Why Computer Simulation Cannot Be an End of Thought Experimentation

dc.contributor.author Shinod, N. K.
dc.date.accessioned 2022-03-27T01:57:37Z
dc.date.available 2022-03-27T01:57:37Z
dc.date.issued 2021-09-01
dc.description.abstract Computer simulation (CS) and thought experiments (TE) seem to produce knowledge about the world without intervening in the world. This has called for a comparison between the two methods. However, Chandrasekharan et al. (2013) argue that the nature of contemporary science is too complex for using TEs. They suggest CS as the tool for contemporary sciences and conclude that it will replace TEs. In this paper, by discussing a few TEs from the history of science, I show that the replacement thesis about TE is a failure. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the arguments of Chandrasekharan et al. (2013) and demonstrates the three distinct aspects of the replacement thesis. The second section examines the argument against TE and shows that they are inadequate to prove the withering of TE from science. The third section discusses Albert Einstein’s Magnet and Conductor TE and demonstrates that replacing such TE with CS yield no advantage.
dc.identifier.citation Journal for General Philosophy of Science. v.52(3)
dc.identifier.issn 09254560
dc.identifier.uri 10.1007/s10838-020-09546-y
dc.identifier.uri https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10838-020-09546-y
dc.identifier.uri https://dspace.uohyd.ac.in/handle/1/4365
dc.subject Chandrasekharan et al
dc.subject Computer simulation
dc.subject Einstein's magnet and conductors
dc.subject Epistemic replaceability
dc.subject Thought experiments
dc.title Why Computer Simulation Cannot Be an End of Thought Experimentation
dc.type Journal. Article
dspace.entity.type
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