of Hyderabad in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of** *Doctor of Philosophy* **in Philosophy is a bona fide record of original research work done by** *Mr. C. Bharath Kumar* **during the period of his study in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, under my supervision and guidance and that the thesis has not been submitted to any other University or Institution for the award of any degree.**

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# CHAPTER I

## THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM: THE MORAL DIMENSION

Since its inception, philosophy has been a critical evaluation of our most general ideas and claims. Those ideas and claims may be about the world we live in, the knowledge we acquire, the conduct we follow, thinking we adopt, the pleasures we enjoy and institutions we build. The common thread that passes through the above mentioned objects of philosophical study is the generality of these concerns. If critical thinking constitutes the head of philosophy, generality of its concerns constitutes its heart. The abstract nature of philosophy is to be traced to the generality of its concerns. In an important sense, philosophy is an expression of a community's self-perception as well as its perception of the world around it in its most abstract form.

Deep reflection on the institutions which human beings build to organize their lives in the light of what they consider it ought to be has always been hallmark of philosophical enterprise. Such an endeavor is almost always organically linked to the reflection over other themes mentioned above. From Plato onwards there is a sustained reflection over the moral and political issues that have a direct bearing on the institutional structure of human life.

Nationalism in one form or another constitutes the most potent and omnipresent political force in the late twentieth century. The nation-state--the parent and child of so many nationalist movements- remains, despite the challenge of an increasingly integrated global economy, the dominant form of political membership of our age. The aim of the present work is to study one dimension of the philosophical underpinning of this phenomenon called nation and by implication of the ideology of nationalism. It concerns the moral dimension of nation and the ideology of nationalism. Its focus is a political phenomenon called nation and political ideology called nationalism and its concern is with the ethical aspect of that object of focus. Hence this research undertaking falls in the interface of ethics or moral philosophy and political philosophy. After all, in an important sense, if not in every sense political philosophy is an extension of moral philosophy as is

evidenced by the fact it is concerned with such morally loaded concepts like democracy, liberty, justice, right, etc. Further, the emerging field of applied ethics as distinct from theoretical ethics which was co-extensive with ethics as a whole has concerned itself with the ethical dimension of modern institutions such as business, media, medicine, law, etc. which though existed in pre-modern times have grown enormously both in magnitude and complexity throwing up ethical challenges and hence the emergence of various branches of applied ethics such as business ethics, media ethics, legal ethics, medical ethics, etc. To these we may add political ethics as one more branch of applied ethics dealing with the moral dimension of political institutions and their functions, particularly the institution called nation whose ideology called Nationalism is the fountainhead of many struggles and which sanctifies what is called state that governs public and even private lives of individuals today in a manner and to the extent unprecedented in human history. This work falls into this area of political ethics.

**Nationalism: The Genesis of the Idea**

It is a truism to say that nationalism as a concept, as an ideology and as a movement has been one of the seminal factors in shaping the intellectual ethos and political reality of modern history in general and the twentieth century in particular. However, the potent force of nationalism was not as clearly visualised and articulated as other socio-cultural trends by even nineteenth century thinkers whose insights are rightly considered prophetic by historians of ideas like Isaiah Berlin, Burchkhardt anticipated the rise of military-industrial complex, Weber foresaw the growth of bureaucracy as an embodiment of instrumental rationality, Durkheim visualised the growing anomie of industrially developed societies, Tocqueville predicted the rise of conformist culture in liberal societies, Marx prophesied market dictated, accelerated rate of technological change bringing about greater socialisation of production running parallel to increasing concentration of the means of production in the hands of a few and Bacune envisaged revolutionary upheavals in the countries of the non-western world. These successful instances of far sight and foresight exhibited by these thinkers stand in contrast to the failure of the nineteenth century thought to anticipate the growing centrality of nationalism in the twentieth century.

The main reason for such a failure is a conviction which was quite central to nineteenth century thinking about social and political reality. It was thought that the unprecedented power and dynamism of the capitalist system succeeds in achieving a global sweep so as to nullify any boundaries, national or otherwise. The international character of production and consumption, the rise of global finance and, equally importantly large scale immigration would enable, it was thought, the market to nullify national boundaries. The nineteenth century economists like George Frederick List understood the anti-national tendency of free-market economy and bemoaned such a prospect. According to them, nation stands in between the individuals who constitute the focal point of micro economics and the world as a whole which are dealt with by macroeconomics gives meaning to the choices of the individual consumer, with the disappearance of the parameters of the national culture, the individual choices lose all significance. This attitude was adopted only by a minority of thinkers. The majority of thinkers, however, celebrated the globalising and their by anti-nationalist propensity of the capitalist system. This is true of not only Adam Smith and David Ricardo whom List chastises for disregarding the nation as an organic economic unit and nationalism as an autonomous economic factor, but also their betenoire Marx and Engels. These, in their *Communist Manifesto*, are equally celebrative of the dissolution of 'nation' in the solvent of the capitalist internationalism when they say, "national differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing....owing to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto" (Margalit 1997: 74).

This is not to say that the concept of nation was never the focal point of modern intellectual engagement before the twentieth century. In fact, the eighteenth century saw a remarkably deep engagement with this concept so much so that in an important sense the twentieth century discussions can be said to pick up the thread of nationalism from where the eighteenth century thinkers left. The eighteenth century debate over nationalism has deep philosophical roots. The controversy over the moral defensibility of nationalism in the eighteenth century was between thinkers who supported the philosophy of Enlightenment

and the thinkers who in opposition to the philosophy of Enlightenment worked out what is called Expressivism or Romantic Philosophy.

The Enlightenment philosophy or the philosophy of Enlightenment represented quintessentially the basic tenets of modern philosophy namely the 1) Idea of nature as merely an object, 2) Man as a self-defined subject and 3) Reason as the essence of man and a capacity to understand nature in order to control it and thus achieve progress. Central to the philosophy of Enlightenment is the idea that human nature is universal and context free. Reason or the capacity for rational thinking is the essence common to all human beings irrespective of the specific contexts of space and time. Since each human being has a capacity to rationally judge things as ought and ought to be, anything collective as an intellectual guidance is neither necessary nor desirable. Ontologically speaking, the collective has a derivative existence and the individual a primary one. Epistemologically, it is the individual as the seat of rationality is the arbiter between true and false. Ethically speaking it is the individual who is the pivot of the moral domain in so far as he exercises his autonomy in terms of his rational will. The philosophy of Enlightenment went to the extent of treating the pre-modern state of human kind as the childhood of Man who attained adulthood with the emergence of modernity with its ideas of a common universal nature and individualism which is grounded in the ontological primacy, epistemological self-sufficiency and moral autonomy vis-à-vis the collective. It is hardly surprising that the philosophers of Enlightenment debunked the very idea of nation given the fact that the universality of human nature renders cultural differences contingent and dispensable and the ultimacy of the individual sets at naught the very philosophical status of the collective such as a nation. The counter-Enlightenment philosophers who called themselves Expressivists or Romanticists rejected every tenet of the philosophy of Enlightenment. According to them nature was not an object, man was not a self-defining subject and Reason was not the essence of man. Apart from rejecting the subject-object distinction, they refused to accept the portrayal of man as rational being, that is, a being with his essence constituted by reason as the capacity to understand nature in order to control it. The anti-Enlightenment philosophers considered man to be an expressive being. The category of expression is so central to the thought of the Romantic philosophers that they are aptly called Expressivists.

As an expressive being man realizes his essence in the very act of his expressions of himself in and through the culture which he creates. He creates and re-creates himself in the very process of expression and culture is both the medium and the message that is it is both the means and the end. Nation is an embodiment of culture in and through which man expresses himself and realizes himself. Among the Expressivists, it is J.G. Herder who worked out a theory that defended nationalism. It must be noted that the conception of nation which was adumbrated by Herder was a cultural one. Nation is treated as something in which is anchored the fulcrum called culture. It must also be noted that Expressivism rejects the very idea of autonomous individual, morally or ontologically. As an Expressive being man is inseparable from and therefore, not autonomous vis-à-vis either nature or culture. Thus, central to the Expressivist view of man is the idea of expressive unity as against the Enlightenment's idea of moral autonomy.

Whatever is the richness of the debate between the Enlightenment and the counter-Enlightenment philosophers regarding the defensibility of the concept of nation, the controversy subsided and the concept of nation disappeared from the framework of the nineteenth century intellectual engagement due to the belief that the phenomenon of nation would be wiped out by the global sway of capitalism. Cosmopolitanism and individualism which were central to liberalism and internationalism which was central to socialist thought made the concept of nation an anathema, though for different reasons since nationalism as a communitarian concept is anti-thetical to or at least ill-at-ease with cosmopolitanism and internationalism.

**The Texture of the Concept of Nationalism**

While there is a general recognition of the importance that intellectuals have played in the development of nationalist ideas and in nationalist movements, there has in the past been a surprising lack of interest in nationalism by social scientists and political philosophers. However, the twentieth century saw a vigorous scholarly engagement with nationalism specifically because the rise of anti-colonial movements followed by violent political upheavals resulting in secession or at least autonomy. As John Hutchinson and Anthony

Smith point out this, "As an ideology and movement, nationalism exerted a strong influence in the American and French Revolutions, yet it did not become the subject of historical enquiry until the middle of the nineteenth century, nor of social scientific analysis until the early twentieth century. Sustained investigation of nationalism had to wait until after the First World War, and it is really only since the 1960s, after the spate of anti-colonial and ethnic nationalisms, that the subject has begun to be thoroughly investigated by scholars from several disciplines" (1994: 3). The philosophical engagement with the problem of nationalism began in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century. The reasons for such a belated engagement and reflection on the part of social scientists and philosophers were due to the nature of nationalism itself as a concept and as a phenomenon. As Hobsbawn and Gellner claim, the business of nationalist politics involves so much of local myth-making that it is not conducive to the kind of panoramic and universalistic reflection which can yield a comprehensive articulation characteristic of a coherent theory. In fact C.C.O'Brien notes that there is something peculiar about the very idea of theorising nationalism since theory aims at what is general that is universal conceptions of moral and political validity where as nationalism exhausts the particular since the ideologues of nationalism pre-occupy themselves with grievances of a specific national group and thus fail to vindicate the legitimacy of national aspirations as a matter of general principle (cf 1991: 56-7). Further, the fluidity and the complex texture of the concept of nationalism is very well brought out by Hutchinson and Smith when they say, "the field of nationalist phenomena, which includes the growth of nations and national state, as well as ethnic identity and community, is vast and ramified. It spills over into any number of cognate subjects: race and racism, fascism, language development, political religion, communalism, ethnic conflict, international law, protectionism, minorities, gender immigration, genocide. The forms that nationalism takes have been kaleidoscopic: religious, conservative, liberal, fascist, communist, cultural, political, protectionist, integrationist, separatist, irredentist, diaspora, pan etc" (1994: 3). Some elaboration regarding the intricate texture and multiplicity of forms of nationalism indicated in the above passage are in order. It has been recognized that nationalism can be of two distinctive types: political and cultural. In fact, the distinctness between political nationalism and cultural nationalism can be traced to the original articulation of nationalism provided by the thinkers of counter-Enlightenment or

Romantic/ Expressivist School in the eighteenth century. Though Germany was the centre of counter-Enlightenment spearheaded by Herder and Schelling and France was the headquarters of the philosophy of Enlightenment, counter-Enlightenment should not be identified with its German variety just as Enlightenment should not be identified only with its French variety. This is because Rousseau influenced Romanticism more than any other philosopher. Significantly Rousseau's influence was particularly decisive on their Romantic conception of nationalism. However, the conception of nationalism worked out by Romantics under the influence of Rousseau was political nationalism alternative to which was the cultural nationalism of Herder. Political nationalism construes the state as the nation's supreme expression of its sovereign political will. Hence nation without nation-state is Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. Individuals lend meaning to their lives by participating in the nation and they can do so only by being citizens of the nation-state. Loyalty to the nation-state is both a necessary and sufficient condition of belonging to the nation and the outstanding expression of such a belonging. In other words, membership of the nation and citizenship of the nation-state are extensionally and in fact, intentionally equivalent. As against this, cultural nationalism looks upon the nation as an organic entity with the national culture as its primary expression. Cultural Nationalists also asserted that the national language is the fundamental dimension of the national culture. The primacy accorded to the national language by the cultural nationalists in the gamut of national culture is not surprising because the counter-Enlightenment philosophers considered language as expression and communication as an expressive activity. In doing so they rejected the Enlightenment's idea of language as a system of symbols referentially related to the world and with description as its primary function, non-descriptive uses of language being secondary. For Cultural Nationalism politics is not an essential expression of the nation; it is only a means for ensuring cultural expression which makes a nation what it is. Hence politics is a means not an end and state is an instrument for the sake of something higher than itself namely the culture which is the hallmark of a nation's identity. It is obvious that political nationalism has been more widely accepted than cultural nationalism. Ernest Gellner's oft quoted definition of nationalism as the principle according to which "the political and the cultural are congruent" (1983: 1), sums up the basic point of political nationalism. In fact, as Avishai Margalit points out "cultural nationalism is in an important

sense the topic that appears today under the label of "multiculturalism" rather than that of "nationalism" (1997: 78). The difference between political nationalism and cultural nationalism does not lie on the mere points of emphasis, namely, 'politics' and 'nation-state' in the case of the former, 'culture' and 'national-community' in the latter. The two involve different sorts of psychology as Margalit points out. This is evidenced in their difference regarding their criticism of Enlightenment's idea that future societies will be politics-free; to quote Margalit "The anti-Enlightenment that focuses on the political nationalism criticizes the Enlightenment's covert assumption that future societies will be able to abandon politics. In *laissez-faire* liberalism, the market is supposed to replace politics. The only legitimate sort of struggle is *laissez-faire* thinking is economic bargaining. According to this view, contractual agreements between individuals and firms are supposed to settle all conflicts. The assumption is that all conflicts between rational people can be settled if and when they are allowed to communicate freely with one another" (*Ibid.*). It is this assumption which political nationalism rejects and consequently debunks the idea of a politics-free society. But cultural nationalism is not so anathematic to the idea of politics-free society. After all according to them, culture is the essence of a nation and culture need not be political centered. Hence, the cultural nationalists' criticism of the Enlightenment's assumption of the politics-free society of 'future' is some what muted. However, the cultural nationalists might question the Enlightenment's notion of man as a rational being since such a notion is a distorted picture of human nature whose essence consists in expressive action rather than instrumental rationality with its cost-effective calculations. With 'expression' as their basic category in understanding human nature cultural nationalists relate freedom with man's expressive capacity rather than rational ability.

Any attempt to provide an adequate picture of the logical geography of the concept of nationalism must take into account the distinction between 'civic' nationalism and 'ethnic' nationalism. There is a lot of discussion about this distinction in the literature of political theory. It is tempting to collapse this distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism into the distinction between political nationalism and cultural nationalism. The temptation arises because the two distinctions are invidious. The political nationalism and civic nationalism are taken to be non-sectarian in orientation whereas

cultural nationalism and ethnic nationalism are exclusivist that is why civic nationalism, unlike ethnic nationalism is said to be compatible with liberalism and democracy. For Instance, Michael Ignatieff in his work *Blood and Belonging* and William Pfaff in his work *The Wrath of Nations* equate 'ethnic' nationalism with 'cultural' nationalism and cultural nationalism as an ideology that construes the nation in terms of a common culture to be protected by the nationalist movement which establishes a nation-state for that purpose. However they overlook the fact that civic nationalism has a pronounced cultural component. The membership of a civic nation is not based on merely an allegiance to certain political principles as they seem to think. The civic nations make very strong demands on immigrants and these demands are essentially cultural as Will Kymlicka points out that "both ethnic and civic nationalisms have a cultural component. Of course, the way culture is interpreted varies from nation to nation. Some nations define their culture in ethnic and religious terms, others do not. These variations are crucial to understanding why some nationalisms are peaceful, liberal and democratic, while others are xenophobic, authoritarian, and expansionist. Unfortunately, since Pfaff and Ignatieff downplay the cultural component of nationalism, they shed no light on the variations in how culture is interpreted" (1999: 133).

Like the distinctions between various types of nationalism, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is made to play both descriptive and normative roles. That is to say, on the one hand the distinction is used to classify the different kinds of nationalism one finds in the modern world and on the other hand to characterise some as valuable and acceptable forms of nationalism vis-à-vis others. As Bernard Yack points out "Distinguishing civic from ethnic understandings of nationhood is part of a larger effort by contemporary liberals to channel national sentiments in a direction – civic nationalism- that seems consistent with the commitments to individual rights and diversity that they associate with a decent political order" (1999: 104).

Coming to the distinction itself the civic nation is said to be a community of equal, right-possessing citizens who share a set of political practices and values. The civic nation is a community created by the individuals who choose to honour a particular political creed and organisation. In this sense a civic nation is said to be the flavour of Enlightenment

vision and liberal imagination. As against this, ethnic nationalism is antithetical to such a vision insofar as it emphasizes "that an individual's deepest attachments are inherited not chosen," that "it is the national community that defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community" (*Ibid.*: 104-5). All this shows that civic nationalism is taken to be morally defensible and ethnic nationalism is not since the former is catholic, inclusive and therefore benign whereas the latter is sectarian, exclusive and therefore malignant. The question is whether the invidiousness of this distinction is defensible. The basis of this invidiousness of the distinction is the idea that civic nationalism involves rational attachment to political principles whereas ethnic nationalism is the celebration of inherited culture. But civic nationalists "ignore the contingent inheritance of distinctive experiences and cultural memories that is an inseparable part of every national political identity. And one must pretend that it makes sense to characterise nations such as France, Canada, and the United States as voluntary associations for the expression of shared political principles. Such is the myth that surrounds the idea of civic nation" (*Ibid.*: 106). The civic nationalists are fond of quoting Ernest Renan's construal of nation as 'a daily plebiscite' since such a construal underwrites individual consent for certain political principles as the locus of national identity but Renan himself construes daily plebiscite to be only one of the two constituents of the nation. The other consists in a common possession of "a rich legacy of memories". In fact the 'daily plebiscite' involves "the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form" (*Ibid.*: 107). Indeed according to him, nations differ "in spiritual complexion which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture". He goes to the extent of saying that "psychological makeup manifested in a common culture" is a defining feature of a nation (cf Renan 1994: 17-21). All this shows how thin is the line between ethnic and civic nationalisms.

The civic nationalists further strengthen the invidiousness of the distinction by drawing our attention to racist and other sectarian violence that ethnic nationalism leads to. In fact nationalist conflict is no less frequently caused by civic nationalists to forcibly incorporate national minorities using the cloak of popular sovereignty. As Yack points out, "popular sovereignty arguments encourage modern citizens to think of themselves as organised into communities that are logically and historically prior to the communities

created by their shared political institutions. To the extent that one condemns our tendency to look for pre-political sources of political identity, modern democratic political culture is part of the problem, not the solution" (1999: 109).Where as ethnic nationalism is candid in locating nations in certain communities inheriting a specific culture, civic nationalism tends "to propagate myths about national identity by redescribing contingent communities of memory and experience as if they were nothing more than voluntary associations of individuals, united by their shared attachment to a body of moral and political principles" (*Ibid.*: 111). Undoubtedly, *prima-facie* civic nationalism is inclusive but the common phenomenon of containing dissent even while tolerating it shows that the inclusiveness is much more limited than the civic nationalists claim.

However, this is not to support the ethnic nationalists' claim that civic nationalism is a pure myth because no nation-state can be culturally neutral. In fact, the civic nationalists have never made the questionable claim that cultural identity is irrelevant for a democratic polity. Rather, as Ronald Beiner points out "what animates the "civic" conception is the vision of a shared citizenship and civic identity that would be in principle capable of transcending these cultural preoccupations, however legitimate they may be, in a political community where linguistic and cultural identities are in potential conflict" (1999: 14). Since such a concern is morally desirable civic nationalism has a theoretical significance. But from this it does not follow that it is correct to perceive the current nationalist phenomenon in terms of two kinds of entities with an invidious distinction between them. Every nation is constituted by both political consent and cultural inheritance of shared memories and practices. Hence the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is a distinction between ideal types and if taken as literal descriptions of nation-states they perpetuate their own myths. This is clearly evident in Yack who says, "the myth of the *ethnic* nation suggests that you have no choice at all in the making of your national identity: you are your cultural inheritance and nothing else. The myth of the *civic* nation, in contrast, suggests that your national identity is nothing but your choice: you are the political principles you share with other like-minded individuals" (1999: 107).

The upshot of the above discussion is that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism should not be taken as denoting two groups of actually existing nations, one civic and another ethnic. If the distinction pertains to two elements which are constitutive of every nation then the distinction is not only harmless but even significant. We would not than consider some nations to be morally upright than others but preserve the moral imperative of reducing ethnic element and strengthening civic element in every nation. The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms then becomes morally significant without being invidious. 'Civic' nation then becomes a regulative ideal and not a moral stick to be used by some nations against others.

Another distinction between types of nationalism concerns what Plamenatz calls Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism. Even while making this distinction Plamenatz considers nationalism to be 'primarily a cultural phenomenon', though it might often take a 'political form' (cf 1976: 23-36). Then western type emerged primarily in Western Europe and the Eastern in the Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Common to both types is the acceptance of a set of standards with the level of development of a particular national culture is measured. The countries in the Western world looked upon themselves as being culturally equipped to meet those standards of nationhood and more importantly those standards were taken to be native to their culture. In other words, even those countries whose culture did not meet the standards to the extent the cultures of advanced countries like Britain and France did, did not consider the standards themselves to be culturally alien. Eastern Nationalism emerged among those people who were recently drawn into civilizational ethos that was alien to them and whose culture did not square with the dominant standards of cultural advance. In fact they themselves acknowledge their backwardness in relation to the global standards associated with the Western Europe. At the same time they recognize the alien character of those standards. Ironically their realization that their inherited culture failed to provide adaptive leverage so as to reach those standards did not prompt them to reject those standards themselves. "The 'Eastern' type of nationalism, consequently, has been accompanied by an effort to're-equip' the nation culturally, to transform it. But it could not do so simply by imitating the alien culture, for then nation would lose its distinctive identity. The search, therefore, was for a regeneration

national culture, adapted to the requirements of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness" (Chatterjee 1999: 2). This lends a contradictory character to Eastern nationalism. It imitates the very model it is hostile to. In fact acceptance-rejection attitude is adapted towards both the alien culture and the native culture. Such ambivalence distinguishes it from western nationalism so qualitatively that a systematic theorization of nationalism fails to guarantee a systematic outcome. The distinction between two types of nationalisms made by Plamenatz is too significant to be dismissed as unimportant by saying that it is a superfluous dilemma in the colonized that has no bearing in their real life. This is what Gellner means when he considers the dilemmas faced by nationalists' leaders as superficial. Superficially the intellectuals, Gellner says, "always face the crucial dilemmas of choosing between 'westernizing' and a *narodnik* tendency... But the dilemma is quite spurious: ultimately the movement invariably contain both elements, a genuine modernism and a more or less spurious concern for local culture... By the twentieth century, the dilemma hardly bothers anyone: the philosopher-kings of the 'underdeveloped' worlds all act as westernisers, and all talk like *narodniks*" (*Ibid.*: 4). Gellner is not sensitive to the intellectual dilemmas faced by the nationalist intellectuals who led the anti-colonial culture nor can he explain the fundamental distinction between the historical trajectories of Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism.

For instance, many, if not all instances of Eastern nationalism exemplify forms of nationalism which go against what is typical about western nationalism. They appear to be illiberal forms of nationalism creating difficulties for the liberal theory of nationalism. Also, nationalism which is essentially a product of modernity takes on anti-modern forms in the non-western world by adopting an ethno-centric character. The liberal theory which believes in the story of progress and with its rationalist orientation provides nationalism an aura of reason and progress faces the challenge of accounting for the illiberal tendencies of eastern nationalism. It is in this way that distinction made by Plamenatz and which is also made by many others using different terms exposes the liberal view to a serious challenge. This is important because liberal view of nationalism is the official view. Liberals like Hans Kohn while maintaining that nationalism is coeval with liberty, rationality, democracy and industry, explain illiberal nationalism as a deviant form of nationalism. Eastern nationalism

is deviant because it dispenses with the values associated with nationalism and yet it is nationalism because it embodies an urge to freedom. The deviation is explained by reference to special circumstances such as the cultural conditions of the non-western nations which are unpropitious to freedom. Thus the explanation of illiberal nationalism, that is, eastern nationalism is sociological where as explanation of western or liberal nationalism is not. The difference in explanans points to the difference in the explanandum. Hence, one is left wondering whether nationalism is one and the same phenomenon rendering the task of theorizing nationalism systematically a daunting one.

This is not to say that liberalism and nationalism are coeval. Not only 'nationalism' figures in non-liberal ideologies but also there are liberal thinkers who reject a place for 'nationalism' in their framework .This point, that is, the ideological fluidity of 'nationalism' which will be elaborated below adds to the complexity of the texture of the concept of nationalism. The tripartite distinction among social ideologies in terms of conservatism, liberalism and radicalism can be a heuristically significant distinction so long as the distinction is not taken to be either mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive and none of them is considered to be a monolith. In fact, the later point is brought to surface by the way nationalism is viewed. Conservatives like Roger Scruton justify nationalism as the ultimate ontological unit of political life (For a clear statement, cf 1990). Against the individualism of the liberal ideology, Scruton considers individuals to be embedded in constituted and nurtured by their nation. They don't attain their identity by themselves and in themselves as liberals imagine but their identity is derived from their inextricable links they have with other members of their national community. In other words, there is 'I' because there is 'we' and it is the nation which is the essence of 'we'. It is because the state is an organic expression of the relevant nation; the state is not an artificial entity, a consciously created human artifact. It derives its naturalness from the nation which is natural par excellence. Though citizenship, that is, membership of the state is the fundamental identity, citizenship itself is preceded by and provided ground for nationality. Individuals are primarily members of their nation and only derivatively of the state. For many conservative nationalists, nations have a common ethnic or biological basis. Though they do not consider nations and races to be co-extensive, nations are looked upon to be like races. They seek to give content to the

expression 'like' by construing nations as moral and spiritual communities. The conservative nationalists locate the legitimacy of the state in the national will rather than the freely given consent of its individual citizens as is done by liberals. However, realizing the authoritarian implications of such a position they accept the liberal theory of legitimacy "but ground it in and circumscribe it by the "higher" legitimacy derived from the true will of the nation" (*Ibid.*: 302). However, conservatives like Elie Kedourie came out with a severe indictment of nationalism as an irrational, narrow, hateful and destructive ideology. As an idea it is not germane to the non-European civilizations though non-European societies make claims about their own brand of nationalism. It is a deadly export of Europe to the rest of the world and it has partly undermined Europe's civilizing mission based on the ideas of reason and liberty. When European scholars take a positive view of Eastern nationalisms, Kedourie takes that admiration to be born of a sense of guilt which completely eclipses from their eyes. The most conducive political order that maintains a clear distinction between different species of men differing in their natural calibre. Nationalism is thus a negation of the essential fairness and the nobility of the true principles of empire (cf Introduction, 1970). Such contradictory attitude towards nationalism is not peculiar to conservativist ideology. It is found in liberalism also. For instance, Anthony D. Smith considers that the core doctrine of nationalism combines three ideals, "Collective self determination, the expression of national character and individuality and finally the vertical division of the world into unique nations each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity" (1971: 23). For Smith, nationalism didn't divide the world but made its appearance in a world that is already divided. In fact, it deserves to be regarded "as a not unreasonable application of Enlightenment Principles to the complexities of modern politics and societies ... it constitutes a necessary condition for the search for realistic conditions of liberty and equality, not to mention democracy, in an already divided world" (*Ibid.*: 15). However, not all liberals take such a benign view of nationalism. For instance, John Dunn considers the emergence of nationalism as the twentieth century's starkest political shame. According to him, "the degree to which its prevalence is still felt as a scandal is itself a mark of the unexpectedness of this predominance, of this sharpness of the check which it has administered to Europe's admiring Enlightenment vision of the Cunning of Reason. In nationalism at last, are so it at present seems, the Cunning of Reason has more than met its

match" (1979: 55). Perhaps, the relation between Nationalism and Enlightenment is much more complex than is understood by Dunn. As Partha Chatterjee points out, "If Nationalism expresses itself in a frenzy of irrational passion, it does so because it seeks to represent itself in the image of the Enlightenment and fails to do so. For Enlightenment itself, to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other; if it could ever actualize itself in the real world as the truly universal, it would in fact destroy itself. No matter how much the liberal-Nationalist may wonder, the Cunning of Reason has not met its match in nationalism" (1999: 17). However, unlike in the case of conservativism, liberalism has a third perspective on nationalism. For example, Gellner in his much discussed book does not consider nationalism to be worthy of either theoretical attack or a philosophical defense since it is not a genuine doctrinal innovation because the condition in which nationalism emerged hardly provided anything like innovative thinking of the kind nationalism pretends to embody. According to Gellner, great philosophers like Hume and Kant "explored, with unparalleled philosophical depth...the general logic of the new spirit" (1983: 20) of industrialism which deserved the philosophical attention. Nationalism came on the scene; the human kind was already committed to the industrial society. Such a commitment irreversibly tied us to the requirements of industrial society namely cultural homogeneity and political unity that brings it about and nurtures. "It is not the case ...that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism" (*Ibid.*: 39). Thus being only surface phenomenon nationalism does not deserve an independent perspective, positive ala Smith or negative ala Dunn.

The radical tradition also displays the same ambivalent attitude towards nationalism. Some radicals went to the extent of saying that Socialism was nationalism painted red. Lenin in particular who considered imperialism to be the highest stage of capitalism looked upon anti-colonial movements as inherently progressive and nationalism to be a liberating ideology. However, many Marxists consider nationalism to be an ideological trap serving the interests' of the bourgeoisie whose interests can only be undermined by an international working class movement. The theoretical point behind the slogan 'workers of all countries unite' is that capitalism being a global phenomenon can be destroyed or at least contained by

a struggle only at international level. However, some Marxists take a neutral view by focusing on it instrumental aspect. For example, speaking of nationalism, Horace Davis says, it "is not only a thing even an abstract thin, but a process, an implement... One does not take a position for or against a hammer, or a can opener, or any other implement. When used for murder, the hammer is no doubt a weapon; when used for building a house, it is a constructive tool. Nationalism considered as the vindication of a particular culture is morally neutral; considered as a movement against national oppression, it has a positive moral content; considered as the vehicle of aggression, it is morally indefensible" (1978: 31). Of course, Davis' view "may be a particularly unsubtle example of Marxist thinking on the subject of nationalism" (Chatterjee 1999: 19). A more sophisticated version has been given by Benedict Anderson in his classic *Imagined Communities*. According to him, contrary to Gellner, the nation is not a product of a deterministic scheme but an 'imagined political community', not an emergent phenomenon out of certain objective social factors but is 'thought out', 'created', though not a pure fabrication as Gellner thinks. To the extent nationalism is an ideology of an imagined community; it can only be described as explained and not praised or condemned.

The above discussion sought to show how nationalism spans over distinct ideological terrain and more importantly how it flows in different directions within the terrain of the same ideology.

**Nationalism as a Theme of Philosophical Inquiry**

We have drawn attention to two factors in order to exhibit and account for the complex texture of nationalism as a concept namely, different varieties of nationalism and two, the ideological fluidity of nationalism. This is necessary to explain the belated recognition of nationalism as an object of intellectual engagement. As pointed out earlier, the intellectual engagement with nationalism virtually started only in the second half of the twentieth century. The intellectual engagement with nationalism are of two types: the empirical engagement is undertaken by historians, economists, sociologists, political scientists and the scholars working in the emerging area of cultural studies. The task here is to provide rich

description and insightful explanation of nationalism in its various forms and manifestations as well as, to the extent possible make predictions regarding the changes it might undergo. The empirical studies have sought to identify the economic, sociological, political or psychological circumstances by which nationalism is to be explained. On this approach, the development and reception of nationalism is not to be sought in the attractions of nationalist ideas, but rather in the material conditions from which nationalism was more or less an inevitable outcome. The second kind of intellectual engagement with nationalism may be called non-empirical or to be more precise philosophical. The philosophical engagement with nationalism is a recent development. To many philosophers, nationalism was but an incoherent expression of group egoism, a non rational sentiment unworthy of philosophical scrutiny unlike Democracy, Secularism and even Socialism. However, in recent years there is a radical change in the attitude of philosophers regarding nationalism. The philosophical engagement which is more recent than the empirical one has three aspects: ontological, epistemological and ethical. Thus one can identify at least three problems regarding nationalism viewed from the philosophical perspective.

1. What is the ontological status of nation i.e. is it real or a construction? If not real, why not and if real why and in what sense?
2. What is the epistemological status of nation i.e. can it be said to be an object of knowledge? If it is, how is it known and what is the character of such knowledge?
3. Does nation have an ethical basis? If it has, what is its nature?

We briefly discuss the first two questions and deal with the third question in detail subsequently.

The ontological question arises because same philosophers considers nation 'to be given', a reality deserving a protracted philosophical reflection. According to them, it is not a just an anthropological fact like kinship since nations through the ideology of nationalism permeate the significant aspects of our thought and action. But since they are not objects like physical entities and mental states, their precise ontological status needs to be delineated. More importantly such philosophers seek to establish that actions have an

ontological status in view of the claim of the rivals who question the ontological status of nations which they consider to be mere constructions. For instance, Gellner maintains that nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist. This means according to Gellner nations are mere inventions or fabrications. At best it is only a surface phenomenon of a homogenous culture necessitated by the modern industrial society whose functional requirements are served by such a culture. A more nuanced version of such a view is provided by Anderson who unlike Gellner thinks of nation as a genuine creation. The political community of nation supplanted the cultural systems of religious community with their dynastic polity. In the process there occurred "a fundamental change ... in modes of apprehending the world, which, more than anything else made it possible to 'think' the nation" (Anderson 1991: 28) Anderson's convincing arguments showing that a coalition of Protestantism and Print Capitalism as the roots of communities' imagination of themselves as nations is, philosophically speaking less important than his claim that nations are products of imaginations. It is this claim which deprives nations any ontological status. As Partha Chatterjee points out when we look closely we see no substantive differences between Anderson and Gellner since "Both point out a fundamental change in ways of perceiving the social world which occurs before nationalism can emerge.... Both describe the new cultural homogeneity which is sought to be imposed on the emerging nations" (1999: 21). In other words, in different ways they treat nations as constructions. In fact, both of them go a step forward. Constructions might achieve some amount of ontological status if they are associated with some intellectual process which may be driven by some ontological considerations. Hence neither of them recognizes any such intellectual process. The straight forward sociological determinism of Gellner comes in the way of such recognition. But, Anderson fares no better. According to him the phenomena of nation and nationalism "is all a matter of a vanguard intelligentsia coming to state power by 'mobilizing' popular nationalism and using the 'Machiavellian' instruments of official nationalism. Like religion and kinship, nationalism is an anthropological fact, and there is nothing else to it" (Chatterjee 1999: 22).

Be it as it may, as all ontological controversies are domain specific the ontological controversy alluded above concerns the political domain. It is an issue regarding whether

nations can be accorded an ontological status in order to make sense of our political discourse and political endeavour.

The ontological controversy has naturally a bearing on the epistemological question whether nations are worthy objects of knowledge or merely amenable to beliefs. Those who maintain that nations can be objects of cognitive claims and hence nationalism to be a cognitive system must accept the ontological status of nations as axiomatic or at least justifiable derivation. However, their opponents cannot merely sit back after claiming that nations, being merely shadows can only be objects of doxa and not episteme. Since they maintain that nations and nationalism are products of the imposition of a new culture they have to explain how the new belief system which has nation as its focal point could supercede the old belief system without such a focal point. The transition is more palpable and traumatic when such a new system of beliefs is an alien imposition as in the case of colonized societies. As Partha Chatarjee recognizes there is, "a problem of incommensurability and inter-cultural relativism which the new national culture must overcome" (1999: 6). Gellner even while recognizing such a problem does not consider it to be a serious one. According to him, universal acceptance of the demands of Industrialism itself enables pre-modern societies to overcome incommensurability and relativism. In his view, "The question concerning just *how* we manage to transcend relativism is interesting and difficult, and certainly will not be solved here. What is relevant, however, is that we somehow or other do manage to overcome it, that we are not hopelessly imprisoned within a set of cultural cocoons and their norms, and that for some very obvious reasons (shared cognitive and productive bases and greatly increased inter-social communication) we may except fully industrial man to be even less enslaved to his local culture that was his agrarian predecessor" (1983: 120). In this way Gellner seeks to ensure that nationalist thought "does not pose any special problems for ...epistemology" (Chatterjee 1999: 6). Gellner's attempt to overcome relativism is somewhat knee-jerk. It is to his credit he recognizes that the cognitivist with his realist stance towards nation does not face the problem of incommensurability where as his own view does. But he could have denied that the incommensurability implies relativism. In his last writing Thomas Kuhn who was the first to propound and ably defend the incommensurability thesis in philosophy of science, makes a

penetrating observation that nullifies any charge of relativism. He says, "There are things that can be said in one language that cannot be articulated in another. Recognition of that point has increasingly enabled me to temper those aspects of my original work which have seemed to justify charges of relativism. It is not the case that a proposition true in one language (or within one paradigm) can be false in one language cannot even be formulated in another. It is not truth value but effability that varies with language" (Kuhn 1999: 35).

Deploying this argument of Kuhn one can circumvent the problem of relativism by saying that incommensurability does not imply relativism. This is epistemologically a better move than recognising relativism as a consequence of incommensurability and then try to explain it away in sociological terms. This is not to say that the epistemological move is free from problems. However, the move keeps alive by its very problematic character the epistemological aspect of the problem of nationalism.

**The Moral credibility of Nationalism**

We shall now come to the core of the philosophy of nationalism which concerns the moral dimensions of nationalism and which pertains to the question whether nationalism has any moral basis. For quite sometime, the ethical engagement with nationalism was carried out within a framework which was not rich enough as to make the discussion charged. So long as ethics in its modern phase was dominated individualism its central concerns was with the question "what is morally right for an individual?" (What is normatively permissible rather than what is good that is what are the most desirable ways to live a wholesome human life?) Rationally enlightened self interest was supposed to provide a sufficient moral fulcrum for any collective including the nation. After all, an individualist is convinced that any group identity is detrimental to an adequate ethical order, national identity being no exception. Hence, for fairly long time the moral dimensions of nationalism did not even pose a problem. Perhaps the realization of the inadequacy of the individualist ethics and the realization of the need to look at the prospects of nationalism as morally credible form of life or interrelated.

Subsequently, nationalism was thought to be a specific manifestation of a general framework namely the modern western conception of knowledge. The latter was considered to be a "universal framework of thought...which proclaims its own universality; its validity, it pronounces is independent of cultures. Nationalist thought, in agreeing to become 'modern' accepts the clam to universality of this modern framework" (Chatterjee 1999: 11). It is this framework which goes in the name of Enlightenment. Hence, it is not surprising that it was thought that the moral character of nationalism was taken to be self-evident. However, this perspective faced the problem of explaining the fact that in many cases nationalism took forms that were anti-enlightenment in the sense they debunked the modern notions of rationality, progress, universality etc. In short, nationalism which was supposed to have its moral locus in modernity and hence not being in need of a moral justification took an anti-modern form at different places at different times. This phenomenon which is called 'ethnic' or 'eastern' forms of nationalism in contrast to the 'civic' or 'western' versions of it. The anti-modern forms of nationalism are most palpably expressed in the craving of nationalists for a return to the pre-modern ethos. The nationalist struggle has been quite often backed by romantic versions of the past. For instance, "In India [the] romantic yearning for a return to an idealized ethnic and religious past which was being eroded by Westernisation and Capitalism was to be found in late nineteenth-century intellectuals like Tilak and Aurobindo and in movements like the Arya Samaj" (Hutchinson 1994: 8). In a certain sense, Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* is also an example of such a trend though this work is a philosophically pregnant critique of modern western civilization. But, such a deviation of the essentially modern phenomenon called nationalism was not given a philosophical explanation since such a deviation was not considered to be germane to nationalism rather the deviation was given a sociological explanation. The deviation of nationalism from its 'normal' path charted by Enlightenment was attributed to the factors typical of traditional societies with their inherent tendency to resist change. The conditions in the non-western world that are unfavourable to Enlightenment's vision of rational and progressive society were taken to be the domain of explanans, i.e., the basis of explanation for the deviation of nationalism which was in itself beyond moral reproach. Thanks to its locus in Enlightenment. This reminds us of the attempt of rationalist philosophers of science to neutralise the attack of the social constructivists on the rationalist image of science. The

social constructivist or the sociologists of science like David Bloor and Barry Barnes (1996) claimed that the actual practice of science does not fit the rationalist philosophers' description of science in methodological terms since science more often than not deviates from the cannons of scientific method and hence science must be explained in sociological terms. Against them, the rationalist philosophers of science like Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan maintain that only the deviant cases in science in the history of science be explained in sociological terms while science in its 'normal' form must be explained in methodological terms.

The explanation of deviant nationalism in sociological terms that is in terms of social conditions can be absolutely unacceptable to the thinkers of nationalist thought and movements which are at variance with nationalism as construed by the philosophers committed to the ideology of enlightenment. Such thinkers of alternative nationalism might claim cognitive superiority of their brand of nationalism by taking resort to intellectual systems that are indifferent to or even antagonistic to the philosophy of enlightenment. To dub such alternative intellectual systems to be irrational and unenlightened and anti-progressive is to simply beg the question.

Further, the view that nationalism is a pure product of Enlightenment and hence inherently ethical and its deviant forms are due to the extraneous factors such as social conditions in backward countries has naïve understanding of the relation between Enlightenment and the so called deviant nationalism. As we have already seen, Partha Chatterjee captures succinctly the complex relation between two when he portrays the so called irrational nationalism as the Enlightenment's 'Other' without which the Enlightenment fails to assert itself as the universal ideal (cf Chatterjee 1999: 17).

Be it as it may. It was realized that nationalism cannot be defended by simply tracing it to the Enlightenment philosophy and claim its moral self-evidence. Hence attempts were made to delineate the reasons on the basis of which the moral claim of nationalism was sought to be established and in doing so to enquire into the moral dimension of nationalism.

One of the main charges levelled against Gellner by Partha Chatterjee is that Gellner treats nationalism as a part of sociological determinism necessitated by industrialism in the West. Chatterjee points out that Gellner did not put nationalism for a moral scrutiny. While Chatterjee does evoke the notion of morality, instead of pursuing this point about morality, he goes on to problematise nationalism in the context of Indian nationalism. This preoccupation of Chatterjee, it must be noted, has deflected from raising the question about morality of nationalism. That is, Chatterjee's point about lack of moral scrutiny of nationalism rests largely on application of nationalism outside the West. In addition to problematising the moral basis of nationalism in the transplanted context, it is also necessary to take back the discussion of moral basis of nationalism to the West where it has its origins. One of the recent writings that can provide an entry point into the moral dimension of the problem of nationalism is that of David Archard who in his "The Ethical Status of Nationality" seeks to evaluate the moral grounds of nationalism, though Archard's focus is the moral claim of 'Unions' and 'Nationalists' on the Irish issue. Archard relates the ethical arguments in favour of nationalism to Gellner's claim that the essence of nationalism is a political principle namely the political and national unit should be congruent. This makes it clear that Archard considers political nationalism as the proper form of nationalism rather than cultural nationalism though as we shall see shortly the question of culture does figure in the moral defense of political nationalism provided by many philosophers whose view Archard does not accept. According to Archard, the ethical defense of nationalism, i.e. of the political principle mentioned above has proceeded in the past on two lines of reasoning which Archard calls Reductionist and Non-Reductionist. The Reductionist line of reasoning argues that the political and the national unit should be congruent in order that some non-nationalist good may be realized and/or some non-nationalist bad can be avoided. The non-reductionist line of reasoning argues that there just is some value inherent within the political-national congruence and this value cannot be reduced to non-nationalist goals. The non-nationalist goods are those "whose relationship to the success of nationalist project is contingent. They may be secured by the success of nationalism but they need not be. Nationalist goods, on the other hand, are those which are constitutive of or internal to the nationalist project; they can be secured only by the success of nationalism. Put another way, non-reductionist nationalism urges the value in and of itself of the congruence of the

political and the national. Reductionist nationalism urges the value of that which can, only or most effectively, be secured by such a congruence" (Archard 1999: 151). Thus, Archard's perspective makes a distinction, ethically speaking, between the reductionist nationalism and non-reductionist nationalism.

The main categories of non-nationalist goods recognized by reductionist nationalism are cultural, economic, social and political. The cultural goods concern preservation and celebration of cultural artefacts such as art, music, and literature and so on associated with a particular community as a hallmark of its identity. But a nationalist claim based on such cultural grounds is not strong enough for two reasons: the cultural needs can be met within the community without having a national autonomy; that is national autonomy and cultural identity are not logically related. Secondly, it is a fact that many diasporic communities retain cultural identity without constituting a nation i.e. cutting across national boundaries. Moreover, establishing the moral credibility of nationalism on the basis of cultural autonomy becomes even more problematic if one calls into question the moral basis of cultural autonomy itself. After all morally benign nature of cultural autonomy is not all that self-evident. In fact the talk of a global culture is not pointless either epistemologically or ethically. Epistemologically it may get linked to relativism. Ethically it may encourage insularity rendering self-criticism highly limited and even impossible. Since substantial criticism of one's own culture more often than not takes a vantage point that lies outside their culture's framework.

Economic goods pertain to income, property and other assets, that is to say, nationalists might claim that their achieving nationhood results in the cessation of economic drain and thereby, promotes economic advance of the community. They may even add that the achievement of nationhood will lead to fairer distribution of wealth since the so called outsiders promote elite who function as their hand-made. However this recourse to the economic goods does not sufficiently justify the nationalist's claim for autonomy. It is true that many times nationalist claims take economic form. In India theoreticians of the freedom struggle starting from Dada Bhai Nauroji kept providing economic reasons as the major plank of their movement. But many of them for quite some time did believe, on adequate

grounds, that India could be given a relative autonomy within the British Empire which on the whole was benign. It is of course true that their hopes were shattered by the imperialist power. However, there was nothing logically necessary about that frustration. That is to say economic autonomy and national autonomy are not logically related though the relation is not merely tenuous. If the relation were logical the view of the early nationalists that India's economic autonomy within the British Empire was possible would have been an outright absurdity. In the case of national secession the economic argument would be even less convincing because it is more possible that economic needs of people can be met within a national framework if the relation between a community demanding secession is not colonized by those from whom secession is sought. Further, it is factually wrong to say that in all cases of success of nationalist elitism has been dismantled. In none of the Third World countries which have achieved nationhood and in none of those which has achieved nationhood through struggle for secession elitism has not reduced and in some cases it has increased and inequalities have been deepened leading to shattered hopes. Partha Chatterjee has provided poignant examples of this point through his interviews with the participants of the freedom struggle (cf Chatterjee 1998: 1-5). But from this it does not follow that the freedom struggle was futile and achievement of nationhood a meaningless exercise. In short, the relation between nationalism and the economic reasons provided for it are not so organically related as to morally justify the former in terms of the latter.

The social goods concern valued attributes such as esteem, respect and status. However, since these can be achieved by equal access to political rights cultural goods and equal economic opportunities, it may be argued that they do not constitute an independent category. Hence the reductionists who invoke the category of social goods include practices, activities and associations such as religion. Though religion can also come under the category of cultural goods, this means that the demand for nationhood can be morally justified because it promotes the religion of a people seeking nationhood. But this view can be questioned by pointing out that there can be "a rich enough understanding of religious liberty to ensure that one's faith is not only one that can be practiced, but one that is esteemed. Tolerance extends beyond mere sufferance to recognition. Then, once again, the nationalist principle receives no support from the existence of social goods" (Archard 1999:

153). To this, it may be replied that a people seeking nationhood or national autonomy might want something more than mere tolerance and even complete religious freedom. They may want their own religion to be the official religion of the state. But this is highly objectionable since, "doing so runs foul of familiar liberal criticisms of governments whose laws and policies violate a principle of neutrality on religious and moral matters. Moreover the argument is not as such a nationalist one but rather represents the very particular (and objectionably illiberal) form a nationalist argument might take" (*Ibid.*: 153-4). Thus, the attempt to establish the oral credibility of nationalism by invoking the category of social good with religion as the focal point is weak.

The category of political goods mainly concerns self-determination. Since its inception the nationalist principle is linked to the democratic principle. It is a widely shared belief that the democratic self-government of a people was inseparably tied to the national sovereignty of a people. However, the appeal of this belief has drastically reduced in view of two factors. That is, it is plausible now to delink the democratic principle from the nationalist principle. In fact, "this needs to be done not least because of the ambiguous scope of any principle of self-determination" (*Ibid.*: 154). This is due to the fact that the 'self' which does the determining and that which the self determines are themselves indeterminate. Moreover the demand to be recognized as a distinct entity to justify the claim for nationhood already presupposes as Adams points out "[T]o prescribe self-determination for a national minority as a distinct entity from the rest of the nation is a mutation of the principle of self-determination" (*Ibid.*). There is a further problem about self-determination. To the question, "Self-determination for what?" there can be two answers. If the answer is that self-determination is for economic equality or cultural prosperity or social status, then it means that self-determination can be subsumed under any one or two or all of the three phenomena in which case self-determination becomes vulnerable to the criticisms which we have made against the attempt to justify nationalism based on the three categories of non-nationalist goods. The other answer to the question, self-determination for what, is that, it is in itself valuable and its inherent value lies in the fact that nationality "is a more evident principle of jurisdictional division than any other" (*Ibid.*). But, such an answer falls under the non-reductionist line of reasoning that seeks to establish the moral credibility of nationalism.

Let us see how non-reductionist line of reasoning that seeks to make a room for an ethical dimension for nationalism fares. As we have seen the non-reductionist line of reasoning claims an intrinsic value for nationalism, that is, for the principle of the congruence of the political and national. The philosophers who adopt this line of reasoning invoke the concepts of rectification of historical injustice, importance of being with one's own people and naturalness of the nation-state.

The argument from historical injustice has been invoked by nationalists both in anti-colonial struggles as well as secessionist endeavours. Even if we acknowledge historical injustice and the need for rectification, the argument does not take us far in establishing the moral claim of nationalism. As Archard points out, "The rectification of a wrong does not have to amount to a literal restoration of the situation which would exist had the wrong not been committed. Rectification does not require a reversal or overturning of the originally unjust act" (*Ibid.*: 159). This may be due to the fact that the original victims of the injustice may not still be alive to enjoy that rectification. Also, destruction of certain goods cannot be rectified by their restoration to the owner even if he is alive and that is why we speak of appropriate compensation, that is to say rectification of historical injustice can be effected by securing for the victims various rights and resources and not necessarily granting nationhood. Secondly, as Archard points out, "The principle of rectifying a historical wrong should operate only in conjunction with only relevant principles" (*Ibid.*). In other words, it is not acceptable that historical injustices ought to be rectified irrespective of the moral costs of such rectification. "[A] past injustice ought to be rectified only if there are no other stronger countervailing moral reasons not to do so" (*Ibid.*: 160). This means that rectification of historical injustice cannot on its own constitute the moral basis of nationalism.

The next two arguments which concern 'importance of being with one's own people' (which is taken resort to by secessionist nationalism) and 'naturalness of the nation-state' (which is restored to by anti-colonial nationalism) are important because the idea of self-determination as an intrinsic value, which we mentioned earlier, has its locus in these

arguments. Self-determination in this sense is taken to be equivalent to, not just, instrument for realizing the importance of being with one's own people and/or attaining a natural state that the nation-state embodies.

The argument from the 'importance of being one's own' as it is called by Archard is characterized by Judith Licthenberg as 'flourishing argument' (1997: 160). According to this argument human beings flourish, when they belong to communities and this flourishing achieves its fullness if and only if the communities to which they belong achieve nation-state. As Archard points out, "there is some Aristotelian warrant for the final move in his view that the polity (polis) is the supreme and fundamental form of community or association (koinonia) to which humans can belong" (*Ibid.*: 161). In other words, the nation-state is valuable because it fortifies and promotes a sense of communal belonging which is necessary for collective flourishing. It must however be noted that 'the importance of being with one's own people' is not taken in an instrumentalist sense. For example, according to Mill such a fortification of communal belonging is necessary for free institutions. On a similar line David Miller argues that a shared sense of membership which would be strengthened by the nation-state is necessary for legitimising a fair distribution of goods and services. Thus, free institutions for Mill, fair distribution for Miller are the ends to be served by the sense of collective membership which in turn is fortified by the nation-state. However, those who put forth the argument from the 'important of being one's own people' consider collective membership to be intrinsically valuable and the nation-state which fortifies it is inherently moral. The question is whether the nation-state is related to collective life as organically as the argument construes. It is a historical fact that the achievement of a nation-state by a community many times results in creating fissures and thus break the community. That is to say, the achievement of nationhood quite often results in the weakening or even undermining of the unitary character of a community. Further, the argument presupposes the prior existence of a community with a unity which is subsequently fortified by the emergence of a nation-state, that is, 'that nations exist prior to their achieving statehood' borne out of a nationalist struggle. That is, nations exist before nationalism. Such an assumption is countered by philosophers like Gellner according to whom nationalism "invents notions where they do not exist" (1964: 18). In fact, the

assumption is ill-at-ease with a less radical claim of Anderson that the nations are "imagined communities" whose members feel bound by certain shared ties and not by face to face contact (1991: 14-16). If the nation is the most remarkable instance of a community which can sustain its identity across time and across great members of physically separated individuals without noticeable attenuation of that identity...It seems correspondingly implausible to think that the nation is dependent upon the state for its continued existence (Archard 1999: 162). Further, even in Europe nation-states came into existence even before there was much sense of nationhood. At best, a pre-existing national consciousness was only among many reasons for the rise of nation-states in Europe. As Glover points out, "In Africa... Many state boundaries were lines drawn on maps by colonial governments and administrators, often cutting through the middle of territories inhabited by Africans who felt part of a single community" (1997: 12-13). In fact, calling those collective entities 'nations' is itself questionable though the very talk of nations existing prior to the nation-states which only come subsequently in order to fortify the former is quite misleading. This is because nations without nation-states is like Hamlet without the prince of Denmark. This is not to deny the existence of what are called 'multi-national states' or stateless nations. It is only to assert that in the primary sense of 'nation', nations and nation-states are two sides of the same coin. It is this sense which must wear the trouser. Deviation from this sense which enables us to talk of a nation existing before it achieves nation-state may not be incoherent but such a deviant use cannot take the burden of proof but the argument from the 'importance of being with one's own people' cannot have even initial plausibility unless it characterizes as 'nation' the collectivity which exists prior to the nation-state. This is not to identify the nation with nation-state. The relation between the nation and the nation-state, even in the primary sense of nation is one of identity-and-difference. By construing the relation between nation and nation-state in terms of temporal priority of the former, the argument is guilty of construing the relation in terms of difference exclusively. The relation in terms of fortification of the former by latter in no way brings in the relation of identity.

The third argument advanced by those who adopt the non-reductionist line in defending the moral claim of nationalism is woven around the idea of the 'naturalness of the nation-state'. According to this argument, nationality supplies a handy and ready to be used

partition of humanity into bodies of citizens. In other words, the principle of division on the basis of nationality is the most natural principle. This is because political societies of today cannot be either village communities or Greek states, nor is it reasonable to attempt to realize a global polity. First of all, it is difficult to understand what the term, 'natural' implies. In fact, the critics of nationalism question the very naturalness of nations when they suspect the moral claim of the nationalists. Hence the argument becomes otiose. In order to avoid the emptiness of their argument, its proponents must give some content to the term natural such as natural boundaries or racial distinctness, etc. Such a 'natural' construal reduces nations to tribes. In fact, Europeans drew national boundaries on the basis of tribal divisions which they thought to be the most natural one but as Basil Davidson (1992) suggests, the word tribe does not have any clear meaning and colonial rulers' intent on dividing Africans into tribes sometimes had to invent tribes. In other words, natural is more often than not a construction. Even if what is identified as natural one are factors like a common feeling or a principle of sympathy generated by a shared life. This in no way renders the nation-state itself as a natural phenomenon. Further, we rarely see nations recognizing the naturalness of other nations. Since no bounded territorial jurisdiction contains or has ever contained a naturally homogenous population, efforts to secure a natural homogeneity to achieve nationhood within a given territory led to morally intolerable consequences. Moreover, the proponents of this argument curiously endow nation with naturalness even though they know that nation is typically a modern phenomenon. It is significant to note that the defenders of capitalism characterizes capitalism as the most natural form of society, capitalist profit as the natural profit, acquisitive tendency so central to capitalist system to be the most natural human tendency. It is a familiar practice to consider something to be natural in order to establish its moral credibility. Those who do so unknowingly rationalize the ill effects of certain socio-economic formations. Considering capitalism to be natural buttressed its exploitative character. Considering nations to be natural amounts to forced movements and even ethnic cleansing. The proponents of two-nation theory in India considered the distinction between Hindus and Muslims to be natural, thereby implying that the two communities by their very nature are inherently different.

The above discussion has shown how inadequate are the two lines of reasoning both of which sought to establish the moral credibility of nationalism. This does not mean that nationalism lacks moral credibility like religious sectarianism or is morally neutral like tribalism. Isaiah Berlin seeks to establish the moral credibility of nationalism and the conditions which must be met by nationalism in order to claim such credibility. Berlin stresses antagonism between the philosophy of Enlightenment with its claim of a universal human nature and nationalism with its philosophical moorings in the counter-Enlightenment philosophy called Romanticism. Very interestingly, Berlin acknowledges that the Enlightenment philosophy had a better value system though it had a poor understanding of human psyche where as nationalism and romanticism had a better understanding of human psyche though their value system is not appealing. Moreover, in the history of ideas and particularly in the history of political ideas the right value system does not go with right psychology. In fact, the relation is inverse. The better the value system, the shallower the psychology and vice-versa. However, from this, it does not follow according to Berlin that nationalism lacks a moral credibility. It can achieve such credibility in spite of lacking a value system comparable to that of Enlightenment philosophy.

This is because Berlin, unlike the anti-nationalists does not think that nationalism is not based on hostility towards the other nor does he share the view of these pro-nationalists who adopt a positive view of nationalism on the basis that nationalism does justice to an inherent human need to make a distinction between 'we and they'. According to Berlin, nationalism is based on the incommensurability of values. For him, not all of the values that are important to us are reconcilable. That is, not all of those values which we value can be realized in one form of life. On the basis of this contention, Berlin makes a case for pluralism of values. Value-pluralism looks upon other forms of life as possessing internal values. Each of us ought to be aware, hence, that other forms of life embody values which are important to us and valorised by us but can not be realized in our own form of life or at least to the same degree. A nationalism that is founded upon such pluralism can claim moral credibility.

The irreconcilability of values is not merely a psychological fact, as the conflict between the values of an active life and a contemplative life but also a conceptual one as the conflict between the monastic life and family life. More importantly, pluralism of values does not mean relativism since relativism implies tolerance and not pluralism. According to Berlin values that are realizable by other forms of life are important not only to people who belong to that form of life but also to us who do not belong to that form of life. To choose a set of values is to choose a way of life. Mostly, we choose a way of life we are born into. National belonging is the outstanding example of this truth. The irreconcilability of values which Berlin characterizes as incommensurability of values implies the status of a value for pluralism which in ordinary terms may be called variety. Berlin maintained that the valorization of plurality and variety is a recent phenomenon. According to him, "the view that variety is desirable, where as uniformity is monotonous, dreary, dull, a fetter on the freely-ranging human spirit...stands in sharp contrast with the traditional view that truth is one, error many, a view scarcely challenged before-at the earliest-the end of the seventeenth century" (1980: 333). Thus, plurality of values is not a necessary evil to be somehow tolerated for the sake of a conflict free world but is something to be desired and nurtured. In fact, it is an existential necessity since more than one form of life must exist in order for values we consider worthwhile to be realized. Every form of life has its own constraints within which individuals in that form of life make their choices. Belonging to a national form of life means being within a frame that offers meaning or significance to the choices people make between alternatives and thus acquire an identity. A national form of life gives a set of choices in every area of life. Two national forms of life might have somewhat overlapping sets of choices yet they differ not only in the range of choices but also in the degree of freedom.

The question is how nationalism fulfils a deeply felt human need by providing us with a complete form of life. The obvious answer is that it is by providing a sense of 'belonging'; the question is what is this sense of 'belonging'? In the first sense in which Johann Gottfried Herder uses the term, belonging concerns what makes it possible for a person to express his or her selfhood. In this sense of belonging "people make use of different styles to express their humanity. The styles are generally determined by the form of

life to which they belong. There are people who express themselves " Frenchly", while others have forms of life that are expressed "Koreanly" or "Syrianly" or "Icelandicly" (Margalit 1997: 84) belonging in the second sense concerns not expression but the sense of feeling at home. 'To belong' in this sense means to be 'accepted by others as you are' (and not because of your achievements or failures in achieving) belonging to a family is the best example of this as opposed to belonging to a professional group. The third sense of national belonging lies between belonging in the second sense and achievement. Such a sort of belonging provides one with a reflected glory connected with achievements of gifted members of one's nation. According to Berlin, it appears the sense of belonging that is belonging in the sense of being at home is crucial for a national form of life. A nation-state fortifies the values germane to a national form of life and herein lies its moral credibility and in doing so it does not demean the values of other national forms of life because of its acceptance of value pluralism. The moral credibility of nationalism has its root in the success of nationalism in recognizing and fulfilling a deeply felt psychological need of human beings to feel at home by belonging to something beyond the drab mundane personal world.

Berlin is aware of the feelings of national superiority associated with nationalist feeling. To the charge that nationalism gives way to the feeling of superiority because of nationalism's particularistic character as opposed to universalistic character of ideologies like Marxism. According to Berlin, the feeling of superiority is neither historically given nor ontologically necessary. Berlin's point is that though the notion of essential superiority which each nations associates with it might lead to destructives political consequences and thus making nationalism morally questionable. The feeling of superiority has nothing to do with the particularism of nationalism. Non-particularistic ideologies, secular ones like Marxism and religious ones like Christianity claim superiority inspite of their universalism.

The above discussion sought to establish that nationalism as a concept and as a movement can find its place in the moral domain so that unlike non rational phenomenon like spontaneous feelings and the categorized like sentiments and kinship it deserves a moral evaluation and need not be driven into a morally neutral domain. In fact, as ably

substantiated by Berlin nationalism passes the litmus test of ethical evaluation and can claim moral credibility. But this only establishes the initial credibility of nationalism in ethical terms. For, there are aspects of nationalism which do not lend themselves so easily to an ethical ratification. Commitment to nationalism implies a partiality towards co-nationals. Secondly, nationalism with its communitarian ethics is pronouncedly ill- at –ease with individual autonomy which is central to individualist ethics in particular and liberalism in general our commitment to which, albeit a good deal of reservations and qualifications. Thirdly, nationalism while being an expression of self-determination of a people realised in the achievement of a nation-state seeks to maintain its sovereignty by discouraging and even suppressing as aspiration of self-determination by the minorities within the nation. The moral issues which emanate these aspects of nationalism will be taken up in chapters III, IV and V respectively. Before we do so, in chapter II we consider the views which seek to establish moral credibility of nationalism by tracing it to deeply felt psychological needs in human nature whose satisfaction or at least expression by nationalism lends it an ethical significance in a manner and to the extent not achieved any collective concept or movement around it.

We may end this chapter by pointing out that the moral credibility of nationalism depends upon our answer to two questions that constitute the core of moral philosophy namely, is our commitment to nationalism normatively permissible, and the question, whether the commitment to nationalism embodies the most desirable way to live a human life. The two questions are distinct because the first question concerns 'right' and the second question concerns 'good' using Rawlsian distinction. This is obvious from the fact that even while granting that nationalism is morally right, that is, it does not violate our standard/s of morality one might claim that it cannot be constitutive of a morally wholesome conception of life. The first question dominates much of contemporary western political philosophy and hence the philosophical discourse on nationalism. This is not surprising because ethics in modern times is almost exclusively concerned with the question of moral standard since modern ethics is organically linked to the philosophy of liberalism and philosophical liberals, with their commitment to individualism are "reluctant to extend the reach of political philosophy beyond questions of the first kind for fear of presuming to second-guess

how individuals choose to conceive their own ends of life" (Beiner 1999: 15). Though the second question has not been given equal prominence as the first one, its importance should not be underestimated. Ronald Beiner aptly calls it 'Existential Question' and rightly traces it to the Greek thought. To quote him, "Philosophical reflection on nationalism must therefore seek somehow to offer an answer to the problem of how to orient oneself among the diversity of life's possibilities" (1999: 16). Our discussion of Berlin's views has shown that *prima-facie* a positive answer to this question is a plausible one. The rest of the chapters seek to further inquire into this question and also the other question which concerns moral permissibility of nationalism. Neither a positive answer nor a negative answer to the Existential Question about nationalism is self-evident or trivial. The positive answer is not self-justificatory and obviously true because the ideal of 'citizen of the world' has never lost its appeal to a great many. The negative answer is also not readily acceptable because nationhood is an achievement unlike race which is given and more often than not the attempt at achieving it is fuelled by morally edifying aims. After all, nation in many third world countries was and has been a site of struggle for autonomy and solidarity vis-à-vis imperialism, old and new, and, hence, the force of the question and the significance of the answer.

# CHAPTER II

## MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM

### Sociologism vs. Psychologism

In the last chapter, we saw how Berlin seeks to establish the moral credibility of nationalism by invoking the concept of plurality of values. According to him, the existence of nations as independent entities – a task set forth by all nationalisms – is required for distinct value systems which being incompatible cannot be realized within a single social entity but many might feel that Berlin's attempt is less than adequate. That is, it may be felt that moral credibility of nationalism should go beyond the concept of plurality of values. It must concern the very needs of human psyche which must be met before it makes valuable preferences. Such thinkers who hope for such a deeper basis for the moral credibility of nation try to look for what they consider to be moral psychology of nationalism. They argue that nationalism is morally credible because the national sentiments and affiliations are organically related to certain unalterable features of human psyche such as the need for a sense of belonging or the need for identity/recognition. The question regarding the existence and nature of the moral psychology of nationalism is not, it must be admitted, itself a normative question. But it underlies the central normative question about nationalism namely whether nationalism deserves to be provided a moral credibility. This point needs some elaboration.

There are thinkers who consider nationalism to be falling outside the moral domain. According to them, it is neither morally justified nor morally questionable. It is neither a positive value nor a negative value since it is not a value at all as it is only a fact of contemporary social life. We may for the time being set aside the objectionability of the fact/value dichotomy implied by such a position. The theorists who adopt such a posture locate nationalism and confine it to the domain of sociological explanation and thereby refuse to admit any normative judgment concerning nationalism and hence deem nationalism to be unworthy of even moral condemnation. Since nationalism is a

sociologically determined need of the modern world it is pointless to either admire it or bemoan it. As against the proponents of sociologistic construal of nationalism the supporters of psychologistic construal of nationalism trace nationalism to, both chronologically and logically to something which is pre-modern or even pre-social.

The concepts of pre-modern and pre-social will be elaborated later. At present, it is sufficient to note that those who trace nationalism to something which is 'pre-social' and 'pre-modern' adopt a stance which is psychologistic in the sense; both concepts are invoked to account for nationalism in terms of certain mental phenomena as against the socio-economic phenomena on the basis of which their opponents explain nationalism. In other words, nationalism according to the champions of the psychologism is morally justified because it fulfills deeply felt psychological needs whose roots pre-date the emergence of modernity. From this it does not follow that the supporters of psychologistic explanation of nationalism support nationalism of every type nor do they consider nationalism to be a permanent feature of human ethos since they acknowledge that those psychological needs may in future be served by other ideas. In other words, they do not object to anticipating a post-nationalist phase of human civilization. All that they claim is that nationalism at least in some of its forms fulfills the basic needs of human psyche and hence it has a moral credibility though such credibility remains genuine within certain conditions and our task is to identify those conditions under which the credibility is established and those conditions it is undermined.

**Sociologism and the Moral Neutrality of Nationalism**

We shall first discuss the sociologistic explanation of nationalism best articulated in the works of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Their works are all the more important not only for the able articulation of the sociologicist position but also because they constitute the point of departure for the philosophers who maintain the anti-sociologistic or psychologistic view of nationalism such as Jonathan Glover and Charles Taylor.

Gellner defines nationalism as "a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1983: 1). It is basically a new feature of modern life since states in earlier times were not structured on nationalist lines. It is also a fundamental characteristic of the modern world since in most of human history political units were not organized along nationalist principles. The boundaries of city-states, feudal units or dynastic empires seldom coincided with those of nations. In the pre-modern era, the nationality of the rulers was not significant for the ruled. What counted was "whether the rulers were more just and merciful than their predecessors" (1964: 153). Nationalism became a social need only in the modern world. And the task of a "theory of nationalism is to explain how and why did this happen" (1983: 6).

Gellner tries to reason for the non-existence of nations and nationalisms in pre-modern ages by referring to the association between power and culture. He does not dwell too much on the first, hunter-gatherer phase as there are no states at this stage, hence no room for nationalism which aims to endow the national culture with a political roof. The agro-literate societies, on the other hand, are differentiated by a complex system of fairly stable statuses, "the possession of a status, and access to its rights and privileges, is by far the most important consideration for a member of such a society. A man is his rank" (1996a: 100-1). In such a society, power and culture, two possible partners designed for each other according to nationalist theory, do not have much propensity to come together. The "ruling class, consisting of warriors, priests, clerics, administrators, uses culture to differentiate itself from the large majority of direct agricultural producers who are confined to small local communities where culture is almost invisible" (1983: 9-10). Communication in these self-enclosed units is 'contextual', in contrast to the 'context-free' communication of the literate strata. Thus, this kind of society is marked by "a discrepancy, and sometimes conflict, between a high and a low culture" (1996a: 102). There is no inducement for rulers to inflict cultural homogeneity on their subjects, on the contrary, they benefit from diversity. The only class that might have an interest in commanding certain "shared cultural norms is the clergy, but they do not have the necessary means for incorporating the masses in a high culture" (1983: 11). However, the overall conclusion of Gellner is quite easy since there is no cultural homogenization in agro-literate societies, there can be no nations.

Gellner proposes a different relationship between power and culture in industrial societies. Now, "a high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity" (1983: 18). Shared culture is not necessary to the protection of social order in agro-literate societies since status that is an individual's place in the scheme of social roles, is ascriptive. In such societies, culture simply underscores structure and strengthens existing loyalties. On the contrary, culture plays a more dynamic role in industrial societies which are distinguished by high levels of social mobility - and in which roles are no longer ascribed. The nature of work is quite dissimilar from that of agro-literate societies, "Physical work in any pure form has all but disappeared. What is still called manual labour does not involve swinging a pick-axe or heaving soil with a spade . . . it generally involves controlling, managing and maintaining a machine with a fairly sophisticated control mechanism" (1996: 106).

This has weighty repercussions for culture in that the system can no longer tolerate the dependence of meaning on 'local dialectical idiosyncrasy', hence the need for impersonal, context-free communication and a high level of cultural homogeny. For the first time in history, culture becomes important in its own right, it "does not so much underline structure rather it replaces it" (Gellner 1964: 155).

There is, however, another issue making for the standardization of culture. Industrial society is based on the idea of 'perpetual growth' and this can only be sustained by a continuous transformation of the occupational structure, "this society- simply cannot constitute a stable system of ascribed roles, as it did in the agrarian age...Moreover, the high level of technical skill required for at least a significant proportion of posts...means these posts have to be filled 'meritocratically'" (Gellner 1996a· 108). The immediate upshot of this is 'a certain kind of egalitarianism'. The society is egalitarian because it is mobile and in a way, it has to be mobile. The inequalities that continue to exist tend to be camouflaged rather than flouted.

On the other hand, the industrial society is also an extremely specialized society. Though, the distance between its various specializations is far less great. This clarifies why we have 'generic training' before any specialized training on and for the job. It provides a very "prolonged and fairly thorough training for all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills... The assumption is that anyone who has completed the generic training common to the entire population can be re-trained for most other jobs without too much difficulty" (1983: 7-8).

This scheme of education is poles apart from the one-to-one or on-the-job principle found in pre-modern societies, "men are no longer formed at their mother's knee, but rather in the *'ecole maternelle'*" (1996a: 109). A very important stratum in agro-literate societies was that of the clerks who can transmit literacy. In industrial society where exo-education becomes the norm, every man is a clerk, they are and must be "mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must possess the generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation" (1983: 35). It follows that the "employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals . . . now hinges on their education. . . A man's education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture" (*Ibid.*: 36).

Apparently, this educational infrastructure is large and extremely expensive. The only agency competent to sustain and supervise such a vast system is the central state. Given the contest of various states for overlapping catchment areas, the only way a given culture can protect itself against another one, which already has its particular protector-state, is to obtain one of its own, if it does not already possess one. Gellner says, "Just as every girl should have a husband, preferably her own, so every culture must have its state, preferably its own" (1996a: 110). This is what brings state and culture together, "The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about" (1983: 38).

Hence, nationalism is a product of industrial social organization. This explains both its weakness and its strength. It is weak in the sense that the number of potential nations go beyond the number of those that actually make the claim. Most cultures enter the age of nationalism without even the "feeblest effort" to benefit from it themselves (*Ibid.*: 47). They prefer to remain as 'wild' cultures, producing and reproducing themselves spontaneously, without conscious design, supervision or special nutrition. By contrast, the cultures that characterize the modern era are 'cultivated' or 'garden' cultures which are usually sustained by literacy and specialized personnel and would perish if deprived of their distinctive nourishment (*Ibid.*: 50).

On the other hand, nationalism is strong because "it determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world" (Gellner 1983: 49). The modern world can be represented as a kind of 'giant aquarium' or 'breathing chamber' designed to preserve superficial cultural differences. The atmosphere and water in these chambers are specifically tailored to the needs of a new species, the industrial man, which cannot survive in the nature-given atmosphere. But the maintenance of this life-preserving air or liquid is not automatic, "it requires a special plant. The name for this plant is a national educational and communications system" (*Ibid.*: 51-2).

That is what underlies Gellner's contention that 'nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism'. Nations can emerge "when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities. Hence, it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round" (*Ibid.*: 55).

Ernest Gellner has an attractive theory of this kind. His theory is, in a sense, a functional account of nationalism. In earlier "agro-literate" societies, the high culture was confined to a class, the literati and perhaps other top strata. The job of handing on this culture to people could be assumed by families in some cases or by special institutions that might be at some distance from the state (for example, the Church in pre-modern Europe). But in the contemporary context, the scale of the educative activity and essential uniformity

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dictate is assumed by the state. Modern societies/economies are all served, unavoidably, by a state system of education. A standardized language and culture is fostered and diffused and hence also to some degree defined by the state. Modern societies necessarily have official languages, almost official cultures. This is a functional necessity. In other words, it is not that nationalism has imposed homogeneity which uniquely characterizes modern industrial society, but it is homogeneity which requires nationalism. In fact, it is the homogeneity which is an "inescapable imperative [that] eventually appears on the surface as nationalism" (*Ibid.*: 39).

There can be disparities in the detailed account, but it seems that it is an indisputable feature of modern market, growth-oriented industrial economies, entrenched as they are in bureaucratic polities, that they force a kind of homogeneity of language and culture, both by design, as through the education system, and by the very way they function, as through their media. It also seems that this couldn't very well be otherwise. The demands of this kind of society in qualified personnel-above all in re-trainable personnel, capable of taking on ever-new technologies and operating by ever-new methods-and the need for intercommunication across vast networks push inevitably to the diffusion of standardized, context-free languages, embedding within themselves a multiplicity of expert 'language games'. As a consequence of this, earlier "network" identities, linked to family, clan, locality, and provenance, tend to decline, and new "categorical" identities, which link us to a multitude of others nationally or even globally-on the basis of confession, profession, citizenship-take on more and more importance.

Compared to earlier societies, which have a tendency to be divided between a "high" culture, and appanage of a restricted class, and a set of partly overlapping "folk" cultures, this modern form tends to universalize a species of "high" culture, putting a larger and larger proportion of its population through tertiary education, inculcating into many of them a canon as "high" cultures have always tended to do to their initiates. As Gellner puts it, "a high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by that polity. That is the secret of nationalism" (1983: 18).

All points made above appear true, but how does it account for nationalism? This seems obvious enough to Gellner. If a modern society has an "official" language, in the fullest sense of the term - that is, a state-sponsored, inculcated, and defined language and culture, in which both economy and state function-then it is obviously an immense advantage to the people, if this language and culture are their own. Speakers of other languages are at a distinct disadvantage. They must either go on functioning in what to them is a second language or get on an equal footing with speakers of the official language by assimilating with them. Or else, faced with this second distasteful prospect, they demand to redraw the boundaries of the state and set up shop in a new polity/economy where their own language will become official. Thus, the nationalist imperative is born.

Before we proceed to consider Gellner's view which is the most impressive version of sociologism, we briefly look at Anderson's account of nationalism which in an important sense supplements that of Gellner. Anderson's point of departure is that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. In order to understand them properly, we need to find out how they have come into being, in what ways their meanings have altered over time and why they control such profound emotional authority. Anderson argues that nationalism surfaced towards the end of the eighteenth century as a result of the "spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces" and once created, they became models which could be used in a great variety of social terrains, by a correspondingly wide variety of ideologies (1991: 4). For him, a convincing explanation of nationalism should not limit itself to identifying the cultural and political factors which makes possible the growth of nations. The real test lies in showing why and how these particular cultural artefacts have stimulated such deep attachments. In other words, the crucial question is, "what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history generate such colossal sacrifices" (*Ibid.*: 7)? Before addressing this question, however, he considers the concept of 'nation' and tries to offer a workable definition.

For Anderson, the terminological uncertainty surrounding the concept of nation is partially caused by the trend to treat it as an ideological construct. Things would be easier if it is seen as belonging to the same family as 'kinship' or 'religion'; hence his definition of the

nation as 'an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'. It is imagined because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'. It is imagined as limited because each nation has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations. It is imagined as sovereign because it is born in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, when the legitimacy of divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm was rapidly waning, the nations were dreaming of being free, and if under God, then at least directly so. Finally, it is imagined as a community because, 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship'. According to Anderson, "it is ultimately this sense of fraternity which makes it possible for so many millions of people to willingly lay down their lives for their nation" (*Ibid.*: 6-7).

At this point, it is worth emphasizing that for Anderson, 'imagining' does not imply falsity. He makes this point quite powerfully when he accuses Gellner for assimilating 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation' with the intention of showing that nationalism masquerades under false pretences. Such a view implies that there are 'real' communities which can be advantageously compared to nations. In fact, however, "all communities larger than small villages of face-to-face contact are imagined. Communities, Anderson concludes, should not be distinguished by "their falsity/ genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (*Ibid.*: 6).

Anderson then looks at the conditions which give rise to such imagined communities. He begins with the cultural roots of nationalism, arguing that "nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which - as well as against which - it came into being" (*Ibid.*: 12). He mentions two such systems as relevant, the religious community and the dynasty empire. Both of these systems held sway over much of Europe until the sixteenth century. Their steady decline which began in the seventeenth century provided the historical and geographical space necessary for the rise of nations.

The decline of the 'great religiously imagined communities' was particularly important in this context. Anderson emphasizes two reasons for this decline. "The first was the effect of the explorations of the non-European world which widened the general cultural and geographical horizon, and showed the Europeans that alternative forms of human life were also possible. The second reason was the gradual decay of the sacred language itself. Latin was the dominant language of a pan-European high intelligentsia; in fact, it was the only language taught in medieval Western Europe. But by the sixteenth century all this was changing fast. More and more books were coming out in the vernacular languages and publishing was ceasing to be an international enterprise" (1991: 12-19).

What was the importance of all these developments for the emergence of the idea of nation? The answer lies, Anderson argues, in the crucial role played by traditional religions in human life. First and foremost, they soothed the sufferings resulting from the contingency of life ('why is my best friend paralyzed?') by elucidating them as 'destiny'. At a more spiritual level, on the other hand, they provided salvation from the arbitrariness of fatality by turning it into continuity (life after death), by establishing a link between the dead and the yet unborn. Predictably, the ebbing of religious world-views did not lead to a corresponding decline in human suffering. In fact, now, fatality was more random than ever. 'What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning'. Nothing was better suited to this end than the idea of nation which always emerges out of an immemorial history, and more importantly, glides into a limitless future: "[i]t is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny" (*Ibid.*: 11- 12).

It would be too naive to suggest that nations grew out of and replaced religious communities and dynastic realms. Underneath the dissolution of these sacred communities, a much more fundamental transformation was taking place in the modes of understanding the world. This shift concerns the medieval Christian conception of time which is based on the idea of simultaneity. According to such a conception, events are situated simultaneously in the present, past and future. The past prefigures the future, so that the latter 'fulfils' what is announced and promised in the former. The occurrences of the past and the future are linked neither temporally nor causally, but by Divine Providence which alone can devise such a

plan of history. In such a view of things, Anderson notes, "the word "meanwhile" cannot be of real significance" (*Ibid.*: 24). This conception of 'simultaneity-along- time' was replaced by the idea of 'homogeneous empty time', a term Anderson borrows from Walter Benjamin. Simultaneity is now understood as being transverse, cross-time, marked by temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar. The "new conception of time made it possible to 'imagine' the nation as a 'sociological organism' moving steadily down (or up) history" (*Ibid.*: 26).

This has deep implications for the idea of nation. An American would probably never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his fellow-Americans. He would have no idea of what they are doing at any one time. Yet he has complete confidence in their existence and their "steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity" (*Ibid.*: 26).

A parallel link is established by the newspaper which symbolizes an intense fictiveness. If we take a quick glimpse at the front page of any newspaper, we will find out a number of, seemingly independent, stories. Anderson asks: what connects them to each other? First, calendrical coincidence. The date at the top of the newspaper provides the essential connection: 'Within that time, "the world" ambles sturdily ahead'. If, for example, Mali disappears from the front pages of newspapers, we do not think that Mali has disappeared altogether. "The novelistic format of the newspaper assures them that somewhere out there the "character" Mali moves along quietly, awaiting its next appearance in the plot" (*Ibid.*: 33).

The second correlation is provided by the simultaneous mass utilization of newspapers. In that sense, the newspaper can be considered as an "extreme form of the book", a "book sold on a colossal scale" or "one-day best-sellers" (*Ibid.*: 33-4). We know that a particular edition will be read between this and that hour, only on this day, not that. This is in a way, mass ceremony, a ceremony performed in silent privacy, "[y]et each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion" (*Ibid.*: 35). It is difficult to envision a more

vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked imagined community. Moreover, observing that the exact replicas of his own newspaper are consumed by his neighbours, in the subway or barbershop, the reader is continually reassured that the imagined world is rooted in every-day life: "fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations" (*Ibid.*: 36).

Anderson's account shows how the rise of direct -access societies was associated to changing understandings of time and, as a result, of the possible ways of imaging social wholes. He emphasizes how the new sense of belonging to a nation was prepared by a new way of comprehending society under the category of simultaneity: society as the whole consisting of the simultaneous occurrence of the countless events that mark the lives of its members at that moment. These events are the fillers of this segment of a kind of homogenous time. This very clear, unambiguous concept of simultaneity belongs to an understanding of time as exclusively secular. As long as secular time is interwoven with various kinds of higher time, there is no assurance that all events can be placed in clear-cut relations of simultaneity and succession.

Two points must be noted before we go further. First of all, the sociologistic account discussed above in either of its versions appears to be very close to the Marxist theory of nationalism. This is not surprising because Marx is averse to psychologistic explanation of any phenomenon. After all, even his strongest critics like Karl Popper acknowledge that Marx gave such a decisive turn to social sciences that social sciences can never be pre-Marxist by de-psychologising the social sciences and establishing the autonomy of the social. In fact, Marx even went to the extent of reducing the psychological to the social where as the prevalent view in his time did the opposite. The proximity between Marxist theory of nationalism and sociologistic explanation of nationalism is more evident in the ease of Gellner than in Anderson. This is because Gellner directly relates nation and nationalism to the phenomenon of industrial society and its imperatives where as, Anderson takes into account non-economic factors. This is ironical because Gellner is anti-Marxist where as Anderson has Marxist sympathies. But this irony looses quite a lot of its strength if

we note the fundamental differences between the Marxist and the Gellnerian theories of nationalism. Unlike Gellner, Marx and Marxists do not simply understand nations in functionalist terms. Consequently, they do not consider nationalism to be beyond the purview of moral evaluation. This is because unlike Gellner they do not relate nationalism to merely the phenomenon of industrial society. They relate it to the class character of the industrial society and hence their theory makes room for moral evaluation of nationalism both positively and negatively depending upon the perspective of the classes. For the same reason they adopt a perspective regarding the nationalist fervor and movement of those who struggle against the colonialism of industrialized societies.

Secondly, there is a fundamental difference between Gellner's account and Anderson's account. It is true that both of them work within the sociologistic frame work. It is also true that both of them, consequently, consider nationalism to be theoretically inadequate and morally speaking empty Yet for Gellner 'nation' is only a fabrication and hence has a derivative, if at all an ontological status. In Marxist terminology, it is a product of reification necessary for industrial society to function. For Anderson 'nation' is an imagery with which a community imagines itself to be a collective entity. A nation as an imagined community is not a fiction or a fabrication but can be very much real. Imaging is not myth-making.

Gellner's theory has been criticized on a number of grounds. First of all, it seems to have trouble explaining the rise of nationalism in pre-industrial contexts, such as nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and twentieth century Africa. Taylor emphasizes, that the homogenizing effect of modern state bureaucracies and educational systems is not a sufficient explanation for the rise of modern nationalist movements. He observes that if a modern society has an official language that is state sponsored and defined language and culture in which both economy and state function, then it is obvious that it as an advantage to people if this language and culture are theirs . Speakers of other languages are at a distinct disadvantage. This means that minority cultures face a difficult choice. To avoid permanent marginalization minorities must either integrate into the majority culture or start a movement to gain official status for their language and culture. Faced with this choice, most

immigrants choose to integrate while it is not the case with some national minorities. "Why do some put up a fight and create nationalist movements while others do not? Or again, if there are two languages widely spoken in a given state, why is it so difficult to come to some arrangement around a form of bilingualism?" asks Taylor (1997: 34). Walker Connor supports by saying "Some people assimilate; they go without much protest into the mix-master of school and army and lose their regional dialects. They enter as peasants and emerge as Frenchmen" (1972: 350-51).

Some people might think that the problematicity of bilingualism needs no explanation. It is so much easier to operate in a single language. If everyone were willing to agree happily to operate in a single language, we would be unwise to insist on two. But if the alternative is strife, resentment, separatist movements, perhaps even the dissolution of the state, well, bilingualism isn't really that complicated.

But if that is so, the crucial explanatory bit is missing from Gellner's account. The reason why some minorities assimilate and others fight back has to be referred to the nationalism of the latter. The reason bilingual solutions are hard is not because they are so complicated and expensive but because they are resisted on fundamentally nationalist grounds. That is, nationalism is still figuring in the account as an explanans, not as a successfully accounted for explanandum. Taylor notes, "Because the modern state does sustain an official language/culture, it becomes of ultimate significance to those with a national identity to get some kind of control of a state...but the original energy fueling these struggles remains to be understood" (1997: 34-35). Gellner's explanation cannot explain why non-elites are recruited into the nationalist struggles or even the solidarity of elites themselves.

If Gellner's account is explanatorily inadequate, Anderson's account is even more unsatisfactory in view of the problematic nature of idea that nations are, 'imagined communities'. This is not because communities are purely 'given' and not at all constructed. The concept is problematic because of the opposite reasons as Michael Walzer, puts it "Constructed communities are the only communities there are: they can't be less real or less

authentic than some other sort" (1999: 207). Walzer reminds us that anthropologists have taught us that " even small face to face communities... are "imagined" in complex and elaborate ways" (*Ibid.*: 216). It is true that Anderson's 'imagined communities' are not fictitious or pure fabrications, they may be real in some sense. It is because the absence of specification regarding the sense in which 'imagined communities' are real that Anderson's notion is interpreted non-realistically by, for example Hobsbawn, according to whom "imagined communities" are ineffective and even inauthentic in filling "the emotional void left by the retreat or disintegration ... of *real* human communities" (1990: 46). The juxtaposition between real human communities and imagined human communities is, no doubt not intended by Anderson. But such a problematic juxtaposition can be read into his work.

**Psychologism and the Moral Source of Nationalism**

We now come to the psychologistic explanations of nationalism. As said earlier, the psychologistic explanations go beyond the rise of modern industries society in tracing the origin of nationalism. According to them, nationalism has its origin in something which is pre-modern or even pre-social, political and cultural requirements of the economic system called industrial society. Kenneth Minogue who does not accept such a view caricatures it as a theory according to which nation is "an un self-conscious cultural and linguistic nature waiting like a sleeping beauty to be aroused by the kiss of politics" (1993: 74). On the other hand, Roger Scruton is equally vehement in defending the idea of pre-modern roots of 'nation' and nationalism. He forcefully says that "to suppose that we [Englishmen] could have enjoyed [our] territorial, legal, and linguistic hereditaments, and yet refrained from becoming a nation, representing itself to as entitled to these things ... is to give way to fantasy.... In no way can the emergence of the English nation, as a form of membership, be regarded as a product of Enlightenment Universalism, or the Industrial Revolution, or the administrative need of a modern bureaucracy. It existed before those things, and also shaped them into powerful instruments of its own" (1999: 288).

The psychologistic explanation of nationalism, as the name itself indicates traces nationalism to certain unalterable and primordial mental features human beings. According to them, nationalism which is itself a modern phenomenon as well as the nation which is a peculiarly modern institution fulfills a deeply felt psychological need peculiar to human beings and these needs are so much rooted in our psyche that they cannot be eliminated. Such a view is generally characterized as innatist. Where as the sociologistic accounts may be characterized as non-innatist. However, it must be noted not all psychologistic accounts are innatist in the same sense and to the same degree. Of the two versions of psychologism we shall see that one of them is thoroughly innatist and the other semi-innatist.

Glover's view of nationalism is thoroughly innatist in the sense nationalism, according to him, is to be traced to a psychological need which he associates with what he calls tribalism. The sociologist account describe nations as products of nation-states rather than the other way around and the latter in terms of their usefulness to capitalism or colonialism. He rejects sociologism because people "emotionally committed to nations do not think of them in instrumental terms or as social constructions. They are often thought of in more tribal terms" (1997: 13) Glover does not equate nation with tribe. For, he uses 'tribe' more as a metaphor or to be more precise, an ideal type. Glover's view squares well with Walzer's characterization of tribalism. "Tribalism names the commitment of individuals and groups to their own history, culture, and identity, and this commitment (though not any particular version it) is a permanent feature of human social life". (*Ibid.*: 215). Glover relates the tribal element in human psyche to our innate urge for creating something coherent to our selves. This sense of coherence is constituted by the relationships that are so important to us and which "normally draw heavily on a shared cultural back ground" (*Ibid.*: 19). This cultural background provides a shared frame of reference which is the way in which we think of our identity and shape it. The nation is the best defense of such a shared cultural background and even as its embodiment. Glover succinctly puts forth his psychologism when he says "Nationalism is partly the expression of a tribalism that goes very deep I out psychology. It is linked partly to a general disposition to group loyalty and partly to the way distinguishing tribal features play a role in our creation of identity" (*Ibid.*: 25). No doubt, Glover's attempt to trace nationalism via tribalism to our innate search for

identity and coherence makes nationalism understandable and even enables nationalism to win some sympathy. But it does not establish the moral credibility of nationalism beyond reasonable doubt. In fact the moral credibility becomes even more problematic if nations are constructed in tribal terms since tribalism is essentially exclusivistic. In fact, Glover himself recognizes this point and even hopes for a future in which human creativity no longer needs tribal mentality. From this it does not follow that nationalism is morally questionable for, as Glover labors hard to show nationalism satisfies a seminal need of human psyche. Hence, according to Glover at least for the present nationalism is morally salutary though it may not be and it should not be the final stage of the moral development of human kind. This point of Glover is quite significant even though he has not established why it is nationalism and not any thing else that meets today that deeply felt human need which Glover harks upon. To answer this question, he must take resort to the sociologistic account of nationalism. But, then the explanatory force of psychologism suffers a proportional reduction This tension in Glover's position results from his attempt to explain a modern phenomenon like nationalism in terms of an innate pre-modern and even pre-social factors that concern human psyche. Charles Taylor's version of psychologistic account of nationalism overcomes this tension to a great extent as we shall see Taylor's version is semi-innatist in the sense nationalism is related by him to something which is innate to us but it is contextualized within modernity

Taylor supports Ernest Gellner's explanation of modern nationalism in terms of the needs of the modern state for a culturally homogenous citizenry. He argues that the essential component of modernization is the diffusion of a common culture, including a standard language throughout a society. This happens mainly because it is a functional requirement of a modern economy, with its need for a mobile and educated workforce It also reflects the need for a high level of solidarity within democratic states. The sort of solidarity needed by a state requires that citizens have a strong sense of common identity and common membership so that they can make sacrifices for each other and this common identity is facilitated by common history and language and the equal access to social institutions for people from different strata of society is also an important part of the process of modernization. He understands modern nationalism as a reformulation of collective imagination that enables people to conceive of themselves as equal members of one and the

same national unit as opposed to say, unequal participants in a cosmic plan interpreted by church authority and enacted by princely powers.

Now, let us understand what insights can these considerations about the social imaginary throw on modern nationalism? They can help illuminate what is at stake in nationalist movements. The points made, in a sense supplement Gellner's account. Gellner showed the phenomenon of a state-fostered official language as a functional requirement of a modern state and economy. And in a similar way there are functional requirements that attend the modern social imaginary.

The horizontal, direct-access society, given political form by an act of the people, forms the background to the modern foundation of legitimate government in the will of the people. This principle is getting harder and harder to oppose in the modern world. Now this has certain functional requirements. Let's first of all take the case where the effort is made to live out the principle of popular sovereignty through a representative democracy. The nature of this kind of society, as in any other free society, is that it requires a certain degree of commitment on the part of its citizens. Traditional despotisms could ask of people only that they remain passive and obey the laws. A democracy has to ask more. It requires that its members be motivated to make the necessary contributions: of treasure (in taxes), sometimes blood (in war); and it expects always some degree of participation in the process of governance

Along with the homogeneity of language and culture the modern economy cultivates the homogenization of identity and loyalty for its survival. One may ask that how does this connect with nationalism? One apparent link is that nationalism can supply the fuel for patriotism. So much so that we can have trouble distinguishing them. But it is imperative to keep them distinct if we want to appreciate our history. If we think of patriotism as strong citizen identification, the nationalism is one basis for patriotism but not the only one.

So, democracies require a comparatively strong commitment on the part of their citizens. In terms of identity, citizenship has to rate as an important component of who they

are. In other words, the modern democratic state needs a healthy degree of what used to be called "patriotism:' a strong sense of identification with the polity, and a readiness to give of oneself for its sake. That is why these states try to instill patriotism and to create a strong sense of common identity even where it did not exist before. And that is why one thrust of modern democracy has been to try to shift the balance within the identity of the modern citizen, so that being a citizen will take precedence over a host of other poles of identity, such as family, class, gender, even religion.

Having set the background for his discussion of the emergence of nationalism in terms of Gellner and Anderson's versions of understanding the phenomenon of nationalism, he offers his explanation regarding the sources of nationalism. He observes that the accounts provided by Gellner and Anderson help us to understand the context in which Nationalism emerged but they fall short of identifying the sources of Nationalism. He notes that the psychological appeal of Nationalism has been neglected by the modernization theories like that of Gellner and Anderson that dominate the field and that are indifferent to the emotive force of nationalism whose explanation, according to Taylor is of first rate theoretical importance (cf *Ibid.*: 35). Apart from providing an explanation of the emotional force of nationalism, Taylor seeks to provide an account of why nationalism though a paradigmatic expression of modernity exhibits features that seem to us alien to what we think to be modernity. This does not mean that the sociologist explanation of nationalism provided by Gellner and Anderson is wrong. It is only incomplete. It, no doubt, accounts for some of the salient features of nationalism and effectively relates those features to the fundamental aspects of modern industrial society. Yet a "crucial explanatory bit is missing from Gellner's account" (*Ibid.*: 34). Gellner's theory fails to explain why some minorities assimilate and others fight back. It is true Gellner's theory can explain this fact but such an explanation has to invoke the nationalism of the latter. But then nationalism figures "in the account as a explanans, not as successfully accounted for explanandum" (*Ibid.*: 34).

He tries to trace the ways in which nationalism arises out of modern society. According to him, the resurgence of conflicts between nations cannot be seen as the atavistic return of primeval identities and mutual hatred being resurrected but these processes can be

explained in terms of modernity. Nationalism is a response by traditional elites to pressures toward modernization that tend to disempower them and undermine their dignity. These elites try to foster a sense of national unity and identity as a means of asserting their uniqueness and restoring their dignity. He argues that the significant changes associated with modernization undermine traditional identities and threaten the dignity of elites "Modern nationalist politics is a species of identity politics" (*Ibid.*: 46). He explores the role of modernity in shaping identity and the 'social imaginary' and how these intersect with nationalism. He presents a forceful, strong version of the claim that both the political forms and the underlying structure of sentiments are results of modernity – rather than any atavistic rootedness. The struggle for 'recognition' is itself a result of realized modernity. He argues that an essential component of modernization is the diffusion of a common culture throughout a society including a standardized language. According to him this occurs mainly for two reasons. First, it is a functional requirement of a modern economy with its need for a mobile and educated workforce. Second, it reflects the need for a high level of solidarity within democratic states. All these claims of Taylor square well with these of Gellner.

However, in spite of this concurrence, Taylor insists that much 'even if not all' nationalism arises as a reaction against the homogenization that Gellner refers to as nationalism. That is, to the extent that national consciousness is a product of modernity, it is a reaction against rather than an expression of the homogenizing tendencies of modern industrial societies. Nationalism prefigures or exists independently of what Gellner sees as the birth of nationalism (*Ibid.*: 34): it is a "prepolitical entity" (*Ibid.*: 40). We can speak of nationalism when the ground of the common political commitment is some ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious identity that exists independently of the polity. The whole nationalist idea presupposes this pre-political identity.

Taylor thinks that one can distinguish two steps while locating the sources of nationalism. The initial refusal of elites who are otherwise well versed with the culture of the metropolis can be seen as the first step. The inducement of masses into a successful national movement would be the second task. He tries to answer the question, why is it that those elites refuse metropolitan incorporation especially when they have accepted many of

the values of metropolis? He opines that modernity-the emergence of industrial economy, a bureaucratically organized state and the popular rule, is like a wave which flows over and engulfs one traditional culture after one another. Whoever fails to incorporate the changes will fall behind in the power stakes. Modernity remains as a threat to those who are deeply committed against change. But some of the elites would like to take on some versions of the change. He reasons, that the reluctance of cultural elites who "refuse metropolitan incorporation" (*Ibid.*: 43), is not because they are opposed to change as such but because the changes that are occurring are denigrating or humiliating to them. Unlike the conservatives, they don't want to refuse the changes. They also would like to avoid the fate of those native people who have been swallowed up by the changes. What they are "looking for is a creative adaptation, drawing on the cultural resources of their tradition that would enable them to take on the new practices ...there is a "call to difference" felt by the modernizing elites." says Taylor (*Ibid.*: 44).The need for difference is a existential challenge not as only a notion of common good but also as a matter of dignity. In this sense nationalism is modern, as it is a reaction to a threat to dignity caused by modernity. The elites convey their sense of humiliation to the larger ethnic group who are engrafted into a group-wide social protest against the modernized state. They can do this because the modernized state, by providing "horizontal direct access" (*Ibid.*: 45), subjects all members of the group to what the elite feels: a status of backwardness. This is transmitted to them in various ways that lead to their mobilization, charismatic leadership or symbiosis (*Ibid.*: 47). Here, Taylor distinguishes between the notion of dignity and the notion of honour. He relates honour with the hierarchical mediated societies and dignity with horizontal with direct access ones. To have honour is to have a status that not every one shares and the concept of dignity presumes that all human beings enjoy it equally. One's notion of self-worth need not depend on one's lineage or clan.

Taylor then explains what can be called as the second phase of nationalism. He tries to answer the question, how nationalism spreads beyond elites and how it stimulates masses by stating that a charismatic leadership with great imaginative power can make nationalism as a mass movement by linking national aspirations to other existing grievances. One example could be the leadership of M.K. Gandhi during the Salt March of the Indian

Independence Movement. Quite often, the movement spreads to the larger strata of population from the original elites who try to imitate them and take them as their models. Taylor also notes that nationalism may sometimes be spread by means of fear of physical threat, and thus not simply as a result of humiliation (e.g. Croatia and Bosnia: 47-48). He asks whether "we should make the state focus definitional for modern nationalism as Gellner does" (*Ibid.*: 35).

An issue in Taylor's discussion is his suggestion that even if the modern state did not originate nationalism, it frequently draws on it in support of the patriotism to which it calls its citizens (*Ibid.*: 40). In contemporary societies, "nationalism has become the most readily available motor of patriotism" and so modern states, seeking to heal their internal divisions, seek to provide an overarching "imaginary" to link the divided parties in a greater "national" unity. He instances Jawaharlal Nehru's attempt in *Discovery of India* to craft a pan-Indian secular nationalism that would incorporate its Hindu and Muslim communities (*Ibid.*: 41). In this sense, the dialectics of state and nation are played out, that it is not only that nations strive to become states but also that states strive to create national allegiances that suit them.

In many ways, Taylor elaborates the position that nationalist movements frequently reflect a reaction against state forces of modernization that fail to acknowledge or even oppose the broadly cultural traditions of a particular community within that state. Even though modern states profess to speak with the voice of "the people," sometimes that voice is much less than representative or cross-sectional and groups within it have reason to consider their distinctive voices excluded or "systematically unheard" (*Ibid.*: 42).

Taylor concludes by exploring the role of modernity in shaping identity and the 'social imaginary' and how these intersect with nationalism. He presents a forceful, strong version of the claim that both the political forms and the underlying structure of sentiments are results of modernity – rather than any atavistic rootedness. The struggle for 'recognition' is itself a result of realized modernity. Taylor alludes to liberal nationalisms, in which a central role is played by "a liberal regime of rights and equal citizenship" (*Ibid.*: 52). Such nationalisms sometimes referred to as civic nationalism. He seeks to explain the emotive

force of nationalism through a story of the injuries to dignity that cultural minorities experience in the face of superior, conquering powers.

Taylor account talks of religious fundamentalism in the same register of nationalism. Even religious fundamentalisms mobilize people in a modern fashion in horizontal, direct-access movements, uses modern institutional apparatuses like elected legislatures, bureaucratic states and armies. It may reject the doctrine of popular sovereignty; it also de-legitimizes the traditional ruling strata. He sees that the different shades of nationalism may help us to understand their interaction. Even if some new categories emerge from the explanation of these varieties if it illuminates the common element in what we called nationalism, it contributes to the explanation of nationalism. The aspiration to take on certain forms of modernity on the basis of one's own cultural resources can obviously be played out in many different ways, depending on what one's wants to take over and what cultural resources one hopes to sustain it with.

Before we come to the criticism against the Taylor's version of psychologism discussed above it is necessary to clarify our characterization of it as semi-innatist and not a full fledged innatist position. Nationalism in Taylor's scheme is both modern and pre-modern. Even though nationalism is "a quintessentially modern phenomenon" (*Ibid.*: 43), it gets 'neatly combined' with something pre-modern and primordial as he succinctly puts it "What is modern would be the context of nationalistic struggles, the stakes and pre-dispositions to struggle, given national sentiment, as these have been outlined by Gellner, supplemented by my remarks (in turn inspired by Anderson) . What is *primeval* would be the sentiment itself" (*Ibid.*: 43, emphasis added). Taylor's characterization of the sentiment involved in nationalism as 'primeval' lends an innatist orientation to his theory and to the extent such a sentiment demands a locus in human psyche implies the idea that nationalism has pre-modern roots. Nationalism as a sentiment is an expression of the primordial psychological need for recognition. This is clear when he says "modern nationalism ...taps into something perennial" (*Ibid.*: 47). Yet, nationalism is fundamentally modern as we have above. Taylor puts a high premium on the concept of dignity in his account of emergence of nationalism. Since according to him one facet of nationalism... is a response to a threat to dignity" (*Ibid.*: 45). 'Dignity' is a modern concept whereas 'honour' is pre-modern. Even if

one insist that dignity is not just modern, we can at least acknowledge that "modernity has...transformed the conditions of dignity" (*Ibid.*: 45). As is evidenced by the fact that "nationalism usually arises among "modernizing" elites" (*Ibid.*: 45). Hence the "nationalist sentiment is one that could arise only in modernity" (*Ibid.*: 45), even though the need for recognition in which that sentiment is located is a primordial one. If modern society is a political society and if the national sentiment has pre-modern roots then it is plausible to say, as does Taylor, that nationalism is pre-political (cf *Ibid.*: 40). Though, paradoxically it is the most politically charged idea.

One may point out that the drawback with the argument that the 'refusal of incorporation' of elites into the metropolitan culture constitutes a species of nationalism rather than its genus. The members of dominant nations are often every bit as attached to their distinctive culture and traditions as are national minorities. One may also wonder why the fact that the nationalism is modern prevents it from being atavistic. Taylor's account leaning on Gellner's ideas, arguing that the market economy replacing former forms of exchange needed a specific culture and that became that of nationalism may be quite true, but does not show that this specific culture did not integrate atavistic elements. Hitler's state was modern too.

However, Taylor insists that nationalism is not at all atavistic. In doing so, Taylor seeks to vindicate nationalism on moral grounds. As Ronald Beiner points out, "portraying nationalism as a fully modern political phenomenon can help in *vindicating* nationalist ideas over against the cruder depictions of nationalism as sheer atavism" (1999: 6). In stressing the modernist dimension of nationalism, Taylor intends to emphasize its organic link to the modern notions of popular will and popular sovereignty so as to play down the undesirable images of nationalism, the demarcation line between which and tribalism is quite thin. However, Taylor is less than successful in his attempt to establish normative superiority of nationalism on the basis of identity and modern politics woven around it. It is undeniable "that struggles over identity are central to modern politics. But the sheer possession of a given identity confers no normative authority on the kind of politics that goes with that identity. To answer the normative questions that interest us, it doesn't suffice to recognize

the centrality of identity; we have to go on to ask *which* identities survive normative scrutiny" (*Ibid.*: 7). This means that the question of moral plausibility of nationalism cannot be settled by invoking the concept of identity since the moral plausibility of identity itself is not self-evident. In other words, the question of normative adequacy is not settled in the case of nationalism by tracing nationalism to identity politics; that question is only transferred to a different level. Taylor seeks to win moral credibility of nationalism by partly relating it to the issue of identity and partly relating it to modernity. As we have seen the first half of this attempt has not succeeded nor does the second part fare any better. This is because at least on the face of it the moral credibility of nationalism is not self-evident and on the contrary nationalism is felt by many to be morally shabby "because nationalism does violate so directly the official conceptual categories of modern ethics, the universalist heritage of a natural law conceived either in terms of Christianity or of secular rationalism" (John Dunn 1999: 29).

In his response to Taylor's essay, Will Kymlicka (1997: 56-65) takes issue with aspects of Taylor's story by articulating the question, why some minorities integrate into the majority culture and some do not? (As we have seen, Taylor criticized Gellner by neglecting this issue) He says the question is misleading. In the case of immigrants, it is understandable they would integrate as they already voluntarily left their own culture with the expectation of integrating into another national society and also possibly leaving behind the motivation for national claims. But in the case of national minorities it need not be the case. He argues, "The fact is that every national group in this century has put up fight. Indeed, walker Connor goes so far as to suggest that there are no examples of recognized national groups in this century having voluntarily assimilated to another culture" ( *Ibid.*: 60). Kymlicka suggests that the desire to maintain our language and culture is natural and ever-present. For him, Taylor sees at the core of nationalism the demand for recognition. "To suggest, as Taylor seems to do, that people generate an attachment to their language and culture as a way of protecting their dignity seems deeply implausible to me" (*Ibid.*: 62). Rather, maintaining one's own language and culture is the normal thing we should not be puzzled about. He argues that the general explanation of nationalism may be no more complicated than the widespread desire to live and work in one's culture. An advantage of this perspective, he thinks, is that it can explain

how nationalism is as much a phenomenon of large national majorities as it is of small minorities. For Kymlicka, Taylor's invocation of dignity is out of place. He criticizes Taylor's account that it is misleading in focusing so exclusively on the nationalism of minorities as if the puzzle is to explain why minorities have this strange and unusual attachment to their own language and culture. The fact is that national minorities are no different from the members of majority nations in this regard. The members of dominant nations are often every bit as attached to their distinctive culture and traditions as are national minorities. How are we to explain the attachment of the French, the Germans, and the Japanese to their respective nations? By focusing on the dignity of disadvantaged national groups, Taylor implies that there is a qualitative difference in the sources of minority and majority nationalisms, but there is no evidence for such a qualitative difference.

But, both can be criticized for confusing a species of nationalism with its genus. Nationalist movements sometimes develop among peoples who lack a sense of cultural distinctiveness antecedent to their struggles with their neighbors. Taylor is surely correct to think that we need an explanation of the "will to difference" that grips so many people in the modern age. The problem with his concept of "dignity" lies elsewhere. The term is morally loaded. While we may legitimately employ it to explain the nationalist struggles of an oppressed minority, we would be rightly reluctant to see "dignity" at stake in the struggles for their own ethically pure states. Here we arrive at a thorny problem that confronts every one who sympathizes with at least some forms of nationalism: the problem of distinguishing morally permissible from morally prohibited species of the phenomenon

What Taylor's account of nationalism leaves unexplained, according to Kymlicka, are "the 'sources' of (the) difference between liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism" (*Ibid.*: 63). Taylor concedes that, "the rhetoric of dignity and recognition is as much at play in illiberal Iranian Nationalism as it is in liberal Flemish nationalism" (*Ibid.*: 64).The fact is that majority and powerful national groups are just likely to adopt illiberal forms of nationalism as minority national groups. For example, Germans have a more racialist conception of national membership than the Québécois. Any version which focuses only on the dynamic

of minority nationalisms cannot explain a phenomenon that is also found in majority nations. The extent to which a nationalist movement is liberal depends, Kymlicka says, "On whether or not (a nationalist movement) arises within a country with long-established liberal institutions. Flemish, Scottish, and Quebec nationalisms are liberal because Belgium, Britain, and Canada are long-standing liberal democracies" (*Ibid.*: 64). Maybe, but to some degree they are long-standing democracies just because their nationalist movements remained liberal, and to that degree Kymlicka's explanation is circular.

Walter Feinberg in his work "Nationalism in a Comparative Mode" (*Ibid.*: 66-73) sees that the concept of dignity as Taylor develops provides a psychological spin on the explanation of nationalism, but this spin is incomplete. The concept of dignity, of elites, according to Taylor forms the spark for nationalist movements. But it is not fine enough to distinguish between national resistance and something like class and gender resistance. It places too much emphasis on the individual psychology of elites, and it neglects other equally important considerations like that of economic ones. It does not mean that economic causes are real and psychological causes are artificial. It only points to the importance of economic causes, at least sometimes and one should be able to capture this dynamic also. Moreover, Taylor's account does not tell why elites should experience a loss of dignity, especially when they have been treated special and have access to the best education that the then cosmopolitanism can provide. Feinberg asks, "Why should they not be satisfied to model or enforce the standards of the dominant culture on their "own" people?" (*Ibid.*: 70). Many people suggest that when elites begin to resist, they begin to do so not merely in terms of their own dignity but also to give voice to the situation of their people where political influence and economic well-being are eroding. To fail to see this connection between the elite and people is to provide an explanation which focuses on individuals and may even imply that national resistance movements could be curtailed by simply providing elites with a little more dignity.

Different forms of nationalism require different explanations. Dignity functions at a deep level within nationalism issue and not at the level of explanation that Taylor addresses. The idea that dignity is tied to national identity tells about the meaning of nationalism. It

does not tell much about the cause of particular nationalisms. Feinberg shows how the idea of dignity relates to these different forms in different ways. He elaborates by stating that nationalism takes at least two forms, the nationalism of exclusion like that of Japanese towards Koreans and the nationalism of resistance like that of Québec. Dignity is important in the explanation of nationalism but it needs to be examined in detail in each case in order to understand the causes responsible for its loss. It is true as Taylor's criticism of Gellner emphasizes, that the homogenizing effect of modern state bureaucracies and educational systems is not a sufficient explanation for the rise of modern nationalist movements. "Even if the push toward homogenization is as strong, this does not tell us why some people and groups work hard to accommodate themselves to the standard model while others strive to resist it. If Gellner fails to answer this issue, so, too, does Taylor" (*Ibid.*: 68-69).

In Taylor's formulation of nationalism, collective imagination is very important, rightly so. But this kind of formulation should be able to explain that why national way of imagining collective identity takes priority over other kinds of imaginative possibilities like that of affiliations to race, religion, gender and humankind. Imagination sets arrange of possibilities, it does not determine which of the possibilities one will choose to organize commitments around. Feinberg argues, "Certainly nationhood requires the kin of imaginative frames described by Taylor, but nationalism requires more. It requires a commitment to bring this imagined world into being for oneself and for others "like oneself". Hence an explanation of nationalism in the modern age requires a comparative framework. The question is not simply, "Why nationalism?' it is why nationalism rather than something else such as, say, transnational racism or classism or religious fundamentalism" (*Ibid.*: 68).

Will Kymlicka supports Ernest Gellner's explanation of modern nationalism in terms of the needs of the modern state for a culturally homogeneous citizenry. Charles Taylor and Walter Feinberg support Gellner's explanation but claim that something has to be added to it for adequacy. Charles Taylor seeks, interestingly but not quite successfully, to marry the modernization theories of Gellner and Anderson to his own Hegelian philosophy of the importance of recognition. Taylor's account tells us that nationalism is not always traced back

to simple economic causes and is not reducible to tribal impulses that will be overcome by more modernization. He is quite right in seeking to understand expressions of nationalism in the first instance in what nationalists tell us about them-that they seek a voice for their collective uniqueness. However, if our understanding of nationalism is to be as comprehensive as Taylor wishes, it will be important to allow that sometimes larger forces spark the spirit of nationalism and that these forces will be different in different cases. Dignity can serve as a reminder that nationalism is about identity and recognition as long as it does not mask cases in which nationalism is also about a reduction in economic well-being and political or cultural influence. In other words, explanations of nationalism must be explanations of nationalisms, and these will take different forms in different situations.

At the end of the first chapter we saw how Isaiah Berlin quite convincingly establishes that *prima-facie* nationalism has a case for moral credibility. In this chapter, we examined whether such a *prima-facie* case can be provided a deeper justification by an examination of the two versions of the psychologistic approach to nationalism which sought to base the moral high ground of nationalism on the psychological sources of nationalism and there by countering the sociologistic position that denies nationalism a normative status by treating it only in sociological terms. As we have seen the two versions of psychologism achieve less than what they aimed at. Even though the proponents of psychologism, especially Charles Taylor have made a strong case against Gellner and Anderson for whom nationalism is not only theoretically incoherent but morally vacuous. In other words, nationalism's claim to be morally convincing remains at the surface level only. From this, it does not follow that nationalism has no moral credibility. It only follows that it is yet to be established adequately. In view of such an ethically ambiguous position, it becomes necessary to turn our attention to some of the distinct ethical questions that pertain to different aspects of nationalism. Such a discussion which is taken up in the subsequent chapters will provide the debate concerning the ethical status of nationalism, a sharper focus. Though these chapters are relatively independent of each other they thematically converge on the central issue of this thesis namely whether nationalism has a moral basis- an issue already discussed at the level of generality.

However, to rectify to some extent the generality of the nature of discussion about the moral dimension of nationalism, in this chapter, we will take up the theme of the moral credibility of one of the central concepts of nationalist discourse and practice, namely, the concept of citizenship. Such a discussion, it is hoped, lends this chapter a sense of specificity and takes it beyond generalities. To clarify that the following discussion is not simply an appendage it needs to be made clear that citizenship is essentially a psychological phenomenon in the sense it is associated with a sense of identity and it is a morally debatable concept and hence should find a place in the discussion of the moral psychology of nationalism.

**Citizenship and Multiculturalism**

Any discussion of the moral psychology of nationalism remains incomplete without looking at the issues that surround citizenship as a concept and as phenomena. Central to the moral psychology of nationalism, as we have noted, is the notion of identity. 'Citizenship' is the core concept in the nationalist discourse. The concept of citizenship has three dimensions as pointed out by political philosopher like Cohen (1999), Kymlicka (2000) and Carens (2000). The first concerns the legal status, the second concerns political agency and the third concerns membership in a community that provides a distinct source of identity. It is also agreed by many political philosophers that the Identity dimension is as thorny as its fundamentality. This is because citizen's subjective sense of belonging is understood as the 'psychological' dimension of citizenship (cf Carens 2000: 166). Precisely for this reason the strength of the community's collective identity and the subjective sense of identity of individuals are directly proportional to each other. "If enough citizens display a robust sense of belonging to the same community, social cohesion is obviously strengthened. However, since many other factors can impede or encouraged it, social integration should be seen as an important goal that citizenship aims to achieve (or resolve), rather than as one of its elements" (citizenship, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 2). Given the centrality of 'citizenship' in contemporary political discourse and practice it is not surprising that the concept, as a bearer of national identity has been contentious one. That is to say, the controversy surrounding nationalism and national identity at some stage or other shifts to the concept of citizenship and this is more so today. This is because focus on nationalism has

shifted from the international realm to the internal realm. Till recently the question regarding nationalism was whether nationalism could be consistent with internationalism. The possibility of resolving conflict between nations through international agencies or mutual understanding has pushed such a question, at least to an extent to the background. The present question is "Are national allegiances not secured at the cost of suppressing the more specific identities of groups and individuals within the boundaries of nation- states" (Miller 1995: 119). In other words, does not citizenship amount to an imposition of a fixed and overarching identity on people with distinct cultural moorings? There are a substantial number of thinkers who give a positive answer to this question and hence treat nationalism itself as an illiberal ideology. In doing so, the very concept of citizenship is taken as the organizing principle of the political life of a society as difference-blind. However, there are thinkers who do not see any conflict between citizenship and other sub-national identities.

Before we elaborate upon the conflict between these two points of view, it is necessary to point out that the conflict itself has philosophical significance. In his widely read work, *Nations and Nationalism* Ernest Gellner makes two points, one positive and one negative. The positive point is that citizenship which is the political version of philosophy of individualism as enunciated by the project of modernity is the core of nationalism. In addition, Gellner makes a negative move which has eluded the attention of many, when he says that nations are built on the debris of pre-modern communities. In other words, Gellner sees a deep discontinuity between pre-modern social institutions and the birth of nation. In the scheme of his analysis there is no possibility at all for a simultaneous existence, if not co-existence of both pre-modern institutions and nation. Nation, in Gellner's word-view, is cleansed of these primitive institutions. The critics of Gellner's position hit hard not so much on the positive side of Gellner's position but on the negative side of his position. According to them, contra Gellner, nations are sustained by or even consist of a lot of primitive associations. Thus we have two models of nation.

Gellner's model has a theoretical rigor in setting normative standards for nation. Modern western nations may have taken this as a normative scheme and organized, re-organized, or rebuilt their societies on this model. In these modern societies, it is the citizenship alone that is recognized as the only site for political negotiations. Other

associations, be it cultural or pre-modern even if they exist as social facts do not have any political purchase. Neither state recognizes them nor can individuals claim things on their behalf outside the citizenship. However, there are two important deviations to this normative model. There are studies contesting the validity of this both at theoretical level and theoretical level. For instance, even in a modern nation like France the recent headscarf issue brought forth the Christian elements in the making of French Nation. There are others who contested the normative model as too idealistic and unviable because they argued that pre-modern sensibilities cannot be completely erased. The other counter to this citizen model becomes relevant when we turn towards formation of nations outside the west. In Asian countries and African countries despite claims made on behalf of citizenship and individualism, the large domains of nation making are pervaded by this pre-modern social institutions and experiences. In fact, in these societies like India where a successful nation is constituted by pre-modern associations though the virtue of citizenship is upheld. There is an enormous process in the successful nations of these regions where instead of these pre-modern institutions being rejected or disappearing nor do in they stand in isolation. In an interesting way they are incorporating modern systems. The dynamics of this incorporation are both internal as well as external. While the ideals of nation-state want to see everybody becomes citizens, the veracity of these pre-modern institutions responds to this claim without necessarily yielding to it, in the process, engaging in an active negotiation. This experience of countering citizenship model has prevailed over the state to tone down its claims, thereby taking their 'other' into serious consideration. A country like India is an interesting site of these decentralized active negotiations between these two models where both the models have to struggle hard to influence each other. The unique thing about thus site is it doesn't facilitate complacency on either side. It does not leave them this luxury of remaining isolated from each other.

The main thrust of the anti-Gellnarian position can be brought about in the form of what McMahan calls 'complex identification' as against 'national identification'. McMahan quotes Schopenhauer's words: "The cheapest form of pride is national pride; for the man affected there with betrays a want of individual qualities of which he might be proud, since he would not otherwise resort to that which he shares with so many millions" (1997: 121-2).In other words individual qualities which can be and need to be cultivated get displaced

from one's conception of oneself. This apart, national identity that is citizenship brings about the withering of others aspects of one's actual identity. Membership in and identification with a range of groups may enrich one's life, extend one's sympathies and bonds with others, and thereby lessen the potential for incomprehension of and conflict with others. "To acquiesce in a vision of oneself in which nationality overshadows the other variegated dimension of one's life, character, and relations with others is to suffer a miserable reduction of the richness of one's identity" (*Ibid.*). Complex identification is constituted by multifarious group identifications as against national identification in which citizenship has a commanding role in shaping a person's identity. Complex identification need not exclude national identification. However, national identification according to McMahan is not necessary for the goods that it often provides such as cultural belonging, security of belonging, self-esteem, social solidarity etc. Complex identification, further, by fostering diverse attachments reduces conflicts whereas primacy of national identity increases them. Finally, complex attachment separates 'political' from 'national' and relegates national to the private domain and in doing so paves the way for decentralization thereby promoting democracy.

Before we see how the above described position can be countered we look at a familiar way of countering anti-citizenship view.

A dominant version of pro-citizenship view seeks to resolve the conflict between citizenship and sub-national identities by taking recourse to public-private division. The supporters of such a view maintain that citizenship is unchallenged because its sub-national competors can be confined to the private domain whereas the public domain can be left completely to citizenship. This solution to the problem of citizenship is a facile solution because the question regarding the moral tenability of the priority attached to citizenship over the so-called ethnic or sub-national identifies is in the final analysis the problem regarding the moral justification of allowing citizenship to monopolize public space. Secondly, nationalism of which citizenship constitutes its core has itself ethnic ingredients. To quote A.D. Smith, "Without some ethnic lineage the nation-to-be could fall apart" (1991: 42). In other words, privatization of group identities side steps the issue rather than resolve it. It is this which prompts some thinkers to take a radical step and declare that ethnic identities

must be set aside and political demands of ethnic groups be dismissed. Their view may be called, following Miller 'Conservative Nationalism' (cf 1995: 124-130). At the core of conservative nationalism lies the idea that national identity or citizenship integrally involves allegiance to the authority of tradition or what Scruton calls 'establishment' constituted by the institutions through which the state exercises its authority on behalf of nation.

The position of the conservative nationalist sketched above suffers from a serious lacuna. These conservative nationalists characterize themselves as modern conservativists and distinguish themselves from traditional conservatives like Burke. They do so by pointing out that unlike their traditional counterparts, they treat tradition to be in flux. Hence, according to them institutions have no sanctity and their authority has only pragmatic significance. In other words, conservative nationalists who are modern conservatives distinguish their position from that of traditional conservatives by taking a flexible view of tradition /establishment. But in doing so, they are compelled to acknowledge the need for allowing different interpretations of national identity and therefore are compelled to yield public space to non-nationalist perspectives also. Thus, conservative nationalism is unable to defend the overarching position they accord to citizenship. To establish the supremacy of citizenship we have to look at some of the recent theories, particularly the views of David Miller who seeks to face the challenge posed by multiculturalism to citizenship. As Miller points out, what challenges citizenship is not multiculturalism as a fact. After all, all liberal societies are multicultural and remain to be so in foreseeable future. What challenges citizenship is a thesis about how we should respond to the fact of multiculturalism. Such a thesis Miller calls 'radical multiculturalism'. The core principle "is the idea for the respect for difference, where this means something more than toleration. A multicultural society must allow each of its members to define her identity for herself, by finding the group or groups to which she has the closet affinity, and must also allow each group to formulate its own authentic set of claims and demands, reflecting its particular circumstances" (*Ibid.*: 131). In other words, according to radical multiculturalism, "the very purpose of politics is to affirm group difference" (*Ibid.*: 132). Given this valorization 'difference' it is not surprising to see that radical multiculturalism considers the idea of common good as a myth or robs it of all commonality. In the words of I.M. Young, one of its strongest defenders, "the perception of anything like a common good can only the

outcome of public inter-action that expresses rather than submerges particularities" (1990: 133).

However, radical multiculturalism is open to the following objections:

1) Ethnic and related kinds of sub-national identities are assumed to be authentic whereas citizenship or national identity is taken to be artificial since the latter are imposed where the former are not. But this contrast is not a genuine one. Group identities are not only socially constructed but also foisted. For instance, in the Indian context there was a when Dalits refused the identity provided by others and claimed that their liberation was in shedding the identity. It needed some effort to make them accept that identity as a stepping stone for liberation. We can at least say that on many occasions groups acquire for themselves identities on the basis of certain reasons which are anything but natural though genuine. Thus, in thinking about ethnicity we need to avoid hyper-voluntarism – "the notion that ethnic identities are simply chosen to suit each momentary encounter with another person" (Miller 1995: 135).

2) If national identity or citizenship is manufactured, sub-national identities are self-manufactured. The sub-national identities are not fixed. More often than not, the identity of one group is formulated in relation to other groups and has an organic link with the group's relative standing. This means in thinking about ethnicity we need to avoid hyper-determinism- "the idea that ethnic groups are the bearers of unchangeable identities from which no members or sub-group can escape" (*Ibid.*: 135).

3) The questionable nature of the invidious distinction between group identities, on the one hand and national identity or citizenship on the basis that the former are genuine whereas the latter is artificial becomes more palpable if we note that the national identities are more democratic. A picture of a group acquiring an identity is quite complicated and even messy. This is, because ambitions and interests of groups create identities that are not as pure as claimed by radical multiculturalists, especially "when measured against the hypothetical standard of a group of people sitting down

together to think out what it means to them to be Jewish or black" (*Ibid.*: 135). As against this, national identities are shaped by political discussions and actions and hence more democratic.

4) Radical multiculturalism overlooks the fact that ethnic groups themselves attach a great value to their share of national identity. It is very rare that an ethnic group questions citizenship. In fact, it asserts its identity to acquire full citizenship which for some or other reasons it feels to be held back from it. In other words, ethnic groups within a nation have a greater zeal for their inclusion than is recognized by radical multiculturalists.

To this, the radical multiculturalists might reply by saying that the ethnic groups which usually are in minority are made to seek inclusion out of desperation caused by fear of disrespect. Hence, the radical multiculturalist claims once equal respect is assured without the carrot of citizenship, their wish to share a common identity will disappear. This claim of radical multiculturalists is unfounded. As Miller points out, "It fails to grasp the psychological needs that are met by a common sense of nationality ... to see themselves only as bearers of a specific ethnic identity ... would be to loose the chance to join a larger community whose traditions and practices have inevitably left their mark on the environment they inhabit" (*Ibid.*: 138). Thus, desire to acquire full citizenship is not a necessary evil but a genuine need and it is so recognized by the ethnic groups. Finally, radical multiculturalism is guilty of construing citizenship and ethnic distinctions on majority- minority lines. It is assumed by its champions that citizenship serves the purpose of majority while ethnic groups which individually or collectively form a minority are marginalized. It overlooks the fact that majority is also constituted by groups with their own cultural distinctiveness. Whether it is so or not, the public culture associated with citizenship is not an expression of the culture of the majority exclusively. In an important sense the culture of citizenship is neutral. Nation building consists in disentangling citizenship from any set of cultural practices, majoritarian or not. Conversely, nation-building consists in removing the stamp of cultural specificity that goes with any sub-national group. The fact that such a goal is not easily realizable cannot be held against the concept of citizenship itself. Overlooking this goal is to drain citizenship of its very essence. It results in dissolving

the concept itself whereas the radical multiculturalists wanted to put citizenship on par with other sub-national identities.

The point made just above pertains to the question of nation-building as a creation of non-sectarian national culture. This point was central to the very ethos of anti-imperialist struggles. Franz Fanon in his *The Wretched of the Earth* (cf. the chapter on 'National Culture') plots the trajectory of the journey the native intellectuals undertake in their anti-imperialist struggle. In the beginning native intellectuals imbibe everything that is taught to them by their colonial masters. In the second stage, the native intellectual undergoes a profound sense of alienation. He feels that he is an outsider to both the world of colonizer and the world of colonized. Out of their sense of alienation and out of an intense desire to overcome it, in the third stage, he returns to his own native culture. He celebrates everything in his culture and even invents a golden age in the past. The customs, the habits, practices, codes and manners and even the dress of his native people are celebrated. Fanon argues that such a celebration of the past provides the native intellectuals' a psychological equilibrium which saves them from the damage caused by imperialism which not only destroys the future and decimates the present and also, more importantly, distorts the past by the myth of pre-colonial barbarianism. However, according to Fanon, the native intellectuals should go to the next stage and realize that a genuine culture is translucent and inseparable from the activity of the reconstruction of a people. The glorification of the past must be replaced by an active construction of a new culture which Fanon calls the 'national culture'.

The argument that nationalism involves pre-political ingredients and the argument that nationalism is colored by the culture of the majority are completely off the mark. This is precisely because citizenship which epitomizes national culture is teleologically geared to overcome both the pre-political ingredients as well as the impact of majority culture, religious or otherwise. Of course, a radical multi-culturalist might consider such a notion of citizenship to be utopian. But that was not his original point. Radical multi-culturalism was an important thesis because it held citizenship to be morally contestable notion and not because it was a utopian concept.

What has been said above in favor of citizenship goes against not only multi-culturalism, but also against the liberal idea of citizenship according to which 'citizenship' is

essentially a legal notion and citizenship is a legal status. As against this, the republican notion of citizenship maintains that a citizen is primarily a political agent. To the extent, liberal nationalism hopes to entertain a robust notion of nationality; it should play down the liberal notion of citizenship. It is true that many constitutional democracies today do not go beyond the liberal conception of citizenship on the ground that contemporary socio-political systems have made the liberal model of citizenship obsolete and even impracticable, but this cannot be argument against the republican model of citizenship. For, that model may still act today as "a benchmark that we appeal to when assessing how well our institutions and practices are functioning" (Miller 2000: 84). Citizenship in the full-blooded sense recognized by the republican model as normative force because of its function as a benchmark and hence its moral significance. It is there fore in the fitness of things that we have discussed citizenship as both an empirical fact of psychology and normative concept in our discussion of moral psychology of nationalism.

# CHAPTER III



## MORAL BASIS OF CO-NATIONALITY

This chapter aims at probing into the question whether there is a moral justification for displaying partiality by way of special concern to the fellow nationals. In doing so, the chapter mainly focuses on the claims of Jeff McMahan, Thomas Hurka, David Miller and Daniel Weinstock. A few words about the problem and its significance are in order.

### Co- National Partiality: Universalism Vs Particularism

The human groups which make a claim on nationality are supposed to satisfy two kinds of criteria, namely objective and subjective. The objective criteria of nationhood concern the external relations that bind the members of a national community as they pertain to a history of mutual association, occupancy of a common territory, common ethnic origins, communication in the same language, possession of same religious beliefs, commitment to a specific set of political institutions, the practice of a common culture comprising acknowledged values and customs. However the list of objective criteria of nationhood is not problem-free. First of all, the criteria are not mutually exclusive; secondly, the criteria are not collectively exhaustive as no items can be added to the list. Thirdly, no nation satisfies all the criteria. Fourthly, the criteria admit degrees: that is, two different nations can satisfy the same criterion in different degrees even while being nations to the same degree. In other words, while criteria can admit degrees, nationality itself does not, thus creating a logical tension between the criterion and what it is criterion of. Fifthly, and more importantly, some terms like culture and values are vague enough to make room for a conflict of use regarding whether a given community is a nation or not, whether a given community is a nation or a federation of nationalities or it is itself a sub-nationality within a larger nation. Differences over such issues can be politically consequential. Sixthly, collectivities other than nation can satisfy at least some of these criteria. Hence the objective criteria need to be supplemented by what may be called subjective criteria. The subjective criteria concern certain beliefs which the members of a nation possess, express and even

celebrate. These beliefs are by and large normative in the sense that they are beliefs about what ought to be rather than what is. Some of such important beliefs are: 1) the flourishing of the nation is intrinsically good, i.e. the nation ought to flourish; 2) it is incumbent on us to manage our affairs by ourselves, i.e. we ought to control matters regarding our collective lives present and future; 3) displaying loyalty to the fellow nationals is a moral duty, i.e. we ought to manifest partiality to our co-nationals.

It is the third belief which is the subject matter of this chapter. The belief itself is a familiar one. A natural disaster that befalls our countrymen disturbs us more than the one that is suffered by people belonging to a different nation. It is common to see a large number of common citizens resenting their government's act of providing aid to some other needy nation when their co-nationals are suffering. Opposition to immigration coupled with preferential treatment to the sons of the soil are a familiar phenomena exhibiting co-national partiality vividly. The question is whether such a partiality towards co-nationals can be morally justified. If it is not, one of the central ethical pillars of nationalism stands immensely weakened and in doing so, establishes a serious limit of the morality of nationalism itself. It would be appropriate to say a few words about the significance of the issue of the moral defensibility of co-national partiality and pin point the philosophical issues it poses. The issue is significant because nationalism with its web of beliefs and emotions is a phenomenon that has contradictory effects and thus producing in many people an ambivalent attitude towards it. On the one hand, it promotes virtues like commitment and self-sacrifice. In doing so, it enables us to overcome our self-centeredness and achieve self-transcendence, thereby enhancing our self-esteem. It provides us a measure of dignity and autonomy that cannot be provided by even the most benign paternalism of a foreign nation. On the other hand, we are all familiar with the darker side of nationalism which many a times eclipses the brighter side. Almost by definition, nationalism is exclusivist. As McMahan point out, "nationalism seeks a heightened unity within the nation by stressing the otherness of those without. It unites some by dividing them from others" (1997: 111). In other words, in providing an impersonal point of reference so as to transcend our personal worlds and thus enables us to go from mundane to the profound, nationalism gives free expression to the tribal impulses by creating the other. It is very easy to either commend co-

national partiality or condemn it as morally indefensible and even reprehensible. By doing either of the two we fail to recognize the complex texture of the issue involved here. The complexity of the issue is due to the fact that there are two different sources of moral reasons. On the one hand, morality has a core that imposes on us certain duties towards others irrespective of our relation to them. On the other hand, such fundamental duties need to be supplemented by certain special duties towards those to whom we are specially related as in the case of family. Thus both strict impartiality and partiality towards the co-nationals are equally appealing. As McMahan points out, "it is...one of the central tasks of moral and political philosophy to seek a coherent, determinate, and stable reconciliation of the competing demand that issue from these divergent sources" (*Ibid.*: 110).

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to note that it is tempting to commend co-national partiality by comparing nations to families. This strategy is appealing because partiality within family is widely recognized as perfectly legitimate. Parents are only permitted to give certain priorities to the interests of their own children. In fact, they are required to do so. This is because the sentiment of partiality is constitutive of the nature of the relation that family embodies. However this strategy does not work. Opponents of co-national partiality might ask, Why equate nation with family? Why not equate whole humanity with family? Or else they may argue for a greater analogy between nationalism and racism than between nationalism and familial sentiment and in doing so undermine co-national partiality by drawing our attention to the fact that partiality towards members of one's own race is universally condemned as arbitrary, illegitimate and anti-human. All this shows that co-national partiality lies somewhere in the spectrum from familial partiality which is widely accepted and racial partiality which is widely condemned. As McMahan points out, "intuitively nationalism is an intermediate case" (*Ibid.*: 111).

The different positions on the moral defensibility of the co-national partiality can be classified as particularist and universalist. The particularist position can be said to have two versions- radical and moderate. The radical particularism restricts the legitimacy of the subjective beliefs including the one concerning co-national partiality to their own nation. According to them, the other nations so called are un-worthy of entertaining partisan

sentiment and collective commitment. Such nationalism is what characterizes Nazism, Fascism and other sectarian ideologies. The moderate particularism, unlike its radical counterpart does not seek to decry the nationalism of others as spurious. Nor do they recognise automatically the national sentiment of others. Such a neutral attitude towards other nationalists is based on their theoretical view that any moral system is a communal product and hence its range of application is limited to its community in which it evolved. Whether others have a right to be nationalists depends upon what their moral system demands. According to this view, the answer to the question whether co-national partiality is morally defensible depends upon the local morality of a community which decides the appropriate degree of partiality within a community and there is no neutral stand point to evaluate whether a local morality's stand on partiality is morally acceptable. In other words, there is no absolute answer to the question whether co-national partiality is morally defensible.

The universalist position can also be taken to have two versions- nationalist and non-nationalist. The nationalist universalism holds that all people are morally entitled to value their own nation and to show partiality to their co-nationals. In this sense, nationalist universalism stands diametrically opposite to radical particularism. The non-nationalist universalism rejects all the three views together. It rejects the sectarianism of radical particularism and relativism of moderate particularism out rightly. According to non-nationalist universalism no degree of partiality can ever be morally justified and hence nationalist universalism should also be rejected as it departs from the equal concern and respect based on the recognition of human worth.

It is obvious that nationalist universalism and non-nationalist universalism are the only viable positions that make the issue of moral defensibility of co-national partiality philosophically exciting since both of them appear plausible because of the substantive nature of their claims and theoretical plausibility. However it must be noted that the difference between them, though a fact is not as stark as it appears. First of all, nationalist universalists do not claim that co-national partiality is morally right without qualification. That is, they do not support co-national partiality without any constraints. In fact, they seek

to specify such constraints in as precise terms as possible. Secondly, nationalist universalists while claiming that co-national partiality is morally permissible and even ethically mandatory do not deny that all human beings have equal worth as individuals. They only deny that an individuals worth is to be the only criterion of how a human being is to be treated. Thus while maintaining that all persons have equal worth, the nationalist universalist maintains that "a person's moral status vis-à-vis a particular moral agent may depend not just on the intrinsic properties that determine this person's objective moral worth but also on the ways in which he or she is related to the agent" (*Ibid.*: 109). Hence according to nationalist universalist, though we are all morally speaking equi-human, we are not all morally speaking, morally distant from one another such that a special relation between two people provides each of them "a special moral reason to favour the other that neither has with respect to others outside the relation" (*Ibid*). Thus according to the nationalist universalist, there exist moral reasons which are agent- relative whereas for the non-nationalist universalist, all moral reasons that guide us are agent-neutral, i.e., they are universal in the sense they are independent of any relation. In short, the nationalist universalist defends co-national partiality on the basis of the moral significance of a special relation that exists between people belonging to a nation whereas non-nationalist universalist refuses to accord any moral significance to such a relation, in fact to any relation whatsoever. The question therefore is whether the special relation between two co-nationals qua co-nationals has any moral significance. For the sake of brevity, let us call the nationalist universalist simply nationalist and non-nationalist universalist cosmopolitanist. Thus the question whether co-national partiality is morally acceptable is the bone of contention between nationalists and cosmopolitanists, between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Let us now see how the nationalists, on the one hand seek to establish the moral credibility of the relation on whose basis co-national partiality stands and on the other hand how they specify the constraints within which only co-national partiality becomes morally defensible.

The nationalists, as pointed out earlier seek to establish, under certain constraints the moral acceptability of co-national partiality by answering that the special relation on which the partiality is based namely the relation of co-nationality possess moral significance. Thus,

the moral acceptability of co-national partiality is parasitic upon the possession of moral significance by the co-national relation. The moral significance which co-nationality relation is supposed to possess can be either instrumental moral significance or intrinsic moral significance. To establish the instrumental moral significance of co-nationality relation is to show that nation as an institution serves some lofty purpose. To exhibit the intrinsic moral significance of co-nationality relation is to show that the institution of nation has a moral significance independent of whether it serves any lofty purpose.

Those who seek to show the instrumental moral significance of the relation of co-nationality point to the familiar positive advantages that the institution of nation brings about in which co-nationality relation is grounded. What are these advantages which promote a wholesome life? First of all, a nation embodies a certain culture participation which is the hallmark of an active membership in a national community. The national culture provides what are called "horizons of significance", thereby equipping the individuals with standards of value that help him or her to make meaningful choices. Secondly, the solidarity which the institution of nation nurtures gives the individuals motivation for co-operation needed to promote a decent material standard of living. Thirdly, nation provides a sense of rootedness in modern society which is essentially impersonal since it acknowledges only abstract individuals as the true constituents of society. Such rootedness gives the individuals in a nation a mental equilibrium that can otherwise be badly disturbed by the absence of organic relations the traditional societies embody. Finally, the members of a national community achieve self- transcendence by merging their individual egos' in a larger whole whose presence they experience palpably.

Mutual co-operation, decent standard of living, rootedness, and sense of fulfilment by means of self-transcendence are all basic constituents of a wholesome life, individual or collective. Nation, that is co-nationality, promotes them and thus is instrumental for a wholesome life. It is therefore morally significant and its corollary, namely co-national partiality is morally justified. This argument of the nationalists is strengthened by drawing an analogy with love. The partiality that results from a love relation is usually justified by showing that love is a morally significant relation because the relation of love is

instrumental in bringing about a healthy and wholesome life. It is doubtful whether this analogy is appropriate. This is because love is not instrumental in its relation to good life but is constitutive of a good life. The question is whether co-nationality and the institution of nation in which it is grounded are constitutive of a good life. There are philosophers who argue that co-nationality relation is not only not constitutive of a good life, it is not even an instrument in promoting a good life.

The non-nationalist universalists or cosmopolitanists question the capacity of the institution of nation and co-nationality to be constitutive of a good life or even to be of an instrumental value for a good life by the disturbing feature of nationalism. Even while providing the advantages mentioned above, co-nationality relation logically requires that co-nationals must treat non-co-nationals as others. The others serve as foils and without them there is no basis for identification. The advantages that accrue from co-nationality thus demand a heavy price and such a price robs the very essence of a morally edifying life.

**Defence of Co-National Partiality**

However, there are philosophers who, while not being cosmopolitans question both the constitutive and instrumental value of co-nationality in relation to a morally good life. They highlight the way in which nation and therefore co-nationality obliterates various other identifications that can be more enriching than national identity. As McMahan points out "To acquiesce in a vision of oneself in which nationality overshadows the other variegated dimensions of one's life, character, and relations with others is to suffer a miserable reduction of the richness of one's identity. Other elements of one's actual identity, as well as further possibilities for self-creation, get crowded out of one's self-conception and may, from inattention and neglect, eventually fade from one's identity altogether" (*Ibid.*: 121). Such distinct identities provide what McMahan calls "complex identification" which he contrasts with "national identification"- an identification in which nationality has a dominant role in shaping a person's identity. According to McMahan, the complex identification provides all the advantages which the nationalists credit nation and co-nationality with the advantages because of which the nation is credited with an instrumental role in shaping the

good life. That is to say, a "robust sense of connectedness with others [and with a larger transpersonal whole] can be achieved through identifying oneself with a variety of collectivities" (*Ibid.*:122). According to McMahan, complex identification provides additional advantages. First of all, it brings about a drastic reduction in conflict by lessening the propensity for conflict characteristic of national identity. Complex identification recognizes and promotes diverse identities cutting across national boundaries. No doubt, in a society of complex identification, people are less ready to die for a specific cause but they are also less ready to kill. To quote McMahan, "it generates a more complex pattern of differentiation and commonality in one's relations with others and thus gives partiality a more diffuse focus than national identification allows" (*Ibid.*). Secondly, complex identification prompts us to build institutional structures different from those demanded by national identification. Such institutional structures do not promote the primacy of the political; rather they promote the primacy of the cultural. This does not mean that complex identification rejects the political aspects of our life; instead it only makes it one element in larger framework which sustains plural identities. Thirdly, the nature of the political aspect itself changes. A society central around complex identification tends towards decentralization of power. In sum, complex identification negates the equations between community and nation, nation and state, state and the political life as well as the political life and centralization of power.

Most importantly, complex identification does not include nationality as an element of individual identity; it only rejects the claim of nationality to pre-eminent importance the nationalists attach to it. Thus national identity has a place within the complex of identities that complex identification recognizes whereas national identity nullifies other identities or drives it into the realm of the private.

Of course, McMahan acknowledges the difficulty in replacing national identification by complex identification and building alternative institutional structures. Perhaps the institution of nation continues to retain its prominent position and the relation of co-nationality continues to command our allegiance as the strongest bond of solidarity, thus making complex identification less and less possible. But this in no way proves that the

advantages that accrue from the institution of nation and co-nationality are sufficient to lend them a moral significance of instrumental kind.

An alternative strategy to establish the instrumental moral significance of nationalism/ co-nationality invokes the concept of cultural pluralism. The objective here is to present cultural pluralism as having intrinsic moral significance and then show that nations serve to promote cultural pluralism since each nation embodies a distinct culture. Since nation involves co-nationality relation and since co-nationality implies co-national partiality, co-national partiality is justified. In other words, co-national partiality is morally justifiable because it is based on the relation of co-nationality which has instrumental moral significance in so far as it promotes cultural pluralism which has intrinsic moral value. This strategy establishes the intrinsic value of cultural pluralism on familiar grounds such as the following; a) Since we cannot establish that there is only one best way to living we must possess alternatives and hence there should be plurality of cultures; b) Cultural pluralism facilitates imaginative thinking about different modes of life, thereby enabling individuals to alter or expand their views about a morally rewarding life; and c) Cultural pluralism has intrinsic value like bio-diversity. (c) is particularly important because it brings out the intrinsic moral worth of cultural pluralism. The philosophers who adopt this strategy are convinced that nations ought to exist and hence co-nationality relations must endure and consequently co-national partiality is morally sustainable precisely because nations and cultures are two sides of the same coin such that if nations disappear, cultures disappear, that is there will be a cultural monolith. Conversely, co-national partiality must prevail and hence nations must continue to exist and therefore co-national relations must be nurtured. Since nations/co-nationality relations are instrumental in preserving and promoting cultural pluralism which has an intrinsic value.

This strategy of establishing moral significance of co-nationality in instrumentalist terms faces a serious problem. One can grant an organic relation between cultural pluralism and nationalisms only if each nation within itself promotes cultural plurality. A cultural monolith within a nation and cultural plurality among nations stand ill-at-ease with each

other. It is doubtful whether a nationalist, even of a universalist kind can easily accept cultural pluralism within a nation. If the nationalist is an ethnic nationalist, he refuses to acknowledge any culture other than what is taken to be the culture of the ethnic group which has a dominant presence in the national community. Even if he is a civic nationalist, he seeks to provide public space to the (non-ethnic) national culture and drives other cultures to the private domain by characterizing them as ethnic. Hence as McMahan says, "The appeal to the value of cultural pluralism does support the preservation of existing nations but not in a way that would satisfy the nationalist... The unity and solidarity that nationalists seek within the nation are threatened by the presence of non-national subcultures within the nation; hence nationalists typically seek the absorption of subcultures into the larger national culture" (*Ibid.*: 123-4).

The preceding discussion which centres around McMahan's view purported to show how difficult it is to establish in instrumentalist terms the moral significance of co-nationality relation and thus establish the moral defensibility of co-national partiality. In what follows, we look at the second mode of defending co-national partiality by establishing the intrinsic moral significance of the co-nationality relation. This approach seeks to defend the view that co-nationality is a source of moral reasons that support co-national partiality and these moral reasons are derived from the nature of the co-nationality relation itself. The philosophers who adopt this approach take recourse to alternative strategies. We will consider three strategies that hinge upon three distinct concepts namely, 1) Commonality, 2) Reciprocity and 3) Gratitude.

The strategy which centres on the notion of commonality starts its operation with maintaining that co-nationality is not a simple relation but a compound of various relations that involve commonalities of language/ethnicity/religion/culture/custom etc. Co-nationality involves the relations of commonality, which is why co-nationality relation while being a relation between persons is not a personal relation at all. As is evidenced by the fact that for any person most of his/her co-nationals are strangers. Further, in some sense one looks upon

his/her co-nationals to be like oneself sufficiently clear to distinguish them from others who are not co-nationals. The question is whether these commonalities are of intrinsic moral significance so as to provide reasons that support co-national partiality.

Mere possession of commonalities does not have moral significance. A group of cricket lovers have commonalities involving likes and dislikes and patterns of behaviour. But those commonalities have no moral significance. A person who ceases to be a cricket lover does not face moral deprivation or does not even find himself in a moral vacuum. Commonalities to be of some moral significance must be commonalities of value that is ideals to strive for, standards to evaluate, commitments to be promoted etc. Further, the values should not be perverse since perverse values cannot legitimize partiality – as is evidenced by the fact that racial partiality is morally indefensible precisely because racism involves perverse values. In short, it is necessary for commonality to be morally significant that it should be a commonality of non-trivial that is substantive and morally edifying values. However, commonality of values in order to be more than merely a commonality of preferences – a subjective phenomenon has to involve certain things which are more than mere preferences. That is to say commonality of values must have an objective dimension. As in all value commitments, commitment to common values in a nation ought to produce commonality of traits i.e. strong dispositions to act in certain ways. As McMahan points out, commonality of traits implies mutual esteem among co-nationals since all of them valorize these traits.

To judge whether commonality of values and traits lends an intrinsic moral significance to co-nationality so that the latter can legitimize co-national partiality, it is necessary to see how far co-nationality (construed as constituted by commonalities of values and traits) differs from co-raciality. We know that racists value certain attributes they take to constitute a definite character of their race; that is, they invoke certain commonalities. These commonalities are not biological factors like complexion, hair-texture or morphological features etc. The latter are akin to, as McMahan points out Locke's nominal essence i.e. they constitute the nominal essence of the race. The nominal essence constituted

by the surface features are not what the racists is any race attach significance to. They are the visible or outer markers of the deeper nature which is the real essence of the race. Racists consider their race superior not because of its nominal essence but its character vis-à-vis which the character of other races is highly deficient- a belief which is the basis of racial discrimination and even oppression. However, racists themselves know that there is no one-to-one match between outward physical marks and the so called inner racial character. The racists know this since they are aware that what they consider to be admirable features of the character of their race are not shared by many of their co-racials who possess those visible marks and equally they are aware that many who do not belong to their race as they do not share their visibe features possess what the racists think to be the admirable features of their racial character. All this explains why co-raciality cannot legitimize co-racial partiality. Racism is therefore based on a false consciousness. The question is whether nationalism is no different from racism and co-nationality is no different from co-raciality such that co-national partiality is no more morally justified than co-national partiality. As McMahan points out, "Typically, nationalists also believe in a real essence that underlies the superficial markers of nationality. This is the "National Character", conceived as a superior set of moral, spiritual, and intellectual virtues. Nationalists often believe that the possession of this character by the members of their nation constitutes an agent-neutral ground for partiality towards them. But this is supplemented, within the nation, by an agent-relative ground, which is that each member of the nation is related to his or her co-nationals by virtue of their common possession of the national character" (*Ibid.*: 126-127). But, national character like racial character is only a statistical generalisation, i.e., not all members' posses it. Secondly, the so called national character embodied in commonly held values and commonly shared traits may be found among non-nationals. If that is so, partiality must be agent-neutral in character there by nullifying nationalist's credo of agent-relative partiality. Thirdly, and more importantly, there is the difficulty of retifying the common values independent of the so called national character. If those values are justified in terms of so-called national character and in turn the national character is justified in terms of those values, it amounts to vicious circle However, the task of giving those values in trans-national terms is not at all easy. Fourthly, even if those values are provided a trans-national justification, all that they could do is to

justify the permissibility of some amount of partiality; they cannot support partiality as an obligation. McMahan gives an example of two philosophers both valuing rational agreement and excelling at it and hence they have value-commonality and trait commonality. "While this might make if permissible for them to be partial to one another in certain contexts, it clearly does not *require* them to, even if the value they share is a worthy one" (*Ibid.*: 128).

It is true that a group forfeits any claim to legitimate partiality if it makes room for morally perverse values if it is unworthy of allegiance because of valorizing perverse values. But from this it does not follow that possession of admirable traits is a sufficient ground for legitimizing partiality. An analogy makes the point clear. To prove against sceptics that there is good reason for being moral, Plato shows how an immoral person like a tyrant is an unhappy person. But even if Plato is right, it does not follow that a moral person will be happy- a claim Plato sought to establish thereby. All that follows from Plato's argument is that being moral is only a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for being happy. Similarly not valorizing perverse values and thereby unworthy of allegiance is only a necessary but not sufficient ground for justifying co-national partiality.

Till now we have seen how value commonality and value trait cannot establish the intrinsic moral significance of co-nationality relation and thereby establish moral defensibility of co-national partiality. In view of the failure of such a strategy let us consider another strategy adapted by the intrinsic approach to the moral defensibility of co-national partiality. It is this strategy which McMahan finds satisfactory. According to this strategy, co-national partiality is morally defensible because it is based upon the relation of co-nationality which gets its intrinsic moral worth from the fact that nation is a project of collective endeavour called nation building. The individuals in a nation are deeply indebted to their nation for meeting their material, intellectual and artistic needs, there by shaping their sensibility. Germane to co-national partiality is the gratitude to the nation which is the necessary out come of what a nation gives to its citizen. This is independent of the degree to which a nation meets the needs of its citizens in comparison with what other nations do. Coupled with this source of moral reasons which we have identified as gratitude to nation is

the phenomenon of reciprocity which is felt among co-nationals not as individuals but co-workers in national construction. Thus gratitude and reciprocity are the sources from which arises the sense of duty and co-national partiality has its foundation in such a sense of duty. It must be noted that duties involving partiality among co-nationals do not emanate from the sources that concern the co-nationals themselves. The duties are owed to the nation itself. That is gratitude towards nation is a duty towards nation. The duty of partiality towards co-nationals is only a derivative duty. According to McMahan, "duties of loyalty and partiality within the nation are not really *associative* obligations at all- that is, obligations that arise simply from "identity and relatedness"...the duties are instead more closely analogous to political obligations as the latter are understood in traditional accounts that appeal to considerations of reciprocity and gratitude for benefits received" (*Ibid.*: 131).

According to McMahan, moral defensibility of co-national partiality on the basis of the intrinsic ethicality of the co-nationality relation via gratitude to nation is contingent upon nation being domesticated in the way family has been. Today, unlike in past, families are not associated with honour, superiority, competitiveness, etc. Nor is it constitutive of individual's identity. Yet it is a moral fulcrum of individuals who, hence, owe an obligation to their families. Nations must imbibe such an orientation of the modern family. One can question McMahan's valorization of modern family which according to many has lost its central position as the centre of gravity of social relations. However, according to McMahan, nation to be domesticated should also be like a family. Family is characterized by non-voluntaryness. One cannot choose to become members of a family; one is simply born in it. To make room for voluntaryness, nations should have their borders porous so as to encourage others to be part of it, if they satisfy the conditions which follow from what a nation considers to be its central values. Citizenship, in other words should not just be inherited but earned. McMahan thinks that a nation which grounds its citizenship not just in birth but an achievement as a consequence of satisfying certain criteria will be less chauvinistic since it is free from the notions of blood and birth. But McMahan is wrong in assuming that the achievement oriented citizenship is less prone to chauvinism than its

alternative. In fact, the arrogance that results from the sense of achievement can be no less pernicious than the arrogance based on blood.

These lacunae prompt us to look at the views of Thomas Hurka's attempt to provide a moral justification to co-national partiality. If McMahan considers moral justification of co-national partiality in instrumentalist terms to be unsatisfactory, Hurka does not even consider it to be worth looking at. Co-national partiality obviously emanates from a special relation which lies somewhere in between the one germane to family and the one associated with raciality. Those who maintain moral justifiability of co-national partiality consider the relation underlying it to be akin to the one associated with family and they also seek to show how different it is from the relation that generates racism on racial partiality. If this is so, instrumental justification of co-nationality is absolutely off the mark. This is because we do not approve partiality characteristic of familial relation by showing that family is instrumental in achieving some desirable goal. We accept familial partiality precisely because it flows out of a relation that is intrinsically valuable. It is because of this, Hurka is justified in seeking to establish ethicality of co-national partiality in intrinsic terms.

Secondly, Hurka recognizes as a presupposition of his argument "that the basis of partiality among co-nationals must be objective rather than a subjective relation" (1997, p. 149). This means that co-national partiality cannot be defended on the basis that co-nationals feel like caring for each other and even many times give concrete expression to such a feeling. No doubt that certain attitudes or feelings are constitutive of the birth, survival and flourishing of any nation. But that do not constitute the core of a nation precisely because they are insufficient to justify a phenomenon like co-national partiality. This is because of, according to Hurka two reasons: 1) If merely a subjective factor like a feeling for caring is the basis of partiality, then a phenomenon like racial partiality can be said to have a moral basis since racists having a feeling of care towards each other but racial partiality is commonly abhorred. 2) Those who defend co-national partiality defend it as a duty that is as something which ought to bind the co-nationals. But it is difficult and even impossible to derive the 'ought' associated with duty from an 'is' associated with a feeling of care. Hence

Hurka recognizes the need to base co-national partiality on some objective relation which he seeks to determine on the analogy of the familial relation. He takes the example of a man and his wife who are bound by intimate relation of love which justifies their being partial towards each other vis-à-vis others (excluding of course) their kith and kin. According to Hurka, there are two distinct aspects to their relation. First of all, they are attracted to each other because of the qualities which the other has. This implies that their belief regarding the possession of such qualities are true. The moment those beliefs are proved false or illusory the relation of love breaks down even if they continue to live with each other because of the force of circumstances. The second aspect is as follows. If one of the spouses finds another person with the same qualities which he or she found in the spouse, he/she would not abandon the spouse for the other person. Nor does he or she exchange the spouse for his or her clone. In other words, that relation has no room for substitution. This is the meaning of saying that they love each other 'as an individual'. But what is to love an individual? It involves loving the person for qualities that no one else can share. It also involves "loving the person for certain historical qualities, ones deriving from his or her participation with one in a shared history" (*Ibid.*: 150). The historical dimension of the relation concerns the joys and the sorrows, freedom and burden enjoyed and suffered. It may even include very trivial and innocuous things in which the two have participated. This historical dimension provides uniqueness to the relation and partners are provided an individuality. After all "since no substitute, not even a clone can be the very person who can have a historical relation that the spouse in fact has" (*Ibid.*: 150). Thus admiration of certain qualities and a shared history constitute the dual basis of the relation of love which justifies some kind of partiality which is permitted and even mandated for the partners. Hurka finds in nationalism or nationalist sentiment something akin to the relation of love that exists between spouses. "Nationalists are, first, attracted to their culture and the activities that define it, thinking them to a considerable degree good" (*Ibid.*: 150), just as the spouses consider certain qualities in each other to be good. Secondly, "What attaches them specially to this culture and its members are historical facts: that this is the culture *they* grew up in, that their co-nationals share *with them* a history of being shaped by, participating in, and sustaining this culture" (*Ibid.*: 151). Hence, a favourable evaluation of the activity of the co-nationals promoting the culture of a nation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the partiality

towards co-nationals. For other nations have similar cultures, it should be supplemented by this crucial fact of shared cultural history-a fact which distinguishes the co-nationals from other people whose culture is equally good. It must be noted that Hurka rightly emphasizes that the culture of a nation need not be considered to be the single best in the world by its protagonists. "Instead, nationalists need only belief that their culture is one of perhaps many in the world that are very good" (*Ibid.*: 151).

Coming to the crux of his defense of co-national partiality Hurka draws our attention to two points: 1) "If national attachment rests partly on the belief that one's culture is good, it is important that that belief be true, which requires the culture to be, in fact, good. This is one point where evaluative considerations bear on the justification of national partiality" (*Ibid.*: 151). 2) More importantly considerations about good and evil must figure to decide "when a shared history is of the right kind to justify partial concern and, when it is, what degree of partiality is justified" (*Ibid.*: 151). The answer to the question whether co-national partiality is morally justified depends upon whether we can approve as moral the character of a culture of a nation and consequently the shared history of the collective action of a people in promoting such a culture. If a culture of a nation is internally discriminating, chauvinistic, expansionist, or shows a tendency towards dominating its neighbours and even seeks to dominate the world, such a culture is morally unedifying and the shared history of the members of a national community endeavouring to promote such a culture is morally reprehensible. Co-national partiality in such communities is immoral to the core. The best example is the case of Nazis. Co-national partiality among Nazis is understandably abhorrent. But partiality among those who suffered the atrocities of the Nazis is morally acceptable. This is because they share a history of suffering. On the basis of these considerations, Hurka concludes that a general account of the basis of duties of partiality is suggested. "Some activities and states of people, most notably their doing good or suffering evil, call for a positive, caring, or associative response. Others, such as their doing evil, call for a negative or dissociative response. Partiality between people is appropriate when they have shared in the past in the first kind of activity or state" (*Ibid.*: 152). Hence, according to Hurka two factors determine the degree of partiality that is justified: the degree to which a

people's history is shared or involves interaction between them and the amount of good that interaction produces. The first factor figures heavily in the family relation since family relation involves closest contact. Family members interact very intimately on daily basis and such an interaction is constitutive of each member. Family relation also gives full play to the second factor since every member of the family benefits from such a relation in terms of his/her growth and such a growth is accepted to be morally desirable.

A national community by contrast scores less than family in relation to the first factor that is the members of a national community cannot have the closeness of contact the family members have but a national community can score as much as the family so far as the second factor is concerned.

The members of a national community can have a shared history of building and promoting certain morally desirable institutions that work for the good of all. Such activities need not result in something which is grand or spectacular as described by certain myths. They can be perfectly normal. They may include things like economic development, law and order system, efficient medicare system, protecting democratic institutions, ensuring justice for all etc. all of which benefit everyone in the community. "When these benefits are added together, they constitute a significant counterweight to the weakness of national relations on the first dimension, that of closeness of contact. The critique of national partiality considers only this first dimension, of closeness. But if we believe that a necessary basis for justified partiality is a shared history, that this history must be good rather than evil, and that the degree of partiality a history justifies depends partly on the quantity of goodness it produces or embodies, we have some responses to the critique" (*Ibid.*: 153).

It is obvious that on Hurka's account of the moral justifiability of co-national partiality, partiality among co-nationals is morally justified less than that of the partiality among the members of a family. After all, even the most ardent nationalist does not say that we must care about the co-nationals much as we care about the family members. Yet

Hurka's account succeeds in establishing the moral basis of co-nationality and also shows why we need not be partial towards non-nationals. We not only have no close interaction with non-nationals but also have produced no significant goods with them. I am partial to co-nationals because I share a history of activity with them. To put it in the words of Hurka, "my nation is an appropriate object of partial attitudes because it more than other similarly sized groups has allowed me to act with others to produce significant human goods" (*Ibid.*: 155). Secondly, Hurka's account justifies co-national partiality only within certain constrains: co-national partiality is morally justified only if co-nationals share a history of joint efforts that bring in morally acceptable results. But even familial partiality is like wise constrained by such a condition. After all we valorise family on the assumption that a normal family promotes the growth of a normal human being and in doing so we keep outside our purview those families which aim at criminalising their progeny and in fact we do not consider them as families at all but treat them as abnormal cases.

Yet, Hurka's strategy is liable to the following criticism No doubt, he rightly recognizes the futility of giving moral justification of co-national partiality in instrumentalist terms. In doing so he correctly recognizes that no national community construes its nationhood in purely instrumental terms. They value their nationality intrinsically. This is evident from the fact that a national community profoundly regrets the loss of its distinct national identity even if it is guaranteed that goods such as political stability, social justice, economic progress etc. which are made possible by their having independent nationhood. However, Hurka's strategy is not completely devoid of instrumentalist concern since, according to him, co-national partiality is justified because co-national engaging activities are geared to morally acceptable goods. Hence, in Hurka's scheme nationalism and therefore co-national partiality has a moral worth which is parasitic upon the moral worthiness the goals that a nation sets for itself. This amounts to saying that though Hurka's defence of co-national partiality is not instrumentalist; its terms are not purely intrinsic either. In order to find out the possibility of defending, morally speaking, co-national partiality is purely intrinsic terms we may turn to the views of David miller.

Miller, like Hurka rejects the instrumentalist terms of moral justification of co-national partiality. Even though, he recognizes, that in the writings many political philosophers "instrumental values feature more prominently in ethical accounts of nationality then they do for instance in accounts family. (2004, p. 67). The main reason for this, according to Miller "is that ethical defences of nationality are aimed at those who are either doubtful that national allegiances have intrinsic value, or who think that such value as they have is outweighed by their harmful consequences" (*Ibid.*: 67 FN). It is sometimes argued that national solidarity and therefore co-national partiality which follows from it have instrumental value, because they enormously help the nation-states to pursue goals like stability, democracy, justice etc. But as Miller rightly points out states are enabled to pursue those goals precisely because the members of a national community attach intrinsic value to solidarity and partiality even though states may attach instrumental value to them. That is to say the instrumental value of nationality is "parasitic on its intrinsic value in the following sense: compatriots must first believe that their association is valuable for its own sake, and be committed to preserving it over time, in order to be able to reap the other benefits that national solidarity brings with it" ( *Ibid.*: 67).

Miller brings out the main thrust of his argument which seeks to establish intrinsic moral worth of co-national partiality by characterizing nations as 'Ethical Communities'. According to him, values like social justice, political stability, democratic practice, economic prosperity "presuppose that nations are ethical communities whose members have special responsibilities both to support one another and to preserve their community. Belonging to them constitutes a good that is different in kind from the good that the music fans enjoy." (*Ibid.*: 69). In his work *On Nationality* Miller explicates this idea of nation as an ethical community so as to provide a moral defence of co-national partiality in intrinsic terms. It is to this exposition we shall now turn.

Miller starts by rejecting the view of nationalism either as a disease mankind is suffering from or as a natural disaster of which it is a victim. Nationalism is not something that just happens to us, it is an accomplishment in so far it is a product of a conscious effort that involves reflection, interaction and collective action. It is not given, it is achieved. Yet

Miller neither celebrates nor condemns nationalism, he sets for himself moderate task of defending what he calls the 'principle of nationality' or simply 'nationality'. The principle of nationality has three inter-connected components: 1) National Identity, 2) Partiality and 3) Sovereignty. National identity embodies the following claim. National identity is a part of individual's identity and an individual's belief in such an identity is neither an illusion nor is indefensible. Further, this identity posses a historical continuity and it is an active identity in so far as it spurs the members into action. More importantly, it involves a national character in the sense of a public culture.

The principle of nationality has as its second component the notion of an ethical community which implies special loyalties and special obligations among the fellow members of a nation which they do not owe to other human beings. In our discussion, we primarily focus on the second component and secondarily the first component, leaving the third component namely sovereignty / self determination for a subsequent chapter.

Defending co-national partiality which involves special obligations to fellow members of a national community exclusively, Miller is aware that such a preposition goes against a powerful humanitarian sentiment represented by what is called 'Ethical Universalism'. Thus the debate over defensibility or the otherwise of co-national partiality is a debate between two theories of ethics, namely, Ethical Universalism and Ethical Particularism. The conflict between Ethical Universalism and Ethical Particularism has nothing to do with the conflict between Consequentialism and Deontology. This is because an Ethical Universalist can be either a Consequentilist or Deontologist. So also the Ethical Particularist. Hence the two rival theories have a difference over the form, and not the content of an ethical theory. What does this mean?

Ethical Universalism looks at individuals in terms of their generic capacities and basic needs and not the relations into which they enter. This does not mean that according to Ethical Universalism relations are fictions. Ethical Universalism grants the relation a non-basic status but not a basic status. In other words, according to Ethical Universalism individuals so far as ethics is concerned are ultimately relation- less, though their standing in

certain relations may be of importance at a non-basic level. Since relations figure only at a non-basic level, they need to be justified, if anything based on them needs to be justified. As against this Ethical Particularism which provides a different picture of ethical universe treats relations to be ultimate factor of life therefore have a basic status so as to make the central focus of the ethical concern: According to Ethical Universalism, Ethical Particularism surrenders reason before sentiment, prejudice and other dubious factors. In doing so, Ethical Particularism nurtures moral conservatism and further nourishes inconsistency generated by conflicting loyalties traceable to distinct relations and such an inconsistency obliterates the very possibility of an ethical system which can by means of a set of principles guide our conduct by properly shaping and refining ethical intuitions. Where Ethical Particularism fails, Ethical Universalism succeeds. In its turn, Ethical Particularism finds a glaring weakness in Ethical Universalism. According to it, in the Ethical Universalist scheme, abstract individuals applying an abstract principle act towards other abstract beings. In the process, ethical motivation is reduced to rational considerations which an ordinary man is unfamiliar with. In other words, Ethical Universalism is not an ethical theory of this world where non-abstract, i.e. relation oriented individuals apply concrete principles while acting towards other relation oriented individuals. Miller rightly draws a parallel between Ethical Universalism and Ethical Particularism with Humean and Kantian ethics. The parallel between Ethical Universalism and Kant is very clear and the parallel between Ethical Particularism and Hume becomes obvious when we look at the following words of Hume.

"When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs, and has taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgement of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those, who have a more particular connexion with him" (Quoted in David Miller 1995, p.58 FN).

From this, it does not follow that Ethical Universalism champions impartiality were as Ethical Particularism champions partiality. It is true that national allegiance and thus co-national partiality can have ethical significance if we accept Ethical Particularism of some sort. However, an Ethical Universalist can seek to accommodate national allegiance and thus co-national partiality at a non-basic level. He may adopt the two following strategies in order to do so.

The first strategy which Miller calls 'voluntary creation' strategy considers nations to be voluntary associations and as voluntary associations they sanction certain obligations on the part of each member towards others. The argument here is that voluntary associations constitute a special context in which special obligations are morally permissible and they are exceptions to the general rule which according to an Ethical Universalist has no special obligations to sanction. But this strategy does not work since nations are not voluntary associations since almost all members get their membership by birth. No doubt one can give up ones membership of a particular nation voluntarily and accept the membership of another nation voluntarily but he does do so on the basis of any principle but by his personal preferences or force of circumstances. Further, even if he is guided by principles, they are not the principles accepted by the Ethical Universalist.

Thus, according to the 'useful convention' strategy, considerations pertaining to moral division of labour explain why members of a national group incur special obligations vis-à-vis one another which they do not incur towards people in general (Miller 1995: 51-2). Since most people can care only for a limited number of other people, efficiency requires that they concentrate on those people with whom they have kinship ties or some other close relationship. But this strategy fails because the concept of convention has a ring of arbitrariness that renders ethnicity of special national loyalties suspect. The ethicality of a convention is parasitic upon what it is a convention for. Thus the second strategy is hopelessly incomplete at best or a total failure.

Hence, Miller concludes, "The choice, as I see it, is either to adopt a more heroic version of universalism, which attaches no intrinsic significance to national boundaries, or

else to embrace ethical particularism and see whether one can depend oneself against the charge that one is succumbing to irrational sentiment in giving weight to national allegiances" (1995: 65).

Ethical Particularism begins its defense of co-national partiality with the assumption that memberships and attachments in general have ethical significance. They generate loyalties and obligations which are mutual if not reciprocal. Secondly, they do not conflict with the pursuit of individual's own goals and purposes and thirdly, national communities are site on which formal systems of reciprocity are established. The question is whether the above characterization holds in the case of national communities. Miller gives a positive answer to this question. He first identifies nationality as a powerful source of identity though it is somewhat amorphous regarding obligations and rights. Though nationality evokes strong feelings and vigorous actions, the actors give vague answers to the question why they act self-lessly towards co-nationals. It is the vagueness and ambiguity of the answer to this question given by the members of a nation that justifies the characterization of a nation as an 'imagined community'. As opposed to this in face-to-face communities there is a clear understanding of loyalty and obligation. As Miller lucidly puts it, "in the case of nationality we are in no position to grasp the demands and expectations of other members directly, nor they ours. Into this vacuum, there flows, what I have called a public culture, a set of ideas about the character of the community which also helps to fix responsibilities" (1995: 68). He adds, "Although at any time it may be possible to say roughly what the obligations of the members of a nation are, these obligations in their particular content are an artefact of the public culture of that nation" (1995: 69). This public culture is a product of political process which involves debates, discussions, actions etc. However, though public culture is the product of political process it has resilience such that political actors cannot easily transform it. It has therefore a relative stability. It is because co-national partiality constituted by special obligations and loyalties towards co-nationals is a product of public culture which is itself a product of political process, co-national partiality is not simply a reflection of traditional bonds and therefore the charge that co-national partiality is conservative is off the mark.

The question is, how do Ethical Particularists justify indifference to outsiders that result from co-national partiality. Ethical Particularists grant that the outsiders are human and are related to us as human beings. This is the first dimension of our relation. But it must also be noted that outsiders are not isolated individuals, they belong to a nation and we are related to them as members of one nation to another nationals. It is this second dimension which makes the ethical picture quite complicated. It by insisting on not being indifferent to outsiders, the Ethical Universalist focuses on minimum or basic rights; he is emphasizing the first dimension of our relation to other nationals. The Ethical Particularist readily accepts this. "The divergence occurs when we juxtapose relationships between persons abstractly conceived with relationships between persons as members of communities, including national communities" (*Ibid.*: 74).

It may be pointed out by Ethical Universalist that recognition of basic rights of non-nationals should be taken as a limit of co-national partiality. Once this limit is granted there is no reason to think that Ethical Universalism is ill- at- ease with co-national partiality. It is this way that Ethical Universalist seeks to take the wind out of the sail of the Ethical Particularist. But this strategy does not work. First of all, there is no simple doctrine of basic rights because societies differ in what they consider to be basic rights. More importantly, satisfying the basic rights of non-nationals might undo something which they consider valuable. For example, saving other nationals from starvation is a universal obligation. Suppose a majority of a people in a nation other than ours are suffering due to starvation as a consequence of their government's bad policies or the insensitivity of the powers that be to meet their basic rights is to directly interfere in the internal affairs of that nation and thus undermining its sovereignty.

It may be objected against the national defenders of co-national partiality that by being exclusionary nations do not exemplify morality and hence co-national partiality is un-ethical. But this objection is unjustified. As Miller points out, this objection, apart from ignoring the fact that the excluded outsiders are included insiders for some other nation, is question begging. This is because what is at stake is precisely whether we can legitimately owe special duties to co-nationals and if we can, nationality is bound to entail differential

treatment for outsiders and insiders. In other words, the objection rejects co-national partiality precisely because is is co-national partiality. To put it in another way, according to this objection, co-national partiality is immoral because it is exclusionary and exclusion is unjust because it leads to partiality and this is a circular argument. The third answer to the objection is the following. No doubt, co-national partiality leads to inequality because all nations cannot provide to their citizens equal advantages since some nations are rich in resources where as some nations are not. Also different nations have different economic histories in relation to accumulated wealth. But such inequalities exist among families also. Some families are comfortably placed and some families are not but we do not think that family as an institution does not have the capacity to ground special duties. That is to say even though there are economic inequalities among families, we do not consider family itself morally unfair institution. The pursuit of family interests is considered morally legitimate. We only distinguish between fair and unfair means of achieving family interest. So the fact of inequality among nations does not by itself undermine the moral value of national attachments and the special duties towards co-nationals they engender.

Those who reject co-national partiality as morally illegitimate are usually prompted to do so because they find it impossible to draw a line of reasonability in connection with special duties. That is to say they think that it is impossible to work out the idea of co-national partiality within reasonable limits. They think that defenders of co-national partiality give absolute priority to special duties i.e. towards co-nationals over duties towards human beings in general. But this stance of the opponents of the co-national partiality is unjustified because the defenders of co-national partiality have sought to workout schemes for assigning relative importance of both kinds of duty, local duties i.e. special duties towards co-nationals and global duties i.e., duties towards humanity at large. Miller himself provides such a scheme whose broad cantos are as follows: The aim of the scheme to weigh duties according to whether they are local or global in scope and local duties being given a greater weight. Under this proposal "the final weight of a duty would be the product of two factors- the seriousness of the duty as determined by its content, and the closeness of our attachment to the people to whom the duty is owed" (*Ibid.*: 72). It is true that such a formula may not appear appropriate in all circumstances. We cannot kill a

foreigner to obtain his body parts for saving the life of a co-national. Secondly, the non-violation of human rights of foreigners and fair terms of trade as well as issues rating to global environment must take precedence over local duties. Thus, global duties put limits on the local duties. Within those limits local duties must receive priority particularly because most of them concern material resources of various kinds. For instance, so far as the issue of meeting the educational needs of co-national and others are concerned, "we should apply a weighting model, and think of partiality towards compatriots as a matter of giving their rights-claims greater (though not absolute) weight when deciding how to use scarce resources" (*Ibid.*: 75). Miller accepts that we might face difficulties in assigning weightage to duties in many circumstances such as the conflict between two duties; say duty of spending resources on the needs of co-nationals and the duty of defending a foreign country which is attached by some other nation. In this case, conscription of civilians may be illegitimate but incurring expenditure on a professional army may not be Further, the weighting model appears to go against humanitarian obligations (such as providing food to the people of a foreign country facing starvation) even though the latter is a duty. But this lacuna of the weighting model is not damaging because meeting the humanitarian obligation is, in Miller's words 'a duty of charity' rather than 'duty of justice' and the weighting model concerns only the latter. Hence the weighting model does not suffer even if it fails to square with the duty to meet a humanitarian obligation.

All this does not mean that Miller's weighting model is perfect. The line of reasonableness that should characterize the domain of special duty may not have been drawn by Miller clearly and neatly. But it is to the credit of the weighting model that it accepts the legitimacy of reasonableness. After all, it is a working model, nuances of which need to be worked out in concrete situations which may be too complex to be articulated in abstract terms.

**Attack of Co-National Partiality**

Till now, we have justified co-national partiality within certain limits which do not render the very idea of co-nationality empty and trivial. We shall now consider some objections against the idea of co-national partiality. We confine ourselves to the views of Daniel

Weinstock who spiritedly attacks the very idea of co-national partiality. His attack is both pointed as well as comprehensive. Let us have a brief look at Weinstock's attack. Those who support co-national partiality whom Weinstock calls particularists consider such an intuition to be the datum and the success of a theory of justice is supposed to depend upon accounting for it. However, such a view is shared even by some of those who do not accept co-national partiality as morally justified and whom Weinstock calls as Universalists. This is clear when they seek to accommodate co-national partiality in practical terms by taking recourse to the concept of moral division of labour. In other words co-national partiality, according to them may serve to smoothen our pursuit of goal which itself is universal in its content. But this strategy of universalists is absolutely pointless. Weinstock accepts Goodin's argument in this connection. According to Goodin, this strategy fails since it requires a massive re-organization of the state system as it exists today and the present division of the world's population into nation-states does not satisfy the requirement that all people's needs be given equal weight. Given the current distribution of world's resources the moral division of labour makes no sense. (cf Robert Goodin 1988). Thus, Universalists have been placed on the defensive by the Particularists. Hence, according to him, universalists should eschew the so called self-evident intuition, instead of trying to accommodate it. On their behalf, he attacks the intuition itself. According to him: 1) we have no good reason to grant status of 'considered conviction' to our intuition that co-national partiality is self-evidently moral. 2) The Deontic status assigned to the special obligations has an ambiguity which is fudged. 3) Co-national partiality is self-defeating. 4) 'Co-national partiality' is ambiguous both regarding who and what.

The first objection concerns the epistemic status of the alleged intuition regarding co-national partiality. As said earlier, defenders of co-national partiality think that we are all intuitively convinced that we owe special obligations to our co-nationals and these obligations are more numerous and more intense than we owe to other human beings. Weinstock's argument is that the self-validating character of this intuition is dubious because the basic structure of society influences our intuitions. In fact, they are constitutive of the basic structure of society. Either they are products of the institutions when they are perceived as just or they are mere reactions to institutions when they are perceived as unjust.

In either case our intuitions are unreliable. Weinstock considers the objection that liberal democracies can enable individuals to develop reliable intuitions by promoting critical thinking through education, formal or otherwise. After all, liberal democracies have weakened negative feelings that discriminate against races and genders. Weinstock answers that the negative feeling towards non-nationals is unlike other negative feelings which have been overcome. Unlike the distinction between races, religious communities, genders, etc the national-non-national is written into the very essence of modern nation-state. So, it is the nation-state which out of necessity produces the intuition regarding the co-national partiality. In other words, the so-called intuition is the product of an ideology called nationalism and not a self-validating conviction or even well thought out stand. Weinstock's attack on the epistemic status of the co-national intuition can be countered. On Weinstock's line of thinking, in order to decide whether the co-national intuition is reliable, nation-states must cease to exist but with that co-national partiality disappears and where is the need to justify that intuition as reliable. This means Weinstock's claim is true only vacuously. In other words, all that Weinstock has shown is that the intuition associated with co-national partiality makes sense only within the framework of modern nation-state. But from this it does not follow that such an intuition is only a product of modern nation-state or that it has no other ground. No doubt, 'ought' does not follow from 'is' but 'ought' does not imply 'is not' either. Secondly, even the intuition is taken to be self-evident by co-nationals; they accept it in absolute terms but no nationalist considers co-national partiality to be absolutely valid. We find that attempts are made by nationalists to make co-national partiality as reasonable as possible by placing as many limits on it. In fact, education in democratic societies seek to create an ethos that facilitates a process of refining the feeling of co-national partiality by adducing more and more sophisticated grounds. Thus the intuition is not taken as self-evident but as a claim perpetually needing fresh justifications and new modifications. Thirdly, nationalists i.e., those who support co-national partiality do not take it as an unquestionable data waiting for a nationalist explanation. Nationalists, while explaining it alter the very character of the data and transform it into an intellectual position rather than a mere intuition. After all, even in science, an explanation alters the very character of the domain of explanandum—a fact with which Deductive- Nomological model of explanation was ill-at-ease and hence was rejected.

The first objection raised by Weinstock against co-national partiality which we explained and countered above concerns the status of the claim of co-national partiality in so far as it was supposed to be based on a mere intuition. The second, third and fourth objection of Weinstock concern the nature of the nationalist's claim regarding co-national partiality which we take up one by one.

The second objection of Weinstock concerns the deontic status of the so called special obligations towards co-nationals, that is, the question regarding in what sense our special duties towards co-nationals are duties. According to Weinstock, the claim of co-national partiality is amenable to one of the following two possible formulations:

1) We must give greater weight to the needs of our co-nationals in deliberating about distributive justice; 2) we may give greater weight to the needs of co-nationals in deliberating about distributive justice

It is obvious that (1) is a strong thesis and (2) is a weak thesis. Let us call them, following Weinstock, 'strong special obligation' claim and 'weak special obligation' claim. It is also obvious that this strong special obligation claim squares well with the nationalist thesis of co-national partiality since its champions consider nationality to be intrinsically valuable and hence an obligations generating relation. But Weinstock claims that the strong claim has to be rejected. In this connection, he undertakes a thought-experiment which is a follows:

Imagine a society in which all citizens are required to pay some fixed proportion of their income to ensure the welfare of others. They are free to distribute that fixed proportion between domestic and foreign welfare programmes according to their feelings and convictions. Suppose there is a convention established among the members of this society such that "the rate by which people are expected to discount the needs and interests of others as compared to the needs and interests of compatriots is, say 1 to 3" (1999: 525). Now, imagine an individual decides to pay as the tax money between co-nationals and others equally. According to the strong special obligation claim such a man is acting immoral. But this is counter-intuitive. Intuitively, the man is as much moral as one who distributes his tax money equally and this intuition squares well with the weak obligation thesis. Hence the nationalist claim regarding co-national partiality must maintain only the weak obligation thesis if is it to be plausible. The question is what does the weak obligation claim mean?

Definitely, it does not refer to obligations that emanate from an agreement that is they are not contractual duties as Weinstock points out, "The needs of others constitute reasons for us, independently of any agreement which we may have reached with them. They are natural duties, and therefore not ones we can avoid simply by not contracting. So the question remains: how can there be obligations which we can choose to take up or not (*Ibid.*: 526)?

In this connection, Weinstock following Onara O'Neill (1986) and others considers our distributive obligations such as obligations to co-nationals as a species of imperfect obligation in the Kantian sense. Imperfect obligations concern maxims or policies which we must take up but which leaves us some latitude and discretion regarding the precise manner by which and precise degrees to which we will discharge them. According to Kant, duties of mutual aid are of this kind. It is because there is no limit on the amount of aid that we could provide to ensure that people's needs are met and because Kant understood that morality makes sense to agents with individual desires and projects. "Duties of mutual aid have to be integrated into a structure that incorporates a significant degree of self-other asymmetry" (*Ibid.*: 527). Thus, Weinstock concludes "the weak special obligation thesis is the Kantian doctrine of imperfect duties applied to the question of whether we should or shouldn't accord priority to our co-nationals in determining the content of our distributive obligations" (*Ibid.*: 527). Weinstock considers the strong obligation thesis to be plausible and give plausibility to the nationalists claim on co-national partiality since it would allow us to defend our choice to give greater weight to be needs of individuals with whom we have special ties. However, according to Weinstock, "it would not pull much weight against the claim that we may define our obligations of mutual aid in such a way as to give the needs of all potential beneficiaries equal weight" (*Ibid.*: 528).

All that Weinstock amounts to say is that the nationalist defenders of co-nationalist partiality have to be content with a claim regarding special obligation which is not strong but the co-national partialist does not need a strong one even though most of the co-national partialists have gone for a strong claim. Secondly, the weak special obligation claim is not weak in absolute terms. It is weak only in relation to the strong claim. This point is lost sight

of because of our attaching excessive importance to the difference between 'must' and 'may'. At least , in the content of the distinction between strong and weak claims of special obligations the difference is mitigated by the fact that the weak claim does not deprive 'mustness' to co-national obligations specially if co-national obligation is taken to be an imperfect obligation in the Kantian sense and which is what Weinstock does. Kant's imperfect obligation is not weak obligation. For him, mutual aid is not an option. It is an obligation though it allows for latitude not allowed in the case of perfect obligations Imperfect obligations are still obligations, though imperfect and this is all the nationalist defender of co-nationals partiality needs. Thirdly, as Weinstock himself acknowledges "the nationalist-special obligation theorist can try to get around this difficulty by appealing to the fact that ... people's sentiments and institutions about justice as a matter a fact naturally incline them toward attaching more weight to the needs of their fellow countrymen" (*Ibid.*: 528). In other words, the weakness of the weak special obligation thesis can be offset by our intuition of justice which attaches greater weight to the needs of co-nationals. In other words, such an intuition, the co-national partialist might argue, can "break the tie among the surfeit of obligations with which they would otherwise be confronted" (*Ibid.*. 528). But Weinstock rejects this claim of the co-national partialists. For he thinks that the empirical hypothesis regarding our natural inclination towards attaching greater weight to the needs of our co-national is "much shakier than nationalists think" (*Ibid.*: 528). This takes us to Weinstock's third objection against co-national partiality.

According to Weinstock's third objection against co-national partiality, the so called intuition about distributive justice which tilts people towards co-nationals is self-defeating in the sense that it undermines the co-national partialist's claim. The defenders of the special obligations towards co-nationals reject ethical universalism because it assumes that human beings are types of agents who reason about their moral obligations in abstraction from their real-world network of relations. Such a stance goes against the common intuition of people which prompts them to be partial towards those with whom they have special relations. Thus, according to co-national partialists ethical universalism is guilty of neglecting our intuition or sentiment or convictions about distributive justice. "But special-obligation theorists do not claim that we ought to trust our sentiments and convictions in the same way

in order to determine how resources should be distributed among our compatriots" (*Ibid.*. 529). That is to say, we have to apply the concept of impartiality among co-nationals to whom we are partial even if many of the co-nationals are inclined to favour members of smaller groups such as linguistic groups, religious groups, ethnic groups etc. As Weinstock aptly puts it, "The sentiments of national allegiance which people display simply help us to trace morally significant borders in the moral landscape; they do not tell us what principles to apply within the regions they mark out for us" (*Ibid.*: 529). In other words, co-national partialists have to accept at one level the principal of impartiality which they have rejected at another level. An important fact about modern nations compel them to accept impartiality among co-nationals. Modern nations involve cultural plurality such that citizens almost invariably possess multiple identities which makes intuitively feel partial towards the members of their group. To overcome what nationalists might consider the sectarian loyalties, they must insist on impartiality among co-nationals in the name of nation building which may "run up against the stubborn persistence and resilience of regional or other cultural identities" (*Ibid.*: 530). Thus the nationalists' resort to people's intuition proves to be double-edged.

Weinstock seems to assume that nationalists cannot offer any ethical argument against what they consider to be sectarian modes of thinking but nationalists might claim that co-national partiality has moral justification where as partiality based on infra-national allegiances are not morally justified. Co-national partiality emerges out of a relation that is a product of public culture built in and through a political endeavour where as infra-national partialities are not since infra-national identities are only seasonally active. In other words, the neutrality of national culture vis-à-vis the distinct infra-national cultures take the sting out of the moral indictment against nationalism as partisan. Further, the resistance to the imposition of nationality as primary identity is not unjust because what is imposed is not one of the prevailing cultural identities; it is not even the majoritarian one. Secondly, infra-national identities unlike national ones are not future directional since they do not involve anything corresponding to national building. Weinstock's claim that the partialists' resort to intuition undercuts their own position and goes against his own universalist position. To

weaken his opponent's position he needs to take seriously the very intuition which goes against the universalist position. In other words, to consider that people's intuition about partiality towards members of their groups is an acceptable antidote to the nationalist project is to throw universalism to winds.

The last objection of Weinstock against co-national partiality is even weaker than his other objections. The last objection focuses upon ambiguity regarding what and who of special obligation? In other words, nationalists are not clear about what the special obligations we have to owe to co-nationals are. That is whether these obligations are material, cultural or civic. Also, they are not clear about who the co-nationals are? That is, whether they include co-residents and/or conceityens (citizens of the same state). This objection is quite off the mark because what Weinstock considers to be ambiguity is actually open-endedness. Since both nation and co-national obligations are products of a historical process i.e. they are achieved not given. They acquire meanings and significance determined by the very political process that generates them. Apart from this empirical reason there is a philosophical reason why 'nation' and 'co-national obligations' associated with them are open-ended. 'Nation' and 'national obligation' have the status of values for those who entertain them. They just concern some rules of conduct. Values unlike rules under-determine our actions and choices made regarding them Two persons respecting the same value such as helping others might act in different ways in realizing that value. It is precisely because co-national partiality is open-ended that makes it morally acceptable, though within the limits which co-national partialist readily accepts.

# CHAPTER IV

## NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT

Underlying the discussion of the moral dimension of nationalism is the conflict between the grand ideologies of our times namely, Liberalism and Nationalism both of which, ironically, emerged out of the intellectual tradition and social reality called 'Modernity'. Liberalism espouses cosmopolitanism, individualism/ autonomy/ self-determination and cultural pluralism whereas nationalism involves particularism, communitarianism/solidarity, political integrity and national identity. However, any study of moral dimension of nationalism has significance beyond the juxtaposition of nationalism with liberalism. Nationalism does appeal to emotive levels of human existence and in the fulfillment of important values. At the same time, one may suspect that it conflicts with moral commitments central to an adequate conception of liberalism. At least, there are two tenets of liberal thought: a certain conception of the equality of human beings and an emphasis on individual freedom or autonomy and from these values some other values like tolerance, pluralism, and respect for individual rights can be inferred. As we have seen in the last chapter the first tenet of liberal thought conflicts with the tenet of co-national partiality this is central to nationalism. As we shall see in this chapter nationalism with its communitarian ethics centered on solidarity is ill- at-ease with the individualist ethics of liberalism whose central concept is (individual) autonomy. However, the possibility of liberal nationalism seems attractive inspite of its incoherence, apparent or real. Many political thinkers and practitioners of politics consider the concept of liberal nationalist not only coherent but also philosophically plausible and morally appealing. In fact, 'liberality' is used as a criterion for distinguishing 'good' nationalism from 'bad' nationalism. Anthony Smith for instance, makes a distinction between 'civic- territorial nationalism' and 'ethnic- genealogical nationalism' and claims that Western Nationalism is of former kind and Eastern Nationalism is of latter kind (cf Anthony Smith 1991, ch.1). This is because, according him, Western Nationalism is at least compatible with a liberal state whereas Eastern Nationalism is not. But we must warn ourselves against the superficial ways of harmonizing liberalism with nationalism. It

is usually thought that nationalists support their position by taking recourse to cultural pluralism. That is, they maintain that nations must exist for cultural plurality to flourish. But as McMahan points out, "The appeal to cultural pluralism does support the preservation of existing cultures, but not in a way that would satisfy the nationalists" (1997: 123). This is because the protection of national cultures seems compatible with the rejection of the typically nationalist view that nation is the organizing principle of political life. To quote McMahan again, "The unity and solidarity that nationalists seek within the nations are threatened by the presence of non-national sub-cultures within the nation, hence nationalists typically seek the absorption of sub-cultures into the larger national culture. Liberal politics, by contrast is tolerant of cultural diversity at the sub-national level" (*Ibid.*: 124).

In this chapter, we will look into what recent writers on liberal nationalism have meant by the term 'liberal nationalism' and explore some problems related to it, particularly the tensions between liberal nationalism and the universalist assumption of equality implicit in liberalism. This chapter discusses the moral coherence of liberal nationalism. It examines the attempts that tried to reconcile liberal objectives such as respect for autonomy, democracy and justice in the context of nation. In this connection it looks, in particular, at the Samuel Scheffler paper "Liberalism, Nationalism and Egalitarianism" which deals with the tensions in liberal theory and related issues.

Nationalism and liberalism are supposed to be natural allies. Historically speaking nationalism arose with the rise of liberalism. This historical affinity apart there is an ideological proximity which has been reinforced by the fact that those who reject liberalism in favor of radical theories support internationalism. Liberals who are wedded to universalism try to account for the moral legitimacy of the special bonds among co-nationals. But nationalists raise the following thorny problem: Liberals emphasized the redistribution of resources between citizens as the most important function of the state. But while insisting upon "the moral equality, from the point of view of each individual person, of all persons, [the liberals] fail to will the means necessary for the attainment of the end to which they aspire, namely, that of a just society. Liberal theories of distributive justice thus purportedly contain a suppressed nationalist premise" (Weinstock 1999: 517). The

ideological bond between liberalism and nationalism is reinforced by the fact that liberalism as the ideology of modern industrial societies', going by Gellner's understanding, needs to possess a collectivist ethos apart from the individualist ideology which is all too familiar. This is because the modern industrial society needs to organize itself collectively in running the economy by maximizing the productivity. Hence Nationalism, within the liberal framework "has both individualist and collectivist aspects, mainly because it proves functional for modern industrialism" (Catherine Frost, personal communication). For example, American nationalism may be more individualist, Irish nationalism may be more collectivist; Canadian nationalism may be more communitarian etc. However collectivism within the liberal ideology concerns mass participation in work and do not necessarily has any relation with a common good and hence should not be confused with communitarianism which speaks of common shared goods. For example capitalism is a collectivist strategy that is about facilitating individual goods. Since liberalism can be both individualist as well as collectivist, individualism and collectivism are not antithetical whereas individualism and communitarianism are. As we shall see, nationalism is associated with liberalism in general and liberal nationalism is taken to be the paradigmatic expression of nationalist ideology. In fact, there is a growing feeling among political theorists that it is harder ever to make communitarian goals the basis of nationalism, simply because "growing social diversity (or perhaps the belated recognition that we ARE diverse) makes agreeing on common goals very difficult. That doesn't mean that nationalism no longer has a communitarian element, it just means that if it does have a communitarian element, that element will be increasingly hard to achieve" (*Ibid.*). As one can understand, there have always been individualist and communitarian proponents of nationalism. David Miller's work on nationalism *On Nationality* is based on a communitarian perspective on present-day nationalism, Margaret Moore's *The Ethics of Nationalism*, or Will Kymlicka's *Multicultural Citizenship* gives individualist arguments for national recognition. Even Yael Tamir's *Liberal Nationalism* takes this same individualist approach. One can see nationalism as something that facilitates shared representation, a necessarily communitarian and collective goal. But if we were to look for the single most important factor in the switch from communitarian to individualist arguments, one can think it lies in the initial commitments of the theorists involved. In other words, these theorists believe that the individual is the fundamental unit of politics, and that

value must be worked up from that level, and all policies justified at that level. Once one starts with that commitment, it's natural that one's argument shifts in an individualist direction. But basic moral theories do not dictate particular positions on nationalism without the addition of a lot of other premises or assumptions. In this chapter our aim is to highlight the moral conflicts between liberalism and nationalism in spite of their historical and ideological affinities, as understood by J.S. Mill and Gellner (J.S. Mill, in nineteenth century, tried to associate nationalism with liberalism and freedom) and in doing so, affirm the prospects or at least theoretical plausibility of communitarian nationalism. As an aside it may be mentioned, however, that nationalism during the anti-colonial struggles in the case of countries like India was primarily communitarian and subsequently the communitarian element was weakened in favor of the liberal –individualistic-collectivist element

But, there is a tension between liberalism and nationalism and some even thought liberalism and nationalism are antithetical ideals; and to the extent that liberal democracy and liberal egalitarianism must presuppose an underlying national community, liberalism is doomed to failure in the eyes of its critics (Michael Sandel 1992). They considered nationalism as morally parochial, politically divisive and only of temporary relevance. Elie Kedourie puts it as liberalism and nationalism are "antagonistic principles" (1966: 109). Bhiku Parekh (1999: 295-325) thought the doctrine of liberal nationalism to be incoherent as it seemingly contradict the ideal of global equal concern that liberal nationalists should support. Further, nationalists consider preservation of national cultures to be an impersonal good in the sense it is not reducible to the goods of individual persons. But liberalism with its commitment to individualism finds it difficult to show that "impersonal goods are morally appropriate objects of any concern" (Hurka: 148) According to individualism, only goods of genuine moral concern are personal goods or goods of individuals. From the point of view of an individualist, purely impersonal goods are a fetish

However, the resurgence of nationalist movements in different parts of the world in recent years, and the renewed challenges of multiculturalism and migration within liberal democracies has prompted interest among liberal theorists in the idea of nation. One outcome of this confrontation with nationalism is the growing consensus among

contemporary liberal theorists that liberalism and nationalism, far from being contradictory ideals as once commonly thought, are not only compatible but indeed mutually reinforcing ideals.

On the one hand, Liberals emphasize individual reflection and choice, respect for personal autonomy, toleration, consent of the governed, free speech etc. Liberalism takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral worth and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of him/her culture, nationality or citizenship, besides other morally arbitrary facts about him/her. They count each human being is human and as the moral equal of every other. On the other hand, Nationalists typically build a way of life around the acceptance of traditions, inherited rules, loyalty, solidarity, authority and subservience to national ideals. Liberal nationalists claim that liberal values themselves can only be realized in a political community whose members share a common national identity. For this reason, liberals see nationalism as an ally. Nationalism, even liberal nationalism, puts great weight on the dichotomies of insiders and outsiders as well as members and non-members. The emphasis on membership evidently conflicts with liberalism's commitment to the equality of persons. It is obvious that individuals cannot commit themselves equally to all members of the human race. We care most about members of our family and a small circle of intimates, and the metaphor of concentric circles spreading out from there, and partly coinciding with geographic, ethnic and national boundaries. This pattern roughly describes the nature of most people's moral commitments. Equally significant is the people's desire to join national communities different from their inherited ones. This desire to join national communities stems largely "from the maldistribution of "primary goods," in Rawls's sense: in particular material decency and freedom from persecution, oppression, and violence. Those seriously committed to the equality of persons cannot be indifferent to the radical maldistribution of these primary goods between nations and within them" (Judith Lichtenberg 1999: 183). Liberal nationalism has emerged because liberals have come to recognize that nationalist beliefs and nationalist politics are not temporary phenomena. If people think of themselves in nationalist terms, have a sense of national identity , and resist attempts to erode the sovereignty of national states then liberals must, it may be thought, take this into account in formulating their own commitments. In these terms liberal philosophers must embrace

nationalist concerns if they are to relate to the beliefs of the members of society that they wish to address.

Liberal Nationalists such as David Miller (1995), Yael Tamir (1993) attempt to reconcile the ideals of liberalism with the facts of national affiliation. It is argued that liberal-nationalist project serves the three core ideals of autonomy, democracy, and social justice. It is in the context of a national community that these liberal values can be best and most fully realized. In fact, that liberalism and nationalism are not opposing ideologies and 'liberal nationalism' is not incoherent is one of the leitmotifs of Miller's widely read book *On Nationality* .Of course, Miller uses 'liberal' in a broad sense which ranges over a wide spectrum of political allegiances ranging from liberal conservatives to democratic socialists. Miller makes a subtle point when he says that divergences between liberalism and nationalism are not at the level of political policies but at the level of justifying theory i.e., the way in which liberalism supports its tenets of toleration, free speech, government by consent etc. Further, he recognizes four points of divergence between liberalism and nationalism:

a) Liberalism implies individualism and therefore autonomy of choice where as nationalism implies communitarianism and hence use individual choices against the background of a public culture;

b) Liberalism considers social and political institutions as a product of the contract between individuals and as sustained by the consent of individuals where as nationalism construes them as expression of the will of national community;

c) Liberals see no intrinsic value in public life and political participation. They, rather, valorise individual initiatives and voluntary associations working for a purpose where as nationalists attach immense significance to public life;

d) Liberals try to adopt cultural neutrality i.e., they seek to treat all cultures within a nation on equal footing whereas nationalism gives primacy to the national culture. Apart from recognizing the tensions between nationalism and liberalism, Miller acknowledges that not all types of liberalism are in harmony with nationalism. Versions of liberalism which are individualistic are not congenial to nationalism whereas versions of liberalism which are

communitarians are. This implies that according to Miller liberalism modified on communitarian lines can adapt it self to the principle of nationality. However, it is no wonder if some one suspects that liberalism so modified looses its very essence. Miller perhaps can answer that liberalism as an ideology is plastic enough to retain its substance even when modified in a major way.

Chris Brown, a contemporary political philosopher characterizes the relation between liberalism and nationalism as "nationalists are paradigmatic communitarians and liberals paradigmatic cosmopolitans" (1992: 21-106). Nationalists, like communitarians, generally emphasize the various ways in which individuals are embedded within particular communities- communities constituted in turn by self-consciously shared identities, defined in terms of race or place or history or religion or whatever. Liberals, like cosmopolitans generally emphasize what is common across all those communities-universal standards and a shared humanity. For Margaret Canovan, nationalism is a 'tacit premise' of contemporary political thinking (Canovan 1996: 1). As Berlin puts it, "It would not, I think, an exaggeration to say that no political movement today, at any rate outside the western world, seems likely to succeed unless it allies itself to nationalist sentiments" (1979: 355). The emergence of liberal nationalism was linked to the belief that nationalism is necessary for the achievement of liberalism's own objectives. Indeed, these concerns constitute the moral objectives of liberal nationalism.

**Concerns of Liberal Nationalists and their Critics**

Liberal nationalists maintain that liberal values themselves can only be realized in a political community whose members share a common national identity. Liberal Nationalism has a conviction that nationalism is essential for the realization of liberalism's own moral objectives – its concerns for personal autonomy, democracy and social justice. So, in turn the concerns of liberalism constitute the concerns of liberal nationalism. In this case, nationalism, properly understood, should be seen by liberals as an ally, not an enemy.

The first concern is about the conditions for personal autonomy. Liberal Nationalists argue that nationality provides the moral pre-condition for individual autonomy, because membership in a national community defines the cultural context of choice within which individuals pursue and revise their conceptions of the good life and acquire their sense of identity and belonging. According to Will Kymlicka liberalism is grounded in a "moral ontology" that "recognizes only individuals, each of whom is to be treated with equal consideration" (1989: 162). One of the defining features of liberalism is its belief in the intrinsic value of persons. A person is thought of being endowed with sufficient reason to evaluate his beliefs and actions. The individual possess the capacity to evaluate his norms and values and if necessary, to revise them. That is the reason why a person is thought of as being capable to take up the responsibility for his own life. It means treating a person as a self-legislating subject who can direct the course of his own life. But no one chooses in a vacuum. The alternatives themselves are contained within the culture that the person in question belongs to, and only national cultures are comprehensive enough to provide the full range of choice. So it is important for autonomy that the national culture should be sustained, and that those who participate in it should be respected rather than disparaged. This requires, in practice, that the community in question should enjoy political self-determination. In theory one might imagine a multinational state or empire in which each national culture enjoyed adequate protection and respect, but in reality, liberal nationalists claim, such states always privilege one particular culture at the expense of the others. To be free you must live in a society whose culture you share and where the choices you make within that culture are recognized as valuable.

Liberal nationalists consider national affiliation is a part of a justifiable social and political order because it furthers their core liberal values. The point is that the idea of nationality is normatively attractive if and only if it serves the needs of individuals, treated as equals. Liberal nationalists argue that the idea of nationality does not conflict with the moral ontology of liberalism, and in fact is necessary for the successful execution of the values of individuality and equality. These values are connected because equality pertains to individual citizens rather than lots or groups or parties, and because individuality grants each citizen an importance equivalent to any other citizen. To mark a

difference between Individuality and Individualism, one can say Individuality means living one's own life, but to do this one needs a range of possibilities that can only be provided through the practices, traditions, and institutions of a stable social order. One also needs to note that "individuality" does not entail "individualism." The former is a claim about the moral status of the person, while the latter is a claim about psychological orientation or motivation (cf David Johnston 1994: 17-27).

Liberals propose autonomy and the exercise of meaningful choice among competing ways of life. For instance, Yael Tamir argues " the liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection and choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity, although generally seen as mutually exclusive, can indeed accommodate each other" (1993: 6).Liberal Nationalism for Tamir combines attention to the liberties of the individual, the traditional strength of liberalism, with equal concern for " the importance of belonging, membership, and cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments that follow from them" (*Ibid.*: 6). A basic condition for human flourishing, she seems to suggest, is that individuals be "able to share their lives with some particular others they care about and see as their partners in a life-project" (*Ibid.*: 94). Her liberal nationalism thus combines a "commitment to personal autonomy and individual rights" with "the importance of membership in human communities in general, and national communities in particular" (*Ibid.*: 35).Tamir argues that liberals should acknowledge a basic right to culture which is defined as a " public sphere in which individuals can share a language, memorize their past, cherish their heroes, [and] live a fulfilling national life" (*Ibid.*: 8), which is different in important respects from simply sharing a bloodless legal identity as a member of a political state.

James S. Fishkin, in his *The Dialogue of Justice* presents the case for what he calls a "self-reflective political culture" constituted by the willingness of its members to participate in "continuing critical examination through unmanipulated debate" of the practices and presuppositions of the social order (1991: 124) Jeff Spinner also emphasizes the link between liberalism and "self-critical reflectiveness" (1994: 94). One of the ways, Liberal nationalists connect nation to self is through the idea that people can only flourish

in social environments organized—informally or formally—as nations. They reflect on how the features of nationality such as temporal depth and territorial rootedness provide a sense of continuity and place that people need to undersytand to understand the significance of their lives. Neil MacCormick views that nationality provides a sense of continuity and place that people need to understand the significance of their lives. "Consciousness of belonging to a nation is one of the things which enables us as individuals in some way in this earthly existence to transcend the limitations of space, time, and mortality and to participate in that which had meaning before us and will continue to have meaning beyond us" (1982: 252).

However, some Liberals, like Jeremy Waldron, reject the arguments in favor of nationalism and argue that liberal principles can be divorced completely from nationality. They challenge the claim that autonomy requires the secure cultural background that nationality provides. Observing that most contemporary societies are multicultural, liberals in this camp argue that autonomy is often a matter of picking and choosing elements from different cultures-the more cultures one has access to, the greater one's independence from the traditions of any culture in particular. Thus Jeremy Waldron has celebrated what he calls cultural "'*melange*'–'the chaotic coexistence of projects, pursuits, ideas, images, and snatches of culture *within* an individual' – as a way of life that is at least as autonomous as a life lived within the framework of a single community" (Jeremy Waldron 1995).

Also, some thinkers argue that many other sources of continuity are available and are as significant to individual flourishing as national affiliation. These "include families, friendships, neighborhood associations, community groups, workplace and professional organizations, religious affiliation and church groups, political associations, and many more sub- and supra-national sources of interconnectedness" (Allen Buchanan 1998: 302-03). Not only are these sources of connection and continuity sometimes are more important to our sense of well-being, but they often come in conflict with our national identity. The multiple sources of connection and continuity result in our seeing co-nationals as different from us along a number of salient dimensions—politics, religion, work—as they are similar to us. A liberal state ought to as far as possible treat such identities even-handedly, creating

institutions that give equal recognition to each of them. Nationalism, might involve the arbitrary privileging of one identity in particular: national culture is given public recognition and state support, often to the detriment of minority cultures. Some citizens, therefore, find their main identity affirmed by the state while others do not, and this violates the liberal principle of equal citizenship.

It is clear from the above discussion that the concept of liberal nationalism is not all that logically well shaped as its proponents seem to assume. The view that the individual autonomy can realize itself through the range of possibilities offered by nationalism with its communitarian ethos is not unquestionable. Let us now look at two more concerns of liberalism and see how nationalism fares in relation to them.

The second concern of liberal nationalists is a concern for democracy. It is based on John Stuart Mill's claim of the relevance of nationhood In his *Considerations on Representative Government,* Mill argues that democracy can flourish only where "the boundaries of government coincide in the main with those of nationality" (1993: 394). His argument in support of this contention is based on an analysis of the necessary conditions for a flourishing democracy: "Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot exist" (*Ibid.*: 392). According to liberal nationalists, we cannot have a successful democracy unless we share a sense of solidarity with co-members (cf Charles Taylor 1996: 119-121).There needs to be a special bonding if citizens are to govern in a way that responsibly promotes the common good and sometimes requires sacrifices on the part of members. People need to be in relations of reciprocity, mutual trust etc. to generate the necessary solidarity and so to act responsibly. Nationalism is in fact "the main source of such solidarity, so nationalism plays a highly important role in sustaining democracy. Moreover, in emerging democracies especially in developing nations, liberal nationalism can achieve something approximating democracy more effectively than the alternatives" (Will Kymlicka 2001: 212). Liberal Nationalists argue that national affiliation serves as a necessary social framework for democratic institutions by securing citizens' 'communicative competence,' by shoring up trust between groups that hold differing

political interests, and by encouraging collective sentiment 'Communicative competence' is the simple idea that "for democratic politics to work, the citizens must be able to communicate with each other" (Brian Barry 1983: 145). Such competence demands the sort of "linguistic homogeneity" and "cultural similarity" national affiliation provides, since "the ability to interpret the behavior of other people depends on a mass of shared understandings" (*Ibid.*: 144-45).

To work successfully, democratic institutions require a body of citizens filled with a certain level of civic spirit. For example, elections must be conducted fairly, and the results accepted by the losing side; governments must be scrutinized to ensure that they are keeping their electoral promises; and minorities' rights to free speech and political association must be respected. This in turn requires citizens to trust one another to behave in accordance with democratic norms. Trust, Miller argues, is something that enables me to "support your just demand on this occasion knowing that you will support my just demand at some future moment," and is best understood as a social relation that "requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide" (1995: 140). In multinational states, each group considers its own interests first, distrusts the other groups, and tends to regard politics as a zero-sum game. In these conditions civic spirit disappears and democracy is difficult if not impossible to maintain. Only if political communities are interpreted in nationalist terms, it may be argued that democracy cannot give any substance and generate any political obligations. If democracy, for instance, is understood to mean self-government, government by the people, then it is necessary to give some meaning to the concept of 'the people'. Democratic government, in these terms, "becomes government by members of one's nation in the interests of one's nation" (Miller 1995: 88-9). The appeal to the nation also "fosters trust between the ruled and the rulers: if those who exercise the power of the state are drawn from the nation then they can more readily be trusted with that power than those who are not of the nation, such as with colonial rulers, or rule from distant capitals in empires" (*Ibid.*: 90-1). Nationalism is important for the achievement of stability in democratic states. "Nationalists believe that individuals who possess a sense of national identity are more likely to acknowledge obligations toward the state if that state is their own nation-state" (*Ibid.*: 73).

The claim that democracy presupposes a shared sense of nationality can be challenged. All that is necessary, liberal critics have argued, is that citizens should identify with and feel loyal towards their political community, and this can be a strictly political identification without the cultural baggage that comes with nationhood (cf Mason 1999). And this makes it easier for minority groups to feel that they belong, and can be respected as equal citizens. Contemporary democratic theorists like Jurgen Habermas agree with liberal nationalists that public culture is important for democratic practices, but they reject the idea that public culture depends upon a network of specifically national ties and sentiments: "This concept of popular sovereignty does not refer to some substantive collective will which would owe its identity to a prior homogeneity of descent or form of life. The consensus achieved in the course of argument in an association of free and equal citizens stems in the final instance from an identically applied *procedure* recognized by all" (Habermas 1992: 4). An idea that has often been used in this context is the idea of constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1999: 264) – the idea that the focus of loyalty should not be the cultural nation but a set of political principles laid down in a constitution. Such loyalty, it is claimed, is a sufficient basis for democratic institutions and policies of social justice.

The third concern presents nationhood as a precondition for social justice. Miller argues, for instance, that a more just and fair distribution of resources between persons is more likely to be achieved in the context of a national community than by appealing to an abstract commitment to the welfare of mankind (cf Miller 1995: 84-5). The members of national communities, he believes, recognize particular obligations to the welfare of other members of their particular community and support policies of redistribution. He also speculates that if a commitment to social justice can be fostered on the basis of a sense of national obligation it may be that this could encourage a greater willingness to accept wider moral responsibilities to other peoples (cf *Ibid.*: 73-80). The welfare state and the other institutions of social justice represent an agreement to pool resources to provide every citizen with a certain level of protection against the contingencies of life. In the event of ill-health, one has access to medical care; in case of unemployment one receives income

support. Built into the system is some degree of redistribution from the talented and the resilient to the more vulnerable members of society.

Liberal nationalists argue that nationality explains why citizens are under special, political, obligations to one another that extend beyond general humanistic duties to respect others as persons with basic rights and needs. In practice co-nationals are held more responsible for each other than for people in general, their responsibilities to co-nationals usually take precedence over general humanitarian responsibilities, and their political obligations arise in a different way than general humanistic duties arise. Co-nationals are "doubly bound" because they owe humanistic obligations to each other as human beings as well as political or associative obligations to each other as members of a historical collective project (cf Richard Dagger 1985: 443). Liberal nationalists maintain that co-nationals have a greater moral significance because they have contributed to and participated in collective projects— public goods like defense, economic infrastructure, disaster relief—from which all benefit. We place the preservation of their basic rights and the satisfaction of their basic needs at a higher priority than those of members of other countries. Though we have general humanistic duties by virtue of our bare existence, we have political obligations by virtue of our social boundedness and territorial rootedness.

We shape our national lives in this way because of a sense of solidarity with fellow-citizens. But this sharing stems from a common identity and a resulting confidence in our compatriots that they will reciprocate when it is our turn to need protection. Contemporary liberal nationalists present their principles of justice as holding within a self-contained political community whose members enter it only by birth and leave it only by death. This argument--that citizenship requires bonds of attachment to the state and to fellow citizens (or co-nationals)--is an instrumental argument for a form of nationalism. It conceives of national identification as instrumental to achieving the good of liberal citizenship, which, in turn, is supportive of principles of justice and respect for diversity. They argue that nationality also explains why citizens are under special, political obligations to one another that extend beyond general humanistic duties to respect others as persons with basic rights and needs. In practice co-nationals are held more responsible for each other than for people in general, their responsibilities to co-nationals usually take precedence over general humanitarian

responsibilities, and their political obligations arise in a different way than general humanistic duties arise.

The critics argue that to justify egalitarian policy through the special duties of co-nationals, through the overlapping circles of sentiment and history is to misconstrue the meaning of equality. Issues of equality are distinct from issues of cultural membership. The liberal value of equality asks us to make sacrifices not because we feel an attachment to our co-nationals, but because they have a right to equal treatment (Arthur Ripstein 1997: 215). The relations of horizontal equivalence expressed in national symbols and narratives place citizens in an equal position in terms of collective identity, but such an achievement is quite different than the achievement of social or economic equality. Having the status of conational grants people access to some goods, but not necessarily those goods relevant to social and economic equality. To see fellow citizens as compatriots may lead one to extend to them a kind of civic recognition—signs and gestures of fellowship and belonging, for example— but this is different from extending to them entitlements to equal shares of the primary goods produced in society.

Even if practices like declaring war on poverty do prove useful in connecting national sentiments to egalitarian purposes, they are uncertain. What such strategies entail is using emotional reactions to national myth, symbol, and narrative—considered valuable in themselves by many people—toward other ends. Put simply, liberal nationalists see sentiments related to national affiliation as a means to an egalitarian end, while co-nationals themselves see them as ends in themselves. Such "purely instrumental nationalism may be unstable as a source of support for egalitarian purposes since non-egalitarian elites can use national myth, symbol, and narrative for their own purposes" (Daniel Weinstock 1996: 93). Even though they have been useful in the past, liberals require a stronger ground than ties of national sentiment for securing the value of justice in practice.

However, Liberal Nationalism has become the official version of nationalism as increasing number of liberals are coming to accept that some sense of shared identity is required to sustain liberal democratic institutions, and that this may call for more than an

allegiance to shared political values and principles. Liberals think that liberal democratic state must be endorsed by a common national community, and that to inculcate and foster this common nationality, the liberal state has to engage in some form of nation building. Indeed, historically, liberals have been more attuned to the centrality of the nation. J.S. Mill thought that the success of liberal institutions in a given society depends on there being a common national culture (1993). The liberal state may thus adopt certain policies to integrate all citizens into what Kymlicka (2001b) has called a societal culture-i.e. a set of public and social institutions operating with a common language- to try to achieve this overlap between nation and state.

Liberal Nationalists like Charles Taylor, Yael Tamir, Will Kymlicka think that the liberal-nationalist project takes away the illiberal sting out of nationalism and also combats unthinking and dogmatic rejections of nationalist politics thereby facilitating accommodation with nationalism. It seems to many that liberalism, especially in its more individualist versions allows too little place for expression of group identity and it's thin conception of communal membership weakens the cultural resources necessary for a sustainable political community. Of course, it may be unreasonable to imagine the liberal ideas of membership allow no place for collective identity, since every liberal theorist presupposes a world of separate states that claim the allegiance of their members. Rather, the liberal ideal would be to get as far as possible from ideas of national exclusivity to be consistent with the continued existence of these ideas. This universalistic aspiration of the liberalism and related issues are explored below.

**Two Concepts of Liberalism**

Let us now concentrate on two ideas of Liberalism, the idea of self-respect and the idea of critical reflectiveness in our attempt to understand the dynamics of the conflict between liberalism and nationalism. Considering the first one, liberals think, self-respect is one of the primary goods whose allocation is addressed by principles of justice (John Rawls 1972: 440-6). Self-respect is a crucial good for Rawls in that it is a good that any person will need to have if he is to accomplish whatsoever his particular plan of life might be. Self-respect is the sense that one's

life goes well, that one's ends and objectives are worth following, and that one's plan of life is worth pursuing. While it may be possible for some individuals to have an internal sense of importance despite the views of others, for the majority people self-respect will be a product of their community status, of their value in the judgment of other people. This is why Rawls emphasizes that self-respect is a creation of the ways that other primary goods are disseminated to individuals by civic principles of justice. People who enjoy self-respect probably take pride in them, in their life, ends, pursuits, and to feel dedicated to that life.

But, nationalists, like Miller, argue that individuals are socially embedded. Individuals are rooted within a particular national community so that it is from their national community that persons obtain their sense of identity and their obligations. In these conditions, a sense of self-respect would be founded on pride in a national community and, therefore, in a person's identity and commitments as a member of that community. Individuals, most probably, will have little sense of their life going well if they are embedded in a society that they take little pride in. This sense of self-importance in one's community is central for the accomplishment of liberal nationalist objectives because without that pride there will be no basis for the moral and political obligations that nationalists plead in sustaining democratic states and social justice.

The second idea that is significant for this dialogue between Liberalism and Nationalism is the idea of critical reflectiveness. As Rawls argues (1993: 30-2), individuals not only own principles, commitments that compose the good life for them but also have the capacity to reflect decisively on their values, whether to accept or reject those values depending on the reflection. He maintains that individual beliefs need not be the predictable outcome of their location.

The idea of critical reflection is of seminal importance to Liberal Nationalists as it differentiates them from Conservative Nationalists. Conservative thinkers like Roger Scruton (1984: 202) maintain that individuals are born into a particular national community. It is from their national community that individuals inevitably absorb their values and to which they automatically be obligated. Liberal Nationalists, unlike their counterparts, maintain that

individuals can and should reflect critically on their particular national community. Tamir, for instance, argues that national communities are communities of choice rather than fate, in that individuals can choose whether to belong to or reject particular communities, such as by leaving one community and joining another. She refers to 'reflective nationalism' and argues that reflection and choice are important for national identity (Tamir 1993: 11). She also suggests that social roles and national identity can be a matter of choice (*Ibid.*: 26-7). She argues, indeed, that "membership of a nation is elective" so that national obligations become "voluntary acts rather than inevitable consequences of fate" (*Ibid.*: 87). Miller also states that although he does not consider national communities as communities of choice, for him, individuals are "forced to bear a national identity regardless of choice" (1995: 43). He does, nevertheless, insist that individuals can and should reflect on their communities and enter debates over the nature and reform of the community. It is clear now that the idea of critical reflectiveness is of paramount importance to liberal nationalism. This implies that individual's self-respect need not be an outcome of being simply located in the community. The critically reflective individuals should be able to appreciate the value of a community and for that the liberal nationalist should establish the value of national communities.

**The Challenges Faced by Liberal Nationalism**

Let us explore the claims that are related to the nationalist belief in the importance of nations as communities, in turn to assess the nationalist claims. While nationalists need not deny the existence and value of other communities, they do insist on the primary importance of national communities. For nationalists, nations are important both empirically and normatively: it is from the nation that individuals do, and should, derive their values and sense of identity, and it is to the nation that they do owe their obligations and responsibilities. If nationalism is to be defended as compatible with liberal principles then it is necessary to defend the importance of nations as communities. Arguments concerning the value of the nation as a community may be broken down into two separate claims: first, that it is important for individuals to live in communities; second, that it is important for individuals to live in national communities. These claims will be examined in turn.

Nationalists in accordance with the communitarian stance argue that persons are to be conceived only as socially embedded beings. The ascribing of priority to community is emphasized by two characteristics concerning an individual's association with a community: 1) Individuals never disassociate themselves from others in a community rather live in particular communities with particular tradition, culture and history. The individuality is induced from the community e.g. their sense of identity, sense of worth, values, ends etc. As Isaiah Berlin puts it for the nationalists, "the characters of the individuals who compose groups are shaped by, and cannot be understood apart from, those of the group, defined in terms of common territory, customs, laws, memories, beliefs, language, artistic and religious expression, social institutions, ways of life, to which some heredity, kinship, racial characteristics; and that it is these factors which shape human beings, their purposes and values" (1979: 341). Hence, personhood is the consequence of their living in community. 2) Individuals should be embedded in a community if their lives are to go well. Berlin says that the need to belong to "easily identifiable group has been regarded ... as a natural requirement on the part of human beings" (*Ibid.*: 338). Neil MacCormick joins Berlin by saying that "The truth about human beings is that they can only become individuals - acquire a sense of their own individuality - as a result of their social experiences within human communities" (1982: 247). This implies that individuals should live in a community to have a satisfactory life.

This communitarian stand taken by Liberal Nationalists is attacked. The critics state that this stance is false since at the descriptive level, we get a different understanding. Even though we have lesser number of instances of individuals isolating physically from their community, there are cases of individuals isolating themselves both intellectually and morally. Thus, descriptively this claim does not hold. Existentialist literature, for instance, "presents the outsider as a central character, a character who lives outside the fabric of his community, rebelling against its customs and conventions, its traditions and its expectations" says Nicholas Buttle (2000: 117). Nevertheless, nationalists may shape the claim in prescriptive form saying that individuals should induce values from their community. The prescriptive claim is vulnerable in the following ways.1) The prescriptive

claim doesn't offer a demarcation line between liberal and illiberal communities because in both communities, individuals induce values of their respective societies. 2) There is a serious difficulty associated with the zeroing in process of the identity of the community. The different components which eventually shape an individual's identity are not rooted or connected with just one particular feature of the community. If such is the case, a criterion of critical reflection needs to be formed in order to weigh the worth of different identities within a community. For example, Miller argues that "national identities emerge through open processes of debate and discussion ..." (1995: 39). It is, however, unclear what criteria should be used to decide between alternative interpretations of national identities. A similar situation exists concerning values embedded in communities. Choosing between values also points to a criterion of critical reflection. The nationalist's prescription of identifying with one's own community undermines such a criterion. Even though communities may be sociologically important in terms of deriving identity and values, the choice of these values points to a normative criteria which need to be defended.

Coming to the point that national communities are important, nationalists have to defend that nationalist communities stand out among other communities. They argue that national communities give the innate belongingness and a sense of identity which individuals crave for. Anthony D.Smith suggests that nations satisfy for many people, "their needs for cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security, and fraternity" (1995: 159). Erica Benner also characterizes the nationalist appeal to national traditions as involving "a unit of political obligation which is small enough to engage hearts as well as minds, yet big enough -at least in principle – to overcome localism and the narrow politics of ethnic, religious, or racial identity" (1997: 191). In this process, they argue against sub-national and international communities stating that they are not genuine communities as they don't share any common history and values. Some nationalists like Miller (1995, ch. 5) also don't value multicultural societies as the different local cultures may undermine the national culture as the overarching identity with which the members of the nation should be connected with. He thinks that the sub-national cultures may lead to instability and conflict. Also, for some nationalists, nationalism gives a sense of spiritualism, a longing to identify with the transcendent. Smith considers nations as "communities of history and destiny that confer

on mortals a sense of immortality through the judgment of posterity" (1995: 58-9). For MacCormick a nation "enables us as individuals in some way in this earthly existence to transcend the limitations of space, time, and mortality, and to participate in that which has meaning before us and will have meaning beyond us" (1982: 252). For Miller, national identity is "an identity that embodies historical continuity...The historic national community is a community of obligation" (1995: 23).

At an empirical level, it is difficult to say that people have identified with nationhood all the time as they might have identified with local communities to quench their need to belong. Even historically it was the case that nationalism appeared only two centuries ago. As Elie Kedourie puts it, "Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century" (1966: 9). Also, individuals need not identify with nation all the time. As Andrew Vincent argues, "Individuals are quite commonly at the interstice between multiple allegiances, many of which can be deeply opposed. Some allegiance, say religious or political (Catholicism, Islam, Marxism, even cosmopolitan Liberalism), may, in fact, entail denying national commitment. In addition, individuals are also usually more deeply embedded in families, workplace, churches, unions or clubs than nations. Nations are not ephemeral, but they certainly have little everyday significance for individuals-at least for most of the time – whereas groups like families, religious affiliations, occupations and the multiple associations of everyday life press upon us all with depressing (and often joyful) regularity. Thus, the idea of nation forms anything more than a small aspect of embedded identity appears as simple commonsense, even, ironically, from a liberal nationalist position" (1997: 285-86). So, for liberal nationalists, it is difficult to claim that national communities are the only important communities at an empirical level. That is why they resort to prescriptive claim that members of the nation ought to identity with the nation. This is challenged by republicans who argue that only at local level individuals can be involved in civic activity and thereby they acquire a sense of civic identity (See Benner 1997: 193-8). Nationalism seems incompatible with the decentralized structures of republicanism. Nationalists have to supply arguments to counter these challenges.

It is also up to the liberal nationalist to defend the claim that it is actually morally worthwhile to be a member of a national community. There are a couple of reasons as to why such a claim needs to be defended, primary among them being the fact that such a defense alone will be able to differentiate liberal nationalism from other forms of nationalism, especially conservative nationalism. The second reason why liberal nationalists should be in a position to mount such a defense is to safeguard the philosophy of liberal nationalism from being formulated in such a way that every national community irrespective of its structure and the values it upholds becomes worth identifying with for a liberal nationalist. Nationalism scarcely fits into the liberal framework if every national community and every feature of every such community is supported solely because it is a national community. A liberal nationalist must be able to identify with only certain communities and certain features of communities that are morally defensible. The conservative stand of blindly supporting a nation because of its mere existence is not the one the liberal nationalist can adopt and thus due care must be taken to ensure that the liberal nationalist does not fall into such a trap.

The notion of critical reflection and its significance is another reason why liberal nationalists need to defend the value of particular nations. Such a defense is a pre-requisite for an individual to take pride in being as a member of such a nation. The commitment of individuals to institutions is also predicated upon the realization of the worth of a nation. Often an initial sense of affinity with one's ancestral community may be transformed into disillusionment when one learns of the fact that one's ancestors were involved in acts of cruelty, exploitation etc. Such acts often create feelings of deep disgust and dissatisfaction in individuals which could culminate in the total dissociation with the national community in which one was born. Thus the commitment to the liberal nationalist framework is more a commitment to a value system than a commitment to a sense of community created by descent or factors of birth. Andrew Vincent says, "It would appear to follow from the liberal nationalist argument that anything which constitutes part of our identity deserves respect. This, in itself, would license respect for the most abominable practices and cannot be what liberal nationalists wish to assert" (1997: 290). One more reason why a particular national community is important is that its members believe that their membership is valuable for

them. While a liberal might well respect the beliefs that people hold concerning their own values, those beliefs cannot be accepted uncritically. If the culture of a community, for instance, is anti-individualist, anti-democratic and unjust, even liberal nationalists would have reservations concerning the worth of that community even if its members thought that their culture was important for them.

Thus, we have identified the two issues that the liberal nationalist framework has to deal with i.e. the defense of the value of the community and the defense of the value of the national community. The demand has often been put forward that there ought to be a reasoned justification for nationalist beliefs. One response to such demand would be the argument that rational philosophic ideas cannot be used to analyze the concept of nationalism. As such ideas appeal to emotion and sentiment and not reason and so should be appreciated in such a manner. "[I]t may not be rational to discard beliefs, even if they are, strictly speaking, false", Miller writes, "when they can be shown to contribute significantly to the support of valuable social relations" (1995: 36). False beliefs embody continuity between generations, hold up the moral virtues of our ancestors and so help maintain the nation as a nexus of social relations. Miller's conception of philosophy is one of a discipline which should deal with the beliefs and attitudes that in reality affect and influence people in different societies rather than merely indulging in abstract contemplation of principles which are in no way connected to day-to day life It is in the context of this argument that nationalist philosophy gains credence and assumes significance, it being a philosophy that is much in vogue in contemporary societies. Therefore it is incumbent upon liberals to recognize the potential of the nationalist philosophy and adapt themselves to it. (cf. Miller, *Ibid.*: 65-73). Miller does think that the nationalist spirit is grounded in what is popularly known as the fabric of thought and emotion. However it is not possible to defend nationalism by merely consigning it to the realm of sentiment and feeling, for, the existence of nationalists is not strong enough reason for accepting the arguments behind nationalism. Even if people are nationalists, this does not settle the question of whether they should be nationalists. If the critical reflectiveness of the national project is to endure it is imperative that the nationalists be able to provide credible and realistic arguments to prove why a

person should embrace nationalistic ideas. Let us briefly look at some of their attempts below.

The stand of the liberals when they are called upon to defend, legitimize, sanction and uphold certain institutions is usually to resort to the realm of general principles. Thus the liberal would try to capture the abstract principle which would sanction the creation of a nation and its existence as a legitimate social entity. Such a principle could perhaps be a general understanding of the conditions in which human societies flourish, i.e. the conditions in which all requirements of a citizen are met. The principle could also be in terms of generalized principles such as justice or rights or democracy. The liberal standpoint is that the value of a nation, a society or an institution can only be determined by the value of general moral principles. However this is an argument that is rejected by the nationalists as they do not approve of the appeal to an abstract and general set of moral values. Thus the liberal nationalist philosophy is deprived of the intellectual resources required to defend the standpoint of certain nations and communities in accordance with the philosophy of the liberal tradition. On the other side, the nationalists put forth three arguments as to why general moral principles cannot be employed to legitimize the cause of nations or communities. Nationalists point out the impossibility of formulating moral principles which can be general and universal as different societies have different value systems and it is not possible to apply the value system of one society on another. Thus any attempt to formulate a general system of values will be a failure as such a system will invariably be biased towards a particular notion of values. According to Isaiah Berlin (1976), this point was first formulated by Vico and Herder. Secondly, even if such a system is formulated, it, in its attempt to be general will be so abstract so as to be completely inadequate as a means of moral assessment of societies. In other words, even if it is possible to formulate general moral principles then these principles, in order to be general, will be so vague that they cannot function as the basis for moral assessment of concrete principles and realities in communities. For example, Anthony Smith (1995: 22) argues that cosmopolitanism is trivial and shallow. The third conclusive argument the nationalists, like Miller (1995: 57), put forth, which is inseparably linked to the second, is that an abstract, universal set of values will be too weak and unclear, thus making it incapable of inspiring individuals to engage in

moral actions such as to provide for the well-being of others. Such moral actions are of vital importance in the nationalist scheme of things. It is the power of such actions that strengthens the framework of the nation. On the other hand, nationalist principles inspire action by appealing to the emotions and sentiments of the members of a community rather than their reason. Hence, nationalists think that general moral principles are futile in the context of nationalism. This is because such general moral principles are impossible to formulate, and if formulated they will be too vague and too abstract to offer any basis by which the worth of particular communities and particular nations could be evaluated.

As discussed above, the rejection of the concept of general moral principles by the nationalists takes away a key argument which can be employed by the liberal nationalists to put up a moral defense of the worth of a national community. In such context liberal nationalism will no longer satisfy the need for self-respect in oneself and one's community as a result of critical reflection on one's situation. The inability to create a feeling of self-respect thus creates situation in which the concept of the nation and the appeal it exerts are of no value to a liberal in his/her attempt to propagate liberal values. Thus to a liberal, the appeal to a general system of values is absolutely necessary as it would otherwise become impossible to sustain an argument in favor of nations and national communities except through the sociological argument that nations exist and individuals value their national identities. But such a sociological defense is weak as it does not address the question of a larger value system, a concept that is of great importance in the liberal framework. Thus we find the conflict between liberalism and nationalism as nationalists reject the significance of general principles and thereby undermine the liberal attempt to use the national community and the appeal to national sentiments as a means to achieve liberal goals. In 'Liberal nationalism', the universalism of liberalism and the "Particularism" of nationalism are pulling in opposing directions" (Nicholas Buttle 2000: 124).

This conflict between the liberalism and nationalism led some thinkers to conclude cynically that these two are not reconcilable and the construct called Liberal Nationalism is a theoretical contradiction. Margaret Canovan sees the dangers of moral Particularism without some moral universalism (1996: 135) and Erica Benner argues that national

values need to be anchored in more fundamental principles (1997: 204). But this is more easily said than done. In this connection let us know discuss the views of Samuel Scheffler to get further exposed to some problems related to the tensions in the liberal theory.

**Samuel Scheffler's Views**

Nationalism poses particular problems for the liberal theory of the state. In a liberal society, individuals reject the responsibilities imposed on them by society, which they consider to be regressive and believe in voluntary action. The socially imposed actions are called associative actions, which arise out of social ties, and liberalists object to it because they have no control over them. But they do have some natural responsibilities, which are characterized as political obligations that are consensually generated obligations to uphold the institutions and laws of one society. But the contradiction emerging here is that one is bound up by the laws of one's own country of birth (liberals refuse the laws based on birth and inheritance).This is a major tension within the liberal theory.

Liberalism is criticized from the opposing standpoints of Universalism or Globalism and Particularism. Globalists believe that liberalism as normally formulated is insensitive to questions of international morality and it focuses too much of its attention on the individual society organized as a political unit. Particularists believe that liberalism underestimates the human and political significance that attaches to membership in nation or in a cultural or communal group and, therefore, neglects the special responsibilities that arise from membership in nation or community. Each of these criticisms points to a different tension within liberal theory. This makes it difficult to see how the liberal tradition with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice and the nationalism with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity can indeed accommodate one another.

Samuel Scheffler's contribution (1997: 191-208) does confront these issues, and his treatment induces a careful study. His essay deals with the question of how various kinds of social ties affect the responsibilities that people have to each other. In other words, it concerns about the boundaries of our responsibilities. He argues that the particularist and globalist criticisms of liberalism point to two different tensions within liberal thought which

need to be faced. First, a tension between an explicit voluntarism and implicit nationalism and second, a tension between a commitment to moral egalitarianism and a commitment to some form of Particularism about political responsibility. These tensions within liberal theory are explored through Scheffler's discussion of debates about associative duties. The two tensions reflect Liberal Nationalism's difficulty in jointly accommodating the three values of autonomy and moral equality, on the one hand, and loyalty, on the other.

Now, let us consider what Scheffler calls the tension between an explicit voluntarism and implicit nationalism. Scheffler, to frame the debate, raises the issue of the associative duties. Associative duties are the special obligations, the ones that arise due to one being a member of a particular nation. These pre-given obligations towards a nation are not subjected to reason. "Associative duties," he says, "do not merely permit the assignment of priority to the interests of one's associates; they require it." He characterizes them as "duties that the members of significant social groups and the participants in close personal relationships have to each other" (1997: 192). He issues a challenge: "If all people are of equal value and importance, then what is it about my relation to my associates that makes it not merely permissible but obligatory for me to give their interests priority over the interests of other people?" He distinguishes "associative duties" from others, for instance, contractual duties or duties of gratitude. Scheffler thinks rightly that we commonly believe that we have some such duties, and he notes how they are problematic given our liberal tradition, which would have us deny that mere membership could generate such duties. He argues that many liberal theories rely tacitly on associative duties both in their attempts to generate political obligations to fellow citizens or to one's political institutions and in characteristic accounts of the acquisition of citizenship.

Some versions of liberalism, particularly those that are more individualistic, have been very uncomfortable with nationalism. On such individualistic accounts, it is the autonomous individual, the rational chooser, conceived prior to and only contingently involved in communal relations, who reigns supreme. What we owe to others we owe to them as fellow rational beings; what we owe we owe impartially and universally. What we owe to particular others we owe not by virtue of custom and tradition, hierarchy and social

order, community and commitment, and the obligations of loyalty that are associated with them, but only through contract with its self-assumed obligations. Scheffler speaks of this as the voluntarist objection to nationalism and patriotism (cf 1997: 193-95). The extreme version of liberalism, insofar as it tends to impact on all social bonds, reducing them to the status of contractual or self-assumed commitments, almost certainly impacts negatively on many other valued particularistic arrangements that are bound by loyalty, and not just on national or patriotic ones. On the face of it, this objection seems a natural outgrowth of a more general concern with the freedom and autonomy of the individual agent. As such it resonates with the central values of liberalism and indeed, one standard objection to nationalism and communitarianism. Liberal theorists are concerned with the responsibility of the individual citizens and the responsibilities are usually categorized as "political obligations," which are conceived of as consensually generated obligations to uphold the laws and institutions of one's society.

What is of interest is that despite subject to particularist criticism, liberalism itself has an important particularist dimension. Political obligations are thought of as special obligations that are owed either to the other members of one's own society or to its political institutions, who are in turn conceived of as specially responsible for protecting and promoting the interests of the members of that society. Thus, whether or not political obligations are thought of as owed directly to co-citizens, they are, in any case, special obligations whose ultimate beneficiaries are one's own citizens. This can be seen in the case of liberal view of membership, how one comes to acquire citizenship in the liberal state. Although thoroughgoing voluntarism would presumably dictate that liberal citizenship should be a matter of choice – the idea is enshrined in the liberal theory via social contract, liberal theorists have little to say how membership is determined. Actual liberal societies attach more weight to birth than choice in assigning citizenship and its associated privileges and obligations. Liberal theorists assume explicitly or implicitly that each society will be organized not merely as a state but as a nation-state. Rawls says the "boundaries of a well-ordered society have to coincide with those of a self-contained national community" (1971:

457). This means that the citizens of each state are thought of as constituting a national group with a common culture.

Although liberalism officially eschews associative duties, the citizens are represented as constituting a national group whose members have particularistic responsibilities towards each other. They are seen as passing responsibilities on to their children, along with the various privileges of membership as a matter of birthright. Thus, as Yael Tamir (1993, ch. 6) has emphasized, there is a tension within the liberal position between an explicit voluntarism and an implicit nationalism.

The second tension in liberal thought, Scheffler says, is between a particularism about political responsibility and the egalitarian assumption that all persons have equal moral worth. There is a "distributive objection" to associative duties which questions how it is that some party may permissibly be disadvantaged by the voluntary acts of others. A and B become members of some kind of a group that is ordinarily thought to give rise to associative duties and C is not a member of this group, which we may call In-group. If, as a result of this, A and B come to have associative duties to each other, then the egalitarian distribution of duty that previously prevailed no longer obtains. A and B may now be bound to accord one another priority in certain ways disadvantageous to C. What is especially interesting about this distributive objection is that it holds against both accounts of associative duties and voluntarist theories of political obligations.

He notes how the distributive objection also counts against voluntarism for the fact of people voluntarily entering into a relationship that creates obligations for one to the other, stands in tension with the view that the beneficiaries of one's acts should be equally benefited. In other words, even if associative duties are thought of as voluntaristically generated, they appear to be open to challenge on distributive grounds. He suggests that the distributive objection tends not to emanate from liberals but rather from globalists. One thinks, it also constitutes a liberal objection to the extent that one views liberals as committed to certain universal values such as justice and equality. It can be seen as the failure of the natural duty of justice as a basis for political obligations. Its failure to provide

an account of the particularity of political obligations can be turned against a particularist account of political obligation. Appeals to the identity-conferring significance of one's political associations do not seem to show why, morally, one ought to owe greater obligations to one's own polity rather than to some hypothetical global one. Scheffler expands on this (*Ibid.*: 199). Insofar as associative obligations may increase inequalities by virtue of the fact that those who enter into associative arrangements may already be advantaged. The distributive objection counts not only against the exacerbation of inequalities but also against the initial inequalities. He notes, that because "the distributive objection is liable to be directed both against versions of liberalism that rely on associative duties and against versions that rely on voluntaristic political obligations and this suggests that the tension internal to the 'particularized' natural duty of justice is symptomatic of a much broader tension within liberal theory" (1997: 200). He suggests that the liberal's trouble with partiality isn't an anomaly but a symptom of something deeper. The particularized natural duty seems like a possibly unstable attempt to integrate a universalistic notion of justice with a particularistic conception of our political responsibilities.

The distributive objection implicitly appeals to an egalitarian premise that all persons have equal moral worth and no person's interests are of greater intrinsic moral importance than any person's. The associative duties are incompatible with recognition of the equal moral importance of each person's interests. It counts as an internal objection to those versions of liberalism that rely on particularized natural duty of justice. The general principle inherent in the distributive objection is that associative duties are undermined to the extent that they produce or perpetuate social injustices. Posing the matter in this way suggests that distributive objection can be developed in a less blunt manner that would enable distinctions to be drawn among various types of associative duties. For example, if national partiality is much more likely to generate significant injustices than familial partiality, the distributive objection is far more telling in the former case than the latter.

One can argue, amplifying Scheffler's notion of distributive objection, that the perception of strong associative duties at the level of nations normally has a far greater potential to lead to injustice than associative duties among close friends and family. The

potential for harmful effects of a shared belief in strong associative duties increases with the power of the group in question. But a family or a small group of friends very rarely possesses the capacity for injustice on a broad scale. Their influence is restricted by their small numbers and the limited resources at their disposal. In addition, groups of family and friends that live in a functioning civil society are restrained from persecuting their neighbors by a legal system, and are furthermore required to pay taxes that, in part, go to the aid of others. In such circumstances as these, the dangers of partiality are greatly diminished, and as a consequence the positive consequences of special obligations among close family and friends carry more weight. In contrast, the potential harmful consequences of national partiality are evident. Nations possess far vaster resources and are typically far less subject to external restraint in their disposal of them. For example, powerful nations have often exploited their less prosperous or less powerful neighbors, as is illustrated by colonialism. In more recent history, the United States supported repressive dictators in developing nations who were friendly to American foreign policy and economic interests during the Cold War. Thus, partiality in the case of nations normally has a far greater potential to lead to injustice than familial partiality, and, consequently, the distributive objection is generally far more forceful in the first case than the second.

The potential injustices of partiality increase as the power of the group in question grows. Since nations are typically more powerful than families, this serves as a basis for the rough generalization that national partiality is more problematic than familial partiality. And since some nations are more powerful than others, it follows that national partiality is more harmful than familial partiality. Moreover, the same reasoning has consequences regarding ethnic or racial interest groups. The moral legitimacy of supposed associative duties, therefore, is highly sensitive to context in which the groups in question are situated.

Scheffler reasons out that the source of the two tensions, between an explicit voluntarism and implicit nationalism and between a commitment to moral egalitarianism and commitment to some form of a particularism, within liberal theory, is traceable to the sensitivity of this tradition to the three values of autonomy, expressed as some core concern for liberty; loyalty, expressed as the particular relations or ties are a source of special

normative considerations; and moral equality, expressed as the notion that persons are of equal worth. This suggestion can be challenged in three ways. (1) Denying the importance of one or more of the values, (2) wondering whether liberalism is sensitive to all of them, and (3) casting doubt on the seeming tension. The first challenge is not considered as serious. Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the second version of the challenge. He complains that liberal morality is "a morality of universal, impersonal and impartial principles," whereas the morality that encompasses patriotism (or, more broadly, loyalty) is "a morality of particularist ties and solidarities" (1984: 57). These two moralities are incompatible. Macintyre distorts his opposition in order to create conceptual and moral space for his own position. What Scheffler presented as tensions in liberal theory is presented as a tension between these two moral outlooks by Macintyre. One may think that he is just wrong on this point. MacIntyre's argument does not engage the particularist dimension of liberalism. It overlooks the fact that most liberals who endorse the idea of liberal morality as a claim about the equal worth of persons deny that this idea fully constitutes the principles governing the conduct of individual agents. As Scheffler points out, liberals accept the existence of "agent-relative" principles, viz., that "facts that have special significance for an individual agent can sometimes have special weight in determining what that agent may permissibly do, despite the fact that the agent is no more valuable or important than anyone else" (*Ibid.*: 203).

Scheffler does not think the third challenge can succeed. Because associative duties do not merely permit the assignment of priority to the interests of one's associates; they require it. In other words, there is no easy way to reconcile the loyalty with equality. Even so, there is some uneasiness about it. Although Tamir says that associative duties are "not grounded on consent, reciprocity, or gratitude, but rather on the feeling of belonging and connectedness" (1993: 137), it does not explain how the feeling of "belonging and connectedness" can give rise to such associative duties.

But, providing a suitable answer to this latter question regarding the source of associative duties would not remove the tension. Is the tension so bad, however? Is it unlivable? Probably not. The values in question are "mutually constraining in the sense that

each, if accepted, places limits on the ways in which the other may legitimately be realized or advanced" and "practically competitive in the sense that institutions and practices that serve to recognize or foster one of them sometimes undermine or erode the realization of the other" (*Ibid.*: 204). Most of the time we manage with all three, and, like the balancing of powers, each keeps some sort of check on the others. Scheffler tamely concludes by stating that we have to get along with these tensions.

Of course, the disputes between liberal nationalists and their critics are hard to settle, but at the very least liberal nationalists have diagnosed an important dimension of moral life. In spite of the uneasiness between the two concepts, there is a growing consensus among contemporary liberal theorists that liberalism and nationalism are not only compatible but indeed mutually reinforcing ideals. They argue nationalism needs liberalism to discipline it and guide it along more democratic directions, so liberalism needs nationalism in order to achieve its ends. Further, Liberal Nationalists think that it is within the context of a national culture that the core liberal values of individual autonomy, social justice and democracy are best realized. At the end we can say it is the dialogue that holds the key between the two concepts to moderate the tension as there are no easy answers. Liberals can acknowledge the importance of belonging, membership and cultural affiliations as well as the particular moral commitments that follow from them. Nationalists can appreciate the value of personal autonomy and individual rights and freedoms, as well as sustain a commitment for social justice both between and within nations.

# CHAPTER V

## MORAL BASIS OF SELF – DETERMINATION

One of the central normative questions of nationalism is whether each nation has a right to self-government and for nationalists achieving political independence for the people they represent is often the primary objective. This is reflected in the importance nationalist ideology attaches to self-determination. The value of national self-government lies in entrusting the general political power with a group and its members. Self-government, to be valuable, whatever is proper for political decision should be subject to the political decision of the group in all matters concerning the group and its members. The idea of national self-government, in other words, speaks of groups determining the character of their social and economic environment, their fortunes, the course of their development, and the fortunes of their members by their own actions. The concept of national self-determination or self-government expresses the idea of democracy, according to which the people are presumed to be best qualified to govern themselves.

Political philosophers have tended to infer the content of self-determination from past and present political arrangements. As a result, they have suggested that the core content of national self-determination is the right to determine whether "a certain territory shall become, or remain, a separate state" (A. Margalit and J. Raz 1990: 440).This right, according to the prevalent interpretation, implies that "a people--if it so wills--is entitled to independence from foreign domination, i.e. it may establish a sovereign state in the territory in which it lives and where it constitutes a majority" (Y. Dinstein 1976: 102).The right to national self-determination is the right of a nation to preserve its existence as a unique social group.

Nationalists argue for political institutions that will allow the nation to be self-determining – to decide on its own future course, free from outside coercion. This means political independence i.e. the nation having a state of its own which means the claim of a state to exercise sovereignty within its established borders. Since each nation has its own

characteristic features, it will be impossible for it to flourish unless it enjoys the political freedom to develop in its own way. Due to its uniqueness, a nation cannot be subjected to laws designed for another people. Hence, political boundaries must be drawn cautiously so as to respect the national identities of the peoples in question. The right to determine whether a certain territory shall become, or remain, a separate state and possibly whether it should enjoy autonomy within a larger state is the central tenet of the notion of self-determination. Given the current international state system in which political power rests with sovereign states, the right to determine whether a territory should be an independent state is quite naturally regarded as the main instrument for realizing the ideal of self-determination. Consideration of this right usually dominates all discussions of national self-determination. In this chapter let us try to examine the attempts to morally justify this right.

While asserting its self-determination a group demands the power to define its public or collective actions including the management of its voluntary organizations, its education, and so on, to choose its regime or government, and to control its collective destiny. This demand may include separation from the existing state. Thus, we can distinguish between the terms 'national self-determination' and 'secession'. The reason is that secession seemingly implies that there is one side which is responsible for all the trouble. The seceding side is therefore thought to have the obligation to put forward some very strong argument for this move. It is even assumed, sometimes, that since the seceding side is responsible for the whole matter, it should therefore in certain ways compensate the other side, or what is left of the ex-state. In contrast to this, it appears that the notion of self-determination is neutral and does not imply that any side is to be blamed for anything. 'National self-determination' refers to national groups only whereas 'Secession' may include any group which wants to secede.

The right to self-determination is the right to acquire or continue to possess the state, a state which is legally independent and politically self-determining and which comprises more or less all and only the members of the nation. To be fully self-determining a group must have a political organization which is not legally or politically subordinate to

any other organizations. When one asks whether nations have a right to self –determination, it means, we are asking whether groups of some kind have the right to form or to maintain a national state. We are interested in whether a nation has the right to create for its members an independent state. This is about the rights of some collectives of some kind, about the rights of 'nations'. Obviously, a 'nation' is not a state, although the people of a state may comprise a nation and even people of some states may constitute a nation. Being a member of a nation would seem to involve identifying with the nation's tradition and history which have to be accepted by others who so identify. Identifying oneself with a given tradition and history can be thought of as constituting in so regarding oneself that one feels pride in certain events in that history and tradition which one regards as accomplishments of some person or group, shame or regret for certain events or failures. One can perhaps say that a group is more a nation as more of its members identify with a more extensive history and tradition, as it includes a greater proportion of those who so identify and as more members accept other members as members. Max Weber says that "a nation is a group of people who have a sentiment of belonging together and sharing a common destiny, the desire to form or maintain a state, and who normally live in a particular territory" (1970: 171).

National self-determination has been historically interpreted in two distinct ways. Each version refers to a different definition of the term nation and hence derives its justification from the protection of a different interest :(a) The cultural version, like that of Yael Tamir (1993), in which the nation is defined as a cultural community sharing a language, a tradition, and a historical-national consciousness. Self-determination is understood as the right of a nation to preserve its national and cultural uniqueness. It is meant to secure the ability of individuals to create political institutions and manage communal life in accordance with the customs and traditions of the people.(b) The liberal democratic version, like that of Miller (1995), in which the nation is defined as "the governed"--the group of individuals living under the same rule. In this case, self-determination is understood as the right of individuals to participate in the governing of their lives. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country directly or through freely chosen representatives. The political ideal is to build a nation out of the population of an existing state with the purpose of contributing to the unity and stability of

the state. The cultural ideal is to create a state for the population of an existing culturally unified nation. The doctrine that nations have the right of self-determination can be advanced by nations belonging to both the categories. But most of the claims in the contemporary world are claims on behalf of culturally, linguistically/ethnically unified nations. For cultural nationalists political self-determination matters only insofar as it allows the cultural life of the nation to develop spontaneously, secure from outside interference. A nation cannot flourish when it is dominated by another and made subject to its laws. A stronger view is that cultural flourishing requires positive political support. Especially in a world of global communication, native languages and other cultural features will be swamped unless they are protected by a state that provides cultural subsidies, supports the national media, creates barriers to the import of foreign films, TV, etc – and only a state staffed by fellow-nationals is likely to do this. This means national self-determination is being valued for instrumental reasons. But some nationalists find intrinsic value in political autonomy. Nations are seen as collective actors with a common will that can only be expressed in political action, whether this is directed at other states or at their own members. National autonomy is valuable in the same way that personal autonomy is: just as an individual who cannot act freely in the world cannot express her personality, so a nation deprived of political independence cannot make its distinctive mark in the world. This is open to the objection that it assumes that nations have common wills whereas in reality they do not – political decisions at best express the will of the majority, at worst the will of an elite that claims to speak for the people. However there are also more practical objections to national self-determination. One is that nations attempting to make policy are in fact severely constrained by outside economic forces and the decisions of other nations. So self-determination can be a myth that disguises, for example, neo-colonial relations of domination between rich and poor nations. Another is that the geographical distribution of populations means that state boundaries can never be drawn in such a way as to correspond to national boundaries, except in a few special cases (Iceland, for instance). Nearly all existing states contain national minorities, so self-determination cannot mean that the members of each nation have an equal chance to decide on their future – there are favoured nations whose members dominate a particular state, and disfavoured nations, like the Tamils and Kurds who form minorities in one or more of the national states of other peoples.

Now, the question of interference of nations in the sovereign affairs of other nations when the latter fail to uphold the rights of minorities: if nation A fails to protect the rights or asset of its members B, the obligation of nation C is first of all to use all reasonable means to induce A to protect the rights of B. This might involve as the last resort, attempting directly to remove from power those responsible for policies leading to the rights violations. The uneasiness exhibited by liberals in balancing the two principles of self-determination and respect to equal rights is best captured by Miller when he says, "Measures such as this would be widely regarded as comprising the self-determination of the nation in question, and for that reason as unacceptable. This demonstrates the incongruity in holding together two principles which are indeed often held together by liberals: one attaches value to national self-determination and argues that nations have no right to involve in another's domestic affairs (expect perhaps in very extreme cases); the other holds that we have a positive obligation to protect the basic rights of our fellow human beings. My point is that the acceptance of the first principle [the principle of self-determination] places severe limits on scope of the second [the principle of respect of respect to equal rights]" (1995: 77).

**The Right of Self-Determination**

To be self-determining a group must have a political organization, and if it is fully self-determining, the organization must not be legally or politically sub-ordinate to other organizations. The claim that nations have this right does not imply that existing states have a duty to ensure that the international order is re-organized in such a way that every nation has its own state. Neither does my right to play cricket imply that anyone has a duty to ensure that I play cricket. The mistaken view that there is such implication pays insufficient attention to the choice of members of the nations concerned. One can say that the concept of nationhood entails that a fairly large population of a nation will desire to form a state, but it does not follow that they would choose to have a national state. "The doctrine of national self-determination is not as destructive of the international order as it might seem to be. It does not imply a duty to see that nation and state coincide, as some have thought" (Alfred Cobban 1944: 56). The claim that nations have this right also does not imply that a nation would never be wrong to exercise this right. The right of self-determination is not an

absolute right. Although a nation's right to self-determination implies that others have a duty not to interfere, this duty is not absolute and may be outweighed by other considerations. A nation's right to self-determination may conflict with the moral and political considerations like the need for international security or for political stability of the same nation. But denying self-determination can also undermine security and stability. It is important to realize that the right of self-determination is not absolute. If nations have this right, they have a moral claim to constitute a separate independent state. It does not follow that this claim should always prevail. David Gauthier argues that secession is not justified if it would involve a violation of "the requirement that one not better oneself by worsening another" (1994: 363-68). It may be wrong to exercise the right to self-determination because of the requirements of global distributive justice.

In some cases where a society's right to self-determination is abridged or a society refrains from exercising its right for moral reasons, compensation may be due (Christopher Wellman 1995: 160-64). As compensation, for example, the society might be given a form of limited subordinate self-government within the state of which it is a part. There can also be circumstances where a society would owe compensation to groups that would otherwise be harmed by its choice to constitute a state. A seceding society may have to compensate the remainder of the original state for investments that the original state made in the society's territory (cf Allen Buchanan 1991: 339-42). The right of self-determination would be the right of a nation not to be interfered with in forming or maintaining an independent national state if it should choose to do so. In Feinberg's terminology, it would constitute "an active negative claim right" (1973: 53). If any nation has this right and chooses to form a state, then other existing states have a duty not to interfere.

Theoretical support for the right of national self-determination has been provided by both the communitarians and liberal group of political theorists. The clearest communitarian case for a strong right to national self-determination has been proposed by Miller and Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz (1990). They hold that any plausible conception of human well-being that goes beyond the satisfaction of biological needs must recognize the importance of culture, which is collectively created and enjoyed. Culture, however, requires

political protection. There is, hence, a strong, prima facie case for recognizing the right of culture groups to govern themselves. This argument would support a prima facie right to national self-determination. Margalit and Raz recognize that collectivities may act unjustly towards their individual members and/or other collectivities. They also argue that the more unjust the collectivity is, the weaker it's right to self-determination. The theory of Miller, on the one hand, and that of Yael Tamir on the other, exemplify clearly the characteristic difference between communitarian and liberal approaches to national self-determination. While Miller presumes national cultures to be beneficent until proved pernicious, Tamir presumes culture to derive its value from the choices of individuals.

In its communal aspect, national self-determination contains a process whereby individuals seek to express their national identity within the public sphere. Hence, it is often described as the right of people to have a public space where they can live in accordance with the customs and the traditions of the people. The right to national self-determination thus implies that individuals should be allowed to establish institutions and manage their communal life so that these will reflect their communal values, traditions, and history, in short, reflect their culture. One problem raised by communitarian political theory is that individuals can live in different types of community, and communitarianism as such cannot identify which communities should have priority if communal demands conflict, as they may. David Miller has proposed arguments for giving moral priority to nation states. If we endorse any conception of social justice that entails a significant redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor, as Miller believes we should, then we should recognize the supreme moral value of the nation state. For only national solidarity, Miller argues, can motivate the necessary redistribution, and only the state can organize it. The right to national self-determination is, therefore, necessary to social justice. One may doubt whether the sentiment of national solidarity is necessary to motivate distributive justice, and can argue that recognizing the moral priority of nation states might subvert the motivation for international justice. Miller's defense of nationalism entails the recognition of a universal right to national self-determination. He offers a strong defense of national self-determination on democratic socialist grounds such as that people should be accorded equal dignity and respect, and that their autonomy or freedom is valuable to them.

Miller holds that national groups have a good claim to self-determination – not necessarily an over riding claim, and not necessarily a claim to an independent, sovereign state, but at least a claim to institutional arrangements that enable members of the group " to decide collectively matters that concern primarily their own community" (1995: 11). This claim recognizes both the advantages that statehood can confer upon a nation and those that nationality can bring to a state. State institutions enable national groups to define and enforce shared values, to protect and nurture national culture, and to express "collective autonomy" (that is, people's interests in shaping the world in association with others with whom they identify) (*Ibid.*: 88). And, shared nationality engenders trust among citizens, thereby facilitating democratic deliberation, and supplies a powerful motivation to accept the costs of just institutions. Again, there are qualifications: collective autonomy is realized only if the state follows the popular will, and nationality engenders democratic trust and buttresses social justice only if the national culture embodies norms of democracy and justice.

Miller defends the idea that national communities have a good claim to be politically self determining. National political institutions are instrumental in that they allow members of nations to meet their special obligations to one another and protect their culture. Miller argues that there are weighty reasons to grant national communities some form of political self-determination, ranging from federal powers to their own state. He claims first that such self-determination is defensible because of the important interests which it serves. Thus, it enables community members (i) to develop a set of institutions which specify and discharge the obligations which, as fellow nationals, they owe to one another (*Ibid.*: 83), (ii) to protect their inherited culture against unwelcome change (*Ibid.*: 86), and (iii) to enjoy collective autonomy by shaping the world in association with others with whom they identify (*Ibid.*: 88). In addition, Miller provides a functional defence of self-determination, which alleges that certain political tasks are discharged more effectively if citizenship and nationality coincide. Relying on the sociological conjectures advanced against the cognitive objection to national identity, he claims that co-nationality engenders trust, thereby facilitating, amongst other things, the solution of collective action problems (*Ibid.*: 98).

The value of self-determination serves as a central element in Miller's conception of international justice. For example, it informs his very interesting account of sovereignty; it explains the right of territorial integrity and the duty not to harm another state; it generates a duty "not to exploit states that are one-sidedly vulnerable to your actions" (*Ibid.*: 104); and it leads to an obligation "to ensure the fair distribution of natural resources," which Miller interprets as an obligation for resource-rich states to transfer sufficient resources to resource-poor states to enable them to become economically viable, so that the right of national self-determination can be meaningfully exercised (*Ibid.*: 105-6). At the same time, self-determination limits a state's international obligations in at least two ways: it places the primary responsibility for people's well-being on their own government (there is an international obligation to aid only when it is impossible—for example, due to unavoidable scarcity—for a state to avert a disaster through its own efforts); and it explains why wealthy states may retain and reinvest surpluses that might have been deployed to greater good elsewhere if that is the wish of their people. Miller does admit an array of general duties towards foreigners and their states. He recognises the existence of certain basic rights which are possessed regardless of nationality and require a certain minimum threshold of resources for each individual. Furthermore, he criticises exploitation arising from economic dependency as well as military weakness, and calls for resource transfers where necessary for national communities to achieve political viability (*Ibid.*: 104-5).

According to him, one can argue that nations need to have their own states, either in order to be able to protect themselves from destruction or from forces that threaten their distinctive character, or in order for co-nationals to have the institutional resources to be able to fulfill the special obligations they owe one another as members of an "ethical community," in Miller's phrase. Both of these considerations can, under certain circumstances, weigh in favor of some form of political self-determination for nations.

Let us try to understand the claims of cultural interpretation of the right to self-determination. The theorists like Tamir believe that all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. This definition assumes that, as a rule, peoples deserve to be self-governing.

But, self-rule and national self-determination are distinct concepts, differing in both their individualistic and communal meanings, representing two distinct human goods and deriving their value from different human interests (cf Yael Tamir 1993: 70). In its individualistic aspect, self-rule is a component of personal autonomy, dealing with the right of individuals to govern their lives without being subject to external forces prescribing "do's" and "don'ts." On the other hand, national self-determination is only one facet of the general right to self-determination, which concerns the right of individuals to define the sort of person they want to be--their moral and cultural identity. In their individual version, both rights celebrate personal autonomy and the right of individuals to make constitutive choices: self-determination concerns the way in which individuals define their personal and communal identity, while self-rule emphasizes the process by which they set their ends and strive toward them.

Let us clarify the distinction between self-rule and national self-determination. As Tamir argues, the process of European unification might, at the end of the day, lead to the creation of one European state in which all European citizens enjoy a full range of civil rights; this state would allow all Europeans to fulfill their right to self-rule but would not allow them to materialize their right to national self-determination. A non-democratic nation-state deprives members of the nation of their right to self-rule but not of their right to national self-determination. History has taught us that individuals might desire to secure status and recognition for their nation even at the cost of surrendering civil rights and liberties. The communal aspect of self-rule refers to the process through which individuals have a say in the determination of the ends and means adopted by the political group to which they belong, thereby placing the right to participate in the political process at its core. Accordingly, if individuals participate in a fair political process--where all members are given an equal chance to take part as well as to present and convince others of their views--they could be said to enjoy self-rule.

It is important to stress that claiming that one enjoys self-rule does not necessarily imply that one's preferences are accepted. At the conclusion of a fair process, individuals might find themselves in a minority position and unable to influence, let alone imprint the

political process with their culture, beliefs, or norms of behavior. However, they can hardly claim that their right to self-rule has been violated. In pluralistic and heterogeneous communities--such as most modern states--it is inevitable that one will be outvoted on a variety of issues. Hence, if given a fair opportunity to participate in the process that structures their lives, individuals can be said to enjoy self-rule regardless of the results of this process. But national self-determination is related not only to the right to participate in determining the cultural nature of the social and political system, but also to the results of this process. National self-determination is said to be attained only when certain features, unique to the nation, find expression in the political sphere.

The cultural interpretation of the right to national self-determination regards it as an expression of the right to culture. According to Yael Tamir (1993: 73-74), the justification of this right is therefore grounded on the following assumptions: (1) Membership in a particular cultural group--in our case the nation--and the freedom to openly express and preserve one's national identity is an essential human interest, no less essential than preserving and practicing one's religion or being able to voice one's political opinions.(2) The interests individuals have in preserving their national Identity is profound and intense. Hence it justifies the development of a set of rights aimed at the protection of these interests. (3) Individuals cannot preserve their national identity unless they are able to express and practice it in both the private and public spheres. (4) The existence of a public place is hence a necessary condition for ensuring the preservation of a nation as a vital and active community. The ability to enjoy the liveliness of public life is one of the major benefits that accrue from living among one's own people. Only then can the individual feel that "he lives in a community which enables him to express in public and develop without repression those aspects of his personality which are bound up with his sense of identity as a member of his community" (J. Raz 1986: 207). (5) Aspiring to national self-determination is therefore bound up with the desire to see the communal space not only as an arena of cooperation for the purpose of securing one's own interests, but as a place for expressing one's identity. The presence of a particular culture in the public sphere and the ability to conceive of a community as expressing one's national identity lie at the heart of the yearning for national self-determination. (6) The right to national self-determination can only be fully

realized if others recognize the national group as a distinct group whose members deserve a certain degree of autonomy. Such autonomy might be assured through a variety of political arrangements--the establishment of national institutions, the formation of an autonomous community, or the establishment of a federal or nation-state --ensuring individuals the ability to participate in the national life of their community.

Though the right to national self-determination involves a right of access to the public sphere, it does not necessarily entail a right to an independent state. The search for an overall guiding principle to determine when the right to national self-determination justifies a particular political solution is pointless. It is perfectly consistent and justifiable to turn down, in particular cases, the same policies one would support in others; one might endorse or reject an autonomous community, a federal or a nation-state, in line with specific circumstances. In each case, the costs entailed by alternative solutions should be weighed against their benefits, and a suitable policy determined in view of such considerations. Since the burdens and benefits of implementing this right should be balanced before a certain policy is adopted, it is reasonable to assume that the larger the number of individuals who would enjoy this policy, the heavier the burdens it would be justified to impose on others. Hence, as Raz suggests, although national self-determination is justified on the basis of the interests of individual members of the community: "the interest of any one of them is an inadequate ground for holding others to be duty-bound to satisfy that interest. The right [of self-determination] rests on the cumulative interests of many individuals" (Raz 1986:209).

The practical political arrangements derived from the right to national self-determination might vary; they depend both on the members' preferences and on the particular circumstances in which national demands arise However, all political arrangements based on this right should draw upon the history, the culture, the language and, at times, the religion of the national group, thereby enabling its members to regard it as their own. In other words, political units and institutions established on the basis of the right to national self-determination should reflect the unique character of the national group.

Adopting a cultural view of the right to national self-determination allows us, argues Tamir (cf 1993: 75-76), to place all the justifications of their right within one logical sequence. In other words, we can now view along one continuum the justification of the rights of nations--whether they are minorities or constitute majorities within particular states--as well as the rights granted to ethnic groups and indigenous peoples. In principle, all these groups are entitled to the same rights. The different justifications adduced as grounds for these groups' rights point to their special nature as cultural entities.

The cultural interpretation of the right to national self-determination allows adopting a consistent view of the rights that ought to be granted to different cultural groups But more than that the cultural interpretation acknowledges that the realization of these rights does not necessarily require the establishment of independent nation-states and could be accomplished within a variety of political arrangements. It is this flexibility that makes the cultural interpretation more suitable to a world order that challenges the viability of independent nation-states and offers to supersede them by larger, multinational regional frameworks.

However, one can go with David Copp (1997) when he says that both national and cultural groups with democratic values only, can realize the right of self-determination. Now, let us turn our focus to the issue of democracy and the right of self-determination

**Democracy and the Right of Self-Determination**

Let us consider whether there is any theoretical barrier to a nation's possessing the right to self-determination and the arguments that justify this right. Recall that to the extent that a group is a nation, more of its members will identify to a greater degree with a common tradition, and will desire to form or to maintain an independent national state, and it will be more feasible to create or maintain such a state. Do any of these characteristics of a nation secure a foothold for the right of self-determination? It seems plain just because a group identifies with a common tradition, it cannot gain for it the right of self-determination. Copp clarifies this point with the following example. The librarians at some university may

identify with an ancient tradition reaching back to the earliest libraries, but they have no right to form a separate state on this ground. It would be completely unfeasible for them to do so, even if no person or collective interfered, and we can assume that this disposes of the matter. However, lack of feasibility cannot be argued with respect to any group which is very much a nation. Do the feasibility and the desire conditions sufficiently ground the claim that a nation has this right?

The right of nations to self-determination seems to be a corollary of democratic principles. Democratic principles imply, of course, that political decisions of states ought to be made on the basis of the choices of the governed. But if the choices of those who are governed should rule in states, the choices of those who are to be governed should rule in deciding what state is to govern a given people. The allocation of a particular group of people to the jurisdiction of one state rather than another can have very significant consequences for the life of each member of the group. The decision that a given group shall be governed by one state rather than another may mean that it is governed by a state where important political issues are resolved differently than they would be in the other state. This may be so even if the decisions of each state are taken on a democratic basis. The preferences of the people of the states in question may ensure this. This means that important political decisions may effectively depend upon the choice regarding which state is to govern a given people and territory. If this decision is not taken on a democratic basis, important political decisions may effectively be taken on a non-democratic basis. Hence, to ensure effective democracy, the choice of the people to be governed should be the basis for deciding what state is to govern them. Now, given that the members of a nation desire that they be governed by a separate national state, there is a prima facie case for their being governed by such a state. But if they do choose this, then democratic principles would seem to imply that a separate national state ought to be formed. As John Stuart Mill says

"Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine, with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they

choose to associate themselves" (1976: 381).

The argument tries to establish that it is a corollary of democratic principles that a group has the right to decide, by democratic procedures, what state it is to be governed by. It would seem to follow that a group has the right to form or to maintain a separate self-determining state if a majority of its members chooses that it do so. It clearly does not follow from this principle that nations have an unconditional right not to be interfered with in forming a national state. Although many of the members of any nation desire that an independent national state be formed or maintained, it does not follow that a majority of the members of any nation would choose this. Many things which a person desires he does not choose. He may have desires which conflict and which he takes to be more important. One might desire that an independent national state be formed but have a stronger desire for a socialist state and believe that the best chance for socialism lies in the existing state. Even a group which is clearly a nation may not have a majority which would choose a national state over any other political arrangement. Therefore, even granting the above principle, it does not follow that any nation has an unconditional right to form or maintain an independent national state. A conditional right would follow. It would follow that any nation has a right to form or maintain a national state if a majority of its members chooses that it do this. But this self-determination right follows directly from the above principle, and it follows from this principle that any group has the right to form a state, even if it is not a nation. This result surely throws the principle into doubt.

This unrestricted principle implies that any group has the right to form a state consisting of all and only its members if a majority of the group chooses to do so. In the case of many groups, it would be completely unfeasible to form a separate state, even if no person or collective interfered in any way, and hence, we assume this to show that these groups do not have this right. Moreover, the unrestricted principle undermines democracy. Suppose the majority in collective C chooses state S. Then C has the right to bring about that it is governed by S. But the group of dissenters in C has the right to ensure it is not governed by S. That is, the unrestricted principle, followed strictly, undermines the rule of democratic majorities.

It is evident that the principle needs to be restricted in its range. It could be restricted to apply only to existing states. The citizenry of a state has the right to decide, by democratic procedures, what state it is to be governed by. It has the right to maintain the existing state, or to dissolve it in favour of government under some other state. For, once the annexation is accomplished, if the majority of the resulting state chooses to continue the annexation, this state has the right to do so even if the residents of the formerly independent state continue to be almost unanimously opposed. Moreover, democratic principles would imply that the annexed state has the right of self-determination, given the almost universal sentiment of its residents. But the narrow principle yields no such right. It is both too strong and too weak.

The range of our principle must neither include all collectives nor be restricted to existing states. Of course, the principle must extend at least to states. Democratic principles imply that the people of an existing state have the right to decide, by democratic procedures, whether to maintain or dissolve the state. But the case of the annexed smaller state suggests that the principle must also extend to groups which could feasibly be states. Now, nations are groups of this kind. The result is that the range of the democratic self-determination principle should include states, nations, and other collectives which could feasibly be states. The principle is that any state, nation, or nation-like group has the right to form or maintain a separate self determining state if a majority of its members chooses that it do so. Call this the "democratic self-determination principle" (David Copp 1979).

If we include all states – nations and nation-like groups— in the range of the principle, it would be easy for us to avoid some of the problems mentioned above. The principle does not undermine the rule of democratic majorities except in case those who disagree with the choice whether to form or to maintain a separate state form the majority in a nation or nation-like group. The case of annexed smaller states vindicates this. The plausibility of the principle could be enhanced by broadening its range to include states, nations, and nation-like groups. This does not mean that democratic self-determination principle with an appropriately defined range leads to the right of national self-determination. However, it is evident that a nation has the right to form or maintain an

independent national state if a majority of its members chooses to do so.

**A Right to Secession?**

Philosophers focus on the moral issues and on clarifying the conceptual framework for thinking about secession. They examine the conditions under which secession is morally justified, that is, the conditions under which a group has a moral liberty to secede- Does a group of citizens of an existing territorial state have the right to break up that state and its territory in order to establish a new territorial state? How we answer this question will, of course, be guided by our basic political-philosophical premises. Those who proceed from liberal or democratic premises - such as that people should be accorded equal dignity and respect, and that their autonomy or freedom is valuable to them - ought to support a right to secession. Nationalist movements often demand secession from an existing state. So explicating the principles to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate secession is one of the best ways for philosophers to contribute to an impartial judgment on the value of nationalism.

Let us have a look at some of the views of Rights theorists in order to get a perspective on the issue of secession. David Copp (1997) argues that any society that rightfully occupies a territory and has shown a stable desire for statehood has a right of self-determination and can justly secede from a more comprehensive state if only the majority of the inhabitants of that territory votes for secession. That may sound quite convincing since it conforms to democratic principles. Copp stresses that the 'territorial' and 'political' societies he thus gives the right to found a state of their own are not necessarily nations. It's neither a right to cultural nor to national self-determination he defends but a right to any group living for some generations on some territory. Recognition of this right would endorse most nationalist movements.

Copp ascribes the right of self-determination not to nations, but to societies in virtue of the democratic rights of their members. Of course if a nation is a society, it would have the right of self-determination in virtue of this. He makes it clear that a state can contain a number of societies with a right of self- determination and his theory, therefore, implies a wide-spread right of secession. He develops a theory of group self-determination that is

grounded in the democratic rights of the members of societies. Copp's compelling justification for territorial rather than national self- determination suggests that there are moral reasons for supporting self-determination. He argues that certain political groups can have a right to self determination based on the considerations that support democracy.

Margaret Moore, another political theorist, attempts to strike a balance between institutional arrangements that make secession too easy and others which make it too difficult. Moore argues that a 'constitutional right to self-determination, including a right to secession, is necessary because we do not want to trap minorities in states that they do not identify with or regard as legitimate' (2001: 218). Moore's contention is that not only would a right of secession clause in a state's constitution help guarantee minority aspirations, but it would also offer the state 'the best mechanism that [it] could employ to ensure the territorial integrity of the state' (*Ibid.*: 219).

Allen Buchanan advances his longstanding study of secession by sketching and justifying secession under the institutional framework for a right of secession in international law. He claims that the "widespread application of the Nationality Principle is a recipe for genocide, forced removals, or unworkable patchworks of microstates" (1997: 308). Since the groups with a right of self-determination would be even more numerous under Copp's theory, Buchanan would presumably reject Copp's theory for the same reason. In contrast to Copp, Buchanan argues for his thesis on secession (Buchanan, 1991) which he calls 'grievance theory' or 'remedial right' theory of secession. This theory is more conservative and "defends existing states from involuntary fragmentation except in cases in which secessionists can make a case that separation is the remedy of last resort for serious injustices" (1997: 317). Such injustices are "persistent and serious violations of individual human rights", 'past' — but not too long past — "unredressed unjust seizure of territory" and 'discriminatory redistribution' (*Ibid.*: 310). He criticizes Copp's theory. Paradoxically, what seems to be the strength of Copp's thesis, his conformity to democratic principles, proves to be his weakness. For if the democratic vote of a territorial and political society suffices for making it a state, it deprives that society's minority "of their citizenship in the country in which they have always lived, transforming them into citizens of another state (or resident aliens in it),

even when neither they nor their state is guilty of any injustice whatsoever, either toward the secessionists or toward anybody else." (*Ibid.*: 315-6). He is not content to formulate principles to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate secession; he sees the task " to channel and control secessionist movements, along with a set of international institutions to secure compliance with these principles" (1997: 303) and wants to contribute to it by showing how his principles can specify " procedures for working out agreement on just terms of secession" and " conditions that must be met before a group is to be recognized as having a prima facie right to secede and authorized to engage in negotiations" This moral target setting of "bringing secession under the rule of international law" (*Ibid.*: 319) may seem too ambitious a program , but Buchanan is right that it is not 'quixotic' (*Ibid.*: 320).

Undoubtedly, Buchanan has proposed a theory of secession which combines liberalism with realism. He argues that the right to self-determination is not a fundamental right but should be derived from a complex set of moral considerations. These include both a realist concern not to undermine the states system as such and a liberal concern for individual rights. What is distinctive in Buchanan's analysis is the relatively strong moral force that he accords to persistent economic discrimination as a ground for the right to secession and the relatively weak force that he gives to the protection of cultures. Buchanan's theory of self-determination is liberal rather than nationalist insofar as he treats culture as an object of individual choice rather than of a collective right. But nations could benefit from his theory if, for example, they were victims of economic discrimination.

Now, let us examine some of the issues concerning secession by drawing some insights from theorists like Copp (1997), Philpott (1995). If individuals have a right to live as self-governing beings then the political form that acknowledges this right, is a voluntary association. The ideal democratic political unit is based on popular consent and voluntary membership. Since democratic governments make decisions obligatory on all citizens, counting those who dislike particular decisions, it makes sound philosophical and practical sense to have political units consisting of people who, whatever be their disparities in specific areas, at least agree to be together and observe common rules. If it is the case that most existing states are involuntary then, it is deplorable: it allows that many people might be

integrated in states they do not wish to be part of, thus fading both the moral legitimacy of states and their practical viability i.e. the stability of states which may be otherwise democratic. In such a condition fewer people have command over their destinies, and more people feel estranged from their governments, than would be the case if states were voluntary or consent-based associations. Theories of democracy focusing on the democratic government of states can move easily over questions of how state memberships are, or ought to be, determined in the first place. There is nothing natural or pre-given about existing state boundaries, and if those boundaries could be determined democratically rather than by, say, chance or conquest, that would be a good thing for democracy. This is not the same thing as saying that secession is a good thing. But it does imply that there ought to be, on democratic grounds, a right of secession available to those who desire it, and that it is better to ensure that as many as possible live in states that are more similar to voluntary associations.

In terms of Buchanan's useful classification (Buchanan 1997: 34-7), this defence of the right of self-determination is 'primary' rather than 'remedial': the existence of the right is not held to be reliant on past oppression or exploitation of the pro-secession population, on the past illegitimate seizure of their territory, or on a threat to their cultural and physical survival. Even so, the presence of historical injustices or future imperatives of this kind certainly fortifies the moral weight of a secessionist case. In a few extreme cases such as where genocide threatens, these injustices and imperatives might even cancel out the majoritarian requirement: that is, secessionist demands might then carry moral weight even if not backed by popular support within a given territory. But past injustices and present survival needs are certainly not, on this account, a necessary condition for legitimate secession.

We understand that a right to secession clearly falls into the subjectivist camp; it requires that legitimate secessionist populations should be self-identifying. A secessionist right cannot be summoned on behalf of a population that does not support it. Nor should the population have to satisfy certain objective criteria of, say, nationality in order to exercise its right to secession. Secessionists may think of themselves as 'national', or meet certain

definitions of a 'nation', but this is unrelated to the strength of their right claim. To suggest otherwise is to privilege 'nations' unreasonably above other kinds of autonomy-seeking associations such as pluralistic groups and multinational associations (Copp 1997: 286-90).

A right to secession sketched above is not unconditional. There may be other considerations of a democratic or egalitarian kind which compete with it. A secession defended on grounds of freedom of association implies the need for a democratic plebiscite to decide whether a group of people actually wish to form a new state. However given that the secessionists wish to form a new territorial state, this requirement poses the question, first, of what territory they are entitled to. Even if we accept that a democratic vote can establish a territorial claim, there are hard questions involved in determining the spatial unit in which the plebiscite should be held (are secessionists entitled to define it in a way that would include the largest possible anti-secession minority?) and who should be entitled to vote (the elections cannot be confined to present residents if another set of people was displaced from the territory to engineer a secessionist majority). Second, there is the problem of what Buchheit terms 'trapped minorities' (Buchheit 1978: 29-30).The minority in the secessionist state which opposes break-up will find itself deprived of membership of the association it desires and subject to involuntary membership of a new association. This comprises a challenge to the principle of free association. It is a moral problem compounded by the opening given to new forms of oppression: if the secessionist minority was vulnerable to unfair discrimination in the original state, the anti-secessionist minority is susceptible to the similar sort of injustice in the new state. Third, the creation of a new state may involve democratic losses even for pro-secessionist citizens. It is doubtful whether there is a net gain for democracy if secessionists secede from a democratically governed state to establish by plebiscite or otherwise an undemocratically governed state. If these are opposing democratic considerations there is also a contending egalitarian consideration that secessionists are not allowed to make off with a disproportionate share of goods produced in common by citizens of the original state, or of natural resources used by them in common, on the grounds that these goods and resources turn out to be located on territory claimed by the successor state. These difficulties are not such as to abandon the right to secession, but they do advocate that it must be weighed against other moral concerns and that it will not always win out.

Now, let us consider the question that if a group has a right to secede from a state, should it be encouraged to implement that right and what should a liberal's or democrat's advice be to the would-be secessionists in this regard? We will examine the question under what conditions a democrat or a liberal can promote a secession.

Let us begin by noting some ways in which secession might promote democratic goals. One of them corresponds with the rationale for the decentralisation of power. Insofar as a secession results in smaller political units, it brings government closer to the governed. Like decentralisation, it increases the chances of responsive, accountable and participatory government. This reason would not apparently hold in the case of secessionist movements seeking to join some other state. While the secessionists in such a case would decrease the size of the original state and might come to be part of a smaller state, they would expand the receiving state.

A second plausible reason to promote a secession crops up in situations where it would result in more linguistically homogeneous states. A common language or lingua franca is a plus point in a democratic state because it helps collective action in the public sphere. It allows for wider, smoother and comprehensive debates about state policy amongst citizens and, at least as importantly, allows citizens to organise more effectively in civil society. An outcome of the latter is that a shared language makes it more difficult for the state to atomise civil society or provoke linguistic groups against each other in a game of divide and rule.
A third plausible reason to encourage secession is valid in multi-ethnic or multinational states. In such cases ethno-national secession might possibly remove ethnicity from the centre of political life and aid the re-organisation of political competition around class and ideological differences and systems of governance. Such a turn of politics could render democratic debate more meaningful, allowing it to focus on ideas and programmes rather than ethnic loyalties. It might also help focus attention on inequalities and lack of democracy internal to ethno-national groups which must be remedied if an egalitarian and democratic order is to be created.

A fourth plausible reason to advice secession is that it might, as Miller argues, makes possible the establishment of an effective redistributive welfare state (Miller 1995: 83-85, 90-96). In circumstances where there is inadequate trust or fellow feeling among citizens to legitimate the transfer of resources from wealthier citizens to poorer ones, the establishment of a new state around more unified populations could facilitate the sort of social solidarity necessary to sustain egalitarian welfarism.

Fifth, there may be circumstances where secession would secure material development or physical safety for a population. This would apply, self-evidently, in those cases where the leaders of the original state methodically dominate or exploit the population concerned; but even where they do not, a self-determining population might be better situated to secure its own welfare in a new state. This last consideration would make an impact on a liberal-egalitarian especially if the section of the population supporting secession was poor and/or poorer than the citizens of the prospective remainder state, and if the seceding population stood to improve its material lot in the new state without impoverishing the citizens they left behind in the original one.

Finally, secession might also increase the chances that the culture of the seceding population will survive, since in a new state it could receive special support and be better positioned to withstand cultural oppression and homogenising pressures operating in the original state or internationally. Liberal egalitarians should not, of course, value the preservation of a culture for its own sake, even if they do attach some intrinsic importance to diversity. The cultural preservation argument ought nevertheless to count for something in the thinking of liberal egalitarians provided that the threatened culture is genuinely valued by its participants and embodies practices consistent with basic liberal values.

Do these reasons, though plausible, amount to a case for advising groups to secede? In some cases they can; but they are, frequently, even usually, insufficient to establish a decisive case. Why this is so becomes clearer when these reasons are weighed against a range of counter-arguments.

In respect of decentralisation, it is important to remember that this is, in democratic terms, a complex and ambiguous good. It brings government closer to the people but also can promote parochialism and, by engendering more homogeneous political units, increase pressures to conform in ways that intimidate individual liberty (cf Buchanan 1998: 19, 23). Decentralisation can also have negative implications for inter-regional equity, and make it more difficult for decision-makers to work out democratic political control over forces, such as multinational capital, which operate across the boundaries of smaller political units. Moreover it may not be necessary to use secession in order to bring about a substantial degree of decentralisation given the possibility of, say, federalising existing states. Nor will secession perpetually be a decentralising experience: the new state could be more centralised than the existing one.

The argument that secession normalises political competition by refocusing politics around non-ethnic issues, and in particular around issues of distributive justice and democracy within groups, must be balanced against the way that nationalist leaders use ethnic mobilization to avert attention from class and democratic issues. Nationalists need not stop doing so once a new state is established, for even then the original state and trapped minorities in the new state remain available as fusing external enemies and reference points for national mobilisation. The divisiveness associated with ethno-national mobilisation within the original state is thus not necessarily neutralised by political separation.

An associated criticism can be directed against the argument that fellow feeling amongst co-nationals provides a strong foundation for the welfare state. It might; but "nationalism could equally be used by conservative forces to counter those arguing for a class-based or redistributive politics," as Buchanan notes (Buchanan 1996: 306). Even where it does foster a welfare state within political units it is likely to work against distributive justice between political units.

Of course, oppressed and subjugated groups may be better off materially and be physically more safe in a state of their own than in an existing state; to this extent their secession might symbolize a gain for justice. But against this positive possibility would

have to be weighed the qualms surrounding whether such gains will materialize; such uncertainties are substantial the economic losses to both remainder and new state might result from declining economies of scale and the possible worsening of the plight of subordinate groups in the remainder state who might also be oppressed and exploited should a territorial break-up deprive them of valuable resources. Also one can have a third option: fighting to transform the existing state in a democratic and egalitarian direction rather than to divide.

A parallel argument can be made in relation to cultural survival. To the extent that the survival of a given culture is important and justifiable, it is more consistent with liberal egalitarianism to fight for its accommodation within a multicultural state than to seek two or more culturally homogeneous and potentially more parochial and conformist new states. Culturally homogenous states are more likely to oppress cultural minorities than multicultural ones. But even for members of a dominant culture a monocultural polity can be oppressive. A liberal egalitarian should want all individuals, whether they belong to majority or minority cultural groups choose any cultural form and join a range of crosscutting types of association. Such possibilities would be more likely to be available in culturally diverse states than in culturally homogenous states. After all, a secessionist state is more likely to be culturally homogeneous.

These arguments will not always outweigh the arguments for secession. How they balance against each other will differ from case to case. There may be cases where advising secession is the only sensible alternative for liberal egalitarians to follow. Leaving away situations of moral emergency where failure to secede intimidates the immediate physical survival or basic human rights of a population, there might be cases where the existing state and the majority of its subjects are so unwaveringly centralist, undemocratic and culturally dictatorial, and the secessionists so clearly committed to decentralisation, equity and pluralism, advising the latter to leave intact the status quo would be irrational. Equally, where there is no decisive case for secession the sensible option is to advise a group of people to stand and fight for desirable changes in an existing state rather than to initiate division of the state.

We tried to have a perspective on the secession issue that can enable to avoid having to condone a secessionist free-for-all without forcing us to defend existing state boundaries regardless. Sometimes these boundaries need changing, but we can decide whether they do by applying relevant criteria, not simply by listening to how loud the clamor for independence has become. It is too crude to suggest that any territorial majority that wants to secede has a right to do so. Instead we need to measure the strength of its claim by looking at how far different groups have or have not evolved separate national identities, at how minorities are likely to fare under various possible regimes, and so forth. Only by getting to grips with the facts of each particular case in this way we can decide whether outright secession is justified as opposed to the many other forms of partial autonomy.

It is clear that there are no simple solutions to problems of national self-determination, either in theory or in practice. We can, however, clarify the range of options in our search for satisfactory solutions by underlying the point that national self-determination is not equivalent to secession, and that nations can sometimes determine their destiny without becoming independent states. The distinction between national self-determination and secession not only expresses a conceptual truth but also a practical necessity. For it is obviously not possible for every nation to form a state and, if it were possible, it is unlikely that the cause of either justice or peace would be served thereby. There may yet be cases where secession is the most just solution-as the remedy for persistent, gross human-rights violations, for example-but secession is highly vulnerable to the "international heckler's veto", to use the expression of Michael Freeman (1998) and should be treated with caution. Short of secession, solutions to self-determination problems can involve moves down, up and across from the nation state. That is to say, the concept of nation is, morally speaking, plastic enough to be consistent with the demand for self-determination.

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